



Joint
Advanced
Warfighting
Program

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Assessment of the DoD Embedded
Media Program**

Richard K. Wright

Contributor:
William H. Harkey

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PREFACE

This paper reports the work performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) in fulfillment of the “Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program” task.

This paper would not have been possible without the time that 244 individuals gave so willingly to be interviewed. Those interviewed included many military commanders, Public Affairs Officers (PAOs), bureau chiefs, news media representatives (NMRs), and individuals who were embedded with military ground units, aboard ships, and at air bases. Their honest and candid comments and opinions were instrumental in ensuring that the assessment was focused on the most important components and aspects of the Embedded Media Program. The files and data provided by numerous PAOs helped ensure that details of the Embedded Media Program could be thoroughly documented and evaluated.

Within IDA, this paper was reviewed by Dr. Thomas L. Allen, and Dr. Edgar M. Johnson. Outside IDA, it was reviewed by Major General William L. Nash, U.S. Army, Retired (Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations); Mr. Gene Policinski, (Executive Director, First Amendment Center, Freedom Forum); and Colonel F. William Smullen, III, U.S. Army, Retired, (Director of National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University), each of whom has extensive experience with and a unique perspective on military-media affairs. Their comments and suggestions improved the quality of the report and are gratefully acknowledged.

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SUMMARY

A. BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense (DoD) Embedded Media Program resulted in an unprecedented opportunity for the media to report in real time on the military units and the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who executed combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A total of 692 reporters, photographers, producers, cameramen, and technicians were embedded with ground units, on ships, and at air bases for an extended period of time. Embedding media with the military is not a new concept, but the magnitude of the effort and the number of media embedded was unprecedented.

Within a month after the fall of Baghdad, most of the embedded media had dis-embedded. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)) requested that the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conduct an independent assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program. The objective was to determine its effectiveness and provide recommendations to further improve the program in other combatant command areas of responsibility (AOR) and during future military operations.

The assessment was based on the results of interviews and of analysis of program data and documents. Interviews were conducted with 244 participants in the program: military commanders, public affairs officers (PAOs), bureau chiefs or news media representatives (NMRs), and embeds. In addition, significant amounts of data and documents were gathered from numerous military units and media and research organizations.

B. INITIAL CONCERNS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY PARTICIPANTS

Commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and embeds identified eight concerns about the Embedded Media Program before it was implemented. The military's primary concern was the potential for the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information by embeds—information that would compromise a mission or affect the safety of military personnel. The media's primary concern was the degree of access that the embeds would have to commanders and Service members once combat operations began. The media

also worried that the information they received might be too limited. Except for a few isolated instances, the initial concerns about the program did not materialize.

The participants' overall assessment of the Embedded Media Program was that it was successful and that it benefited the military, the media, the public, and the military families. In large measure, the program was successful because of the trust and confidence established between the commander and the embeds assigned to his/her unit. The military and the media became advocates of the program and stated that it should be implemented during future military operations, with adjustments as necessary to meet the circumstances.

The support of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and detailed public affairs (PA) planning built the framework for success. The embeds' unprecedented and unfettered access to military units and Service members resulted in more extensive media coverage for the military than in any previous conflict and helped strengthen the military-media relationship.

Participants identified potential policy and/or procedure changes that would make the program more effective. Most of the improvements are within the purview of the military, but, in some cases, they will require coordination with the media.

Each of the initial concerns, program strengths, and areas needing improvement is discussed in detail in this document.

C. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM PLANNING

Existing PA policy and doctrine and an assessment of media operations in previous conflicts served as the starting point for developing the embedded media plan. PAOs at the Pentagon, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Component Commands worked together over a 4- to 5-month period to develop a comprehensive embedded media plan that was integrated with the operational plan and supported by the SECDEF and CJCS.

Concurrent with ongoing planning at the Pentagon and at CENTCOM, the CENTCOM and Component PAOs began to identify the number of embeds each component could support. The decision on the number of embeds was left to the commanders because they would be responsible for integrating them into their units and providing support. Each component and each ground unit used different considerations and methods to determine how many embeds could be accommodated.

The SECDEF and CJCS guidance was to “tell the story—good or bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell the story.” Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) issued on 10 February 2003 provided PAOs and commanders the guidance, policies, and procedures for embedding media and the ground rules that embeds must agree to follow. The ground rules were specific, but component commanders made some changes. Everyone involved in the Embedded Media Program thought the ground rules were, for the most part, logical, reasonable, fair, and appropriate.

D. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM PREPARATION

OASD(PA) planning figures for the distribution of embed allocations to news media organizations were 70 percent national/regional, 20 percent international, and 10 percent local. The actual embed distribution was 64 percent national/regional, 27 percent international, and 9 percent local. Bureau chiefs/NMRs were satisfied with the number of embed allocations they received and thought the process was fair.

OASD(PA) provided embed allocations to media organizations and let them select the embeds. Commanders and PAOs wanted embeds to be physically fit and have some previous experience reporting on the military or covering a conflict. The media organizations selected their embeds based primarily on experience and maturity. All embeds were volunteers, and, with few exceptions, commanders were satisfied with the quality of the embeds assigned to their units.

OASD(PA) directed that all embed assignments would be individual embeds except for the broadcast media, which could have two-person teams. However, print-media organizations wanted to have reporter-photographer teams because the pictures that accompany an article provide a more powerful story. Despite the guidance, 41 reporter-photographer teams were embedded with ground units and aboard ships.

All media—embeds and unilaterals (media not embedded with units)—who wanted to report on ground forces had to register with the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC)-Kuwait. Of the 2,870 individuals who registered, 558 (19 percent) embedded with U.S. ground forces or at air bases. Most embeds originally assigned to air bases were unable to embed at those locations because of host-nation sensitivities.

Two hundred thirty seven media organizations received 839 initial embed allocations, while PAOs identified organizations to fill 78 local embed allocations—for a total of 917 embed allocations. Of these, 224 media organizations ultimately provided

692 embeds. The changes between those initially offered embed allocations and those eventually participating in the Embedded Media Program were significant. However, a good mix of media representatives (television, newspaper, magazine, photo, radio, news, and wire services) remained down to the brigade and regimental levels, with ground units and aboard each aircraft carrier.

Unit embed strengths fluctuated as embeds arrived or departed. When the war started on 20 March 2003, 408 embeds were with ground units. By the time Baghdad was captured on 9 April, the number of embeds had increased to 422. On 2 May, the day after the President declared the end of major combat operations, the number of embeds had decreased to 108, and, by 6 June, the number of embeds had dwindled to 19. On 20 March, 101 embeds were aboard Navy ships, and, on 9 April, this number had decreased to 27. The last Navy embeds departed 16 April.

Attendance at an OASD(PA)-sponsored media training course run by each Service was not a prerequisite for being embedded or a guarantee that an individual who attended a course would be selected to embed. While attendees felt the course was of personal and professional value, only 50 percent of the 232 attendees embedded with units. Bureau chiefs/NMRs were supportive of the military training program and thought that embeds should learn as much as possible about the military.

Commanders thought the military should offer continuous training to the media and encourage the media to embed with a unit during training exercises. In keeping with the philosophy of “train like you fight,” the military and the media would benefit.

Most embeds were prepared to join their assigned unit and knew something about it, but all embeds received additional training and orientation. Commanders spent considerable time discussing many topics with their embeds and thought that these discussions were a good investment of their time.

Unit PAOs provided media training and information about the Embedded Media Program to commanders and often to Service members. Commanders felt comfortable that their soldiers, marines, sailors or airmen would do well when they spoke with the media and that, in turn, the public would hear and see a great story.

E. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Most embeds joined a unit, boarded a ship, or went to an air base 7 to 10 days before the war started, while the remainder joined at the unit’s home station. Embedding

early gave the embed time to get acclimated, to learn about the unit, to get to know the members of the unit, and, most importantly, to establish trust and confidence. It gave the Service members time to get to know the embeds and become accustomed to having them in the unit continuously. Embeds who joined the unit at home station also had an opportunity to observe deployment preparations and to meet and get to know the Service members' families. Embedding after the war started was more difficult and less effective.

OASD(PA) had a good understanding of the desires and needs of the media and established good working relationships with bureau chiefs/NMRs. Commanders who had PAOs relied on them to implement the Embedded Media Program within their unit. Once ground units entered Iraq, subordinate commanders saw little of the PAOs because of the wide dispersion of their units. On the aircraft carriers and at the air bases, the PAOs worked closely with the commanders and the embeds.

Support and involvement by commanders at all levels in all components and Services was a major factor in the Embedded Media Program's success. The critical factor was the trust and confidence that developed between the commander and the embed. Commanders appreciated the embeds' contributions and made them feel like part of the team. Commanders did not do anything specific to ensure the safety of embeds; rather, they protected them as they did all other members of the unit.

Commanders were tasked to provide embeds with billeting, rations, medical treatment, military transportation, limited communications support to assist in transmitting media products, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) protective equipment. This support was provided; however, in some cases, problems that arose hampered support efforts.

The PAG stated that embeds were not authorized to use their own vehicles while traveling in an embed status, but ground commanders wanted the PAG changed to allow broadcast-media vehicles on the battlefield. Guidelines were developed, and the broadcast-media embeds agreed to abide by them. The Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Commanding General approved the concept for the broadcast media to take their own vehicles, but OASD(PA) disapproved the request. Despite the guidance, 15 broadcast-media teams from the major broadcast-media organizations took vehicles and additional personnel into Iraq. Commanders stated that it was advantageous to them for the broadcast-media embeds to have their own mode of transportation.

The military issued NBC equipment and provided training to embeds in Kuwait before they joined their units. Problems associated with getting appropriate authorizations and funding for the equipment, identifying where it would come from, and shipping it within the relatively short period of time available delayed the start of embedding with ground units until 10–11 March 2003.

Embeds could stay with a unit as long as they wanted. Most embeds voluntarily disembedded between 9 April and 1 May 2003 because major combat operations were declared over, freedom of movement throughout Iraq increased, and many large media organizations established bureaus in Baghdad. Ground commanders were disappointed because the embeds missed important stories during the transition to the Stability and Support-Operations (SASO) phase of OIF.

Three of the 692 embeds from different media organizations were involuntarily disembedded and not allowed to return to a unit. Several more embeds were involuntarily disembedded for short periods of time and then allowed to return to the unit. Several unilaterals violated the ground rules and were precluded from any further visits to units.

The cost of the Embedded Media Program to the military, estimated at approximately \$1.2 million, primarily for the NBC equipment, media training course, and food, was minimal compared with the overall cost of the war. Commanders and PAOs stated that benefits of the program far outweighed the cost. Media organizations incurred most of the costs of the Embedded Media Program but accepted it as a cost of covering the war. Although no detailed cost data are available, the biggest expenses for the media organizations were the equipment they purchased to allow the embeds to prepare their reports, the communications equipment required, and the satellite charges for transmitting the reports.

F. REPORTING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) PA concept for OIF had three objectives:

1. Dominate the media coverage of the war
2. Counter third-party disinformation
3. Assist in garnering U.S. public and international support.

The Embedded Media Program assisted in the accomplishment of the objectives.

Commanders assumed and bureau chiefs/NMRs generally agreed that the embeds, despite their smaller numbers, provided more coverage during the major combat operation phase of OIF than the much larger number of unilaterals, but no data exist to determine how much they provided compared with all other coverage.

Commanders appreciated having an impartial witness to record the truth—good or bad—for the world to know. Embedded media provided independent but accurate and objective reports about incidents and combat operations they witnessed, and these reports were significantly different from what was being reported by the Iraqi Information Minister.

Commanders and PAOs thought the embeds' reporting helped gain public support and respect for the military. Neither the military nor the media thought the role of the embeds or the media was to try and influence support for military or government actions.

The Embedded Media Program had a positive effect on troop morale and military families. One of the biggest morale boosts for Service members was the ability to call home using the embed's satellite phone or to send an e-mail using the embed's laptop. The military families were most interested in the reports about the units and the human-interest stories provided by the embeds. Since communication between families and Service members during the major combat phase of OIF was limited, embeds provided a critical link.

The ground rules about reporting casualties were clear. In only one known incident did an embed violate the CFLCC ground rules on casualty reporting. Commanders and spouses were frustrated by the slow military next-of-kin (NOK) notification system about casualties compared with the media's ability to report battlefield casualties in real time. They want everything possible done to improve the NOK notification system and expedite the notification process.

Commanders, embeds, and bureau chiefs/NMRs did not think embeds lost their objectivity or were co-opted. The bond of friendship and trust that developed between a commander and an embed was a positive benefit because it improved the quality of the reports. Embeds reported both good and bad, but, when they reported on unfavorable incidents, they understood the background and context of what happened.

Access was the key element desired by the media during OIF. Embeds had nearly unlimited access to Service members and freedom to go unescorted nearly everywhere within a unit, on a ship, or at an air base. The PAG prohibited commanders from allowing

an embed to have access to classified information and provided guidance on sharing sensitive information. Commanders thought the guidance was unclear about the information that the embeds could be provided. Most commanders provided embeds access to classified information to help them develop an understanding of the concept of an operation and report factually when they observed its execution. In return, commanders expected the embeds not to violate the ground rules, which they did not. Most of the classified or sensitive information the embeds received was perishable and lost its potential value to the enemy after 24 to 96 hours.

Commanders and PAOs did not censor reports, and most of them did not screen or conduct a security review of any reports. However, the embeds often asked a leader in the unit to review a story or look at a video once it was completed to ensure that it was accurate and did not violate any ground rules. No pressure was exerted on embeds to report anything other than the facts.

The rapid advances in technology permitted most embeds to file real-time reports from the battlefield. The only limits were a function of operational security and communications transmission difficulties.

Before the war, some individuals in the media complained that embeds would only have a “soda straw view” of the war. The embeds never intended to report anything other than what they observed. They knew that their editor or producer would combine their report with other reports to develop a coherent explanation of the war. PAOs and senior commanders thought that the military and the media shared a responsibility to provide an integrated view of what happened at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels during the war. The bureau chiefs/NMRs stated it was primarily their responsibility to provide the broad view of the war. They did not expect embeds to provide a big picture.

Even though the unilaterals who registered at the CPIC-Kuwait agreed to abide by the ground rules, the embeds and the unilaterals were treated differently. The unilaterals lacked the commander’s trust and confidence that allowed the embed unfettered access to information. Commanders did not have confidence that a unilateral would report fairly and accurately.

G. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Commanders had mixed opinions about what the senior DoD leadership’s reaction would be to embed reporting if combat operations did not go well, but most commanders did not think their immediate superiors would be overly concerned as long as

embeds continued to provide fair and unbiased reporting. If the war went badly (i.e., failures and shortcomings during combat operations), commanders at all levels stated they would still want embeds in their unit. Commanders believed the American public had a right to see and understand what was happening. Even if a story was not good from the military's perspective, the embeds would provide the facts along with the background and context.

If major combat had lasted a long time, commanders, embeds, and bureau chiefs/NMRs agreed that replacing embeds and establishing a replacement/rotation policy would probably have become necessary. The timing of the rotation would be important and would depend on the combat situation. Commanders wanted the media to cover events as they occur and would be willing to take a replacement embed rather than have no embed.

The commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and embeds stated that the Embedded Media Program should be continued in any future conflict, with an understanding that it may not be executed in exactly the same way. How the program will be executed and how many individuals will be embedded will depend on several factors (e.g., the type of military operation, types and size of forces involved, location, and scope). Draft embedded media plans should be ready to implement for different types of operations.

H. CONCLUSIONS

The Embedded Media Program was successful from the perspective of the military and the media. It provided the media unprecedented access to military units and members of those units and allowed the American and international public to witness the professionalism, dedication, sacrifice, and outstanding performance of the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen during combat operations. Although each embed provided only a small view of the war from his/her perspective at a particular time and place, the program provided the public a view and understanding of the war that could not be provided as effectively any other way. The military-media relationship was strengthened, the cultural gap was reduced, and many of the lingering suspicions that each institution had of the other were greatly reduced. Because the interaction between the many individuals involved in the program was so close, relationships were formed that will assist both institutions in the coming years—when young commanders become senior commanders and reporters become producers, editors, and bureau chiefs.

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Policy

- Develop an embedded media policy that addresses the spectrum of conflict in different regional areas
- Involve the media in the development of embedded media policy
- Develop policies and procedures for authorizing, funding, acquiring, and issuing NBC equipment and medical supplies for embeds
- Evaluate and clarify the policy on embedded media access to sensitive and classified information.

2. Planning

- Develop an embedded media plan for inclusion in PA Annex of Operational Plans (OPLANs)
- Conduct earlier coordination to get permission to embed media at air bases in the region of a potential conflict and develop ground rules that will satisfy host-nation concerns
- Develop an embed replacement/rotation plan as part of any future Embedded Media Program
- Review the OIF ground rules and simplify them based on what commanders and embeds actually did, what worked, and what was reasonable
- Approve and disseminate changes to ground rules made by subordinate commanders to minimize problems and confusion with the media between the original ground rules announced and any changes implemented
- Provide print-media organizations the option to assign a reporter-photographer team to the same military unit
- Conduct a study of media communications technology to ensure it will not interfere with battlefield systems and operations
- Develop a comprehensive plan for allowing broadcast-media vehicles on the battlefield in coordination with ground commanders and broadcast-media bureau chiefs
- Develop recommended packing lists of personal equipment for embeds—for each Service and for the different types of units to which the embeds are assigned.

3. Training

- Revise professional military education and media on the battlefield (MOB) training to include working with embeds and unilaterals
- Develop the best structure for a media training course and the most beneficial program of instruction (POI)
- Revise the DoD regulations and instructions about media travel to make flying aboard military or military charter aircraft and participating in military training exercises easier for the media.

I. BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense (DoD) Embedded Media Program resulted in an unprecedented opportunity for the media to report in real time on the military units and on the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who executed combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A total of 692 reporters, photographers, producers, cameramen, and technicians were embedded with ground units and on ships and air bases for an extended period of time. Embedding media with the military is not a new concept, but the magnitude of the effort and the number of media embedded were unprecedented.

A. REPORTERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: THE CIVIL WAR TO AFGHANISTAN

Much has been written about military-media relations and the involvement of the media during previous wars and other military operations. These writings are briefly highlighted here to show that while much has been made about the uniqueness of the Embedded Media Program during OIF, it has a basis in military-media relations, policies and procedures that stemmed from past successes and failures.

During the Civil War, about 500 people covered the war for Northern newspapers. Of these 500, about 150 went out in the field with soldiers. Reports were often transmitted by telegraph, with information that included order of battle and other military information useful to the enemy.¹ Foreign reporters also covered the war. One such reporter, Frank Vizetelly, was a writer and artist for the *Illustrated London News*. Originally, with the Union forces, he later began covering the war from the Confederate perspective.²

¹ Aukoffer, Frank and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Nashville, TN, 1995.

² South Carolina State Museum, <http://www.state.sc.us/wcst/rla/scmuseum/viz/index.html#toc>.

During World War I, reporters were either accredited or were visiting correspondents. Those who were accredited lived with the units, and those who were visiting only stayed temporarily. All of them had to agree to have their stories reviewed and to abide by specified ground rules.³

During World War II, accredited reporters were allowed in theater and accompanied the units, but their stories and pictures were censored. “A total of 27 reporters landed on the Normandy beaches with Allied troops on June 6, 1944.”⁴

During the Korean War, reporters’ stories were not censored initially, but censorship was later imposed because of concerns about security leaks and the influence that articles from Korea were having on public opinion. “It was estimated that there were never more than 70 reporters at any one time reporting from the front lines.”⁵

During the Vietnam War (1962–1973), the media had open access to military units and were provided transportation on the battlefield to cover units. Reporters’ stories were not censored, but those who were accredited agreed to abide by specific ground rules. A commander had the option of allowing a reporter to accompany the unit. Most saw it as beneficial to unit morale. No more than about 400 reporters were accredited at any given time, and usually fewer than 40 were actually in the field with combat units.⁶ Some military personnel blamed press coverage for the loss of the war because of the presses’ reports of battlefield casualties and the capability to show the horror of war on television, which turned public opinion against the war. In an opinion poll about military-media relationships conducted in 1995, 64 percent of the military officers surveyed said they either strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the statement that “news media coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort.”⁷

³ Frank Aukoffer and William P. Lawrence, *America’s Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Nashville, TN, 1995.

⁴ John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors, Covering the Gulf War*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992.

⁵ John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors, Covering the Gulf War*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992.

⁶ John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors, Covering the Gulf War*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992.

⁷ Frank Aukoffer and William P. Lawrence, *America’s Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Nashville, TN, 1995.

During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983), the press was initially denied access because operations were conducted rapidly on a small island. No media accompanied the participating forces, and no live coverage of the invasion was provided. First-hand reports from Grenada did not surface until 2 days after the operation began.⁸ The media complained to the military about being excluded initially and not being able to provide reports to the American public. These complaints led to the creation of the Sidle Commission,⁹ which recommended the creation of a DoD National Media Pool.

During Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989), the media pool was used for the first time, but it was not used effectively. It did not arrive in Panama until 4 hours after the initial U.S. assault began on 20 March 1989. Because of transportation problems, the media pool was unable to provide first-hand reports of ongoing combat operations. When transportation was available, military escorts did not take the media pool into combat areas because of safety concerns. An additional 300 journalists arrived in Panama on 21 and 22 December but remained at Howard Air Force Base (AFB) until 23 December.¹⁰ By then, most major combat operations were nearly over.

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) was the first major American war to be covered by news media, who were able to broadcast reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy.¹¹ More than 1,600 media representatives wanted to cover the war, but the military accommodated only about 125 media at any one time, so a rotation system was established.¹² Media pools provided limited coverage of operations, although some journalists accompanied a few Army and Marine Corps units and provided more detailed accounts of those units. Ground rules and guidelines were established for press coverage and included 12 categories of information that could not be reported. A military escort officer accompanied each small pool of reporters. Often, reporters experienced a delay of 2 to 3 days in getting stories filed

⁸ Operation Urgent Fury, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/urgent_fury.htm.

⁹ Grenada pushed the military into discussion with news executives and reporters about how to arrange coverage of the smaller combat operations. The result was the Sidle Commission Report, named after Retired Army General Winant Sidle who oversaw the deliberations. It established a set of recommendations governing press-military planning in future operations.

¹⁰ Pascale M. Combelles, "Operation Just Cause: A Military-Media Fiasco," *Military Review*, May–June 1995.

¹¹ DoD Final Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992.

¹² Charles C. Moskos, *Reporting War When There is No War*, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996.

because couriers had to bring them from the units to the rear.¹³ Reporters who do not accompany the media pool remained in the hotels and attended briefings. Unilateral media were also on the battlefield. These unilateral reporters were unescorted and tried to find stories on their own, but they were not able to report much about what was happening on the battlefield. The consensus of the military and the media was that much of what the units accomplished was lost to history.

During the initial operations in Bosnia (1995) with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Implementation Force, media were embedded with units in Germany and traveled with these units to Bosnia, where they remained for periods of 2 to 6 weeks. The intent was to allow the media to become familiar with the units and the soldiers, which would result in more positive reporting and a more positive attitude toward the media by the soldiers. Media reports were not censored.¹⁴

Operations in Kosovo (1999) were primarily an air campaign and, thus, reporting from the ground was limited.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (2001 to the present), the media were not permitted to accompany military units initially since these units were small, widely dispersed Special Operations Forces (SOFs). Minimal reporting of special operations began in October 2001. After conventional forces began arriving in February 2002, limited embedding began. American journalists were permitted to accompany U.S. SOFs and conventional ground forces to a limited extent in limited numbers and for short periods of time. They were also aboard the Navy aircraft carriers that were supporting the operation. Although embedding was limited, many unilateral reporters were present throughout Afghanistan. The embedding program, although limited, appeared to work well.

B. REPORTERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

Even though embedding was not a new concept, the scope of the program during OIF was vastly expanded. It was an ambitious program that had the support of the DoD leadership. Planning by public affairs officers (PAOs) for the Embedded Media Program

¹³ John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors, Covering the Gulf War*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992.

¹⁴ Charles C. Moskos, *Reporting War When There is No War*, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996

was better and more deliberate than in past conflicts where it had been employed. Potential embeds were offered training, and those who embedded were given some individual protective equipment and offered inoculations. Military commanders welcomed embeds into their units. Embeds earned the trust of commanders and Service members. Bureau chiefs embraced the program and received the access that they wanted to military units.

Within a month after the fall of Baghdad, most of the embedded media had dis-embedded. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)) knew that seminars, workshops, and conferences would be organized to discuss media operations during OIF, just as had been done after each previous major combat operation. Various media and military organizations would sponsor these gatherings. (OASD(PA)) requested that the Defense Information School (DINFOS) conduct a Joint Public Affairs Lessons Learned (JPALL) study on all aspects of media operations, with the exception of the Embedded Media Program. They also requested that the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conduct an independent assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program. The objectives, task, and approach of the IDA assessment are detailed in the next section.

II. ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE, TASKS, AND APPROACH AND REPORT STRUCTURE

A. ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE AND TASKS

1. Assessment Objective

The overall objective was to conduct an independent assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program to determine its effectiveness and provide recommendations to improve the program in other combatant command areas of responsibility (AORs) and during future military operations.

2. Assessment Tasks

- Conduct interviews with military commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs, and embedded media and assess the Embedded Media Program from their perspective
- Collect and analyze data about the program, including
 - Adequacy of program policies
 - Effectiveness, understanding, and implementation of media ground rules
 - Program implementation among the Services and units
 - Method for assigning embedded media
 - Effect of broadcast equipment on the battlefield
 - PAO-commander relationships
 - Commander and Service member relationships with the embedded media
 - Objectivity of the embedded media during combat operations
 - Media guidance and training for commanders and Service members
 - Effectiveness of the DoD media training course
 - Program costs
 - Other significant aspects of the program identified during the assessment
- Prepare a report of the assessment.

3. Scope

The assessment of the Embedded Media Program encompasses the period from the initial planning in the summer 2002 through the end of major combat operations in Iraq and the disembedding of most of the embeds by 1 May 2003. It does not address the limited embedded media process that continues during the Stability and Support Operations (SASO) phase of OIF.

B. ASSESSMENT APPROACH

The assessment is based on a combination of interviews with those involved in the Embedded Media Program, a review of relevant literature, and analysis of available data.

1. Interviews

Because so many individuals were involved in the program, which included military units and media organizations, an extensive number of interviews were conducted. These interviews included a representative sampling of four groups of participants: military commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs or news media representatives (NMRs) who interfaced with OASD(PA), and media embedded in the units. Figure II-1 shows the scope of interviews.




Figure II-1. Scope of Interviews

a. Interview Demographics

During the period May 2003 to April 2004, 244 individuals were interviewed. Most interviews were conducted at selected military installations and cities in the United States. A few were done over the telephone. Interviews with all foreign bureau chiefs/NMRs and personnel who had been embedded were also conducted in the United States or done over the telephone, except for one foreign embed who was interviewed in Canada.

Interviews with military commanders and PAOs were conducted at Ft. Stewart and Ft. Benning, Georgia (3rd Infantry Division); Ft. Campbell, Kentucky (101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)); Camp Pendleton and Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Corps Ground Air Combat Center, California (1st Marine Expeditionary Force); San Diego, California (USS *Constellation*); Norfolk, Virginia (USS *Harry S. Truman*); Carlisle, Pennsylvania (U.S. Army War College); and in the Washington, DC, area.

Although OASD(PA) recommended that Washington, DC, bureau chiefs represent their media organizations, no requirement to do so was imposed. Many media organizations, primarily local newspapers and television stations, do not have offices in the Washington, DC, area. Interviews with bureau chiefs/NMRs and former embeds not conducted in the Washington, DC, area were conducted in cities near the military installations visited, and in New York, New York and Boston, Massachusetts.

After developing a list of major military units that participated in OIF, a matrix was developed as a guide for how many interviews to conduct. Table II-1 summarizes the interviews that were conducted with military personnel. Military commanders at all levels—from Corps to company level and PAOs, from the Service Headquarters (HQ) in the Pentagon down to division level—were interviewed. In some cases, an Executive Officer (XO) was interviewed if a commander was not available.

Some units identified Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPARs) at levels below division, so some of them were interviewed. Table II-2 shows the mix of grades (ranks) of military personnel also interviewed. In addition to the military personnel, six spouses of commanders were also interviewed.

After determining the type and number of media organizations and personnel who actually participated in the Embedded Media Program, similar matrices were developed to guide the number of interviews that would be conducted with bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds. Table II-3 and Table II-4 summarize the number of interviews conducted.

Table II-1. Military Personnel Interview Matrix

Organization	Cdr	Staff	PAO	UPAR	Total	Subtotal
OASD (PA)			4		4	
JCS PA			2		2	
State Dept DoD PAO LNO			1		1	
Army PA			2		2	
Marine Corps PA			1		1	
Navy PA			3		3	
Air Force PA			2		2	15
CENTCOM HQ		1	3		4	
SOCCENT/SOF			4		4	
CFLCC HQ			5		5	
CPIC-Kuwait			5		5	18
Army Units						
HQ, Department of the Army		1			1	
V Corps HQ (Ger)	1		2		3	
3rd Inf Div (Stewart/Benning)	15	8	2	2	27	
101st Abn Div (Campbell)	14	1	1		16	
2nd Bde, 82d Abn Div (Bragg)	2		1		3	
173rd Abn Bde (Italy)			2		2	
4th Inf Div (Hood)			1		1	
1st Armored Div (Germany/Riley)			1		1	
2nd Armored Cav Regt (Polk)			1		1	
3rd Armored Cav Regt (Carson)			1		1	
1st Cav Div (Hood)			1		1	57
Marine Units						
IMEF (Pendleton)			2		2	
1st Marine Div (Pendleton)	10	3	2	2	17	
3rd Marine Air Wing (Pendleton)	2		1		3	
1st Force Svc Spt Grp (Pendleton)	1				1	
15th MEU (Pendleton)	1		1		2	
IMEF Engineer Group					0	
TF Tarawa (Lejeune)	1				1	26
CFMCC HQ			1		1	
CPIC-Bahrain			1		1	
Persian Gulf					0	
CVSG <i>Constellation</i> (San Diego)	1	1	2		4	
USS <i>Bunker Hill</i> (San Diego)	1				1	
CVSG <i>A. Lincoln</i> (Everett, WA)			1	1	2	
CVSG <i>Kitty Hawk</i> (Japan)					0	
Mediterranean					0	
CVSG <i>T. Roosevelt</i> (Norfolk)					0	
CVSG <i>Harry S. Truman</i> (Norfolk)	2	1	2		5	
USS <i>Deyo</i> (Norfolk)	1				1	15
CFACC HQ			1		1	
Al Jabar AB (Kuwait)	1		1		2	
Ali Al Salem (Kuwait)					0	
Aviano AB (Italy)	1				1	
ACCE	1				1	5
Total	55	16	60	5	136	136

Table II-2. Military Personnel Interviewed by Grade and Service

Grade	Army	MC	Navy	AF	Total
0-9	2				2
0-8	3				3
0-7	1	2	1	1	5
0-6	12	3	8	1	24
0-5	28	9	6	5	48
0-4	14	4	2		20
0-3	13	5	2	1	21
0-2		3	1		4
E-9	1				1
E-8	1	1			2
E-7			1		1
E-6	1	1	1		3
E-5	1	1			2
Total	77	29	22	8	136

Table II-3. Bureau Chiefs/NMRs Interview Matrix

Media Type	National/ Regional	Local	International	Total
Newspaper	11	4	3	18
Magazine	3		2	5
News Service	2			2
Wire	2		1	3
Photo	2			2
Television	5	2	3	10
Radio	2			2
Total	27	6	9	42

Note for Table II-3: Two bureau chiefs represented three types of media organizations.

Table II-4. Embedded Media Interview Matrix

Media Type	Type Unit With Whom Media Embedded						Total
	Joint	Army	MC	Navy	AF	SOF	
Newspaper		18	10	4	1	1	34
Magazine		3					3
News Service							0
Wire		2		1			3
Photo							0
Television	1	3	7	2	2	2	17
Radio		1	3	1			5
Total	1	27	20	8	3	3	62

OASD(PA) allocated embed assignments based on media type and whether a media organization was national/regional, international, or local. Table II-5 provides the media organization codes used by OASD(PA). These codes are used throughout this report.

Table II-5. Media Organization Codes

Type Organization	Code
U.S. TV	UT
U.S. Radio	UR
U.S. Wire	UW
U.S. Newspaper	UN
U.S. Magazine	UM
U.S. News Service	US
U.S. Electronic Web	UE
U.S. Photo	UP
International TV	IT
International Radio	IR
International Wire	IW
International Newspaper	IN
International Magazine	IM

Conducting the interviews took several months. The commanders and PAOs who served in Iraq were not interviewed until they returned to the United States. Many of them were reassigned, either while they were still in Iraq or shortly after they returned, so locating some of them took some time. Many of the embedded media took some time off after they returned and then were sent elsewhere to cover other assignments. Others were covering local assignments where their media organization was located. Appendix A provides a complete list of the individuals interviewed for this assessment. All the interviewees consented to having their names and assignments published in this report.

b. Interview Process

At the beginning of each interview, the purpose of the IDA assessment and the manner in which the interview would be conducted was explained. Although each interviewee may have had a personal interest in and bias about the interview topics, he/she was told that being as objective and open-minded as possible during the interviews was important. The interviewee was told that the focus was only on the Embedded Media Program and that other issues related to military PA operations would not be addressed in the IDA report. Each individual was asked to base his/her responses only on specific experiences and involvement with the program. In addition to factual information, some responses included the interviewee’s perception about a specific topic.

All interviews were for nonattribution, and, usually, only the interviewee and the interviewer were present during the interview. A general list of questions related to the assessment task was used to structure and guide the interview, but no survey was administered. In many cases, an interviewee would comment about a topic that had not been mentioned during a previous interview, and further discussion ensued. Additional discussion about a particular topic also ensued when an interviewee had information or expertise that allowed the interviewer to gain additional insights about a topic. All interviewees were asked the same opening questions about their overall assessment of the program, the strengths of the program, and the areas needing improvement. Most interviews lasted an hour; however, a few were shorter and many were longer. Following all the interviews, the comments were reviewed to determine the consistency—or lack of consistency—between and within the four groups of individuals interviewed.

The interviewee's comments, along with other data available, form the basis of the assessment. Since all interviews were for nonattribution, no name, unit, or organization is provided when a quote from an interview is used. Reference is only made to indicate that it was a commander, PAO, bureau chief/NMR, or embed who is quoted. Comments by interviewees were similar and consistent for many topics. Even so, they are usually addressed in the report by the category of interviewee to show the different perspectives that each group had about the topic.

The interviewers believe that the interviewees provided valid objective and subjective thoughts and useful information about all issues discussed. They realized the importance of the study and appreciated the fact that DoD had requested that such an assessment be undertaken. Every person contacted for this study was very willing to participate and provide whatever insights or information he/she had. The PAOs at the military locations were extremely helpful in arranging interviews with various commanders.

2. Document Data and Analysis

As much factual data as possible pertaining to the objective and tasks were gathered and analyzed. For some topics addressed in the report, useful data were available. For many topics, an assessment had to be made based on the information provided during the interviews and additional information gathered from other sources.

From all the PAOs interviewed, every effort was made to gather as much printed and electronic program documentation and data as possible before the material was destroyed or the individual was reassigned and his/her successor would be unable to

locate it. The PAOs were very supportive of this effort, and some provided extensive amounts of material, including databases and rosters, e-mails, memorandums, briefings, and training materials.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) conducted several meetings with bureau chiefs to address the Embedded Media Program. OASD(PA) also published several Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) messages about the Embedded Media Program, and these messages were distributed to commanders and PAOs. IDA acquired copies of all transcripts of the meetings and messages.

DINFOS conducted surveys of participants in the media training courses that the Services conducted from November 2002 through January 2003, and those data were provided to IDA. DINFOS also developed surveys for the embeds and UPARs involved with the Embedded Media Program. Bureau chiefs/NMRs and Service PA chiefs were sent an e-mail with information about the surveys and a request to forward the e-mail to the appropriate individuals. The e-mail linked the embeds to the survey on the DINFOS Web site that could be accessed and completed. Only nine military UPARs responded, so data from those responses were not used.

The embeds' response was much better. The survey was completed by 129 embeds (19 percent of the total embeds), and the results were provided to IDA. The survey results provided another source of information on many of the topics addressed by the embeds who IDA interviewed. Some questions were multiple choice, and other questions asked for a narrative response. The responses indicated a wide range of experience in time spent working in news media and the type of media in which an individual worked (see Table II-6). Seventy-four percent had covered military issues before OIF, and 68 percent had covered other military conflicts or wars. As a function of media experience, respondents had covered from 1 to 12 conflicts or wars. Only 19 percent had served in the military.

Table II-6. Media Experience and Type of Media

Years of Experience	Count	Percent	Type of Media	Count	Percent
1-5	14	10.9	Print	74	57.4
6-10	32	24.8	Radio	42	32.6
11-15	19	14.7	Television	10	7.8
16-20	27	20.9	No response	3	2.3
More than 21	34	26.4			
No response	3	2.3			

Several military organizations prepared after action reports (AARs) and lessons learned from OIF, which included information about PA operations. IDA was provided the PA-related material and extracted that which related to the Embedded Media Program.

As mentioned, several organizations sponsored military-media symposiums, seminars, and workshops. IDA personnel attended several of these and/or obtained reports published upon their conclusion.

IDA reviewed 219 news articles, commentaries, and editorials published in 76 different newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and wire services (see Appendix B). Seventy-eight percent of the articles appeared in 50 newspapers or magazines that had embeds covering the war. Of the 186 individual journalists who wrote or contributed to articles, 47 (25 percent) were embedded with U.S. forces (primarily ground units) during OIF. Many of the articles not written by embeds included views of embeds or representatives of media organizations with embeds. The articles were written between November 2002 and March 2004 and are assumed to be representative of all articles written about the Embedded Media Program during that time. These articles discuss the Embedded Media Program in general or specific topics relevant to the assessment. The thousands of articles written by embeds about the units or individuals in those units or about combat operations were not reviewed.

The articles were divided into three broad groupings:

1. Those written from the time the media training courses were announced and public discussions about possible media embedding began in November 2002 until embeds started joining units and the war began
2. Those written from the start of the war on 20 March 2003 until the fall of Baghdad on 9 April when most of the embeds began disembedding
3. Those written since that time.

A subjective assessment of the articles indicates that 39.7 percent were positive, 50.2 percent were neutral, and 10.0 percent were negative with respect to the Embedded Media Program. Most of the articles that were neutral either provided an explanation of the program, facts about some aspect of the program, or contained views or opinions that were supportive of and expressed concerns about different aspects of the program.

Among the many topics addressed in the articles, three aspects of the program are discussed most often, regardless of when they were written:

1. The effect of the latest communications technology
2. The ability of the embedded media to maintain their objectivity
3. Whether embedded media could, or should, provide an overall picture of what was happening on the battlefield.

Relevant aspects from these articles will be incorporated throughout the remainder of the assessment. The opinions and assessments of the articles are generally consistent with findings from the interviews. For some topics (e.g., objectivity and access), authors who were not embedded have differing views than those expressed by embeds during interviews.

The 69 articles written before the war started covered numerous subjects: the Embedded Media Program overall; whether the military would keep its word on access; military “boot camps” (media training course) for journalists; military-media relations; technology; costs of covering the war; the objectivity of reporters; safety; and the media’s ability to cover the “big picture” of the war. While most of the articles were neutral or positive, most could also be characterized as wary, cautious, or dubious.

Once the war started, the focus of the 68 articles written during the combat phase shifted. Much of the reporting dealt with the immediacy and drama of live coverage of the war vs. the desire of the media to provide depth and context for the audience. Even though embedded journalists could not provide the “big picture,” the fact they were on the ground where the fighting was occurring made for compelling viewing. Advances in technology permitted real-time coverage by the embedded broadcast media and near-real-time reporting by the print media, with vivid depictions of the war.

Another 82 articles written between the fall of Baghdad (April 2003) and March 2004 were reviewed. Most of these articles discussed the author’s assessment of the Embedded Media Program and were positive. Articles included reflections about the program by those who were embedded, discussion about journalists’ safety, and thoughts about how well the media covered the war. Many wrote about the advantages and disadvantages of embedding and about the future of embedding.

Table II-7 is a summary of data sources and types of data collected. Appendix C contains a detailed list of data collected.

Table II-7. Source and Types of Data Collected

Data Sources	Data Types
OASD(PA), OJCS PA DINFOS Service PA offices CENTCOM & SOCENT PAO CFLCC PAO CPIC-Kuwait 3rd Infantry Div PAO 101st Airborne Div (AASLT) PAO Combat Training Center (CTC) PAOs IMEF PAO 1st Marine Div PAO 3rd Marine Air Wing PAO CPIC-Bahrain USS <i>Constellation</i> PAO USS <i>Truman</i> PAO Media organizations Research organizations	PAG Transcripts – ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs’ meetings Military doctrine, regulations, and directives Databases Rosters E-mails Memos Briefings Surveys Lessons learned AARs Training materials Interviews News articles

Information gathered from the interviews and results from the data are found in the appropriate sections of the report. The assessment of the various topics is based on either subjective or objective data, or a combination of both, depending on data availability and applicability to issues being addressed.

C. REPORT STRUCTURE

The remainder of this report presents the assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program conducted during OIF.

Section III presents the initial concerns about and overall assessment of the Embedded Media Program. Strengths of the program and areas needing improvement are also identified. The topics address those areas that were most relevant to the participants. They are discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.

Section IV presents details about program planning. Planning was based on existing policy and doctrine, consideration of military-media operations in previous conflicts, and past experiences of those involved. It looks at planning conducted at all levels, which resulted in the publication of the PAG that guided the program.

Section V presents details about program preparation, including the process for allocating embed positions, the assignment process, prerequisites for embeds, and the training provided to the media and military personnel.

Section VI presents details about program implementation, including discussion about embedding and disembedding the media; the relationships among the commanders, PAO and embedded media; support provided by the military to the media; and program costs.

Section VII presents details about reporting from the battlefield. It discusses the extent to which the Embedded Media Program assisted OSD in accomplishing its PA objective and the effect of the program on troop morale and military families. It contains information about those areas that were of most concern to the participants before the program started (e.g., objectivity of the embeds, operational security and access to information, filing reports, and report content). It also compares the embeds and the unilaterals.

Section VIII discusses the implications and considerations for using the Embedded Media Program during future military operations.

III. INITIAL CONCERNS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY PARTICIPANTS

The opening questions asked during interviews focused on the interviewee's initial concerns about the Embedded Media Program before it was implemented, his/her overall assessment of the program, the strengths of the program, and areas needing improvement.

A. INITIAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM

Detailed guidance and ground rules for the Embedded Media Program were published in "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)" on 10 February 2003. Despite the detailed information that was provided, the military and the media had concerns about the implementation of the Embedded Media Program before it was actually executed. This was expected. Although this was not the first time the media had been embedded in military units, embedding had never been done on such a large scale.

1. Release of Classified Information

The primary concern expressed by most military commanders and PAOs was that the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information by embeds during live broadcasts or near-real-time reports filed on media Internet sites or in print might compromise a unit's mission or effect the safety of Service members. The ASD(PA) was concerned that the media and military personnel being interviewed might compromise operational security. During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 19 March 2003, the ASD(PA) stated,

"There have been some people who have either said and/or people who have reported a greater specificity of location and timing and things like that, that get to the heart of our concerns with operational security. I want to emphasize again the importance of all of us being very, very careful with information that could affect operations, information that we all know could put lives at risk. So we have reissued our guidance; we've done conference calls with as many of our public affairs officers in the

region as we could. I met with the Service PAOs right before this call to emphasize it again. And I really hope and encourage all of you to do the same with your correspondents.”

2. Casualty Reporting

A major concern expressed by OSD and senior commanders and PAOs was related to casualty reporting. This concern was raised during the interviews, and it was one of the main topics of discussion during the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs’ meeting with on 27 February 2003. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DASD(PA)) stated,

“There’s only one [guideline] that I would want to actually touch upon and that has to do with casualty reporting. It happens to be probably the most sensitive from the government’s perspective. The issue has to do with the timing and identification of casualties. Reporting on casualties obviously is permitted, but there are safeguards and conditions within the ground rules to try to prevent identification of battlefield casualties in real time. The sensitivity here is trying to allow the next-of-kin procedures to be able to get to family members and notify them of injured or killed family members prior to the first notification of it being in real time in the television coverage or a news story or a wire story that goes out there.”

He reiterated the concern again during ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 19 March 2003 when he stated, “I would like to also solicit your assistance once again on casualty reporting.”

3. Accuracy of Embed Reporting

The other major concern expressed by tactical commanders was how accurate the reports and stories would be. Would the embed come to the unit with an agenda that would result in a slanted story?

4. Military-Embed Relationship

A few commanders and PAOs wondered about how well some subordinate commanders would work with the media or if the presence of so many media might affect their decisions or actions. However, commanders who had had recent positive experiences with the media in Bosnia or Afghanistan thought the program would work fine and had no concerns. They thought they would be able to deal with any problem that might arise.

5. Access by Embeds

The media had more concerns about the program than the military had. Based on past experiences with the military, they expressed concern that the military might not follow through on certain elements of the embed program and that some of the ground rules as described in the 10 February 2003 PAG would not be implemented. Their primary concern was the degree of access that the embedded media would actually have to the unit's commanders and Service members once combat operations began. They also thought that the information they received might be too limited. The media were concerned that they might not be able to file reports in a timely manner or that reports might be screened or censored, although they acknowledged that advances in technology might negate that possibility.

6. Safety

The safety of media personnel was also a concern, but the media thought that the embeds would probably be safer on the battlefield than the unilaterals would be.

7. Embed Assignments

Some of the media expressed a concern that they might be with a unit or in a location that would not allow them to see much combat even though the DASD(PA) stated during the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 19 March 2003 that "every unit out there has a very key role or it wouldn't be there, and at some point it will probably be pressed into service and your reporter will be at that center of gravity or that decisive point. So I encourage you to resist calls from the field saying I need to leave my unit, I need to disembed."

8. Objectivity

Some bureau chiefs wondered if their embeds would lose their objectivity and be co-opted by the military because they were so close to the Service members and the operations over an extended period of time. They were also concerned that some military commanders might try to manipulate and control media coverage in their unit or hinder the embeds' ability to report unfavorable information.

B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY PARTICIPANTS

The Embedded Media Program was very successful from the perspective of the military and the media. In response to the question about the overall assessment, those interviewed most often described the program as outstanding, great, excellent, terrific, or very successful. The program was successful beyond their expectations—better than either the military or the media had anticipated. One bureau chief stated, “The program was enormously successful. Neither the military nor the media anticipated how much live coverage there would be. The attitude and level of support from the Pentagon was great. The military was open and supportive and willing to help the media. The American public had a first hand view—good, bad, and ugly—right in their living room. They got to see the war from the perspective of so many different soldiers. There was no effort by the military to hide anything or the media to sensationalize anything—just an effort to provide the facts.” Many indicated that they were skeptical at the beginning of the program, based on previous experiences, but they were now strong proponents of the embed program. It provided a positive experience for participants and an independent witness to history that was missing in the past. It also allowed the war to be recorded much better than it would have been without the embeds. The working relationship between the military and the media during the OIF Embedded Media Program was a much better than it was during the first Gulf War and other recent conflicts. It definitely worked better than using media pools. The military received better coverage, and, because of the scope of the program, they could not be accused of manipulating the news.

The program’s success at the unit level is directly attributable to the trust and confidence that was established between the commander and the embeds assigned to his/her unit. Although each embed provided only a small view of the war from his/her perspective at a particular time and place, the program provided the public with a unique view and understanding of the war that could not be provided as effectively any other way.

The program was mutually beneficial for the military, the media, the public, and the military families. One journalist perhaps phrased it best when he stated, “It was a win for the military because it was the first time since the Vietnam War that the American people saw what individuals do in combat. It was a win for the media because it was the first time since Vietnam that they had such access across the board to combat operations and had the technology to communicate to the public in real time. It was a win for the public and military families because they could watch TV or read a newspaper or magazine and follow units in combat or see their loved ones.”

Military PAOs thought that the embed program was the best thing that DoD could have done, considering that the media would cover the war anyway. One senior PAO chief stated that the major benefit of the program was that “we now have an entire generation of reporters, commanders, and troops who earned each other’s respect by going to war with each other, lived and shared life together, understand how hard each other’s job is, and that each is a professional with high standards.”

A bureau chief summarized the program this way: “The program made sense because, in accordance with the First Amendment, American citizens have the right to see how American dollars and blood are being expended. It prevented a disinformation campaign from being effective. It was more than the military doing the media a favor. It was good for America.”

While those involved were strong supporters of the Embedded Media Program, they generally agreed that it should not be the only reporting method. It was successful as a supplement to other media coverage. It provided one aspect of one side of the war only, and, therefore, other methods of reporting were needed to better understand the war in its entirety. In any future conflict, the Embedded Media Program should provide one component of media coverage, recognizing that how the program is executed and how many individuals could be embedded would depend on the type of operation and the type and number of units involved.

All expressed hope that the Embedded Media Program would be used in future military operations. They would be willing to participate in the program again.

C. PROGRAM STRENGTHS

The Embedded Media Program provided the media unprecedented access to military units and members of those units. This allowed the American and international public to see the professionalism, dedication, sacrifices, and outstanding performance of the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen during combat operations. It also allowed the spouses and other family members to see what their loved ones were doing and provided a morale boost to the troops. The result was more extensive coverage for the military than in any previous conflict.

1. Support From Senior Military Leaders

Support for the program by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) resulted in support and acceptance of the

concept by subordinate commanders at all levels in the chain of command. From the perspective of the embeds, the commanders of the unit to which they were assigned made the embed program successful.

2. PA Planning Concurrent With Operational Planning

Linking the planning for media operations (in general) and the Embedded Media Program (in particular) to the operational planning from the beginning was a key factor in its success according to the PAOs. The military had adequate time to plan the program and the right people involved in the planning. It was a team effort between the PAO and the commander at all levels, which resulted in all Services and components implementing it well. At the same time, informal discussions between key OASD(PA) personnel and bureau chiefs were held to discuss different ideas and to see what might or might not work. This later resulted in being able to resolve most problems or issues that arose at the unit commander-embed level.

3. Testing the Embed Concept and Embedding Media Early

The 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) brigade and battalion commanders found that working with the media during 2- and 3-day embed periods while training in Kuwait from November 2002 to January 2003 was especially useful. This also allowed the PAO to provide input—based on practical experience—while the media embed plan was being developed. The military and the media stated that getting the embeds in Kuwait about 7 to 10 days before the war started was very beneficial. Those units that had embeds before deployment from the United States thought that embedding early was even better.

4. Military-Media Relationship Strengthened

The military-media relationship was strengthened, the cultural gap was reduced, and many of the lingering suspicions that each institution had of the other were greatly reduced. The military and media stated that the Embedded Media Program broke down the barriers between the military and the media that existed before the program was implemented. Both sides were committed to making the program work, and they operated in good faith. Bureau chiefs thought the Pentagon was cooperative and responsive throughout the program. They understood the need to establish good working relationships and recognized that both institutions have different but critical roles. Now, each knows and better understands and appreciates what the other does. The military made no effort to hide the facts, and the media made no effort to sensationalize the facts. They just

reported the facts. Each side learned that the other was extremely professional. A battalion commander stated that “the unit and embed leveraged each other. The unit and soldier got good coverage, they used the embed to tell the soldier and unit stories, and the embed got credibility in reporting because he had an in-depth knowledge of what he was reporting, which provided for a higher quality article.”

The Embedded Media Program educated an entire generation of commanders, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and soldiers about media relations, which will allow them to be comfortable and interact effectively with the media in the future. The soldiers liked having embeds in the unit because they liked the coverage that their unit received. Commanders stated that this increased morale within the unit because soldiers received great coverage of and recognition for daily activities. Another unintended benefit of the program was that it will serve as a good recruiting vehicle. One senior NCO stated, “The American youth saw that it takes something special to be a great soldier and that the military is an honorable profession.”

A generation of military reporters has been trained, and, in the future, these reporters will become bureau chiefs, producers, and managing editors. A bureau chief stated, “There is now a core group of journalists that understands and appreciates the military and what it can do as an organization and individuals.” Most of the embeds had not served in the military, and some had never done any military reporting, either in peacetime or combat. Also, many embeds were or had been foreign correspondents or military reporters and, depending on their age and experience, had covered many conflicts, but not in such a close, personal way. Several embeds saw the program as an unrivaled opportunity and a great experience.

Embeds who completed the survey indicated that they had experienced a significant change in their perception of the military because of their embed experience. They were very impressed with the quality, professionalism, and dedication of the Service members and learned to appreciate the hardships they had to endure. Many who had covered the military previously appreciated the opportunity to get to know the enlisted men and women better. Constantly being with a unit and its members gave them a much better understanding of what happened on a daily basis and over a period of time. It also increased their respect for the members of the unit and the military as a profession.

5. Mutual Trust and Respect Between Commanders and Embeds

Both commanders and embedded media stated that a high level of trust, mutual respect, and rapport were established between them. They also thought that the bonding that developed between most of them resulted in better reporting—not a loss of objectivity. Because of the close interaction between so many individuals involved in the program, relationships were formed—relationships that will assist both institutions in the coming years when young commanders become senior commanders and reporters become bureau chiefs.

Bureau chiefs stated that the military learned the media could be responsible and trusted not to divulge military information that would put the mission or the soldiers at risk. The military also learned that embeds were there to tell truthful stories and humanize the war. Bureau chiefs and embeds stated that they appreciated the openness and candor of the military commanders in providing background information and that they were supportive of and willing to help the embeds get and file their reports.

6. Timely, Accurate, and Independent Reporting

Having embedded media throughout the theater of operation permitted timely, accurate, and independent reporting. The military was primarily interested in accurate, objective, and truthful reporting, and the embedded media provided it. The media understood what happened and why it happened. One journalist stated, “Embeds were like a thousand points of light. Smart commanders realized what a critical tool they had to report the good and bad, first hand, objectively. For the Pentagon to report on a bad incident, people may have not believed it. An embed reported a bad incident for what it was: a tragic part of war.”

The embeds had the ability to get reports directly, rather than from other sources. This provided a good conduit to the American and international public. Embeds had a credibility of independence that would not have existed if the military had provided all the reports. One of the major benefits for the media, as stated by the commanders, was that this embed program allowed the media to live the life of a soldier and gain better insight into how hard the soldiers worked. Commanders stated that the media learned that soldiers were great and that the military had nothing to hide. The embeds could report on soldiers doing their best every day. The embed gained credibility because of his/her in-depth knowledge of the story being reported and the higher quality articles or reports. The commanders were impressed by the quality of the embeds, to which they attributed

much of the success of the program. They thought that the media organizations, by and large, had selected the right people—their best and brightest.

Commanders and PAOs stated that information was reported accurately and that the embeds provided fair and realistic coverage of events. The embeds took their job seriously and were open minded and sensitive to the information that was provided to them. Commanders viewed their presence as a benefit in helping to understand what happens and why and to be able to verify facts. The embeds had a better in-depth perspective of incidents than unilateral reporters because they understood the background and the context in which events occurred. Likewise, on ships, even though the Navy has had an extensive embark program (where most visits to ships last only 1 or 2 days), the embeds had a much better opportunity to get to know the ship and crew and to understand the operations.

When asked what the best aspect was of being embedded, 40 percent of the embeds who completed the survey wrote about the ability to get a story first hand and see it through the perspective of the soldier. Witnessing events on a daily basis was invaluable to their understanding of the event and their ability to report it in real time or near-real time.

7. Unfettered Access to Information

Another major strength of the program on which all commented was the unfettered access to information that the embedded media enjoyed. One embed stated,

“Journalists usually come in after a battle, see what they see, and go back to their hotel rooms and write. But being embedded, you’re right there behind the shoulder of the infantryman in the fight, you’re on combat patrols, you’re with the brigade command as they are planning the attack, you see everything the way the soldier sees it. More than the way the infantryman sees it – the infantryman’s viewpoint – but also the officer’s viewpoint, from all sorts of viewpoints. You just can’t beat that kind of access.”

In most cases, the access was to the commander, all members of the unit, the operational planning, and the execution of operations. The program provided the media a perspective on war and soldiers that they could not get any other way. Being with the unit continuously—totally immersed and integrated—for an extended period of time allowed the embeds to provide more accurate, in-depth reporting than they could have done on a short visit. This access was also extended to embeds from foreign media organizations.

In addition to access, the media stated that no restrictions were imposed beyond what was stated in the ground rules. They provided timely stories in real or near-real time, with no censorship or screening of reports. The embedded media knew and understood the ground rules and what they could and could not report.

The embeds who completed the survey commented on two other positive aspects: the access to information about the operations and the openness and candor of the unit commanders and all members of the unit. The ability to establish a relationship of trust allowed them access to information they could not get in any other way. One embed wrote, “I had exceptionally good access to intelligence and operational information, thanks entirely to the open-minded approach of the commander who made it clear that we could see what we wanted provided we followed the ground rules.” Another embed wrote, “It was the willingness of the soldiers to share their stories and information. As a reporter used to fighting for access, these soldiers were amazing in their candor and cooperation.”

8. Effect on the Public and on the Military Families

As mentioned earlier, the public and military families were prime benefactors of the Embedded Media Program. Commanders and PAOs stated that the public related well to the “boy next door” and saw the soldier—not just the briefers at CENTCOM HQ and the Pentagon—as a primary spokesman for the military. As one embed stated, “Nobody puts a better face on the military than the men and women in it.” The American and international public could see, hear, and read daily about what was happening in units and to soldiers, based on first-hand reports from the embedded media. The information was accurate and timely. The multiplicity of views from so many embeds was important also because it negated any disinformation provided by the Iraqis.

The public saw the daily highs and lows of individuals, teams, and crews in ground units, aboard ships, and at air bases. They learned about the decision-making, the endurance, and the limitations of soldiers and about the quality of soldiers and commanders and their sacrifices. One embed stated, “I saw 18 and 19 year olds doing phenomenal work, with great skills, under pressure over a long period of time.” The embeds reported on the strength, resourcefulness, and professionalism of soldiers. The public got to know the human side of war, got to know individuals, and got to see the human face of combat. They learned to appreciate and understand the “fog and friction of war.”

The military commanders, PAOs, and spouses stated that the Embedded Media Program allowed families to remain informed about what their husband/wife and the unit to which they were assigned did almost daily. The spouses thought seeing daily reports was wonderful for them and their families since they had limited communication from the unit or Service member. It helped families feel connected, to know what was happening. The embeds were their link to the unit and their spouses during the combat phase of operations.

D. AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT

Although those who were interviewed regarded the Embedded Media Program as very successful, they identified some areas that needed improvement if the program is continued in the future. A few areas mentioned were improved by the initiative and actions of those involved, but other areas could not be improved during program implementation.

To make improvements in all areas identified will require changes to policies and/or procedures. The military can make most of the improvements, but, in some cases, it will require coordination with the media. Many of those interviewed, when asked about areas needing improvement, stated they could not think of any, because they were so impressed by how well the program was conducted.

1. Continue the Program During Stability and Support Operations (SASO)

Some way should be found to continue the embed program during the SASO phase. Most of the embeds were gone from units by 1 May 2003 when the President of the United States announced the end to major combat operations. The ground commanders expressed concern that many great accomplishments related to the reconstruction of Iraq have gone unreported. They were disappointed that so many embeds left as soon as combat operations transitioned to SASO. They felt that the embeds who left missed the opportunity to report on many great stories. The information the commanders got from the news or their families indicated a lot of more negative reporting and an absence of reporting about all the positive things that were being accomplished to help rebuild Iraq. The embeds' departure also placed stress on the military families, who had enjoyed the constant coverage and now could not get any information about their loved ones or their units.

From the media perspective, SASO was and is being covered to the extent necessary. After the fall of Baghdad, the embedded media was not needed as much because the freedom of movement was greater and this enabled more access not only to the military units, but also to the Iraqi population.

When the embeds disembedded, they reported some confusion in being able to get back to Kuwait. Although the local commander and PAO understood what was to happen, getting back often took a few days and several modes of transportation by units that did not understand their needs.

2. Allow Broadcast Media To Have Vehicles

Bureau chiefs in the broadcast media and the PAOs and commanders stated that broadcast media should not be dependent on a military unit for transportation because of the added burden placed on the unit. In the future, the broadcast media should be permitted to have vehicles and support personnel, subject to certain guidelines and depending on the state of broadcast technology. OSD guidance stated that broadcast-media embeds could not have vehicles. Army and Marine commanders and PAOs thought they should have vehicles as long as certain procedures were followed, but they were unable to get approval from OASD(PA) before the commencement of hostilities. Compliance with the DoD policy varied. In some units, nearly all broadcast teams had a vehicle and one or two additional individuals. In other units, some broadcast teams had vehicles, and others did not. In the remainder of the units, none of the broadcast teams had vehicles.

For the embeds who completed the survey, 15 percent of the written responses to the question about the worst aspect of embedding addressed the lack of mobility on the battlefield. They did not address it from the standpoint of needing a vehicle for broadcast teams, but rather as a desire to get a broader perspective and have greater freedom of movement than the unit provided.

3. Embed Reporters and Photographers as a Team

Many of the bureau chiefs and embeds, primarily those from large organizations, stated that the print media should be allowed to have a reporter and a photographer embedded together in the same unit. Media organizations state that a more powerful story is rendered when pictures reinforce the story. Some organizations were able to work around the restriction of having only one embed per unit. Some PAO and commanders were able to facilitate the media's request once embed assignments had been made.

4. Plan Better for Providing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Equipment to Embeds

The process for acquiring NBC equipment and distributing it to the embeds must be improved if DoD provides this service in the future. DoD wanted to provide the equipment so that the embeds had the same protection as the military against any enemy use of chemical or biological weapons. Once the decision was made to provide the equipment, the major problem was the considerable time required to acquire and ship it to Kuwait so it could be issued to the embeds who were with Army and Marine units already in Kuwait. The embeds were kept in Kuwait several days more than planned, pending receipt of the equipment, before they embedded.

5. Revise the Embed-for-Life Policy

Several individuals from each group stated that if the war had lasted longer, the embed-for-life policy may have had to be reviewed and changed. The embed-for-life policy meant that once an embed left a unit, for whatever reason, he/she could not return. Some flexibility should exist for moving embeds within and among units and allowing embeds to return to the same unit if they departed and wanted to return later. Commanders stated that some units without an embed felt disadvantaged because they were not getting the same great coverage that units and soldiers with embeds were getting.

6. Improve Media Access to Air Bases

The Air Force did not get any significant media coverage from the Embedded Media Program because embeds were not allowed access to five of the seven air bases in the region used by the U.S Air Force. Despite extensive effort by the military to get permission, host-nation sensitivities precluded it. Embedded media were only allowed to report from Al Jaber Air Base (AB) and Ali Al Salem AB in Kuwait.

7. Provide Information About Embeds Earlier at the Small-Unit Level

Many of the ground units below division level either did not know how many embeds they would receive until just before they arrived or sometimes did not make a final assignment until they knew more about their particular embed. As a result, they had to scramble at the last minute to arrange transportation and accommodate other support requirements. Although the 10 February 2003 PAG stated that the units would assist the media with getting equipment replaced or repaired, doing so in a timely manner was difficult once combat operations began.

8. Change the Media on the Battlefield (MOB) Training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs)

Each of the Army's CTCs conducts MOB training as part of all rotations. Several commanders stated a need to change the training to more accurately reflect the Embedded Media Program. This would help the junior officers and NCOs better understand the media's role as currently envisioned by the military. Based on experience from OIF, more training should be provided on how to integrate embeds into the unit and how to deal with foreign embeds.

9. Prepare Embeds Better Before They Join a Unit

Many embeds attended a DoD-sponsored media training course or a hostile-environment training course offered by private contractors. Many embeds also had previous experience covering military conflicts. However, some commanders and PAO stated that some embeds who joined Army and Marine units should have been better prepared. Some embeds did not understand or underestimated the rigors, hardships, and dangers associated with a combat environment. While some embeds received recommended packing lists of personal items to bring with them, others did not. Any list provided needs to be specific to a component or a unit.

Commanders stated that more effort should be expended to manage expectations for embeds and their media organizations. Many did not understand what to expect in terms of the amount of combat they might see and did not understand that a lot of time was devoted to preparation, mission rehearsals, and other activities. Many great stories surfaced, but some of these were not directly combat related. Some editors, upon hearing or seeing something in the news about a combat operation, did not understand why their embed was not reporting similar actions, or if the embed was within a few miles of the action, why their embed could not report on it.

10. Review and Revise the Ground Rules

Many commanders and embeds thought the ground rules were too lengthy and detailed and should be simplified. This was usually done in one-on-one discussions between the commander and the embed when they first met. Other issues or questions were resolved as they arose. Commanders and embeds were confused about the access to and release of classified and sensitive information. This was resolved at the local level, with no significant problems. While the ground rules addressed the need for the military

to get gun camera video and weapons systems video to the media expeditiously, it did not happen, even for those embeds who were with units that took the videos.

11. Improve the Casualty Notification System

Reporting of casualties by the embeds, though not in violation of the ground rules, placed stress on military spouses because of the slow next-of-kin (NOK) casualty notification process and procedures used by the military.

E. FINDINGS

Commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and embeds identified eight concerns about the Embedded Media Program before it was implemented. The military's primary concern was about the potential for the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information by embeds while filing real-time reports—information that would compromise a mission or affect the safety of military personnel. The media's primary concern was about the degree of access the embeds would have to commanders and Service members once combat operations began and that the information they received might be too limited. The initial concerns about the program did not materialize except in a few isolated instances.

The overall assessment of the Embedded Media Program by the commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and embeds was that it was very successful and beneficial for the military, the media, the public, and the military families. In large measure, this success was the product of the trust and confidence established between the commander and the embeds assigned to his/her unit. The military and the media became advocates of the program and stated that it should be implemented during future military operations, with adjustments as necessary to meet the circumstances.

The support of the SECDEF and CJCS and detailed PA planning built the framework for success. The embeds' unprecedented and unfettered access to military units and Service members resulted in more extensive media coverage for the military than in any previous conflict and helped strengthen the military-media relationship.

Participants identified potential changes to policies and/or procedures that would make the program more effective. Most of the improvements are within the purview of the military; however, in some cases, they will require coordination with the media.

IV. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM PLANNING

Planning for the Embedded Media Program was based on previously established PA policy and doctrine. It also considered the effect of media operations during previous military operations. PAOs at all levels in the chain of command were involved in planning. The result of the planning included an initial assessment of how many embeds the units could accommodate and the issuance of PAG for the military. This PAG also contained ground rules that the embeds would have to follow.

A. RELEVANT PA POLICY AND DOCTRINE

The OIF Embedded Media Program was unique because of the large number of embedded media. However, the details contained in the 10 February 2003 PAG, including the ground rules, are generally consistent with and derived from previously existing DoD documents. What follows is an overview of Joint and Service doctrine relating to media operations in general and embedded media in particular. Other sections within this report discuss specific parts of the doctrine applicable to the topic addressed (e.g., the development of the PAG, security of information, and so forth).

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 November 2000, states,

“We in the Armed Forces of the United States must account for our actions with the American people whom we serve, by dealing openly and well with the representatives of the nation’s free press. We are also responsible for protecting classified or sensitive information related to the national security and will be challenged by the news media concerning such information. It is our duty as members of the Armed Forces to balance these demands in a responsible and intelligent fashion.”

The DoD Principles of Information are contained in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5122.5, Subject: *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA))*, 27 September 2000, and serve as the guide for all DoD PA activities. With minor changes, these principles of information were approved and reissued by the SECDEF on 9 November 2001 (see Figure IV-1).

DoD Principles of Information

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.

Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out the policy, the following principles of information shall apply:

Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.

Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with the other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has the primary responsibility for carrying out this commitment.

**Figure IV-1. DoD Principles of Information,
as Reissued by the SECDEF on 9 November 2001**

After the Persian Gulf War, bureau chiefs from major news organizations complained to the SECDEF about how the media were allowed to cover that war and the lack of support by the military. Negotiations between the Pentagon and the media representatives in April 1992 resulted in a *Statement of Principles – News Coverage of Combat*, which was to be followed in future combat operations involving American troops.¹⁵ This Statement of Principles was incorporated into DoDD 5122.5 (see Figure IV-2). These principles were applicable during OIF; however, some were not incorporated during execution of the Embedded Media Program. CENTCOM had planned for the possibility that OASD(PA) might activate the National Media Pool at the beginning of hostilities until such time that media could be embedded with operational air, ground, and naval forces, but this plan was never activated. The 10 February 2003 PAG made no mention of the

¹⁵ Frank Aukoffer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Nashville, TN, 1995.

Statement of DoD Principles for the News Media

1. Open and independent reporting shall be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Media pools (limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for news gatherings and sharing of material during a specified activity) are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, they sometimes may provide the only means of early access to a military operation. In this case, media pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (in 24 to 36 hours, when possible). The arrival of early-access media pools shall not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone shall be credentialed by the U.S. military and shall be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. Armed Forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules may result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations shall make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists shall be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military PA officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft when possible. The military shall be responsible for the transportation of pools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military shall supply PA officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and shall make those facilities available, when possible, for filing independent coverage. If Government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means available. The military shall not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. Those principles in paragraph 8., above, shall apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

Figure IV-2. Statement of DoD Principles for the News Media (April 1992)

media pool. Improved technology eliminated the need for the military to be the primary means of filing media reports because the media could file their own reports in real time directly from the battlefield. The military provided backup communications, when possible, in the event embedded media were unable to file their own reports.

Joint Pub 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997, provides the principles and doctrine for U.S. military support to the media in conjunction with military operations. It recognizes that accuracy and timeliness of information made available to the public is essential in establishing and maintaining credibility. The “DoD Principles of Information” and the “Statement of DoD Principles for News Media” are

reinforced throughout this document. It does not contain any mention of embedded media but includes guidance on support to the media, operational security and access to information, and guidelines for discussion with the media. These guidelines provide categories of information that are releasable and those categories of information that should not be released because they could jeopardize operations or endanger lives. However, the list of categories is not necessarily complete and may be adapted to each operational situation.

Doctrine for each of the Services is contained in its own PA-related publications related. They generally provide the same information and guidance as the DoD and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) documents, with appropriate modifications by the respective Service.

Doctrine for U.S. Army PA operations is contained in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Field Manual (FM) 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*, 30 May 1997. Unlike the DoD and JCS publications, it addresses the embedding of media in operational units. It states that PAOs should seek volunteer media who are willing to spend an extended period of time with soldiers during operations. Those media eat, sleep, and travel with the unit. They are authorized open access to the unit and are not escorted by PA personnel. Reporters file their stories from unit locations, and security is accomplished at the source.

PA doctrine for the Marine Corps is contained in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.3, *Marine Corps Public Affairs*, 18 January 2000. This publication also addresses the concept and value of embedding media in units. “Embedding news media into the force fosters mutual trust and understanding. Some reporters who are eager to become better educated about the military see embedding as an unparalleled opportunity. Embedding provides journalists with a unique perspective and usually results in better coverage.” The MCWP also discusses the potential benefit that reports from embedded media may have on international support for the enemy and the effect that stories may have on the enemy’s leadership and morale.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.4, *Public Affairs Operations*, 25 November 1999, discusses the principles for conducting PA operations. While not specifically addressing embedded media, it does state that “reporters covering operations should be given access to units and airmen and, whenever feasible, be included in the operation as a part of the unit. Incorporating journalists into units gives the media a unique perspective,

a chance to know airmen, and an opportunity to understand and experience the Air Force.”

Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5720.44A, *Public Affairs Policy and Regulations*, 3 June 1987 (with two changes: 19 September 1990 and 29 May 2002) contains a section on news media embarkations. Media embarks are similar to media embeds, except that embarks are usually onboard a ship for a short period of time. Usually, the embarks onboard a ship are fewer in number than the embeds during OIF, and each embark or group of correspondents having similar interests is assigned an escort officer.

B. OSD AND JCS PA PLANNING

On 28 September 2001, the ASD(PA) met with the Media Pool Bureau Chiefs.¹⁶ The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to help the media get the access they needed to do their jobs while, at the same time, protecting national security and the safety of military personnel in any future combat operations. It was explained that the Defense Department was going to exercise the media pool because of the complete turnover of personnel involved in media pool operations. The pool system is not the ideal but rather a last resort that may be the only way for the media to cover the initial few days of an operation. OASD(PA) personnel also indicated they were looking at how and where the media could be embedded in various operations. The bureau chiefs stated that they wanted people with every Service but that DoD should determine the mechanism for doing that. When the issue of censorship and security reviews was raised, the bureau chiefs were told that security at the source would be one of the principal means to ensure that no classified information is released. One bureau chief addressed the issue of rotating personnel who were embedded if it was going to be for a long period of time.

In the summer and fall 2002, during formal and informal discussions between the ASD(PA) and news bureau chiefs, access was the key element desired by the media during any future conflict. Shortly after planning began for OIF, the Special Assistant for PA in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) coordinated PA planning to ensure that it was integrated with operational planning for potential operations in Iraq.

¹⁶ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD PA Meeting with Media Pool Bureau Chiefs*, 28 September 2001.

Senior leadership support was critical to the success of the Embedded Media Program. Numerous discussions between the SECDEF and CJCS and the ASD(PA) and OCJCS Special Assistant for PA about the effect that negative reporting and enemy disinformation about OEF was having on public opinion became a key element in convincing them to support the Embedded Media Program for OIF. Unbiased media reporting directly from the battlefield could help gain information dominance and counter the enemy's ability to use disinformation. It would also minimize the time and effort expended by CENTCOM and the Pentagon to counter the enemy's false reports. It was believed that the best stories would come from the troops. They are on the front lines doing their job every day the best way they know how and, therefore, would be the best spokespersons for the military.

An Iraq PA Planning Cell was established and met 2–7 October 2002. It was chaired by the OCJCS Special Assistant for PA and had representatives from OASD(PA), CENTCOM, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) PA, and each of the Service HQ PA offices. They reviewed media operations during previous conflicts, Annex F (Public Affairs) of the Operations Plan and the OSD PAG for OEF, and current planning for OIF and addressed Service and CENTCOM concerns. After looking at the war plans and the principles of information, the planning cell concluded that employment of the DoD National Media Pool would not be effective for fast-paced operations. Likewise, having only a large number of unilateral media on the battlefield was not a good solution. An embedded media plan emerged because it was a logical solution. This cell did not focus only on an Embedded Media Program; rather, it focused on all aspects of PA operations for OIF. When the results of the PA Planning Cell were briefed to the ASD(PA), the first recommendation was to support a media embed plan. Other actions directed in the meeting that related to the Embedded Media Program included preparing a “Personal For” message about future PA operations to be sent from the SECDEF and the CJCS to the combatant commanders; providing a media training program to orient reporters who may be embedded in future operations; providing some protective equipment to the media; developing a system to rapidly access gun camera video, weapons systems video (WSV), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) footage; and determining how many reporters could be embedded.

The OSD PA concept for OIF had three objectives:

1. Dominate the news coverage of the war
2. Counter third-party disinformation
3. Assist in garnering U.S. public and international support.

OASD(PA) knew that coverage of the war would not come only from embedded media. Media organizations would also be providing reports from unilaterals on the battlefield and from CENTCOM, the Pentagon, the White House, and foreign capitals. However, OASD(PA) envisioned that the Embedded Media Program would play an important role in helping to accomplish those objectives.

A “Personal For” message, Subject: Commanders and Public Affairs, was sent by the SECDEF and CJCS to combatant commanders on 14 November 2002. It was retransmitted on 21 February 2003 for distribution to all commanders; intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications officers; and PAOs. It addressed how potential future operations can shape public perception of the national security environment. It recognized the need to facilitate access to national and international media, dedicate transportation and logistical support to move the media and their products, hold daily briefings, establish processes to rapidly disseminate authorized intelligence products, and “tell the factual story—good or bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell the story.”

Joint PA doctrine states that the ASD(PA) approves and disseminates the PAG, PA plans, and PA annexes. The CJCS ensures that PA annexes to operation plans comply with existing Joint PA doctrine and guidance. The combatant commander develops a detailed PA annex for operations plans and develops Proposed PAG (PPAG) for approval by the ASD(PA).¹⁷ The CENTCOM PAO forwarded the draft OIF Annex F (Public Affairs), and PPAG to the Pentagon in early November 2002. Recommended changes were made to Annex F, and it was returned to CENTCOM for staffing with the component commands. Simultaneously, JCS staffed it with the Service PA chiefs, and the final CENTCOM Annex F was approved early in December 2002.

¹⁷ Joint Pub 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997.

The final PAG was prepared by OASD(PA) because of the uniqueness of the media embed program and the centralized planning involved. The CENTCOM PPAG was used as the starting point for the document, but it changed considerably over time. OSD (Health Affairs) was consulted about eye inserts for gas masks and inoculations that would be offered. The OSD General Counsel was involved in discussions about operational security, the embeds' access to classified information, and the hold-harmless agreement that embeds would be required to sign. On 15 January 2003, a final PPAG was coordinated through PAOs with the State Department, JCS, CENTCOM and component commands, and the Services. Although no formal meetings about the PAG content were conducted with bureau chiefs, informal discussions were held with some key individuals in the media, who provided input for consideration by OASD(PA). Based on a bureau chief's recommendation, guidance about an appeals process related to security reviews and the confiscation of media products was added. The approved PAG was issued on 10 February 2003 (see Appendix D).¹⁸

Other messages with PAG that addressed embedded media were issued before 10 February 2003, but these messages did not address specifics about the program guidelines and implementation.

PAG on "Embedding Media for Possible Future Operations" issued by OASD(PA) on 27 November 2002 stated that many PAOs were receiving media requests to embed in possible future military operations. It directed them not to make a commitment to embed any media and concluded by stating, "If and when the President makes a decision about future military operations, the DoD will inform news media organizations about opportunities to report on and cover U.S. forces."

PAG on "Movement of Forces Into the CENTCOM AOR for Possible Future Operations" was issued to commanders on 17 January 2003 and included guidance related to media embeds. It stated, "Embedding media with air, naval, and ground forces, with the exception of special operations forces, is only authorized for coverage of unit transit into the theater of operations prior to commencement of any potential hostilities. For combat operations, DoD will implement a centralized embed program. Reporters requesting to embed for potential combat operations will be referred to OASD(PA)." The

¹⁸ The 10 February 2003 PAG is included as an appendix because it is a primary document that provided the guidance for the Embedded Media Program. Several other PAG are referenced throughout the report because they address specific topics related to the program.

purpose of this PAG was to address media travel with military units that had received a deployment order and would deploy to the CENTCOM area of operations to prepare for future contingencies. The media was not given a guarantee about embedding with a unit just because they flew to the CENTCOM AOR with that unit.

C. CENTCOM AND COMPONENT PA PLANNING

Based on media reporting during OEF and other military operations and prior experience with the media during those operations, several PAOs had concluded that some sort of large-scale Embedded Media Program should be developed to tell the story of combat operations if war erupted in Iraq. Concurrent with ongoing planning at the Pentagon, the PAOs at CENTCOM and the component commands were developing plans for some type of embed program. The U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command (ARCENT) PA staff began working on a PA plan early in 2002 and, in June 2002, briefed CENTCOM on a concept for large-scale embedding for ground forces. CENTCOM expanded the plan to include the other components and by September 2002 had prepared a draft Annex F. It was sent to the component command PAOs for their review and input. The CENTCOM representative to the Iraq PA Planning Cell in the Pentagon shared the results of that effort with the cell members. On 9–11 October 2002, the CENTCOM PAO hosted a planning conference that was attended by component command PAOs and the OASD(PA) liaison to CENTCOM. That conference also focused on all aspects of OIF PA operations, not just an Embedded Media Program. Each component PAO briefed his tentative PA plan. Additional discussion took place about Annex F, the PPAG, embedding procedures, and ground rules for the media. The component commands provided additional input to Annex F and the PPAG after the conference. This input was consolidated and forwarded to the Pentagon in early November 2002.

The CENTCOM PAO also began to identify the number of embeds that each component command could support. As a result of the briefing to the ASD(PA), the message from the OASD(PA) liaison officer was to embed the maximum number of embeds and minimize planning for the media pool because it had not been effective in the past. The Iraq PA Planning Cell originally envisioned about 240 embeds. Following the CENTCOM planning conference, the initial estimate of embeds who could be accommodated was 400.

Over the next couple of months, the CENTCOM PAO and OASD(PA) began collecting from the component command PAOs the number of embeds who could be accommodated by their ground, air, and maritime forces. The component PAO, in turn, asked the major subordinate commands to determine how many embeds they could accommodate. This decision was left to the commanders because they would be responsible for integrating the embeds into their units and providing logistical support and transportation. The aggregate numbers for the components changed over time as force planning changed.

Final numbers for Army and Marine units came through the ARCENT/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). The number of embeds was quite fluid because it was a function of which ground forces would be employed during OIF and when they would be deployed. It was a moving target, and the total planning figures for embeds to be allocated to ground units ranged from 350 to 700.

On 10–11 January 2003, the CFLCC PAO conducted a 2-day PAO meeting to discuss future PA operations, identify and resolve PA issues, or identify PA issues requiring higher HQ actions. Topics that focused on the Embedded Media Program included lessons learned from recent embedding that was conducted by elements of the 3ID and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) units conducting training in Kuwait, the media embedding concept, and media embed issues. Embedded media issues included media vehicles on the battlefield, protective and NBC equipment for embeds, training for military personnel and embeds, media equipment shortcomings, logistical support requirements for embeds, rotation vs. nonrotation policy for embeds, and the assignment process for embeds. In January 2003, the CFLCC PAO also began to conduct weekly meetings with media representatives in Kuwait to discuss embedding and other PA topics.

Each Army unit used different considerations and methods to determine how many embeds they could accommodate. The CFLCC PAO and the V Corps (VCORPS) PAO continuously revised the number of embeds that nondivisional units¹⁹ could accommodate as the task organization changed. Over time, the number increased to a combined total of 83 embeds.

¹⁹ Nondivisional units were primarily separate brigades and battalions under the direct control of the CFLCC HQ or V Corps HQ.

Originally, the 3ID PAO thought they could accommodate 25 to 30 embeds. After discussions with the division commander and chief of staff, the number was increased to 65. In November 2002, when the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3ID deployed to Kuwait to conduct training, about 200 media were in Kuwait. By December, 400 to 600 media were waiting for something to happen. The 3ID PAO proposed that the 2nd BCT train with embeds because it would be beneficial for the unit and for the reporters. The concept was to embed media with the brigade for 3 to 5 days in the field to observe training. During December 2002 and January 2003, more than 85 individuals had the opportunity to embed during various battalion- and brigade-level exercises conducted by the 2nd BCT and then the 3rd BCT. The 3ID experiment with embedded media allowed commanders to get comfortable with the media and develop embedding tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The embeds realized they needed to work with their equipment and develop procedures for filing reports. They identified problems with the durability of their equipment and its ability to withstand the elements and a need for power sources for extended periods. Based on this experience, the unit increased to 85 the number of embeds it thought it could accommodate.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (101ABN) PAO determined they could accommodate 61 embeds, based on an allocation of one per line company.

The 82nd Airborne Division (82ABN) PAO requested 16 embeds for the BCT that was scheduled to deploy. They did not ask for more embeds because they were planning to conduct airborne operations and were not sure how they would link up more embeds with the unit.

The 4th Infantry Division (4ID) PAO conducted their assessment and determined they could accommodate 65 embeds.

The 1st Cavalry Division (1CAV) PAO conducted an analysis by embedding PA personnel as embeds with a BCT during its training and gunnery. As a result, they requested 72 embeds.

The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) thought they could accommodate two embeds per squadron. The unit has four cavalry squadrons and one support squadron, so they requested 8 to 10 embeds.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) requested 12 embeds.

The 1st Armored Division (1AD) PAO had not been involved in the initial allocation process, but OASD(PA) used a planning figure of 62 embeds for the division.

The IMEF thought they could accommodate 206 embeds for the task organization and units that were planned for participation in OIF. The number of embeds was based on what they thought a battalion commander could support without the embeds being a problem. It worked out to four embeds per battalion, which was one per company and one for the battalion HQ. This included embeds for combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. Units from the 1st Marine Division (1MARDIV) and other IMEF units trained with about 40 short-term embeds in Kuwait in February 2003. Both the units and embeds gained the same valuable experience, as did the 3ID. Several hundred media also took day trips to units that allowed them to get insights into Marine training and desert conditions.

Table IV-1 is a summary of ground unit initial embed planning figures.

Table IV-1. Ground-Unit Initial Embed Planning Figures

Component	Unit	No. of Embeds	Subtotal
Army	CFLCC	33	465
	VCORP	50	
	S	85	
	3ID	61	
	101ABN	16	
	82ABN	65	
	4ID	72	
	1CAV	9	
	2ACR	12	
	3ACR	62	
1AD			
Marine Corps	IMEF	206	206
Total			671

During the October 2002 CENTCOM planning conference, the Navy did not know how many aircraft Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) would be involved in OIF. Therefore, rather than trying to determine an aggregate number, the U.S. Naval Forces CENTCOM (NAVCENT) PAO determined the number of embeds that an aircraft carrier could support. At first, the Navy planned on 20 embeds and then increased the number to a minimum of 30. This was based on their experience during OEF but was also a function of space for personnel and equipment on the aircraft carrier. The final operational plan called for 5 CSGs to support OIF, so 150 embeds could be accommodated. They did not identify the number of embeds that the other ships (small boys) (e.g., cruisers and destroyers) in a CSG could support. The intent was to offer the embeds the opportunity to embed on the small boys once they had been embedded on the aircraft carrier.

During early planning, the Air Force did not know which units would be involved and where they would go. Therefore, they based the number of embeds on the size of the air bases they planned to use in the region and on the support facilities available. Because of host-nation sensitivities about acknowledging their level of support for U.S. operations, the Air Force did not know which countries would allow media access to the air bases. The original plan was for 83 embeds at 7 locations in 5 countries (see Table IV-2).

Table IV-2. Air Force Initial Embed Plan

Country	Air Base	Embeds
Kuwait	Al Jaber AB (AJ)	10
	Ali Al Salem AB (AAS)	5
Saudi Arabia	Prince Sultan AB (PSAB)	15
Turkey	Incirlik AB (INC)	15
Qatar	Al Udeid AB (AU)	30
	Doha Int'l Airport (Commando Solo) (CS)	3
Bahrain	Shaikh Isa AB (SI)	5
Total		83

Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) planned to have embedded media, but, because of the sensitive nature of the operations, it was agreed that the embeds would be identified on a by-name basis and that they would embed with a unit only during specified missions. The media identified as potential embeds were vetted through several organizations and individuals. The proactive support and involvement by the DASD(PA) was beneficial.

D. 10 FEBRUARY 2003 PAG AND GROUND RULES

The PAG is the operational tool that guides commanders and their PAOs in the application of doctrine and policy during major military operations, exercises, and contingencies.²⁰ PA ground rules are defined as “conditions established by a military command to govern the conduct of news gathering and the release and/or use of specified information during an operation or during a specific period of time.”²¹ OASD (PA) published ground rules that the media were required to follow if they embedded. The embeds signed a statement acknowledging their understanding and acceptance of the ground rules.

²⁰ HQDA FM 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, October 2000.

²¹ Joint Pub 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997.

1. Changes to the 10 February 2003 PAG and Ground Rules

The Embedded Media Program provided for centralized planning and decentralized execution. The 10 February 2003 PAG was very specific, but a provision was provided for changes. It stated, “Any modification to the standard ground rules will be forwarded through the PA channels to CENTCOM PA for approval.”

At the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC)-Kuwait, the embedded media and those who registered as unilaterals were required to sign the CFLCC Ground Rules Agreement. Those media who registered as unilaterals also had to sign the CFLCC Ground Rules Agreement if they intended to visit any Army or Marine units. The most significant change to the ground rules for media embedded with ground units was related to casualty reporting. The 10 February PAG stated, “Battlefield casualties may be covered by embedded media as long as the Service member’s identity is protected from disclosure for 72 hours or upon verification of NOK notification, whichever is first.” The CFLCC Ground Rules Agreement stated, “Although images of casualties are authorized to show the horrors of war, no photographs or other visual media showing a deceased Service member’s recognizable face, nametag, or other identifying feature or item may be taken.” This was consistent with the wording in the PAG ground rule about release of photographs or other visual media of enemy prisoners of war or detainees. This change in policy also was continuously briefed to the media. One additional CFLCC ground rule stated that the media would not possess or consume alcoholic beverages or possess pornographic materials while embedded with coalition forces. All ground forces had the same restrictions on alcoholic beverages and pornographic materials.

NAVCENT PA prepared a ground rules document that included standard ground rules, lists of releasable and nonreleasable information, rules about wounded, injured, and ill personnel, and guidance about classified and sensitive information. The ground rules were consistent with the 10 February 2003 PAG, but embeds were required to sign them. Some areas on ships have restricted access, which also applied to the Navy personnel on the ship and depended on their security clearance and need for access. Embeds and embarks were usually not permitted access to the intelligence center, nuclear reactor area, and ready rooms, and these restrictions were included as part of the specific ground rules on board each ship.

The Air Force had additional restrictions on what could not be reported or photographed at the air bases because of host-nation sensitivities. Embeds could not name the country from which they were reporting or the name of the air base, and they could not show any imagery of host-nation people, equipment, facilities, landmarks, and so forth.

All embeds with special operations units had to agree to SOCCENT-established ground rules. The 10 February 2003 PAG ground rules were incorporated, but additional rules were applicable to SOFs. They included restrictions about discussing specific TTP and lessons learned, a requirement to remain with their designated escort at all times, and release of only general information about families of SOF personnel. The Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) embeds could not release a story without PAO escort approval to ensure that going live would not compromise any part of an ongoing mission.

2. General Assessment of the Ground Rules

The ground rules were very comprehensive and detailed. As the guiding principles for implementing the program, they were well received by those involved with the Embedded Media Program. Some specific ground rules and other topics in the PAG will be addressed in subsequent sections.

Because the ground rules had been coordinated through the PAOs and most PAOs at all levels had input, they thought the ground rules were good. They thought that some flexibility was needed to interpret and fine-tune the ground rules at subordinate levels, especially between commanders and embeds. This was necessary and important because things that are not envisioned during the planning phase can arise during the implementation phase, even after extensive staffing. Specific changes to the published ground rules were already addressed. Component command PAOs stated the guidance about security was somewhat confusing. Problems arose in interpreting guidance about classified and sensitive information, but issues were resolved between commanders and embeds. The blanket approval that authorized travel aboard DoD airlift aircraft for all embedded media on a no-cost space-available basis was good because it precluded the need to go through the extensive approval process normally required by DoD travel regulations. PAOs stated that the embeds knew the ground rules. Sometimes the embeds needed an explanation about why they could not report certain things because of how the report might affect the operation or the safety of soldiers. This was something that was not always clear to them initially, but they understood once it was explained, and no problems ensued.

All commanders were aware of the ground rules and thought, for the most part, they were logical, reasonable, fair, and appropriate. All had either read the ground rules or had been briefed on them. Many senior commanders discussed the ground rules with subordinate commanders, and their PAOs were available to clarify any questions. Most stated and were impressed that the embeds knew the ground rules well and in several instances better than the commanders, who had varying degrees of knowledge about the specific content of the ground rules. Furthermore, the embeds obeyed the ground rules and were careful not to compromise the operations or safety of the Service members. This applied to both U.S. and foreign embeds. They were aware that any violation of the ground rules could put them at risk also. When unit commanders met with their embeds, they discussed the ground rules and usually simplified them to a few short common sense rules. The commanders and embeds had no problem coming to an understanding about what the basic ground rules would be. Some commanders mentioned that the ground rules about access to sensitive and classified information were confusing and that they did not like the restriction about no media vehicles.

The bureau chiefs were satisfied with the published PAG and ground rules, which they thought were fair and reasonable. Some stated that they could probably be simplified. Most were generally satisfied with the apparent flexibility that was applied at the unit level between the commanders and embeds. Because of the confusion about access, the bureau chiefs noted that some commanders were either more or less restrictive than the ground rules stated.

The embedded media stated that the ground rules were fair and appropriate. They were clearly written and easy to understand, except for some confusion about access, which embeds resolved with their commanders. One embed stated, "Most restrictions were reasonable and did not affect the stories I wrote." Another embed stated, "No reporter wants restrictions, but they were fair about reporting on future operations." Broadcast-media embeds did not like the restriction about no media vehicles on the battlefield. Some thought the ground rules were too lengthy and overly detailed. Embeds liked the way the commanders simplified the ground rules during their initial meeting. They concurred with the commanders assessment that the embeds probably knew the ground rules better than the commanders. The embeds had read and knew the DoD ground rules very well and signed a statement acknowledging that "failure to follow any direction, order, regulation, or ground rule may result in the termination of the media

employee's participation in the embedding process."²² They received similar component command ground rules and signed another acknowledgement statement.

At an Army-sponsored workshop in September 2003, military and media personnel concluded that the eight-page list of ground rules was too lengthy to be of practical use. Most felt a simple discussion between PAOs, their commanders, and their embedded media representatives could identify workable parameters. In fact, most indicated that this simple discussion is what they did anyway. The group recommended that "embedded journalists write a follow-on set of rules and then distribute them to all participants for review and subsequent DoD approval."²³

E. FINDINGS

Existing PA policy and doctrine and an assessment of media operations in previous conflicts served as the starting point for developing the embedded media plan.

PAOs at OSD, JCS, CENTCOM, and the Component Commands worked together over a 4 to 5-month period to develop a comprehensive embedded media plan that was integrated with the operational plan and supported by the SECDEF and CJCS.

Concurrent with ongoing planning at the Pentagon and CENTCOM, the CENTCOM and component PAOs began identifying the number of embeds each component could support. The decision on the number of embeds was left to the commanders because they would be responsible for integrating them into their units and providing support. Each component and each ground unit used different considerations and methods to determine how many embeds could be accommodated.

The 10 February 2003 PAG provided PAOs and commanders the guidance, policies, and procedures for embedding media and the ground rules that embeds must agree to follow. The ground rules were very specific, but component commanders made some changes. For the most part, everyone involved in the Embedded Media Program thought the ground rules were logical, reasonable, fair, and appropriate.

²² DoD "Release, Indemnification, and Hold Harmless Agreement and Agreement Not To Sue," undated until signed by the media employee and the media organization representative participating in the embedding process.

²³ Michael Pasquarett, *Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media's Joint Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Center for Strategic Leadership, Issue Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 2003.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Review the OIF ground rules and simplify them based on what commanders and embeds actually did, what worked, and what was reasonable
- Approve and disseminate changes to ground rules made by subordinate commanders in order to minimize problems and confusion with the media concerning the original ground rules announced and any changes implemented.

V. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM PREPARATION

Preparations for the Embedded Media Program began with the process of giving media organizations embed allocations to each component and major ground unit. The media organizations designated the individual embeds, and the PAOs made the final assignments to units. DoD offered training about the military to potential embeds, and units provided focused orientations and training to embeds after they arrived. Commanders and Service members also received training to help them become familiar with the Embedded Media Program.

A. EMBED ALLOCATION PROCESS

The SECDEF approved the Embedded Media Program concept in November 2002. At that time, the decision was made that OASD(PA) would centrally plan the program. They would manage it and coordinate the identification of media organizations and the allocation of media personnel to participate in the embed program. They would also be the sole adjudicator of problems and issues identified by any military or media organization.

OASD(PA) did not dictate how many embeds would go to a unit but, instead, asked each component command to determine how many embeds the unit could accommodate without any adverse effect. Based on their input, CENTCOM provided OASD(PA) the number of embeds that each unit, CSG, and air base could accommodate. Units provided only the aggregate number they could accommodate. They were told not to make requests for specific media organization or individuals, except local media. They were also told not to make anyone any guarantees that they could embed in that unit. Not only did units with a deployment order (DEPOD) provide data, but units that had not been officially notified to prepare for deployment also provided data. By including units that were tentatively identified, OASD(PA) was able to do better contingency planning for an equitable distribution of embeds. Based on this input (discussed in the preceding section), 904 embed allocations were identified initially. The media organizations were never asked how many people they wanted to embed or where they wanted them to be embedded, although some organizations and individuals requested specific considerations.

While OASD(PA) received planning figures from CENTCOM and the component commands, they also created an initial list of media organizations that might be interested in participating in the Embedded Media Program. The list included U.S. and international media organizations whose bureau chiefs attended the ASD(PA) meetings, organizations that had requested allocations for the media training courses, and organizations that had already contacted OASD(PA) to express an interest in participating. It also included the names of the largest media organizations in terms of circulation, outlets and market share. DoD assumed that the organizations that expressed an interest in attending the media training, which was not a prerequisite for being selected for an embed assignment, were interested in participating in the Embedded Media Program or they would not have committed the resources to send individuals.

An ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting was held on 14 January 2003 to discuss some of the plans for the Embedded Media Program. Before that date, the Pentagon had been saying for some time that they were going to have an aggressive, ambitious embedding program if a future conflict occurred. The embed program would provide news organizations an opportunity to cover U.S. forces from their deployed locations. The DASD(PA) had a meeting at the State Department Foreign Press Center (FPC) on 30 January 2003 to discuss the Embedded Media Program with members of the foreign press and to answer their questions. After both meetings, transcripts were posted on the Internet so those who did not attend would have the same information.

At the meetings and in the transcript of the meetings posted on the Internet, media representatives were given the name of the OASD(PA) point of contact (POC) and his e-mail address. On the assumption that all organizations represented at the meeting wanted to participate in the Embedded Media Program, they were asked to identify a POC and provide his/her name, phone number, and e-mail address so that contact could be maintained as planning progressed. The DASD(PA) stated that the DoD preference was for the Washington Bureau Chief to be the POC because it would be most convenient; however, each media organization may have reasons for selecting someone else, so they could select whomever they thought would be best. No deadline was given for submitting POC information. It was also explained that OASD(PA) would only deal with and through the POC to coordinate media organization participation in the embed program. During the 14 January meeting, the ASD(PA) explained,

“We will insist on one point of contact for the obvious reasons, and then for the less obvious reason and the one that people don't like to talk about,

and that is people cutting deals. I cannot tell you the number of people who have come to me over the last couple of months and said, 'Hey, we've got a guy who's out in such and such and he's talking to a buddy of his who's a one star with such and such, and his buddy's telling him yeah, we'll take you along for the first three or four weeks, whatever.' The only deals that get made on the embeds for at least the initial phase as we're describing it, will be deals that are made here. We've worked this through very, very carefully with the Services, very, very carefully with Central Command. It's the only way it will work from our perspective. So if you have correspondents around the world saying to you don't worry about it, I've got it greased, I've got my colonel who's told me I'm taken care of, you need to get to him or her and say it's not a deal. Because we will come to you and say air, sea, ground, etc.—these are the number of opportunities you have. You decide how you want to plug people in. If that person's one of the people you want to plug in, fine, but that's a decision you all have to make."

After the 14 January meeting, bureau chiefs/NMRs immediately began to provide a name and contact information for the media organization POC. Not all of them were Washington bureau chiefs. They were also managing editors, foreign editors, military editors, news directors, or assignment editors. The OASD(PA) POC received more than 200 e-mails from representatives of organizations requesting to be on the list of those wanting to embed media. Before the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the OASD(PA) POC had already received more than 50 e-mails from either a bureau chief/NMR or an individual member of the organization requesting consideration for the embed program. After the announcement was made, individuals who made personal requests to embed were directed to contact their organization's POC.

The OASD(PA) POC received requests from media organizations requesting an embed allocation as late as 16 April 2003. He established a waiting list of more than 200 media organizations that did not get an embed allocation as well as organizations that wanted additional allocations if they became available. As a position became available in a unit, it was offered to a media organization on the waiting list. Many organizations asked for specific units. If they asked early enough, an effort was made to accommodate the request.

The planning figure for the distribution of embed allocations to media organizations was 70 percent national/regional, 20 percent international, and 10 percent local. Major military units were told that 10 percent of the embeds they requested could be local media. The unit should coordinate with the local media organizations interested in

participating in the program, determine how to allocate their 10 percent of local embeds to each organization, and provide that information to OASD(PA). The units were told to advise the media organizations that final approval and allocation of positions would come from OASD(PA). If a unit wanted to take more than 10 percent local media, OASD(PA) would approve it as long as they were willing to increase the overall number of embeds by that number. The media were not told the distribution formula, but they were told that the distribution of allocations would be as equitable as possible among similar types of media organizations.

One objective of the allocation process was to get thorough coverage in all media markets. The largest number of embed allocations would go to the 5 major networks and the 100 newspapers that had the largest circulations. Television networks had to allocate embed positions to their affiliates. Each of the major networks received 20 or 22 embed allocations (10 or 11 two-person teams), which were spread to all component commands and major units. The top-ranked newspapers by circulation received 9 to 11 allocations, while those at the bottom of the ranking received 2 allocations. Distribution to radio stations was also based on market share. Magazines had an informal ranking based on circulation and market audience. Although OASD(PA) had previously made a list of media organizations that might be interested in participating in the Embedded Media Program, the list that was used for actual allocations was based on those media organizations that submitted POC contact information. Therefore, as an example, not all 100 of the largest newspapers received allocations. A review of the OASD(PA) allocation database indicates only 55 of the largest 100 newspapers requested and were offered allocations.

Allocations to international media were distributed to provide coverage by all media types in all regions, especially the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, because DoD wanted people across the world to be informed about what happened. A foreign country's support for military action was not a criterion for selection. At a meeting with the foreign press, the DASD(PA) stated,

“It's in the Department's interest, this country's interest, to make sure that we have access to our forces from reporters that represent the world community out there. ... All you have to do is look at the training opportunities. Al-Jazeera has been out, trained with us, and Al-Jazeera is going to go out and embed with us. They have an embed opportunity that's been identified for them. There are a number of European organizations, Asian organizations, Middle Eastern news organizations, as well as organizations in the United States. We want to reach the world's populations

through all the reporters doing their work, but not from the standpoint of whether or not they're part of the coalition.”²⁴

An important decision made about the allocation process was that OASD(PA) would allocate embed opportunities to media organizations, and the media organization would decide which individual from that organization would go to which major military unit. It was assumed the news organization knew best whom to place where to accomplish its objectives. As the DASD(PA) stated, “There’s nobody that’s in a better position to identify individual reporters than you are. You know what your resources are, and you know where your strengths are, and you know how you want to cover any combat operations out there. So we need you to be a partner in this, and we think it’s best if you select and tell us who the individual reporters are once we come to you and say these are your embed opportunities.”²⁵

On 12 February 2003, OASD(PA) sent an e-mail to the CENTCOM and Component PAOs. This e-mail contained information and lists about the embed allocations.²⁶ Two spreadsheets provided a list of all media organizations that had been allocated embeds. It provided the number of embeds by type (ground, maritime, air), the number of embeds by specific major ground units and air bases, and contact information for the bureau chief/NMR’s POC. One list was in alphabetical order by media organization, and the other was by media type. Four rosters, one for each component command, listed embed allocations by media organization. The lists for the Army and Marines provided the allocations to the major units that had received deployment orders (DEPORDS). The Air Force list provided the allocations to each air base in the region where they wanted embeds. The PAOs were told that the media organizations soon would get a list of units to which their embeds would be assigned. The PAOs also were told to provide the list of names and organizations for their local embeds so those media organizations would get the same OASD(PA) notification as the other organizations. The rosters included 539 ground, 153 maritime, and 83 air embed allocations (see Table V-1). Included in the unit allocations were a total of 52 local embeds.

²⁴ Department of State Foreign Press Center Transcript, *Department of Defense Media Support Plan: DASD(PA) Meeting With Foreign Press Representative*, 30 January 2003.

²⁵ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

²⁶ OASD(PA) E-mail, Subject: Embed List 12 Feb 2003.xls, 12 February 2003.

Table V-1. Initial Planning Figures for Embeds

Component	Unit	Allocations	Subtotal	Local Embeds
Army	CFLCC	33	336	3
	VCORPS	51		5
	3ID	84		8
	101ABN	61		6
	82ABN	16		1
	4ID	63		6
	173ABN	16		1
	3ACR	12		1
Marine Corps	IMEF CE	4	203	
	IMEF	110		12
	1MARDIV	79		8
	15MEU	10		1
Navy	Navy	153	153	
Air Force	AJ	10	83	
	AAS	5		
	PSAB	14		
	INC	16		
	AU	30		
	CS	3		
	SI	5		
Total		775	775	52

On 12 February 2003, OASD(PA) began sending e-mails to bureau chiefs/NMRs to provide them with their organizations' embed opportunities. The e-mails provided the number of embeds by type (ground, maritime, air), the number of embeds by specific major ground units, and the number of embeds by air bases. They did not include the ultimate assignment for each embed. During the Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 27 February, the DASD(PA) stated, "When we made the decision to centralize this process, we made that decision because we wanted to make sure that the right news organization across the spectrum of international, domestic and all forms of medium got properly represented on the battlefield. But we made a conscious decision to do that down to the division level where there is a PAO and a division commander, where the embed can discuss the type of coverage he/she wants to do." To support the local and regional medias' needs for their readers and viewers, the OASD(PA) POC tried to match their embed allocations with military units in that region. E-mails were sent to 212 media organizations, with allocations to fill 731 of the 775 embed allocations in Table V-1. It did not include 44 allocations for the 82ABN, 173ABN, or 3ACR. A caveat stated that not every country hosting U.S. forces had agreed to accept journalists, so some embed opportunities might require additional time for approval and some may not be executed at all.

The e-mail contained either five attachments or one attachment and four universal resource locators (URLs). One attachment was a form that had to be completed with basic information about the individual(s) they wanted to assign to each designated unit. The only information requested was name, social security number, passport number, and country of issue. The document was to be returned to the OASD(PA) POC by 19 February 2003. The instructions also stated that on or about 21 February, another e-mail would be sent to indicate the individual POC for each unit of assignment, with guidance to make direct contact with those units. The other attachments or URLs were a letter outlining the vaccination program and procedures, specific hold-harmless agreements for the individual vaccinations (smallpox and anthrax), and a universal *Release, Indemnification, and Hold-Harmless Agreement and Agreement Not to Sue*.

After OASD(PA) received the names for the initial allocation of embeds, they sent an e-mail to the bureau chiefs/NMRs with a list of all PAOs, their military organization, and contact information (e-mail address and phone number). They were encouraged to begin direct coordination with the PAOs of the units to which their embeds were assigned. An attachment to the e-mail gave embeds who had strong prescription eyeglasses instructions on how to order prescription lenses for the biological and chemical mask.²⁷

Also on 21 February 2003, the OASD(PA) POC sent PAOs the list of embeds for their units, current as of that date, so they could prepare for the distribution of embeds to subordinate units. He advised them that the list would change over time because he had not heard from some media organizations and some media organizations had declined their embed opportunities. Because of that, he would reallocate embed allocations and provide the PAOs updated information as it became available. The PAOs were also informed that the embeds knew their unit of assignment and would be contacting them. The PAOs should only deal with embeds on their list to preclude someone trying to be embedded where they had not been assigned.²⁸ An analysis of the roster indicates that 204 media organizations, including 21 local media organizations, responded. Therefore, 183 of 212 national/regional and international media organizations provided a response

²⁷ OASD(PA) E-mail, Subject: Unit Points of Contact and Instructions for Embedded Media, 21 February 2003.

²⁸ OASD(PA) E-mail, Subject: DoD Media Embed List as of 21 Feb 03, 21 February 2003.

by the suspense date. Table V-2 indicates that OASD(PA) received 609 names for 731 allocations. The media organizations declined to fill 62 allocations. Included in the list were names for 37 local embeds. Not all units had identified and provided a list of local embeds to OASD(PA) by 12 February so not all local media organizations were formally offered embed opportunities initially. The 101ABN and 4ID requested more than their 10-percent allocation of local embeds, as permitted, based on names provided by local media.

Table V-2. Data From DoD Media Embed List (21 February 2003)

Component	Unit	Media* Responses	Declined	Names Submitted
Army	CFLCC	30	7	23
	V Corps	42	3	39
	3ID	74	6	68
	3ID (L)	4		4
	101st	44	2	42
	101st (L)	11		11
	4ID	55	4	51
	4ID (L)	12		12
Marine Corps	MEF CE	4		4
	IMEF	95	4	91
	IMEF (L)	10		10
	MARDIV	63	4	59
	MEU	8		8
Navy	Navy	137	22	115
Air Force	AJ	8		8
	AAS	5	1	4
	PSAB	15		15
	Inc	16		16
	AU	31	7	24
	CS	3	1	2
	SI	4	1	3
Total		671	62	609

* **Note for Table V-2:** Responses include names and declined allocations.

Media organizations received e-mails to fill embed allocations for other units as follows: 24 February – 82ABN (16); 7 March – 1AD (62), 1CAV (72), 3ACR (12); and 27 March – 2ACR (9). The 173ABN was attached to the 4ID, so their embed assignments were allocated by the 4ID. The SOF units got 15 embed allocations. The unit PAOs also received a list of all media organizations that had been allocated embeds for their unit. Suspense dates for responding with names were adjusted accordingly.

OASD(PA) offered media organizations a total of 917 embed allocations, which included units that did not deploy in time to participate in major combat operations (i.e., 1AD and 1CAV). The allocations went to 237 media organizations consisting of all media types. An analysis of the allocations indicates that 613 (66.8 percent) went to national/regional media organizations, 226 (24.6 percent) went to international organizations, and 78 (8.5 percent) went to local media (see Table V-3). Local media embeds represented 11.7 percent of the ground-unit allocations, excluding SOF units. Data that identify all local media organizations that received embed allocations from OASD(PA) are not available.

Table V-3. Distribution of Embed Allocations by Media Organizations

Media Type	Media Organization	Embed Allocations	Subtotal	Percentage
UE	2	3	613	66.8
UM	18	53		
UN	70	247		
UP	4	9		
UR	9	34		
US	9	47		
UT	24	191		
UW	2	29		
IM	8	10	226	24.6
IN	45	59		
IP	1	1		
IR	4	8		
IT	32	86		
IW	9	62		
Local	Not available	78	78	8.5
Total	237	917	917	100.0

As discussed previously, international media allocations were distributed to provide coverage by all media types in all regions, especially the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Table V-4 provides embed allocation data by world region based on number of media organizations and number of allocations.

During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA) told the bureau chiefs,

“Don't sell short any particular embed opportunity that you might get, only because initially it might not be perhaps the most, what you feel newsworthy type unit to be reporting on, but as the campaign develops and over time, you may find out that that unit plays a very key role in the actual operation. We don't typically deploy units that don't have a key

Table V-4. Distribution of Embed Allocations to International Media

Region	Media	Media Type						Total
		IM	IN	IP	IR	IT	IW	
Middle East	Organizations	1	8			5		14
	Allocations	2	12			16		30
Europe	Organizations	6	20	1	3	15	6	51
	Allocations	6	24	1	7	40	57	135
Asia	Organizations	1	15			9	3	28
	Allocations	2	20			22	5	49
Americas*	Organizations		2		1	3		6
	Allocations		3		1	8		12
Total	Organizations	8	45	1	4	32	9	99
	Allocations	10	59	1	8	86	62	226

* **Note for Table V-4:** *Americas, excluding the United States.*

role to play in the success of a military operation. Just like with your air, sea and land opportunities that you're going to be getting, there are going to be times when air activity is certainly more the focus of an operation or where things that are happening at sea are more the focus of, or the essence of what might be going on at a particular time.”

By the suspense date given, or shortly thereafter, media organizations returned the forms with the required information to OASD(PA). IDA reviewed all the OASD(PA) e-mails that were sent to media organizations that had allocations and also reviewed the responses. E-mails sent to media organizations accounted for 849 of the 917 allocations. Thirty-nine media organizations that declined to fill 57 allocations, and 78 media organizations that did not provide a response for 133 allocations. Some media organizations declined some allocations while accepting others. Likewise, media organizations that did not respond to some offers provided names for other allocations. A total of 109 media organizations did not provide names for 190 (22 percent) allocations. Assuming the response would be consistent if all e-mails were available for review, 202 allocations would not have been filled. Table V-5 provides data on media organization responses to the embed allocations they were offered. As time permitted, OASD(PA) coordinated with other media organizations to try and fill vacant embed allocations. The 15 initial allocations to SOF units are not included in Table V-5 because they were handled separately on an individual basis.

As discussed previously, the smallest organizations received only one allocation while the larger media organizations received more allocations, using the distribution formulas established by OASD(PA). In addition to receiving more allocations, the large

Table V-5. Allocations by Military Unit and Fill by Media Organizations

Component	Unit	Embed Allocations	Allocations in e-mails Sent	Decline	No Response	Allocations Not Filled	Allocations Filled
Army	CFLCC	33	30	6	3	9	21
	VCORPS	51	48	2	7	9	39
	3ID	84	81	1	12	13	68
	101ABN	61	54	1	8	9	45
	82ABN	16	13			0	13
	4ID	63	67	2	11	13	54
	3ACR	12	12	2	5	7	5
	2ACR	9	8				8
	1AD	62	54	4	26	30	24
	1CAV	72	60	2	29	31	29
Marines	IMEF CE	4	4				4
	IMEF	110	110	2	10	12	98
	1MARDIV	79	67	2	4	6	61
	15MEU	10	9				9
Navy	Navy	153	148	22	16	38	110
Air Force	AJ	10	10	1		1	9
	AAS	5	5	1	1	2	3
	PSAB	14	14	1		1	13
	INC	16	18	2		2	16
	AU	30	30	4	1	5	25
	CS	3	3	1		1	2
	SI	5	4	1		1	3
Total		902	849	57	133	190	659

media organizations had allocations distributed to more of the units shown in Table V-5. Of the 237 media organizations that received allocations, 112 (47.2 percent) had an allocation to 1 unit, 90 (38.0 percent) had allocations to 2 to 4 units, and 35 (14.8 percent) had allocations to 5 to 13 units. Appendix E provides data on media organization allocations by type of media and the number of units to which they received allocations.

Based on interviews with bureau chiefs/NMRs, they were satisfied with the number of embed allocations they received and thought the process was fair. When the allocations were made, they were not sure if they were getting the same opportunities as their competitors, since no consolidated allocation roster was provided to the media. However, they believed that OASD(PA) would do their best to be fair. Large media organizations expected to get more embed allocations than small media organizations. They also stated that they received more than they had anticipated.

Most media organizations filled all their embed allocations, but others did not for various reasons. Large organizations did an assessment of how they thought they could get the best coverage from their embeds. They understood that not all embeds would be at the “tip of the spear” and realized that the military wanted to have coverage for all types of units. However, some media organizations did not think that a long-term embed with a CS or CSS unit would get newsworthy information, even though he/she would get some good human-interest stories. After a while, the amount of material to report from some ground units that were not in or near the action or from a ship would dwindle. Because the media organization could only assign an embed to a major unit, they realized that the embed would have to try and get a “good” assignment within the unit. Some media organizations that initially filled allocations subsequently turned them down once the final assignment to a specific unit was made or after the embed went to a unit and stayed a short period of time. All media organizations wanted embeds with ground units, but for small media organizations that only received one or two allocations, this did not always happen. Several of these media organizations received an allocation only to an aircraft carrier or air base, but realized that it was “the luck of the draw.” Some allocations were declined because the media organization did not think these allocations would meet the needs of their readers or viewers. Others decided not to fill a position because of cost considerations. Some organizations provided names of embeds for air bases that were not able to accept them, such as Al Udeid AB, Qatar, or to a unit that did not deploy, such as the 1CAV. A few media organizations were satisfied not to be with a combat unit because of concerns about safety for their embed. Some media organizations that could not fill all their allocations made arrangements with other organizations to share reports (e.g., a newspaper embed did call-ins with a television network, a local embed provided material to a local television station, a news service gave allocations to a broadcast organization in return for them filing reports, and a wire service had an arrangement to get additional pictures from a photography agency).

News articles discussed hopes and concerns about the allocation process and the decisions that bureau chiefs made about filling allocations. Sandy Johnson, the Associated Press (AP) Washington bureau chief, laid out the best-case scenario: “... that you’d get lucky and wind up with a unit that sees real action ... that you would be the first Western journalist with the U.S. military” during a march into Baghdad. The worst, she said, would be “that ‘embeds’ wind up in a blackout situation where they are not allowed

to file until after everything is over. It is up to the local commander, and we did see that happen in the [first] Gulf War.”²⁹

Another news article reported that the Pentagon offered Cox Newspapers eight allocations, but Cox gave five of them to the Cable News Network (CNN) in exchange for freelance contributions. Susan Stevenson, deputy managing editor of the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, Cox’s flagship paper, said, “We couldn’t afford to fill all of them. Covering war is expensive, and trying to cover the war in an objective and fair way is probably even more expensive.” The *Baltimore Sun* turned down two of its four allocations—one on an aircraft carrier and one at an air base in Turkey—because they seemed unlikely to produce much frontline news.³⁰ Based on OASD(PA) data, the newspaper did fill allocations for the 101ABN and 1MARDIV.

Mark Silverman, publisher and editor of the *Detroit News*, had no plans to send local talent. “I would love to send people to Iraq to get stories if the stories would be as good as or better than something I could get from AP, *USA Today*, the *Washington Post*,” he explained. “You send people into a war zone for two reasons: if you have the expertise that allows you to do meaningful coverage or if you have some good local ties.”³¹ Based on data from several sources, the *Detroit News* was not offered any allocation initially; however, the newspaper did have one embed each with the IMEF and on the USS *Lincoln*.

Steve Sweitzer, news operations manager at WISH-TV, a Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) affiliate in Indianapolis, Indiana, took the same position. He stated, “We don’t have the resources to cover the war. We see our charge as covering our backyard. If we could send a crew to cover Indiana troops, our interest would be much higher. The station will turn to CBS and CNN for coverage of frontline action.”³² That station did not request any embed allocations and did not subsequently send any embeds to cover the war.

²⁹ Sherry Ricchiardi, “Preparing for War,” *American Journalism Review*, 1 March 2003.

³⁰ Howard Kurtz, “Media Weigh Costs, Fruits of ‘Embedding,’” *Washington Post*, 11 March 2003.

³¹ Sherry Ricchiardi, “Preparing for War,” *American Journalism Review*, 1 March 2003.

³² Sherry Ricchiardi, “Preparing for War,” *American Journalism Review*, 1 March 2003.

B. EMBED ASSIGNMENT PROCESS

1. Prerequisites for Embeds

OASD(PA) allocated positions to the media organizations and let the media determine who would go to which major units. Neither the military nor media believe that the military should be involved in specifying criteria for embeds beyond the requirement to be physically fit and healthy. The “Statement of DoD Principles for News Media” (see Figure IV-2) includes the agreement that “news organizations shall make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.”³³

All PAOs and commanders agreed that media organizations should select the individuals to be embedded. Their primary expectations were that embeds would be in good physical condition and have some previous experience reporting on the military or covering a conflict overseas. Some ground commanders had embeds who were not physically prepared for the harsh conditions or psychologically prepared to go into combat. These embeds departed before the unit crossed the border into Iraq. The commanders stated that the embeds in their units came with a wide range of experience—from those who had none to those who had covered the military and conflicts for 15 years or more. The media organizations need to send qualified people who at least know the fundamentals of the Service they are covering. It was evident to commanders which embeds had not done any background research before they joined the unit. Those who were more knowledgeable fit into the unit better and faster than those who did not, and the quality of their reporting was better. Because bureau chiefs had selected professionals, those who did not know much when they arrived were fast learners and filed excellent reports. It just took longer. With few exceptions, commanders were satisfied with the quality of the embeds assigned to their units.

The bureau chiefs/NMRs who were interviewed were unanimous in stating that the military should not stipulate any criteria for selection of embeds, except the requirement that they be physically and medically fit for the assignment. The media organizations selected their embeds based on experience and maturity. All were volunteers, and many had experience covering conflicts or had had other overseas assignments. One

³³ DoDD 5122.5, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)), 27 September 2000.

bureau chief stated that even stipulating age and weight requirements would be wrong. Based on a review of the database provided by the CPIC-Kuwait, the oldest embed was 75 and was embedded with a 1MARDIV artillery battalion. The second oldest embed was 69 and was embedded with an infantry rifle company in the 3ID. His managing editor, Robert Rosenthal, stated, “We looked at the perspective he would bring from having covered the Gulf War before, his ability and his drive. He doesn’t just sit around waiting for stories to come to him. All that outweighs any concern about his age.”³⁴ The youngest embed was 23. One embed who traveled with a combat unit weighed 300 lbs when he arrived. The unit was concerned about his health, ability to keep up, and safety, but, based on interviews, he did an outstanding job because of his previous experience reporting on conflicts around the world, his professionalism, and his personality. The bureau chiefs/NMRs were pleased that OASD(PA) allowed them to make the selection internally within their organization.

The embeds interviewed also thought the media organizations should determine who would be embedded. DoD-stipulated prerequisites could undermine the credibility of the journalist with his peers and with the readers and viewers. Embeds stated that they should do a self-evaluation to determine if they are physically fit and able to withstand the rigors of combat operations and the harsh environment, especially if they are going to accompany a ground combat unit. The embeds thought that those embeds who were not physically fit would endanger the members of the unit and themselves.

2. Media Selection and Assignment Process

Bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that they worked diligently to select the best individuals and that all embeds were volunteers. Some of those selected had heard about the program and volunteered, and others were asked if they wanted to participate. Those who were asked had no pressure to embed because they still had to be a volunteer. The main selection criteria were the quality and experience of the writer, photographer, reporter, or cameraman. The bureau chiefs/NMRs considered, not in any particular order, previous assignments covering the military, experience covering armed conflicts, prior military experience, and overseas experience. The potential embeds had to be in good physical and medical condition to withstand the rigors of the assignment they were given.

³⁴ Michael Liedtke, “Reporter Doesn’t Let Age Keep Him Off War’s Front Lines,” AP, *Mercury News*, San Jose, CA, 21 March 2003.

The selection of embeds was done either by a committee or a single bureau chief, editor, and so forth depending on the type and size of the media organization. They tried to anticipate where the toughest assignments would be and assigned their best people there. In addition to the criteria listed earlier, they took into account the media organization's needs and objectives in reporting about the war and the desires of the individual. They also considered any close relationship a potential embed had with a unit on their allocation list or a commander in that unit. Many of those selected had covered a unit in the first Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, or Afghanistan and were assigned to that unit. News services with newspapers near installations with deploying units usually matched the embed from that paper with that unit. One organization that had several allocations selected only individuals who had experience overseas or covering conflicts. A few organizations, especially the smaller ones, had nobody with any exposure to the military so they selected someone with excellent journalistic skills.

Foreign media organizations generally used the same criteria as the U.S. organizations. In addition, they considered the English-speaking ability of the embed and his/her knowledge and experience covering the U.S. military or events in the United States. In some cases, the embed's citizenship was a factor because of the ease or difficulty of getting a visa to enter certain Middle East countries.

Embeds selected to accompany SOFs were handled separately. In some cases, OASD(PA) identified a specific individual to the media organization, or the organization was asked to identify someone and provide information about that individual's experience and suitability for the assignment. The individual was carefully vetted because of concerns about being embedded with these particular units. No effort was made to select anyone based on the story that would be filed; rather, selections were made on the ability to work with a certain type of unit and interact effectively with members of that unit.

Many of the embeds interviewed stated that they had prior military experience, previous assignments covering the military, overseas experience, and/or experience covering armed conflicts. Those who had no prior experience thought they were well qualified in their profession and that they would do well as an embed who had prior experience. The motivation to be an embed varied. All realized that it was an opportunity to cover a big story. Those who had covered the military during peacetime wanted to cover it in wartime. Many wanted to report on the war from the perspective of the individual warfighter or get an in-depth understanding of how war is fought and report it to the readers/viewers accurately and honestly. Their comments about the selection process within

the media organization were similar to those of the bureau chiefs/NMRs. After volunteering and being selected for an embed assignment, some stated that they had a choice of unit because of experience and seniority, some provided their input about assignment preference, and others were told to which unit they would be assigned. None expressed any dissatisfaction with the selection process.

On a more practical level, most of the embeds—and especially those who did not have any exposure to the military—thought they should engage in self-study to learn as much as they could about the military and the unit they were going to join. The embeds would have preferred advanced notice about the specific unit they would accompany so they could learn more about it. Learning about a particular division would be good, but learning about the missions, capabilities, weapons, and equipment of a specific brigade, battalion, or company would be better. Usually, the embeds did not find out the specific unit with which they would embed until a couple of days before they joined the unit.

a. Reporter-Photographer Teams

Embeds from print-media organizations were distributed on the basis of one per unit. During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 27 February 2003, a bureau chief asked, "We like to send a reporter and a photographer together. Can I get your thinking on that?" The DASD(PA) stated,

"We're still at the point where all these embed opportunities are single embed opportunities. The television ones are two person, and I know there are some news organizations that would prefer to, if they were given two embed opportunities, to take them into one unit as opposed to two units, but I've got to tell you that the majority of you out there have fallen on the other side of the fence in that you don't want half as many opportunities that you would be afforded by doubling up, and that most of you have elected to express your desires to us to give you the maximum amount of opportunities even if they're not in the same division. So, they still are currently one-person embed opportunities. A lot of you have done some very interesting and creative management in terms of your relationships with other news organizations, and the way that you have arranged to have reporters and photographers from different news organizations work together in the same unit and vice versa in a different unit."

Print organizations wanted to have a reporter-photographer team because the pictures that accompany an article provide a more powerful story for the reader. A regional newspaper bureau chief/NMR stated that the stories his embed wrote were great, but they would have been better with pictures. A magazine bureau chief/NMR stated that his

photographer got terrific combat photographs, but he was not very good at writing the story to explain the events. One large print organization did not send any photographers as embeds. The bureau chief stated, “It made no sense to split a team because the pictures would not fit the story.” Their solution was to use wire-service photographs. Another bureau chief stated, “Wire services and photo agencies existed so it would not be necessary to have a photographer with every reporter at every event.” A local paper bureau chief/NMR stated, “It was especially important for small papers doing interviews with local soldiers to have a photographer because it meant so much to the military families back home to see as well as read about their loved ones.” The news services had the best opportunity to pair reporters and photographers because of the allocations they received. In some cases, both the news service and papers owned by the news service had embed allocations. To get a reporter-photographer team, they would pair a reporter from one paper with a photographer from another paper and assign them to the same unit. In other cases, they would list the reporter from the paper that received the allocation and the photographer from the news service and then assign them to the same unit. Even if a large print organization received two allocations to the same major unit, the PAOs were told they could only assign one individual from that media organization to a subordinate unit. However, the PAOs tried to accommodate requests to pair a writer and photographer in the same unit whenever possible.

Of the 184 embeds representing newspapers and magazines, 82 (46 percent) were a member of a reporter-photographer team. Table V-6 shows the distribution of the 41 reporter-photographer teams. These teams represented national, international, and local newspapers and magazines.

Table V-6. Distribution of Reporter-Photographer Teams

Unit	R-P Teams	Unit	R-P Teams
CFLCC	1	1MARDIV	8
VCORPS	1	MEG	1
3ID	9	1FSSG	4
101ABN	5	24MEU	1
82ABN	4	USS <i>Lincoln</i>	3
4ID	2	USS <i>Kitty Hawk</i>	1
3ACR	1		

b. Broadcast Teams

The OASD(PA) plan was to allocate broadcast media two embeds per unit in order to have a reporter-cameraman team. Some broadcast media requested that an engineer and/or a technician be allowed to accompany their embed team, especially with

teams that accompanied ground units. The third person would be used to set up and maintain a transmission capability. However, OASD(PA) would not allow it. Some broadcast teams did take their own vehicles and therefore had three or four-man teams. The issue of vehicles for broadcast media is detailed later.

c. Embed Allocations for Television Affiliates

The large broadcast-media organizations [i.e., the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), CBS, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), CNN, and FOX] were given allocations for 10 or 11 two-person teams. The difference came with allocations to air bases, so that all seven air bases would have national television coverage. OASD(PA) expected the networks to select the teams from their own stations or from their affiliate stations. The major networks did not like the requirement because it meant they would have to give up some of their allocation to a local network over which they had no control. One bureau chief stated, “Most affiliates are not owned by the network, and we do not know the quality of the reporters. The military unit should decide what embeds should come from local affiliates because they know the station and the people who do the reporting.” Local stations agreed and viewed it from their perspective. Although coordination may exist on some level, a local affiliate not owned by the network gets little support from a major network. An affiliate representative stated, “It does not work like a partnership, and it would not work out to expect the network to allocate embeds to a local affiliate. It is not in their best interest.” Another issue was related to working with affiliates. Although a local station may be affiliated with a major network, it may also be owned by a news service. A review of media organizations that were offered embed allocations indicated that none of the initial allocations went to an affiliate television station, except for those requested by PAOs as part of their 10-percent local embeds. Most of the divisions had several local television stations and to give them all allocations would mean the unit had to increase the total number of local embeds beyond 10 percent. Based on actual embed data, this is exactly what happened.

3. Military Embed Assignment Process

OASD(PA) knew that most media wanted to have their embed(s) with the first unit into combat or in a unit that would see considerable combat; however, OASD(PA) also wanted to have embeds with ground units assigned not only to combat units, but also to CS and CSS units. Spreading embeds across all types of military units could be done with large media organizations that received many allocations, but small media

organizations, such as a single market newspaper, only received one or two allocations. Each major-unit PAO was provided a roster of all embeds and their media organization that were scheduled to embed with the unit. The PAOs, in conjunction with the commanders, further allocated embeds to subordinate units, ships, and air bases. Major-unit PAOs were encouraged to use the same philosophy as OASD(PA): distribute embeds to maximize coverage across all types of media and all media markets. PAOs and some of the media organizations engaged in limited switching of embeds.

Military commanders stated that embeds should be in all types of units so the story of their soldiers can be told. It is good for the public, the military families, and troop morale. Commanders also thought that having U.S. embeds in a unit was important. Some small units only had international media, who reported to their market but could not be followed by the American public because of language differences. Families did follow the English-speaking international embeds' reports by reading them on that media's Web site.

a. CPIC-Kuwait

All media who wanted to report on military ground forces had to register with the CPIC-Kuwait, located in the Kuwait City Hilton Hotel. This applied to unilateral media (media not embedded with units) and to embedded media. If the embed was already overseas, in the region, or elsewhere or if the unit had already deployed, he/she had to register at the CPIC before joining the unit. If an embed was assigned to a unit in the United States and the unit had not deployed, he/she joined the unit at home station. After arriving in Kuwait with the unit, those embeds were still required to register at the CPIC.

The PA personnel at the CPIC accomplished four tasks:

1. Registered all media and provided their credentials (a badge indicating whether the individual was an embed or unilateral)
2. Issued NBC protection equipment to embeds who arrived in Kuwait before joining a unit
3. Trained embeds in the use of NBC equipment
4. Provided anthrax and smallpox shots to embeds who wanted the shot(s).

Every individual—embed or unilateral—who registered and received a badge signed a copy of the CFLCC ground rules.

The CPIC-Kuwait maintained a database of all registered media. It was provided to IDA and used to determine which individuals were embedded with ground units. The database contained 48 data elements that were to be entered for each individual. Three individuals entered data, which led to inconsistencies in how the data were entered for similar data elements. Some data were incorrect, and other entries were incomplete. If an individual's status changed, the database was updated but previous information was lost. After correcting data entries for errors and inconsistencies wherever possible, the database served as another useful source of information on the Embedded Media Program.

A total of 2,870 individuals registered with the CPIC-Kuwait. The database showed that 558 media embedded with U.S. forces, which includes 539 with ground forces and 19 that went to air bases. Also, 150 media were registered to accompany UK forces and 4 were registered to accompany Australian forces. The embeds with the UK and Australian forces were not part of the DoD Embedded Media Program. The UK embed program was similar to the DoD program, but it was totally planned and executed by the United Kingdom. Because the UK forces were part in the IMEF task organization, the IMEF PAO tracked them for personnel accountability. A total of 2,158 media were registered as unilaterals. Table V-7 details the distribution of embeds to the units.

Table V-7. Distribution of Embeds (CPIC-Kuwait Database)

Organization	Number	Subtotals
CFLCC	30	539
V CORPS	51	
3ID	85	
101ABN	75	
82ABN	19	
4ID	54	
2ACR	4	
3ACR	6	
Special Operations	10	
USMC	205	
Air Force	19	19
United Kingdom	150	154
Australia	4	
Unilaterals	2,158	2,158
Total	2,870	2,870

Even though several hundred media were in the region from late 2002, registrations did not begin until 21 February 2003. They continued until 10 May 2003, when the CPIC stopped registering the media at the CPIC-Kuwait and media operations transferred to Iraq. By 19 March 2003, the day before the start of the war, 455 embeds (82 percent)

and 1,251 unilaterals (58 percent) had registered. By the time Baghdad fell on 9 April, 531 (96 percent) embeds and 1,874 (87 percent) unilaterals had registered. The last embed registered on 21 April and the last unilateral registered on 10 May. Of the 72 embeds who registered between 1 and 21 April, 42 indicated they were embedding with the 4ID. Sixty (11 percent) female embeds registered with the CPIC. The embeds represented 199 different media organizations.

Based on database entries, it cannot be determined when individuals disembedded. The assumption in the original plan was that as embeds departed the unit to which they were assigned, they would return to Kuwait, but many did not do so. The data on those who did return is also not reliable. Disembedding is discussed later in this report.

b. Ground-Unit Assignments

Assignment of embeds to ground units was done by the major-unit PAOs in coordination with their commanders. At each level within Army and Marine units, an effort was made to provide a good mix of media types. No standardized procedures were in place for assigning embeds within the major units. Some Army units did not deploy or deployed late, so some embeds assigned to those units were able to get an embed assignment in another unit. Others scheduled to embed either did not deploy to the region or went there and covered the war as a unilateral.

In addition to the divisions assigned to VCORPS, nondivisional units were assigned to the CFLCC and VCORPS. Embeds had already been allocated for those CFLCC and VCORPS units; however, if those units determined they could accommodate additional embeds, the PAOs would try to get more writers and photographers from among those media at the CPIC-Kuwait who were hoping to embed. Embeds were not assigned to units that were not likely to cross into Iraq during the war. For those units, the PAOs coordinated day trips for the media who were in Kuwait City and could not get an embed assignment. The CFLCC units had 29 embeds, and the VCORPS units had 42 embeds.

The 3ID asked for 85 embeds and initially received names for 72. The division PAO recruited more embeds from the CPIC-Kuwait and eventually had 84. The division Command Post (CP) had a print reporter and a broadcast team. The remainder of the embeds went to subordinate units. Commanders had established good relationships with some media who participated in the mini-embed opportunities during their November 2002–January 2003 training in Kuwait, so the PAO tried to match embeds with those

units. The embeds had asked their media organization to assign them to the 3ID, and then they coordinated with the PAO for their subsequent assignment. No 3ID embeds deployed from Ft. Stewart, Georgia, with their assigned units. All of them, including local embeds, joined the unit in Kuwait on 11 March 2003. Several members of the media who covered the departure of the 3ID from Ft. Stewart subsequently embedded with the division in Kuwait.

After talk about an Embedded Media Program began, the 101ABN PAO received more than 30 requests from individuals representing national and local media stating they would like to embed with the unit if a war in Iraq erupted. He never made any promises, but he told the media that he would record their interest. The unit received its DEPORD on 10 February 2003. On 21 February, the PAO received a roster with 53 embed names and their media organizations in an e-mail from OASD(PA). He sent an e-mail to all embeds on the roster and told them to report to Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, on 25 February. They were welcomed, in-processed, given an orientation, issued protective equipment, and provided some training. He developed a plan to disburse embeds to the battalions, but brigade commanders could make changes as they thought appropriate. The division eventually had 79 embeds in Iraq.

Local embeds deployed with the 82ABN from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and the national and international media joined them in Kuwait. The PAO coordinated with the commanders on embed assignments before the embeds arrived and dispersed them throughout the unit. They had originally planned on 16 embeds but had 20 embeds while they were in Kuwait and Iraq.

The 4ID originally planned for 65 embeds but ended up with 58 embed names. In early February 2003, the PAO sent a letter to each embed telling him/her to report to Ft. Hood, Texas. They were provided a list of recommended personal equipment and told that they would receive some training and NBC equipment. The embeds stayed in a hotel in Killeen, Texas, the adjacent town, but made daily trips to the post and units. They in-processed and were issued equipment the first 2 days and then received about 10 days of training. The PAO developed a distribution plan to spread the coverage by media types and markets. Embeds were assigned to each brigade and the CS and CSS units, at which time they met their UPAR and spent some time with the unit. After it became clear that the division would not enter Iraq through Turkey, the division was not sure when it would deploy. Without a specific departure date, they let the embeds go, with a 48-hour recall for their flight to Kuwait with the unit. Some embeds dropped out and tried to

embed with other units or go as unilaterals. Four embeds joined the 173ABN in Italy and deployed with them to Northern Iraq when the brigade was attached to the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N). The 4ID had 51 embeds when they entered Iraq. The division did not deploy until 28 March to Kuwait. The division entered Iraq in mid April.

OASD(PA) had 12 embed allocations for the 3ACR, but media organizations only filled 5 of them initially. The unit eventually had eight names of embeds, but only four media were ultimately embedded with the 3ACR in Iraq. Two local embeds deployed with them from Ft. Carson, Colorado, and two joined the unit in Kuwait.

From the original 9 allocations for embeds, the 2ACR ended up with 13 names of embeds. Embeds in the United States came to Ft. Polk, Louisiana, and deployed with the unit in April 2003. Some embeds who deployed from Ft. Polk joined other units when they got to Kuwait. The unit had four embeds when they entered Iraq.

The 1AD in Germany received 62 embed allocations, which also included embeds for their 3rd Brigade at Ft. Riley, Kansas. Media organizations provided 21 names, and the PAO contacted each individual. The PAO assigned most of them to the BCTs and a few to the separate battalions. The plan was to have the embeds join their assigned unit either in Germany, Ft. Riley, Kansas, or Kuwait; however, not one embed went with them to Iraq because they all decided it would be too late. After the unit began SASO, beginning 25 May 2003, four embeds were with the division.

The 1CAV at Ft. Hood, Texas, wanted a large number of local embeds in addition to national and international embeds. The 72 allocations from OASD(PA) included 14 local embeds. The media organizations provided 26 names of embeds, mostly from smaller organizations that did not have embeds already. Other media organizations probably thought that the unit would not deploy or that it would arrive too late. Because the 1CAV did not deploy to Iraq in time to participate in combat operations, some of the embeds were assigned to the 4ID.

OASD(PA) distributed embeds to four different Marine organizations: the IMEF Command Element (IMEF CE), IMEF, 1MARDIV, and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15MEU). Embeds for Reserve units were planned if IMEF knew in advance that a reserve unit would deploy to Iraq. The PAOs knew the general battle plan for combat operations and took that into consideration when making assignments to ensure good coverage. The embeds were picked up at the CPIC-Kuwait and taken to their units on

10–11 March 2003. The Marines also took additional embeds from among the journalists who were waiting in Kuwait trying to get an embed allocation if one became available. The IMEF CE had four embeds as allocated by OASD(PA). The IMEF PAO wanted the option to identify the embeds for the CE from among all embeds assigned to IMEF as was done by VCORPS. Having the right individual is important because considerable time is spent building relationships, establishing trust, and getting a journalist to understand and be able to report on a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In the end, changes were made, and, although four embeds were with the IMEF CE, a broadcast team was replaced by embeds from two newspapers.

The IMEF units, not including the 1MARDIV and 15MEU, had 110 embed allocations. The media responded initially with 101 names, but the units had 108 embeds in Kuwait. The 15MEU PAO originally was to have 10 embeds but ended up with 13 embeds after a reserve battalion joined them. The 15MEU PAO discussed with embeds where they would be assigned and tried to accommodate any requests for changes. Eighteen embeds were assigned to the 3MAW—5 at Al Jaber AB and 13 at Ali Al Salem AB. They assigned fewer embeds at Al Jaber AB because the Marine attack squadrons with fixed-wing aircraft were based there. With no opportunity to fly in the aircraft, the embeds were limited to interviewing pilots and support personnel and taking pictures of plane take-off and landings. To provide them additional reporting opportunities, the PAO arranged day trips to other bases whenever possible. Various Marine helicopter squadrons were based at Ali Al Salem AB. Embeds at Ali Al Salem AB could fly aboard the medium- and heavy-lift helicopters, go to camps where Marines were located, get stories, stay a couple of days if they wanted to, and return to Ali Al Salem AB.

After the 1MARDIV PAO received the 59 embed names and their media organizations, he made assignments to subordinate units. He tried to honor the requests of media who coordinated early, especially those who had worked with them in the past and had established relationships with units or commanders. When possible, reporters and photographers also were embedded in the same unit as opposed to different units within the division. As time passed, the division PAO tried to move embeds around to accommodate wishes (e.g., an embed assigned to an artillery unit who asked to be moved to an infantry unit to get closer to the combat action). Some embeds who had been embedded in IMEF support units were also allowed to embed in divisional units. The division eventually had 85 embeds.

c. Navy Embed Assignments

The NAVCENT PAO had requested 150 embeds—30 for each of the 5 CSGs that were scheduled to participate in OIF. Three carriers were part of NAVCENT and the U.S. 5th Fleet operating in the Persian Gulf: the USS *Lincoln*, USS *Constellation*, and USS *Kitty Hawk*. Two carriers were part of the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean: the USS *Truman* and USS *Roosevelt*. The CPIC-Bahrain and CPIC-Kuwait maintained similar database to track all embeds and embarks, and these databases were provided to IDA. The PAO originally received a roster with 115 embed names but ended up with 110 embeds spread among the 5 CSGs. He split television networks and wire services among the aircraft carriers. Although no local embeds were on the roster, he put embeds from media organizations close to the homeport of a carrier on that carrier. Embeds from European media organizations were put on the USS *Truman* and USS *Roosevelt* operating in the Mediterranean since it was easier for them to fly to Cyprus. Most embeds from Asian media organizations were assigned to the USS *Kitty Hawk* because her homeport is Yokosuka, Japan. The embeds were flown on Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) aircraft³⁵ to the aircraft carriers from the CPICs in Bahrain and Cyprus over the course of a week beginning about 7 March 2003. Although embeds were assigned to aircraft carriers, they were also offered the opportunity to embed for a short period of time on other ships in the CSG (e.g., destroyers and cruisers). Twenty-five embeds took advantage of this opportunity and embedded on two or more ships during their embed (see Appendix F, Table F-1). On some aircraft carriers, the embeds berthed with the sailors, and, on other aircraft carriers, some sailors were relocated so all embeds were billeted together.

d. Air Force Embed Assignments

The Air Force requested 83 embeds, and the media provided 70 names for 7 locations. Most embeds assigned to air bases were unable to embed at those locations because of host-nation sensitivities. The wing commander at Al Jaber AB, which was originally scheduled to have 10 embeds, was asked to take more embeds since embeds were not allowed at the other air bases as originally planned. As a result, the Air Force had 24 embeds. Eighteen embeds were at Al Jaber AB and two embeds were at Ali Al Salem

³⁵ A COD is a C-2A aircraft designed to land on aircraft carriers. It provides critical logistical support to CSGs. The primary mission is the transport of high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between carriers and shore bases. Source: United States Navy Fact File, <http://www.chinfonavby.mil/navpalib/factfile>.

AB, Kuwait. One embed was with the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) located with the CFLCC HQ. Although not in the original plans, an Air National Guard (ANG) unit brought three local embeds with them. The unit was part of the Expeditionary REDHORSE³⁶ Group located with the CFLCC at Camp Arian, Kuwait. All embeds reported to Kuwait and were taken to Al Jaber AB. The two embeds who were assigned to Ali Al Salem AB were then taken there.

e. SOF Embed Assignments

The embeds were not embeds for life but were embedded for brief periods of time. Some came from other major units or went to embed with other major units. They were told where to report outside of Iraq so that they could link up with their respective units before they deployed, but doing that as planned was difficult because of host-nation sensitivities. Some rotation of embeds within the subordinate units gave them more exposure to different types of special operations (e.g., operational detachments, civil affairs, psychological operations, and so forth). During the period of combat operations, 25 embeds accompanied subordinate units on some of their missions. The 173ABN accommodated the desires of the embeds with respect to unit assignments. They were embedded at the brigade, battalion, and company level. The number of embeds assigned to SOFs, considering their missions, provided adequate coverage.

f. Local Media and Equitable Distribution of Allocations

From the small-unit commander's perspective, the local media are more important because they provide a link to military families and the community. Having a local embed was good because the unit and the media had invested time in establishing a relationship and the local embed already had gained an in-depth understanding of the unit. However, they all understood and supported the need to have national and international embeds. For some PAOs and local media organizations, the local embed policy and procedures were confusing. Some PAOs expressed frustration at the need to get approval for their local embeds because of OASD(PA)'s desire to avoid the appearance of favoritism to any particular media organization. PAOs understood the desire to ensure a balance of media types across all military units, but they did not think

³⁶ REDHORSE is an acronym for Rapid Engineering Deployable Heavy Operation Repair Squadron Engineers. Red Horse teams are mobile civil engineer units that perform heavy repairs and upgrade airfields and facilities.

any significant problems or concerns would arise if the differences in distribution for similar media organizations were slight. When a local paper was owned by a news service that had also been given embed allocations, OASD(PA) was concerned that approving a local embed might give that news service more embeds than another news service. A news service using its own criteria (e.g., select an embed from a paper with a broad market coverage) already may have filled their allocations. The same concerns were related to local affiliate television stations.

OASD(PA) made every effort to be fair and equitable in the distribution of embed allocations among types of media and the markets. However, because of the many relationships among media organizations, trying to determine what is fair and equitable is difficult. “More and more media organizations—newspapers, magazines, television networks, Web sites—are forming globe-spanning, interlocking, and often-cyclic partnerships with each other; some paid, others not. In an effort to hold budgets in line while expanding out of their traditional niches, newspapers give stories to each other, print reporters appear on television news shows, and Web sites link to newspapers, television networks and magazines (see Figure V-1). For instance, London’s *Financial Times*, which has a U.S. circulation of just 135,000, now has its articles seen by the *Los Angeles Times*’ 1 million daily readers. In return, the *Los Angeles Times* now has its work read in the dozens of countries where the *Financial Times* circulates. Most major news organizations have struck partnership deals. Gannett Company’s 100 papers have agreements with 44 local television stations across the country to share content. The company’s 22 television stations also partner with 48 newspapers and radio stations.”³⁷ A review of OASD(PA) data indicates that 24 of 71 U.S. newspapers that were offered embed allocations are owned by 8 of the 9 news services that were also offered embed allocations (see Table V-8).

C. ANALYSIS OF EMBED ASSIGNMENTS

Previous data provide details on the number of initial embed allocations and the response by media organizations to fill those allocations. All available data were used to determine how many individuals were actually embedded in units during the period of

³⁷ Frank Ahrens, “Media Giants Getting Together, Firms See Partnerships as Low-Cost Way To Expand Reach, Coverage,” *Washington Post*, November 6, 2003.

Table V-8. News-Services-Owned Newspapers Offered Allocations

Belo	Knight Ridder
<i>Dallas Morning News</i> <i>Providence Journal</i>	<i>Charlotte Observer</i> <i>Columbus Ledger-Enquirer</i>
Booth Newspapers	<i>Contra Costa Times</i>
Copley News Service	<i>Detroit Free Press</i>
<i>San Diego Union Tribune</i>	<i>Kansas City Star</i>
Cox Newspapers	<i>Philadelphia Daily News</i>
<i>Atlanta Journal Constitution</i>	<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>
Gannett News Service	Newhouse News Service
<i>Arizona Republic</i> <i>Indianapolis Star</i> <i>USA Today</i>	<i>Oregonian</i> <i>Star Ledger (Newark)</i> <i>Times-Picayune</i>
Hearst News Service	Scripps Howard News Service
<i>Houston Chronicle</i> <i>San Antonio Express-News</i> <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i> <i>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i>	<i>Albuquerque Tribune</i> <i>Corpus Christi Caller-Times</i> <i>Knoxville News Sentinel</i>

included rosters and e-mails about embed assignments. IDA extracted data from the CFLCC PAO daily situation reports (SITREPs) to assess the fluctuation of embeds over time. The CPIC-Bahrain database was used to analyze embeds with the five CSGs. The Air Force provided a roster of their embeds. Every effort was made to identify discrepancies in databases and reconcile these discrepancies. This was done in discussions with PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and/or embeds. New databases were created, and names were added to or deleted from the final count based on the best available information. Many numbers have been used by others to define the scope of the program, generally using ballpark numbers (e.g., more than 500 embeds). The extensive effort to determine the actual number of embeds was undertaken to show the true magnitude of the Embedded Media Program—not only at the macro level, but also at the unit level—and to provide greater insight into the program.

OASD(PA) directed that “CENTCOM PA will account for embedded media during the time the media are embedded in theater. CENTCOM PA will report changes in embed status to OASD(PA) as they occur.”³⁸ OASD(PA) did not receive daily status reports from CENTCOM. OASD(PA) concerns about change in status were related to any embeds injured or killed. They updated their database of embed names received from

³⁸ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), 10 February 2003.

media organizations as additional embed opportunities were identified, usually because allocations had not been filled by another organization. They did not gather any data on embeds to determine if those originally selected by the media organizations actually embedded. OASD(PA) added to the embed list until 17 April 2003 and, on 18 April, delegated authority for media embedding in the CENTCOM AOR to the CENTCOM PAO. The CENTCOM PAO was authorized to further delegate that authority to subordinate elements at his discretion. The guidelines for embedded media contained in the 10 February 2003 PAG remained in effect. CENTCOM was also directed to assume responsibility for maintaining a historical record of additional embeds added to the program and submitting updates and a final list upon completion of the program to OASD(PA).³⁹ No final list of embeds was ever forwarded to OASD(PA), and nothing indicates that an official end to the Embedded Media Program was ever designated. Embedding continues during SASO but only with a limited number of embeds, usually coordinated through Division PAOs.

The final list of embeds prepared by OASD(PA) on 17 April 2003 had 774 embed names representing 260 media organizations (see Table V-9). It does not reflect the number of actual embeds with ground units, on aircraft carriers, and at air bases. For example, the count includes 26 embeds for the 1CAV that did not deploy and 55 embeds for air bases to which they could not go. It also does not reflect the number of media organizations that actually participated in the Embedded Media Program. The total of the media organizations on Table V-9 is greater than the 260 media organizations that were on the list because many media organizations had embeds going to more than one component and more than one unit. The 260 media organizations is greater than the 237 media organizations that were offered the 917 embed allocations initially because of efforts by OASD(PA) to fill the allocations that were declined or for which no response was forthcoming. Thirty-four local media organizations included in the 260 media organizations.

The CFLCC PAO provided IDA their daily SITREPS from January through June 2003. They began reporting on the personnel status of embeds and unilaterals on 1 March and continued reporting the status through 6 June. Status reports provide numbers of individuals by unit, not names. Ground-unit PAOs were to provide unit embed

³⁹ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Delegation of Authority for Media Embedding Program in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), 18 April 2003.

Table V-9. OASD(PA) Allocations and Final Embed Count (17 April 2003)

Component	Unit	Initial Embed Allocations	Component Totals	Final OASD(PA) Roster of Embed Names	Component Totals	Media Organizations
Army	CFLCC	33	463	24	348	19
	VCORPS	51		42		32
	3ID	84		79		61
	82ABN	16		13		10
	101ABN	61		61		46
	4ID	63		66		49
	3ACR	12		5		4
	2ACR	9		11		8
	1AD	62		21		17
	1CAV	72		26		19
MC	IMEF CE	4	203	4	214	3
	IMEF	110		125		85
	1MARDIV	79		65		53
	15MEU	10		8		5
	24MEU			10		7
	IMEF (4LAR)			2		1
Navy	Navy	153	153	123	123	73
AF	AAS	5	83	3	74	3
	AJ	10		13		9
	AU	30		21		17
	CS	3		2		1
	Inc	16		18		13
	PSAB	14		11		10
	SI	5		3		2
	CFLCC (RH)			3		2
SOF	SOF	15	15	15	15	9
Total		917	917	774	774	-

daily strength figures to the CFLCC PAO for inclusion in the report. The SITREP provided the total number of individuals and total number of unilaterals registered with the CPIC from 1 March through 17 April, even though the last person, a unilateral, registered on 10 May. Those numbers increased daily from 603 to 2,700 total registered and from 442 to 2,434 total unilaterals. The SITREP provided total embed numbers from 1 March through 6 June. During the period 1–10 March, the SITREP only provided data from the CPIC-Kuwait registration database (i.e., total registered, total embeds and total unilaterals). Unit PAOs began reporting embeds with their units on 11 March. Some units already had embeds in their units before 11 March (e.g., the 101ABN and the 82ABN that brought embeds with them from the United States), but most units that had embeds joining them in Kuwait could not begin embedding until 11 March after the embeds received their NBC equipment. After 11 March, the total embeds' number on the status

reports was the aggregate of what was reported by the unit PAOs. The unit embed strengths fluctuated daily as embeds arrived in or departed from a unit. Based on data provided, the maximum number of embeds (428) in ground units occurred on 6 April. On 20 March when the war started, 408 embeds were with ground units. When Baghdad was captured on 9 April, 422 embeds were with ground units. No SITREP was issued on 1 May when the President declared the end of major combat operations, but, on 2 May, the number of embeds with ground units had decreased to 108. By 6 June, 19 embeds were reported to be with units. Appendix G contains a detailed status report.

A total of 692 individuals were embedded. Table V-10 provides the distribution of embeds among major units. The total number of embeds in units was 701. Five of those individuals embedded initially with the Air Force at Al Jaber AB and Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait, and subsequently embedded with ground units. Three individuals were embedded in two different major ground units, and one individual was embedded with the Navy and then a ground unit. Embeds who were in two different units are shown in the double count column indicating the two units in which they were embedded (e.g., the number 2 indicates that embed was with the 101ABN and the 4ID). Included in the count of 692 individual embeds are 32 individuals from the broadcast media, which increased some of the broadcast teams to 3 or 4 individuals.

Based on interviews and analysis of the data, several embeds who were assigned to ground units did not embed. At least 17 embeds disembedded before the start of the war. Those who disembedded before 20 March are included in the total number of embeds. Although the 4ID entered Iraq after the fall of Baghdad and the 2ACR entered Iraq in early May, embed data for these units are included because they were involved in the Embedded Media Program from the beginning.

All SOF components (ground, sea, and air) had embeds.

A total of 67 female embedded (9.7 percent of the total embeds), as shown in Table V-10. This included 23 females who were embedded with ground combat units: infantry, armor, reconnaissance, and field artillery. In those units, they were the only females in the unit.

The Navy had 110 individuals embedded from 63 media organizations. As discussed previously, once they were embedded on an aircraft carrier, they were given the opportunity to embed on another ship. Twenty-five embeds took advantage of that opportunity. Most went to either the cruiser or destroyer in the CSG, but four were

Table V-10. Embeds by Major Ground Units, Ships, and Air Bases

Component	Unit	Total Embeds	Subtotal	Female Embeds	Females in Combat Units	Double Count		
Army	CFLCC	29	332	2	1	4, 7		
	VCORPS	42		9		3		
	3ID	103		10				
	101ABN	79		10		7	2, 4	
	82ABN	20		5		3		
	4ID	51		5		4	2	
	2ACR	4						
	3ACR	4						
MC	IMEF CE	4	210	9	6	1		
	1MARDIV	85						
	15MEU	13						
	3MAW	24					5	8, 9
	TF Tarawa	19					1	1
	MEG	14					1	
	1FSSG	37					2	
	24MEU	14						
Navy	USS <i>Lincoln</i>	27	110	9		1		
	USS <i>Constellation</i>	22		5				
	USS <i>Kitty Hawk</i>	29		3				
	USS <i>Truman</i>	16		1				
	USS <i>Roosevelt</i>	13		2				
	USS <i>Nimitz</i>	1						
	USNS <i>Comfort</i>	1		1				
	TGE	1						
AF	Al Jaber AB	18	24	4		5, 6, 7		
	Ali Al Salem AB	2		1		8, 9		
	CFLCC-ACCE	1		1				
	CFLCC-Arijan(RH)	3						
SOF	SOF Components	21	25	2	1	3		
	173ABN	4						
Total		701	701	67	23	9 pairs		

embedded on a second aircraft carrier. In Table V-10, they are counted against the first aircraft carrier on which they embedded. One embed was on four ships. Including those embeds on multiple ships, the Navy had embeds on 19 ships. The total number of days embeds stayed on one or more ships ranged from 4 to 40 days, with the average time being 25 days. The first individual embedded on 26 February, and, by the start of the war on 20 March, 101 people were embedded. When Baghdad was captured on 9 April, the number of embeds had dwindled to 27. The last embeds departed on 16 April. In addition to embeds, the Navy also had 237 embarks⁴⁰ from 120 media organizations who visited

⁴⁰ An embark is an individual who comes aboard a ship for a short period of time.

28 ships. The total number of days embarks stayed on one or more ships ranged from 1 to 29 days, with the average time being 6 days. Fifty-four embarks visited between two and six ships. Individuals embarked on ships between 14 February and 16 April and disembarked between 18 February and 20 April. Of the 237 embarks, 16 became or had been embeds. Appendix F, Table F-2, provides data on the distribution of embeds and embarks on different ships.

Twenty-one embeds were with the Air Force at Al Jaber AB, Ali Al Salem AB, and the CFLCC-ACCE between 13 March and 14 April, but no data exist to determine when each embed arrived or how long he/she stayed. Some embeds were able to rotate to forward operating bases (FOBs) beginning 24 March. Embeds with the Expeditionary REDHORSE Group deployed with the unit from the United States on 31 March.

Ultimately, 224 media organizations participated in the Embedded Media Program. The large media organizations had embeds in several different units and in all components, while the smaller ones had only one embed in one unit in one component. Table V-11 shows the total number of media organizations by media type and the number of each type of media organization with each component. The total of the media organizations with each component is greater than the 224 media organizations that participated because many media organizations had embeds in more than one component and more than one unit.

The 701 embeds, including the 9 that were embedded in 2 different units, were widely dispersed among the components in terms of media type. Table V-12 shows the number of embeds from each type of media organization and the distribution of embeds among the components.

Table V-13 shows the final distribution among the national/regional, international, and local media. The OASD(PA) plan was for a 70 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent distribution of embeds. No plan was in place for the distribution of allocations to international media organizations, beyond providing broad coverage by media types in all markets. Fewer national/regional media and more international media were present than had been planned in terms of media organizations and embeds. The distribution of local media for the entire Embedded Media Program was 9.0 percent, and, for ground units alone, it was 11 percent. Of the 187 embeds from international media organizations, 143 (76.5 percent) were embedded in ground units, and, of those, 61 (42.7 percent) were embedded with Army and Marine ground combat units (infantry, armor, reconnaissance, and field artillery).

Table V-11. Media Organizations With Each Component

Media Type	Media Organizations	Media Organizations With Each Component				
		A	MC	N	AF	SOF
IM	5	4	2			
IN	30	13	13	7	1	
IR	3	3	1			
IT	33	19	10	10		
IW	8	3	4	6	1	
UM	17	13	8	4	2	2
UN	59	44	43	14	3	4
UN (L)	17	13	3		2	
UP	3	2	1	2	1	
UR	8	5	7	3		
UR (L)	1		1			
US	7	4	3	4	2	
UT	15	9	7	11	4	6
UT (Doc)	2	1	2			
UT (L)	14	13	1			
UW	2	1	2	2		1
Total	224	147	108	63	16	13

Table V-12. Embeds With Each Component

Media Type	Media Organizations	Embeds	Embeds With Each Component				
			A	MC	N	AF	SOF
IM	5	9	6	3			
IN	30	37	14	14	8	1	
IR	3	6	3	3			
IT	33	90	44	24	22		
IW	8	45	18	14	12	1	
UM	17	40	23	9	4	2	2
UN	59	170	85	60	16	4	5
UN (L)	17	26	19	4		3	
UP	3	8	2	2	3	1	
UR	8	17	5	8	4		
UR (L)	1	1		1			
US	7	20	8	5	5	2	
UT	15	169	65	46	31	10	17
UT (Doc)	2	5	1	4			
UT (L)	14	36	32	4			
UW	2	22	7	9	5		1
Total	224	701	332	210	110	24	25

Table V-13. Distribution of National/Regional, International, and Local Media Organizations

	Media Organizations		Embeds	
National/Regional	113	50.4%	451	64.3%
International	79	35.3%	187	26.7%
Local	32	14.3%	63	9.0%
Total	224	100.0%	701	100.0%

A total of 237 organizations received the 839 initial embed allocations, while the PAOs were to identify organizations to fill 78 local embed allocations, for a total of 917 embed allocations. A total of 224 media organizations ultimately provided 692 embeds. While the total number of media organizations is close, a more detailed comparison shows a significant change between those initially offered embed allocations and those eventually participating in the Embedded Media Program. It was not merely a function of media organizations not providing embeds to the units that did not deploy or the air bases where embeds were not permitted. For those units and air bases, 135 media organizations received 173 allocations, not including an unknown number of local media organizations that would have received 26 allocations. However, of the 135 media organizations, 115 had embeds in other units. Of the 237 media organizations, 76 did not provide any embeds while 63 additional media organizations were offered allocations and provided embeds. The same thing happened between the 917 allocations and the 701 embed assignments. Excluding the allocations for 78 local embeds, the initial media organizations received 839 allocations but did not fill 131 of them. Of the remaining 708 allocations, they provided 592 embeds. The additional media organizations provided 109 mbeds, for a total of 701 embeds. Twenty-eight local media organizations were among the additional 63 media organizations that provided 57 of the 109 additional embeds. Media organizations that did not fill allocations, as well as those that were subsequently offered allocations, represented national/regional and international media organizations and most media types. Appendix H provides comparison data by media type of the initial media organizations with allocations and the final media organizations with embeds.

Appendix I provides a complete list of media organizations, with the number of embeds who participated in media training course, the allocations by Service, and the number of embeds by Service. It is important to note that the numbers do not necessarily equate to the same individual if the number appears in multiple categories. For example, a media organization may have sent two individuals to the media training course, but only one ultimately embedded with a unit along with an individual that did not attend the

media training course. A media organization may have received three allocations but had five embeds. Two of the individuals identified to fill an allocation may not have participated, but the organization sent two other individuals in their place, while also receiving two additional embed opportunities.

D. TRAINING

Training for the media about the military and training for the military about the embed program and how to interact effectively with the media was an important aspect of the Embedded Media Program.

1. Media Training Course

In the fall 2002, the OASD(PA) had informal discussions with Washington bureau chiefs and reporters who routinely cover on the Pentagon. Those discussions focused on media coverage during future military operations. One outcome of those discussions was a decision to offer basic Joint military orientation and training for the news media. On 30 October 2002, ASD(PA) sent the bureau chiefs a letter that announced the program. The purpose of the course was to “allow participating news personnel to gain basic military knowledge and build skills that will help them safely and accurately report on Joint military operations.”⁴¹ The primary topics of an ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 30 October 2002 were ongoing PA and media planning for future operations and the media training course. The course was also designed to “provide unit commanders a measure of confidence that the embeds would have some fundamental understanding of how the military operates.”⁴² It was made clear that attendance at one of the media training courses was not a prerequisite for being embedded or a guarantee that an individual would be selected for embedding. The course also was not designed to compete with or replace the hostile-environment training courses to which many media organizations routinely send their journalists.

Four 1-week courses were conducted, each one taught by one of the Services at a different location. OASD(PA) also looked at the possibility of conducting a fifth course in an overseas location, but that did not occur. The course was taught monthly, from

⁴¹ ASD(PA) Memorandum for Bureau Chiefs, Subject: Joint Military Training for Media Members, 30 October 2002.

⁴² Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 30 October 2002.

November 2002 through February 2003 (see Table V-14). The first course lasted 7 days, and the other courses lasted 5 days. Each session accommodated 60 individuals.

Table V-14. Media Training Course Dates and Locations

Service	Dates	Location
Navy/Marine Corps	16–22 November 2002	Norfolk Naval Station and Quantico Marine Corps Base (MCB), Virginia
Army	16–20 December 2002	Ft. Benning, Georgia
Air Force	20–24 January 2003	Ft. Dix, New Jersey
Marine Corps	3–7 February 2003	Quantico MCB, Virginia

A standardized program of instruction (POI) was developed in coordination with OASD(PA), DINFOS, and the Services. It consisted of 52.5 hours of instruction split between field exercise and training (25 hours) and lectures (27.5 hours). The same core curriculum was taught at each site and included basic military knowledge and skill topics (e.g., military ranks, customs and courtesies; Service missions and organization; survival skills; weapons systems and capabilities; law of war and rules of engagement; embed procedures; and ground rules.)⁴³ Appendix J, Table J-1 provides a detailed list of subjects that were taught. The Service hosting the course was permitted to teach Service-specific topics as long as they covered the standardized POI. The cadre teaching the course represented each of the Services. Based on media feedback from the first course, the POI was modified for the next course. This was also done for the last two courses. The media wanted more specifics about the ground rules, but OASD(PA) had not finalized them at the time the training was conducted.

a. Media Organization and Individual Participation

At the 30 October 2002 meeting, the bureau chiefs were told to begin submitting names of individuals in their organizations whom they wanted to attend. No official announcement about the media training course was made, but a transcript of the meeting was put on the Internet so other media organizations would know about it. By 14 January 2003, OASD(PA) had received training requests for 771 individuals from 197 media organizations (116 U.S./81 international).⁴⁴ Because the number of names submitted was more than the available allocations, OASD(PA) gave media organizations allocations for each course and let them determine who should attend. Allocations were divided among

⁴³ Department of Defense, *Training Program of Instruction for Media Training Course*, 1 November 2002.

⁴⁴ OASD(PA) E-mail: Subject: Tasking for Bureau Chiefs' Meeting, 14 January 2003.

the various types of media organizations to ensure attendance by a broad representation of organizations within each course and among the four courses. Two weeks before the course start date, organizations received their allocation and were told to submit contact information on the individuals they had selected. OASD(PA) sent those individuals an e-mail that included instructions about when and where to report and a packing list.

Attendance rosters for the media training courses were analyzed to determine the representation across all media types. These courses attracted 232 attendees (41 female) from 81 media organizations (60 U.S./21 international) (see Table V-15).

Table V-15. Attendance at Media Training Courses

	Course #1 (Navy)	Course #2 (Army)	Course #3 (AF)	Course #4 (MC)	Total
Total individuals	58	60	60	54	232
Total organizations	34	44	46	35	81
Females	8	11	13	9	41

Most training course attendees were from U.S. newspapers (70) and U.S. television (56) (see Table V-16). Organizations received from 1 to 15 quotas (41 received 1 quota; 28 received 2 to 4 quotas; and 12 received 5 to 15 quotas). Appendix J, Tables J-2 and J-3, contains detailed information about course attendance by media organizations.

A comparison of the media training course attendees was made with those individuals who actually embedded with units (see Table V-17). Fifty percent embedded with units, 9 percent were registered as unilaterals with the CPIC in Kuwait, and none did an embark with the Navy. Based on a review of all available rosters, 41 percent did not participate as an embed or register as a unilateral at the CPIC-Kuwait. If they did cover the war, it was in some other capacity or some other location. No data indicate why so many did not participate. Of the 95 who did not participate, 15 had allocations: 5 to air bases that could not accept embeds, 5 to late-deploying Army units, 3 with the Navy, and 2 with the Marines. The names of the other 80 individuals did not appear on any CPIC or unit rosters of actual embeds. Reasons for others not participating could include self-selection out of further consideration, the media organization got fewer allocations than anticipated or sent other more qualified individuals, or the media organization declined to participate in the embed program when offered allocations. Fifty percent of the female attendees did not participate. However, all individuals who attended the training increased their understanding of the military.

Table V-16. Attendance by Media Type

Media Type	Media Organizations	Individuals
UM	5	12
UN	34	70
UP	1	3
UR	5	13
US	7	19
UT	6	56
UW	2	18
IN	6	6
IR	1	1
IT	9	11
IW	5	23
Total	81	232

Table V-17. Course Attendee Embed Status

Embed With	No. of Embeds
Army	52
Marine Corps	34
Navy	13
Air Force	8
SOF	10
Unilateral	20
Navy Embarks	0
Did Not Participate	95
Total	232

b. Media Training Course Survey

At the conclusion of each course, attendees were asked to complete a survey developed by DINFOS.⁴⁵ This survey included demographic data and the attendees' ratings of the training they received at their respective media training course. Each survey had a different number of questions depending on the sponsoring Service [Navy (58), Army (42), Air Force (39), and Marine Corps (34)]. All surveys had the same 33 questions, which included demographics, experience with journalism and the military, and assessments of the core curriculum. The 24 questions about the curriculum asked respondents to rate the training subjects as "No Value," "Minimal Value," "Somewhat Valuable," "Very Valuable," or "Extremely Valuable." The last two questions asked the

⁴⁵ Defense Information School, *Consolidated Media Training, End-of-Course Assessment (November 2002–February 2003)*, 12 March 2003.

journalists what one subject they would add and what one element they would remove from the course. DINFOS recorded the results from each course individually, and then they consolidated the survey results. What follows is IDA’s assessment of the consolidated results.

Demographically, the journalists were overwhelmingly male (81.7 percent), Caucasian (82.1 percent), and fairly evenly distributed among all age groupings. Years of journalism experience varied significantly. The largest percentage had 5 to 10 years (29.3 percent) and 11 to 15 years (28.0 percent) experience in journalism, but 11.1 percent had more than 26 years of experience. They rated their knowledge and experience working with and reporting on the military primarily good (31.9 percent) or some (28.8 percent). However, when asked about experience in the field with military units, 30.4 percent had no experience, and 25 percent had some experience. Their knowledge level on information presented in the course was minimal (20.8 percent), some (36.7 percent), and good (31.0 percent).



By Sgt. Darly G. Sanford - USMC

**Figure V-2. NBC Training,
Media Training Course,
Quantico MCB, Virginia**

Seven questions focused on survival and safety: *protect against and NBC attack (see Figure V-2); react to direct and indirect fire; perform first aid; mine hazards and countermeasures; survival-level navigation; cover and concealment; and embark/debark a helicopter.* These were considered by far the most important subjects. Combined ratings of “extremely valuable” and “very valuable” ranged from 92.8 percent to 67.9 percent. The “no value” rating ranged from 0.0 percent to

2.2 percent.

Six questions focused on basic military knowledge: *major Service weapons systems; individual weapons and capabilities; mission and force structure for each Service; Code of Conduct and Law of Armed Conflict; Operations Security (OPSEC) procedures; and the security classification system.* Based on responses, this grouping was considered slightly less important. Combined ratings of “somewhat valuable” and “very valuable” ranged from 76.0 percent to 61.6 percent. When those ratings were combined with the

“extremely valuable” category, the range was 88.7 percent to 72.9 percent. The “no value” rating ranged from 0.0 percent to 4.4 percent.

Two questions focused on physical fitness: *participate in a 5-mile road march with a 25-lb rucksack and physical fitness requirements for the military*. Combined ratings of “extremely valuable” and “very valuable” were 70.7 percent and 69.5 percent, respectively. When those ratings were combined with the “somewhat valuable” category, the results were 94.8 percent and 91.3 percent. The “no value” rating ranged from 0.4 percent to 1.9 percent.

Three questions focused on living in the field: *equipment required for the field; field sanitation; and individual camouflage*. While 70.7 percent thought knowing what to bring to the field was “extremely valuable” or “very valuable,” the other subjects did not rate as well. Combined ratings of “somewhat valuable” and “very valuable” were 63.0 percent and 63.4 percent, respectively. The “no value” rating ranged from 0.9 percent to 4.6 percent.

Four questions focused on the military and the media: *media embed procedures, effect of civilian communications equipment on the battlefield, roles and capabilities of PAOs, and Joint Information Bureau (JIB) structure*. The most important topic was media embed procedures. The combined ratings of “extremely valuable” and “very valuable” was 73.7 percent. Civilian communications equipment on the battlefield was rated lower. The combined ratings of “somewhat valuable” and “very valuable” were 66.5 percent. The last two topics were rated the lowest. The combined ratings of “somewhat valuable” and “minimal value” were 64.6 percent and 56.9 percent, respectively. The “no value” rating ranged from 3.1 percent to 7.5 percent. The topics on roles and capabilities of PAOs and the JIB structure received the largest “no value” ratings of all questions asked in the survey—7.5 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively.

Two questions—perhaps the most important considering the time invested in course attendance—asked the journalists to rate the overall personal value of attending the course and the overall value of attending the course for other journalists. The combined ratings of “extremely valuable” and “very valuable” were 89.9 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. No attendee thought that attending the course was of “no value.”

The last two questions asked the journalists what one subject they would add to the course and what one element they would remove. The attendees provided written

responses, which DINFOS included in their report. They also categorized the written responses into a list for each category. The “add a subject” question had 23 topics. The 3 recommended by more than 10 percent of the attendees were land navigation/field training (16.3 percent), first aid (14.8 percent), and surviving hostile desert environment (10.7 percent). The “remove an element” question had 22 topics. The three recommended by more than 10 percent of the attendees were PowerPoint presentations (23.0 percent), Services 101 (12.8 percent), and less classroom time (10.1 percent).

Appendix J, Table J-4, contains the detailed demographic information and responses to the questions.

While the hours of instruction were split almost equally between the classroom (25 hours) and the field (27.5 hours), the response indicates that the attendees wanted more hands-on and practical-exercise-type instruction. Many suggested that more take-away handouts and less classroom instruction would allow for more time in the field. The journalists appreciate the difficulties of life in the field and the physical rigors of military life and were very interested in personal safety and survival. In general, they felt the media training course was of personal and professional value.

c. Future Media Training

The bureau chiefs/NMRs interviewed were supportive of the military training program. They thought that the embeds should learn as much as possible about the military and should interact with military personnel. Since they did not know how many or what types of allocations they might get if an embed program were implemented, they sent those most likely to embed because they knew they would not be able to send everybody that might be embedded. Some bureau chiefs/NMRs were more focused and sent those who they thought would be with ground units because they would benefit most from the survival training. Some declined to apply for the military training courses because the personnel they were likely to embed already had adequate training and experience. Many of the large media organizations routinely send their foreign correspondents and others most likely to cover conflicts to 5- or 6-day hostile-environment training courses. Because of the cost (approximately \$3,000 per individual), most small media organizations do not send their personnel to a hostile-environment training course or they are very selective about whom they send. Several media organizations sent personnel to the military’s media training and to hostile-environment training. They saw advantages to both and wanted their personnel to be as prepared as possible.

When asked if their media organizations would participate in future military training courses during peacetime, if offered, the bureau chiefs/NMRs were not sure. All agreed they would send personnel if the likelihood of a conflict was strong (as it was when they sent personnel to the media training course before OIF). A few stated they would not send personnel during peacetime. Because of the time involved (even though it may be only a 5-day course), it is a business decision, and the media organization must determine if they will realize a good return on their investment and the opportunity for a good story. Some would consider sending personnel who wanted to learn about the military because they intended to become a military reporter or cover military operations, even during peacetime. Other bureau chiefs/NMRs stated they would definitely support a semi-annual or annual military training course because anything that increases familiarity between the military and the media is good and their personnel benefit by learning more about the military.

Bureau chiefs were also asked about sending personnel to participate and embed with a unit that was conducting training at a CTC or during a field training exercise. Some stated that they had done this in the past and noted that their journalists were not going for the training but, rather, to have an opportunity to cover a good story. Obviously, they learned more about the military and that particular unit, but they did not receive any training. Bureau chiefs thought media participation was of greater value to the military than the media. The unit and the Service members would be “training as they fight” with embeds in the unit, as the bureau chiefs/NMRs assumed they would in the future.

Slightly fewer than half of the embeds interviewed about the military training course had attended the course. Attendees had a wide range of experience in dealing with the military or covering conflicts. All thought that the course was very beneficial, especially learning survival skills and interacting with the military. For some, it was their first exposure to the military and insight into danger, and they may not have embedded had they not attended the course. They were less satisfied with the classroom briefings. They would have preferred getting those briefings in handouts in order to have more time for hands-on training. Some of the embeds who attended the military training also attended a hostile-environment training course or had previous experience with the military or covering conflicts. They thought the more they learned the better. One embed stated, “Any training increases confidence. Basic military knowledge helps you avoid loss of credibility with the military.” Among those who did not attend the military training, half of them

attended hostile-environment training and thought that was adequate. Several wanted to attend the media training course, but they did not because either they did not get a quota or they had already gone to Kuwait. Some who did not attend—and did not ask to attend—stated in hindsight that attending the course would have been helpful.

PAOs stated that the media training course gave media organizations a quick way to provide more individuals with a basic exposure to the military. If the media would support the concept, some sort of media training course should be offered in the future. Even if war were not imminent, this training would allow media organizations to maintain a pool of journalists who have an understanding of the military. No clear consensus emerged about conducting a course either semi-annually or annually during peacetime or only in anticipation of a potential conflict where the media would be embedded again. Also, no clear sentiment was expressed about the value of conducting a course that provided instruction on all Services or a course that provided Service-specific instruction.

PAOs were not sure if media organizations would support sending media to embed with a unit at a CTC unless there was a particular story that they wanted to cover. Army CTCs may want to use them as role players, but the media may not be willing to do that. CTC PAOs are developing procedures that will make it easier for the media to be a role player and to be able to get a good story. Unit PAOs stated that the difficulty in getting approval for the media to travel with the unit on military aircraft to an exercise has been a limiting factor in past media participation. They do not want or cannot afford to pay for commercial transportation as an alternate means of getting to an exercise location. A DoD regulation states, “An example of public affairs activities that may qualify for travel in DoD owned or controlled aircraft may be for news media to cover military exercises or military operations.”⁴⁶ However, DoD policy states, “The Armed Forces shall not compete with commercial sea, air, or land transportation when that transportation exists, is adequate, and public affairs objectives of the travel may be accomplished through its use.”⁴⁷ PAOs state that the usual interpretation emphasizes the “no competition” clause rather than the “PA objectives ... accomplished” clause. However, if the media do not travel by commercial air, the PA objectives will not be accomplished.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense 4515.13-R, *Air Transportation Eligibility*, November 1994, with three changes through 9 April 1998.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5435.2, Subject: Delegation of Authority To Approve Travel In and Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes, 25 April 1975.

Commanders thought the media military training was a good idea, although not all commanders knew which, if any, of their embeds had attended the military training. They thought it was unfortunate the allocation of embed assignments could not have been made before the course so the courses could be more Service oriented. Navy commanders were not sure how useful the entire course was for embeds coming to an aircraft carrier since much of the training focused on survival skills in the desert.

Commanders thought the military should continue to offer some sort of military training in the future and should encourage the media to embed with a unit conducting a field training exercise or training at one of the CTCs—even if a conflict was not imminent. In keeping with the philosophy of “train like you fight,” commanders saw benefits to the military and the media if the media embedded during peacetime training exercises. It would give the Service members and the media the opportunity to develop the same type of relationships and appreciation for each other’s job as they did during OIF—but during a peacetime environment. Comparing their negative experience with past MOB training during CTC rotations and their positive experience with embeds during OIF, commanders stated that MOB training must change to reflect this new environment of embedded media. Some tactical commanders stated that giving the media an overview of the strategic and operational level of war during any training offered in the future would be beneficial because they would have a better understanding of the relationship to the tactical level. Navy commanders stated that they had always had embarks on their ships, so it would be no problem to bring them on board for longer periods and provide them greater exposure to shipboard operations. Having media with a unit participating in a Red Flag exercise⁴⁸ would allow the pilots and airman to get used to having the media around and would improve the media’s knowledge and understanding of air operations.

At the end of the military-media conference sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation in August 2003, both groups agreed that training should continue—not just through the media training course, but also by incorporating the media into exercises at the military training centers. Col. Jay DeFrank, OASD(PA) stated, “Everybody forgets and meanwhile, military doctrine advances, military technology evolves, and the situation changes. Then war breaks out and everyone has to start anew.” Some expressed concern that media organizations might not dedicate the assets and

⁴⁸ A Red Flag exercise is a realistic combat training exercise conducted on the bombing and gunnery ranges at Nellis AFB, Nevada, for a period of 2 to 6 weeks, depending on the exercise’s specific purpose.

resources if they did not see any benefit to participation.⁴⁹ At an Army-sponsored workshop in September 2003, the military and media personnel involved in the embed program recommended “the pre-deployment media training be made tougher and that it should be made available for attendance for potential embeds quarterly. An associated recommendation is for units to invite media members to embed with them during training at both their home station and the Combat Training Center to begin to build the trust that is so important to the process.”⁵⁰

2. Unit Training for Embeds

All embeds who went to Kuwait before embedding with a ground unit received orientations and additional training. The CPIC in Kuwait provided weekly updates on activities in the region and available training opportunities—either day trips or 2- to 4-day embeds with a ground unit conducting training in Kuwait from December through February. More than 400 media took advantage of these training opportunities. Embeds joining the 3ID and IMEF stayed at the hotel longer than originally planned because of delays in getting their NBC protective equipment, so the PAOs offered training on various military subjects while they were still in Kuwait City.

Embeds who were interviewed stated that they received extensive orientations and additional training once they got to the unit, ship, or air base. Regardless of where they were embedded, they all received additional NBC training. Those embeds who embedded with ground units in Kuwait or the United States received training that focused on the unit to which they were assigned and generally included the organization and mission of the unit; familiarization on weapons, vehicles, and equipment; and land navigation. Embeds with the Navy had an orientation on the ship, and those with aviation units had an orientation on the air base or field location. All embeds received safety briefings appropriate to the vehicles, aircraft, and equipment with which they would come into contact. One embed stated, “It was a dual obligation for the embed to learn about the military and the unit and for the unit to educate the embed.” Based on interviews, these obligations appeared to have been met.

⁴⁹ Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

⁵⁰ Michael Pasquarett, *Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media’s Joint Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Center for Strategic Leadership, Issue Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 2003.

Commanders stated that most embeds were prepared to join the unit and did know something about it; however, regardless of the embed's background, he/she received additional training and orientation. Commanders wanted to ensure not only the safety of the embed, but also that he/she did nothing that would jeopardize the unit mission or safety of unit personnel. Commanders stated that they spent considerable time with their embeds discussing many topics, including the unit mission, doctrine, terminology, and TTPs. They all felt that this was a good investment of their time. In those units with a PAO and aboard the aircraft carriers and at air bases, the PAO briefed the embeds on the implementation of the embed program. Then, the embeds were briefed about the unit by the commander and usually in more detail by the staff. For ground units, training and orientation occurred at each level in the organization. Embeds also observed small-unit training and participated in immediate action drills (e.g., what actions to take when engaged by the enemy).

Based on the embeds who completed the DINFOS survey, 60 percent stated that they received training from the unit with which they were embedded. In response to the question *Rate the training received in terms of its relevance to conditions you experienced (i.e., military-specific terminology, field equipment, first aid, etc.)*, 54 percent were very satisfied or satisfied, 12 percent were neutral, and fewer than 1 percent were dissatisfied. Thirty-four percent did not respond.

3. Media Training for the Military

Based on interviews with commanders and PAOs, considerable media training was conducted before OIF. Unit PAOs stated that they provided media training and information about the Embedded Media Program to subordinate commanders and, in many cases, to the unit members, usually before departing from their home station. Most PAOs prepared and distributed a simple quick-reference guide for subordinate units. This guide included information about dealing with the media and stated the ground rules for the Embedded Media Program. Some units conducted quarterly media awareness training for everyone in the unit, while, in other units, the PAO conducted media training at officer professional development or NCO professional development classes. During field training exercises, some units conducted media on the battlefield training to give commanders and soldiers/marines practice in dealing with the media in a typical situation they might encounter. One division PAO created a situational training exercise as part of a unit's field training. In this particular exercise, every soldier was interviewed. The interview was taped and critiqued to make each soldier more comfortable in talking with

the media. Many brigades and battalions had an individual on the staff who had an additional duty as the PA representative for the unit. The PAOs provided these PA representatives additional training so they could assist with whatever PA issues arose in the unit and be better prepared to assist embeds when they arrived. PAOs stated that the key to the success of the Embedded Media Program—besides the media training—was the commander’s support for the program.

Many commanders stated that they and their personnel had become familiar with working with the media—primarily unilaterals—during previous deployments. In addition, the CTCs had seen an increased exposure to media on the battlefield. Before receiving embeds in the unit, commanders stated that they briefed their subordinates about the Embedded Media Program. They gave them their guidance on dealing with the media but did not discuss specific talking points. Commanders felt that their soldiers, marines, sailors, or airmen would do well when talking with the media and that, in turn, the public would hear and see a great story. They reinforced the training provided by the PAO and generally told them to tell the truth and talk about their job and what they know about—but reminded them not to speculate.

E. FINDINGS

Bureau chiefs/NMRs were satisfied with the number of embed allocations they received and thought the process was fair.

Commanders and PAOs wanted embeds to be physically fit and have some previous experience reporting on the military or covering a conflict. The media organizations selected their embeds based primarily on experience and maturity. All embeds were volunteers, and, with few exceptions, the commanders were satisfied with the quality of the embeds assigned to their units.

Despite OASD(PA) guidance that all embed assignments would be individual assignments (except for the broadcast-media teams), 41 reporter-photographer teams were embedded with ground units and aboard ships.

About 20 percent of the individuals who registered with the CPIC-Kuwait were embedded with U.S. ground forces or at air bases. Most embeds originally assigned to air bases were unable to embed at those locations because of host-nation sensitivities.

The changes between the media organizations that received the initial embed allocations and the media organizations that ultimately had individuals who embedded were

significant; however, a good mix of media representatives was sent to the brigade and regimental levels with ground units and aboard each aircraft carrier.

Unit embed strengths fluctuated as embeds arrived in or departed from a unit. When the war started on 20 March 2004, 408 embeds were with ground units. By the time Baghdad was captured on 9 April, this number had increased to 422. On 2 May, the day after the President declared the end of major combat operations, 108 embeds were with ground units, and, by 6 June, 19 embeds were with ground units. A total of 101 embeds were aboard Navy ships on 20 March, and, by 9 April, this number had decreased to 27. The last Navy embeds departed 16 April 2004.

While attendees at the OASD(PA)-sponsored media training course felt the course was of personal and professional value, only 50 percent embedded with units. Bureau chiefs/NMRs were supportive of the military training program.

During peacetime, commanders thought the military should continue to offer media training and should encourage the media to embed with a unit during training exercises. In keeping with the philosophy of “train like you fight,” both the military and the media would benefit.

Most embeds were prepared to join their assigned unit and did know something about it, but all embeds received additional training and orientation. Commanders spent considerable time with their embeds discussing many topics and felt that this was a good investment of their time.

Unit PAOs provided media training and information about the Embedded Media Program to commanders and often to Service members. Commanders felt that their soldiers, marines, sailors, or airmen would do well talking with the media and that, in turn, the public would hear and see a great story.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Provide print-media organizations the option of assigning a reporter-photographer team to the same military unit
- Conduct earlier coordination to get permission to embed media at air bases in the region of a potential conflict and develop ground rules that will satisfy host-nation concerns
- Develop the best structure for a media training course and the most beneficial POI

- Revise the DoD regulations and instructions about media travel to make it easier for the media to fly aboard military or military charter aircraft and participate in military training exercises.

VI. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

After 4 to 5 months of planning and preparation, another important part of the Embedded Media Program began when the embeds joined their units, went aboard aircraft carriers, or went to air bases. Effective relationships between the military and the media were critical to implementation. Although the media was to be self-sufficient, the military had support requirements for the embeds. Deciding when to disembed and terminate the embed-for-life concept varied among those involved with the program.

A. WHEN TO EMBED MEDIA

Most embeds joined a unit, went to an air base in Kuwait, or boarded a ship 7 to 10 days before the war started, while the remainder joined at the unit's home station. Embeds with the 3ID and IMEF joined their units in Kuwait because the units were already there. Embeds with CFLCC and V Corps separate brigades joined those units in Kuwait and Europe. Local embeds deployed with the 82ABN from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, while the national and international embeds joined them in Kuwait. Most embeds with the 101ABN joined their units at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, while embeds with the 4ID linked up with their units at Ft. Hood, Texas, and Ft. Carson, Colorado. The few embeds with the 2ACR and 3ACR either departed from Ft. Polk, Louisiana, and Ft. Carson, Colorado, respectively, or joined the units in Kuwait. Embeds with SOFs linked up with their units in numerous locations. Embeds with the Navy reported to Bahrain and Cyprus and embedded on the aircraft carriers from those locations. Embeds with the Air Force went to Kuwait and were taken to the air bases. Reporting early allowed the commanders and embeds to establish relationships and build trust. It also allowed the embeds to report on training and preparations for war.

Commanders and PAOs stated that having the embeds join the unit early worked well because it gave the embed time to get acclimated, learn about the unit, get to know the members of the unit, and, most importantly, establish trust and confidence. The additional orientation and training that the embeds received gave them a better understanding of the unit. It also gave the Service members time to get to know the embeds and get accustomed to having them in the unit continuously. At the military-media conference sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation, COL Rick Thomas, CFLCC PAO,

stated, “Spending time together before [the war] had benefits for the military. It gave the commander and soldiers in the field an opportunity to see what it was like to have media sit next to them, live with them, eat with them, move with them, and look at the challenges associated with that.”⁵¹ Time was a critical factor. Commanders stated that they and unit members would not have had as much time to spend with the embeds if they had arrived 2 to 3 days before the war—and even less if they had arrived after combat operations began. Having less time would also put embeds at a disadvantage because they would not have time to learn about the unit and get to know its members. The commanders who had embeds join the unit only 2 to 3 days before the war would have preferred to have them earlier. One PAO stated that the commander/unit relationship with those embeds who joined the unit shortly before the war or after the unit was already in Iraq was not as strong as was that of embeds who had joined earlier. Commanders also stated that if the embeds arrive too soon they may get bored, but those commanders that had embeds join the unit at their home station thought that was even better than joining the unit in Kuwait. The embeds who joined the unit at their home station had the opportunity to observe the deployment preparations and to meet and get to know the military families. Commanders realized that having all embeds, especially foreign embeds and those already in Kuwait, join the unit in the United States was not always practical. The embeds with the 101ABN and 82ABN spent the most time with their units before the start of the war (on 20 March 2003) because they had reported nearly a month earlier. Commanders and PAOs realized determining when the embeds should report was a business decision for the media organizations, but, for the most part, embeds reported when requested. One consideration about when to embed is the message that it sends to the enemy (i.e., if a large number of reports start to be filed by media personnel who join military units, it may be an indication that the war will start soon).

Bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds agreed that embeds should join a unit before the war starts in order to build trust, get comfortable with each other, learn more about the specific unit to which the embed is assigned, and participate in training and rehearsals. Embeds with ground units stated that the time in the desert was useful for getting acclimated. Embeds with the Navy stated that getting on board early was useful so they could learn their way around the ship. Embeds who joined only 2 to 3 days before the war stated that joining so late was not good. They should have joined the unit when things

⁵¹ Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

were calmer. Most of the media thought 7 to 10 days was adequate. At a McCormick Tribune Foundation military-media conference, Walt Rogers of CNN, who was embedded with the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3ID, stated that one of the most important aspects of the embedding process was to spend a week in the field getting to know the soldiers. It was also an opportunity to test media equipment and test procedures that would be used for reporting on the move.⁵² The embeds who joined the unit at their home station also thought 7 to 10 days was good because it allowed them to observe deployment preparations and meet the military families. However, if the deployment date was uncertain, perhaps several visits to the unit would be just as effective, rather than being with the unit the entire time. The bureau chiefs/NMRs know where and when is best for embeds to report to the unit, based on an assessment of their needs in terms of time, money, the individual, and so forth. For small media organizations, if an embed joins a unit in the United States and deploys with the unit, this is usually less expensive in terms of transportation and lodging.

B. EMBEDDING MEDIA IN UNITS, ON SHIPS, AND AT AIR BASES

OASD(PA) assigned embeds to the lowest-level ground unit and air bases that had a PAO. Although each aircraft carrier had a PAO, all the embed names and media organizations were provided to the NAVCENT PAO, who made further assignment to the five CSGs. The media—both bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds—were concerned about how the process would work below that level. During the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 14 January 2003, a bureau chief asked, “How specific are these embed opportunities going to be? Division-wide, battalion? And once we embed, how much flexibility will there be within the unit?” In response, the DASD(PA) stated, “We’re going to get you down to a fairly low level, but you are absolutely correct, at a certain point then, there will be a number of journalists that are assigned, let’s just say for example at the division level. You will have a number of journalists that are at a division and from there, there will be some opportunities to embed with a particular battalion or a company or whatever. Within that unit, there may be some opportunities—you may be covering a particular company for an extended period of time, but you want to see what’s going on at the battalion TOC [Tactical Operations Center]. Those are things that I’m sure that mature commanders in the field and mature journalists out there will work out

⁵² Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

and try to present as many different opportunities for you as possible.”⁵³ During the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 27 February 2003, a similar question was asked. “Say you have a reporter who’s with a ground unit and say they’re with a brigade HQ, division HQ, battalion HQ, something like that. If they’re embedded with that HQ unit, are they going to then be able to go into the individual units that report to that brigade on some events and activities?” The DASD(PA) responded, “Some of those things are things that your reporter is going to have to discuss when he gets to his division and based on what type of coverage you want to do. There may be a strong desire to report from a command element. There may be a strong desire by your news organization to report from a company or platoon environment. So those are things that your individual reporters will be expected to express their interest with when they link up to their unit.”⁵⁴

Decisions on specific ground-unit assignment for embeds were coordinated between the PAO and the commander. Some embeds stated they asked the PAO for a specific unit or type of unit and met with varying degrees of success in getting what they wanted. Most embeds did not know to which specific subordinate unit they would go until they arrived at the stateside installation or, at most, 1 to 2 days before leaving the Kuwait Hilton en route to the unit. Commanders wanted to ensure optimum media coverage for their units, considering the embeds assigned to them and the type of media organization they represented. Brigade commanders stated they tried to ensure an equitable distribution of embeds to subordinate units by media type (national and international, and so forth). Most of the brigade and regimental commanders discussed the embed’s desires with him/her and tried to accommodate these desires. The remainder had already decided where the embed would be assigned. The same thing happened at the battalion level. The opportunity to move between higher and lower HQ and report on activities at those levels seemed to depend on the relationship that the commander and embed established, although most commanders allowed the embeds to go and report from anywhere within the unit.

One embed stated, “Media organizations and individuals need to know what they want to accomplish and then work to make it happen.” One embed from a large media organization stated that his opinion was that “all large organizations and well known media got preferential treatment.” A review of embed assignments for those types of

⁵³ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

⁵⁴ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 27 February 2003.

individuals indicate they were embedded with ground units at all levels from division to company, similar to the spread of embeds from small media organizations. As mentioned previously, the initial assignment of “known media” was made by the media organization. Most commanders stated that they wanted the embeds to have the opportunity to do their job effectively and to be in the best position to report on the operations—concerns for safety notwithstanding. Access within the units is discussed later in the report.

Embeds with the Navy were assigned to a specific aircraft carrier, from which they could also embed on other ships in the CSG for a few days, although most chose to stay on the aircraft carrier. Onboard the carrier, they were not assigned to the cover either the ship or the carrier air wing. They had access to both.

Embeds with the Air Force were assigned to an air base. The commanders wanted to be sure that embeds had the opportunity to cover all aspects of the operations, not just the fighter squadrons. At Al Jaber AB, before the war started, they worked out a schedule for the embeds to learn and get stories about logistics, weapons and munitions, engineers, and so forth. This allowed them to develop a better understanding of the teamwork involved between the squadrons and to learn how an air base operates.

C. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG KEY GROUPS

The key to success of the Embedded Media Program was largely dependent on the relationships established among the various groups:

- The PAOs with bureau chiefs/NMRs, other PAOs, commanders, and embeds
- The commanders and the embeds
- The unit members and the embeds.

During the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 27 February 2003, the DASD(PA) stated, “The success of this [Embedded Media Program] is really going to be dependent on not only us but also on the individuals that are here in this room. It really is a two-way street, and there is some mutual responsibility on the part of both you and us to make this work. We have put an awful lot of confidence and trust in the news organizations as well as our commanders out there to make this relationship work. I believe our commanders really do understand the importance and the responsibilities of the press out there, and I think that working together, particularly in an embedded situation like this, that it has all the promise of both the military and the media being able to accomplish their very

important missions should it come to conflict. Stay in touch with us. As problems arise that you think need to be brought to our attention, please do it so we can resolve them. Encourage your reporters that you're sending to the field to work closely with their commanders on issues that arise that can be resolved at the unit level.”⁵⁵

1. PAO Relationships

Bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that the OASD(PA) had a good understanding of the desires and needs of the media and had established good working relationships. They were supportive, cooperative, responsive, and helpful. They returned phone calls and responded to e-mails promptly. The foreign media also complimented OASD(PA) for the support they received. Likewise, the local media bureau chiefs/NMRs who dealt primarily with the local-unit PAO stated that they had an excellent relationship with the PAO, who was very helpful in assisting them.

PAOs reported that they worked well together and supported each other. The centralized planning and decentralized execution discussed earlier was indicative of this effort. They kept each other informed about changes to embed assignments and worked to solve problems that a subordinate-unit PAO could not solve. The component PAOs did not work that closely with the CENTCOM PAOs about the specifics of implementing the Embedded Media Program, but they did coordinate with the respective CPIC PAOs. The component PAOs also worked with the Service PA offices in the Pentagon to help with responses to inquiries. Component PAOs complimented the major-unit PAOs, noting how proactive they were.

PAOs stated that the SECDEF and CJCS “Personal For” message to commanders about support of PA activities set the tone and gave clear, helpful guidance. Commanders who had PAOs relied on them to implement the Embedded Media Program within their unit. They worked together to determine the initial embed assignment plan, and then the PAO would discuss the plan with subordinate commanders to incorporate their ideas about embed assignments. Although nearly all commanders saw the value of the program, the PAOs did work closely with those few who were reluctant or unsure about having embeds in their unit. Once ground units entered Iraq, commanders stated they saw very little of the PAOs because of wide dispersion of units. Once the PAOs had completed coordination and gotten embeds to their units, the subordinate commanders

⁵⁵ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 27 February 2003.

became responsible for implementing the program. On the aircraft carriers and at the air bases, the PAOs were still intimately involved with the embeds and worked closely with the commanders and the embeds. The PAOs with SOF units helped commanders understand the value of embeds to their operations and either escorted or coordinated escorts for the embeds.

The PAOs were the initial interface between the embeds and the units, either arranging to get them from the unit's home station in the United States, from the CPIC-Kuwait to their ground unit or air base, or from the CPIC-Bahrain and CPIC-Cyprus to the aircraft carriers. The embeds stated that the PAOs provided them the information they needed and kept them informed before they embedded. The PAOs were always available to assist them on the aircraft carriers and at the air bases. Embeds with the Navy complimented the PAOs for the help they received from them on the aircraft carrier. The embeds with the Air Force were disappointed with the first PAO at Al Jaber AB because of his inexperience in dealing with the media; however, once the PAO was changed, that was no longer a problem. The new PAO was very proactive. Once embeds assigned to ground units joined their final unit, they rarely saw the PAO, except when it was time to disembed and some of them needed help arranging transportation to Kuwait. The PAOs were with the embeds in SOF units and facilitated their effort to get effective coverage of SOF operations.

In response to the DINFOS embedded media survey question *How satisfied were you with the support you received from military public affairs personnel?*, 23 percent of the embeds were very satisfied, 38 percent were satisfied, 23 percent were neutral, 11 percent were dissatisfied, and 4 percent were very dissatisfied.⁵⁶

2. Commander-Embed Relationships

Support by commanders at all levels in all components and Services was a major factor in the Embedded Media Program's success. The SECDEF and CJCS set the tone with their message to combatant commanders, who, in turn, provided similar guidance to their subordinate commanders. In the succinct words of one PAO, "The commanders got it." From the PAO perspective, the commanders for whom they worked were very supportive of the program. They met with and briefed the embeds when they first came to the unit and gave the embeds many individual interviews when time permitted. Several

⁵⁶ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

provided detailed briefings on impending operations to provide the context of the bigger picture for embeds as they reported from subordinate units.

Commanders realized the program would not succeed without their involvement and support. They understood the program's value and benefits to the overall success of their mission and for the morale and welfare of the troops. Only a few subordinate commanders (colonel and lieutenant colonel level) viewed the program as a minor distraction and did not want to give interviews. Some were reluctant initially because of concerns about compromising the mission and soldier safety. One senior commander told all embeds in the unit, "You can report anything you see as long as you do not put soldiers at risk." Another commander, after discussing simplified ground rules with his embeds, told them, "If you do anything that will harm my soldiers, I will take it personally." Over time, they realized that the embeds reported in a responsible and professional way, and those initial concerns were alleviated. Most commanders reported spending time with the embeds to ensure that they understood what was happening during operations, but they encouraged them to talk to the Service members and tell the story from their perspective.

The commanders stated that they gave no preferential treatment to the embeds and that they were treated just like any other member of the unit or ship. Nearly all embeds interviewed stated that the commander of the unit to which they were assigned, regardless of the unit's level, was very supportive of the Embedded Media Program. The commanders made the embeds feel like they were part of the team and that their work was appreciated. The international media embeds stated that the commanders accepted them and integrated them into the unit in the same way that they accepted and integrated the national and local media embeds. The embeds appreciated the time commanders gave for interviews. The embeds on the aircraft carriers also appreciated the update briefings provided by the admiral or the ship's commanding officer.

The commander's support for the Embedded Media Program was reinforced as a result of the relationship they established with the embeds. The critical factor, as stated by the commanders and the embeds, was having trust and confidence in each other. As one embed stated, "The key to the program is the relationship between the commander and the embed, the personal chemistry. It does not matter what the SECDEF or an editor says. It is what happens at the personal level." In some cases, this positive relationship began almost immediately from the first meeting between the two individuals because the personalities meshed. In most cases, both were cautiously optimistic as the relationship developed over time. One commander told his embeds, "Don't violate the trust we place

in you.” Another commander’s guidance to the embeds was, “Do what’s right. I don’t have time to check everything you do.” Commanders appreciated the fact that many of the embeds had taken time to learn about the unit and/or they had previous experience with the military. They were responsible, followed the ground rules, and wrote fair and accurate reports. Likewise, the embeds developed trust in the commanders as they were given access and the freedom to report what they saw. Another time-related element was when the embeds came to the units. The relationship between commanders and embeds was better for those embeds who arrived 7 to 10 days before the war. That allowed them to get to know each other on a personal and a professional level. Those embeds who arrived immediately before or after the war started had little time to do that.

Many ground-unit commanders and embeds stated that the close professional and personal relationship they established during the Embedded Media Program has continued and that they still maintain contact through correspondence or phone calls. Many of the embeds were at the unit’s home station to report on its return and have been invited by the commander to attend reunions and hail and farewells. An interesting comment by a few commanders was that the personal relationship they established allowed them to discuss things they felt they could not discuss with anyone in the unit. One commander stated, “One thing I liked about the close relationship with the embeds was that they were about the same age, and I could talk to them as a friend, not a member of the unit. It was not like talking to a subordinate. We had many great discussions with lots of why questions that made me think about why I did something or the unit did things, or why they were done in a certain way.”

3. Service Member-Embed Relationships

The relationship between the Service members and the embeds was similar to that between the commanders and embeds. The commander’s support of the Embedded Media Program was transmitted to the unit. Most unit members were willing to accept the embeds based on that, though some were reluctant initially. As a group, the senior NCOs across all the Services were more cautious than the junior officers and lower-ranking enlisted personnel because they seemed more concerned about how the embeds would report what they saw. The embed’s fair and accurate reporting and the effect that their reporting had on morale won them over. Embeds stated that most members of the unit or ship or at the air base were willing to talk to them, but some did not want to talk to them, which they understood. One embed stated, “It was a chance to get to know people and let them get to know me. This was one of the most interesting aspects of the experience.

Over time, as I got to know more people, it broke down some of the formality between a reporter and anyone being interviewed. I wasn't just some stranger with a notepad, asking a lot of questions, but rather someone they knew." Over time, the embeds felt accepted as a member of the unit. Embeds with ground units stated that earning the respect of the unit took time because the members of the unit had a close relationship with each other and the embed was the outsider. CNN's Walter Rogers stated, "They let us go out a week in advance, get to know the troops, build trust. It's just like any reporter in any situation. You get to know the people you are covering. You talk to them. They know you. You know them and you build rapport. And that rapport stands you through the whole time very well."⁵⁷ The embeds gained the respect of the Service members when the Service members saw that the embeds were willing to do the same things they did—endure hardships and share the same life-changing experience of combat—and not complain. One embed stated, "When I told the soldiers I was there voluntarily, could leave when I wanted to, and did not get any combat pay, they thought I was crazy, but they learned to respect me." Most of the embeds with ground units also gained acceptance within the unit by allowing the Service members to use their satellite phones to call home. One embed stated, "The key to gaining the confidence of the soldiers was (1) for them to see how you react under stress (i.e., react calmly under fire and soldiers will realize you won't put them at risk) and (2) when they find out from a loved one that they read a great report or saw their name in print or on TV." Some embeds stated that because they were not in the chain of command or a member of the unit, some of the unit's soldiers and Marines would talk to them about personal problems and use them as a sounding board for their complaints. The embeds accepted that role and did not violate the trust the Service members placed in them.

In response to the DINFOS embedded media survey question *Overall, how would you rate the reception you received from the men and women in your unit?*, 30.2 percent stated it far exceeded expectations, 37.2 percent stated it exceeded expectations, and 24.8 percent stated it met expectations. In response to the question *What was the attitude of the military personnel that you were embedded with toward your work?*, 50 percent were strongly supportive, 31 percent were supportive, and 9 percent were ambivalent. Only 2 percent were unsupportive or very unsupportive, and 9 percent did not respond.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Alicia C. Shepard, "Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War," *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

⁵⁸ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

4. Foreign Embeds

The SECDEF and CJCS told commanders in a message, “Hold daily briefs in theater with a large group of international as well as national press. A natural impulse is to talk to reporters from our own nation—we encourage you to aggressively reach out to those of the international press as you tell our story. They and the publics they serve also must understand why we are engaged.”⁵⁹

The commanders stated that they understood that the foreign embeds were needed to keep the international public better informed. Even though the Services might not benefit from stories reported by the international embeds, their presence was important to the overall media effort.

Commanders tried to treat all embeds the same, but, in large part, this depended on the working relationship and trust that were established. As long as the foreign embeds followed the ground rules, most commanders provided them the same access. One commander had embeds from three different foreign countries and had no difficulty with any of them. A few commanders stated they had some initial concerns about the foreign embeds because they were not sure what was being reported or if it was being reported fairly and accurately because of cultural differences that may influence the foreign embed’s perspective on the war. They were more cautious when dealing with the foreign embeds initially, but no commander reported any problems with a foreign embed.

The SOF units did not have any foreign embeds and did not think they should be with SOF units because they had ample opportunity to report on U.S. forces.

The foreign embeds thought it was a very good program and felt accepted by the commander and Service members. Several foreign embeds had experience covering U.S. forces in earlier conflicts and knew how to work with them. Some were impressed that they were accepted so readily and treated the same as the U.S. embeds.

D. MILITARY SUPPORT PROVIDED TO EMBEDS

Military support for the embedded media was discussed during the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 14 January 2003. The details were finalized in the 10 February 2003 PAG. The PAG stated,

⁵⁹ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Commanders and Public Affairs, 21 February 2003.

“Commanders will provide billeting, rations, and medical attention, if needed, to the embedded media commensurate with that provided to members of the unit, as well as access to military transportation and assistance with communications filing/transmitting media products, if required [see Figure VI-1]. Embeds are not authorized to use their own vehicles while traveling in an embed status. Space on military transportation will be made available, to the extent possible, to move media equipment. The media are responsible for loading and carrying their own equipment. Units should plan lift and logistical support to assist in moving media products to and from the battlefield, and, in the event of commercial communications difficulties, the media are authorized to file stories using



By John Moore – AP

Figure VI-1. Embedded AP reporter Chris Tomlinson (right front sitting on track ramp) eats an MRE with soldiers from A Co, 3rd Bn, 7th Inf, attached to TF 4-64 Armor, 2nd BCT, 3rd Inf Div

expeditious military communications capabilities. An escort may be assigned at the discretion of the unit commander. The absence of a PA escort is not a reason to preclude media access to operations. Commanders will ensure the media are provided every opportunity to observe actual combat operations. The personal safety of correspondents is not a reason to exclude them from combat areas. Anthrax and smallpox

vaccines will be made available to the media at no expense to the government. Embedded media are authorized and required to be provided with, on a temporary loan basis, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective equipment by the unit with which they are embedded. Unit personnel will provide basic instruction in the proper wear, use, and maintenance of the equipment. Upon termination of the embed, initiated by either party, the NBC equipment shall be returned to the embedding unit. If sufficient NBC protective equipment is not available for embedded media, commanders may purchase additional equipment, with funds normally available for that purpose, and loan it to embedded media.”

Based on interviews, the support was provided, although not without difficulty or problems in some cases.

1. Transportation and Vehicles

Embeds who deployed with a unit from home station flew with the unit via military air or commercial charter air. Most embeds flew commercially to Kuwait, Bahrain, or Cyprus and joined units from those locations. When embeds with ground units disembarked, if they did not become a unilateral, they got a ride via ground or air transportation to Kuwait and then flew home commercially.

Embeds assigned to ground units were usually assigned to ride in a particular vehicle, just as each soldier or marine is assigned to a vehicle. Based on interviews, the embeds rode in nearly every type vehicle present on the battlefield. The space was limited because many of the vehicles were already filled with members of the unit, so most embeds rode in a command vehicle or with an XO, command sergeant major, or first sergeant. Embeds at battalion level and higher sometimes rode in one of the staff vehicles. The unit worked out a load plan, either putting the embed and his/her equipment in the same vehicle or putting the embed in one vehicle and the equipment in another vehicle. If the embed was separated from his/her equipment, he/she was able to keep essential professional equipment. Commanders also wanted to have embeds travel in a vehicle in which they would be able to know and/or see what was happening. The embeds who rode in command vehicles were usually able to monitor the radio traffic between the commander and higher or lower HQ and get an understanding of what was happening during movement (e.g., enemy contact, change in missions, situation reports, and so forth). Several embeds stated that they were able to ride in different vehicles within the unit. One embed stated, "I hitched rides in different vehicles and got some of my best interviews with the different soldiers I met." Units that have few vehicles anyway, such as the 101ABN and 82ABN, had more difficulty accommodating the embeds, but they managed to move them around the battlefield.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs from print and local broadcast-media organizations stated that their embeds did not need their own vehicle, and most embeds agreed with that. Many embeds were given headsets that allowed them to monitor conversations on the command radio network, which they would not be able to do if were in their own vehicle. They were usually able to get rides to the different subordinate units. Sometimes subordinate commanders would tell the embed what they would be doing and offer to take the embed with them. The issue of broadcast-media vehicles was not addressed during the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meetings, except on 14 January 2003 when the DASD(PA) told the bureau chiefs that the military would provide transportation for embeds and that the

embeds would ride in unit vehicles.⁶⁰ At the 30 January meeting with the foreign press, the DASD(PA) reiterated that and added, “We don’t think it’s in your interest or our interest for you to be out there driving around the battlefield in whatever kind of vehicle you might be able to procure. So we’re going to provide you your transportation if you’re embedded.”⁶¹ Bureau chiefs were told that embedded media should bring only what they can carry. To minimize the embed’s load, he/she was encouraged to consider bringing the modern, up-to-date equipment. Even though this equipment is more expensive, it is usually less cumbersome.⁶²

Broadcast vehicles were an issue for the ground units and for the broadcast-media embeds from the major networks embedded with them. The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Embeds are not authorized to use their own vehicles while traveling in an embed status.” Before the PAG was issued, some ground units and broadcast media had already experimented with how to accommodate broadcast vehicles. The broadcast-media organizations purchased vehicles such as Hummers, Land Rovers, and Toyota Land Cruisers and experimented with the best way to mount equipment for the optimum transmission capability while on the move and in different situations and locations. Figure VI-2 shows a broadcast-media satellite truck preparing to deploy to the field.

CBS News visited the 1MARDIV in the fall of 2002 and proposed using a Hummer wired with a satellite transmission capability to broadcast television reports while accompanying division units in combat. This would eliminate the need for a unit to haul the broadcast crew and equipment in one of their vehicles. The media could set up for transmission in 15 minutes and produce higher-quality pictures than those that could be provided by a videophone. During division training in Kuwait in February 2003, several broadcast-media organizations that participated in short-term embeds used their vehicles to broadcast from the field.⁶³ During the 3ID training in Kuwait in November–December 2002, when the media embedded for 2 to 3 days, some of the broadcast media

⁶⁰ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

⁶¹ Department of State Foreign Press Center Transcript, *Department of Defense Media Support Plan: DASD(PA) Meeting With Foreign Press Representative*, 30 January 2003.

⁶² Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

⁶³ 1st Marine Division, *Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Lessons Learned*, May 2003.



U. S. Army Photos

Figure VI-2. A broadcast-media embed team prepares a commercial satellite truck for deployment to the field

brought vehicles rigged with their equipment. The 3ID advocated the use of the media vehicles so the units would not have to carry the media equipment in vehicles already loaded with soldiers and unit equipment. With the vehicles and additional support personnel, they could bring better equipment and transmit better quality video.⁶⁴ Both units developed TTPs for the broadcast-media vehicles and ground rules for operations, filing, transmissions, logistics, and training—TTPs and rules to which the media would have to agree if they brought a vehicle.

Ground commanders wanted flexibility in the “no media vehicle” guidance, but the time to accomplish that was limited. After the 10 February 2003 PAG was issued, the division PAOs requested a change to the PAG to allow broadcast-media vehicles. They submitted requests through VCORPS and IMEF to the CFLCC PAO, who forwarded the request to OASD(PA). Weighing the pros and cons for media vehicles on the battlefield, the DASD(PA) disapproved the request. On 17 February, the CFLCC PAO prepared a memorandum for the CFLCC Commanding General (CG) about media vehicles on the battlefield.

For the IMEF, VCORPS, and 3ID, this memorandum discussed the areas of agreement and the minor differences and additions related to the concept. The vehicles would also allow the media to broadcast from the field and reduce the requirement to retrograde their products from the front to the CPIC-Kuwait. On 20 February, the CFLCC CG approved the concept for the broadcast media to take their own vehicles. The request

⁶⁴ 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), *After Action Report*, Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003.

was again forwarded through CENTCOM PA to the ASD(PA), who disapproved the request. On 11 March, in an effort to avoid media complaints that might then require ground units to add media vehicles after the war started, the CFLCC PAO made one more request through channels for the use of media satellite trucks. On 17 March, the DASD(PA) disapproved the request and reiterated the policy outlined in the PAG. At a military-media conference in August 2003, the DASD(PA) stated, “It was decided, after lengthy discussions, that one of the most dangerous situations that we could have out there in a fast- moving battle going over great distances was to have everybody show up with whatever type of vehicle they could get their hands on in Kuwait and to try to keep up with the combat vehicles that they would be traveling with. It was one made after considerable thought and discussion with the bureau chiefs—the people that made the assignments—that put the journalists in the field.”⁶⁵

Despite the guidance, some embedded media from the major broadcast-media organizations had vehicles and additional personnel when the war started on 20 March 2003. Thirteen broadcast teams had vehicles when units entered Iraq. Most had one vehicle, but a few had two vehicles. In addition, two other broadcast teams acquired a commercial vehicle several days after entering Iraq. The reporter and cameraman with these broadcast teams did not ride in the media vehicle. They rode in one of the military vehicles, as did all the other embedded media, so that they could be close to the action and could see and hear what was happening. None of the local broadcast-media embed teams or other types of U.S. broadcast teams had vehicles, and most of the international broadcast-media teams did not have broadcast vehicles. At Al Jaber, one broadcast team had a vehicle the entire time, one team received permission after 2 weeks to get a vehicle, and one team never had a vehicle.

The best-known media vehicle was the “Bloommobile,” used by NBC correspondent David Bloom, who was embedded with the 3ID. He and his cameraman traveled on an M88 Recovery Vehicle that had a gyro-stabilized camera mounted on it. This camera transmitted to the Bloommobile, a specially modified vehicle with a satellite up-link that could transmit live video on the move. The commander allowed the M88 Recovery Vehicle to go wherever the broadcast team could get good coverage of operations, except

⁶⁵ Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

when it was recovering another vehicle. The two media broadcast vehicles (the other was a Land Rover) moved with the combat trains.

All did not go well with the media vehicles that went with the units. One broke down and had to be towed. Another vehicle that broke down could not be repaired and was abandoned, so the unit XO let the broadcast team use his vehicle and driver. One unit permitted a broadcast-media team to bring a vehicle that ran on motor gasoline (MOGAS) and to use it until it ran out of gas. When it did, they left it on the side of the road because the unit only had diesel fuel. Another vehicle lost a tire.

Senior ground commanders and PAOs stated that the broadcast-media embeds should have vehicles to carry crews and equipment as long as controls and guidelines were established. The guidelines were developed, and the media had agreed to abide by them. The PAG should have been changed. Allowing the media to have their own mode of transportation provided them greater flexibility, reduced the need to find space to transport the embeds and their equipment, and allowed for better reporting from the battlefield. Commanders in the 101ABN, who did not have media vehicles with them, stated that it would have been no problem for the embeds to accompany them on air assaults and have their vehicles link up with them later when the unit's vehicles also came forward. Several commanders modified trailers or trucks to accommodate the broadcast equipment for broadcast teams that did not have vehicles. In the 1MARDIV, after the final decision had been made, several media broadcast teams returned their vehicles to Kuwait City. The commanders did the best they could to transload all the equipment and rig a vehicle or trailer, but the end result was not as effective as what the media had rigged and tested over an extended period. If the media are not permitted to bring their own vehicles, commanders stated that the military should have a plan to provide broadcast-media teams an appropriate vehicle if they want one. The commanders did not have any spare vehicles in their units to provide to the media. On the air base, transporting the broadcast teams and their equipment to widely dispersed locations so they could get the coverage they wanted was difficult.

Communications and transmission technology had advanced significantly between the first Gulf War and OIF, and this allowed even more real-time coverage. Technological advances in transmitting video live from the battlefield—advances that include smaller, man-portable systems—may negate the need for a broadcast-media vehicle during future combat operations.

2. NBC Protective Equipment

The military issued NBC equipment to embedded media. During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA) stated, "We think it is important if you're embedded with our forces, that you ought to be traveling with the same NBC protection that our folks have. It is an ever-present threat on the modern battlefield, and we think it's the right thing to do." Based on the 10 February 2003 PAG that directed units to issue NBC protective equipment, the CENTCOM J4 [logistics officer] sent a message to component command J4s on 13 February directing them to issue NBC protective equipment.⁶⁶

OASD(PA) thought that having the NBC equipment issued at the unit level would facilitate the issuance and turn-in of the equipment. The CFLCC made the decision that it would be better to issue the NBC equipment through the CPIC-Kuwait to ground-unit embeds when they registered because they estimated that 85 percent of the embeds would join their assigned unit in theater and that units already deployed did not have overages of equipment.⁶⁷ Another reason was that if the war lasted for a longer period of time and embeds started rotating in and out of units (which was not part of the "embed-for-life" concept), issuing the equipment from the CPIC-Kuwait would also be easier.

No media personnel could be embedded until they received the equipment and training. The CPIC-Kuwait was prepared to conduct training as soon as the embeds received the equipment. Problems arose in getting appropriate authorizations and funding for the equipment, identifying where it would come from, and shipping it within the short period of time available. OASD(PA) assumed that the PAG was the authority for the units to purchase additional NBC equipment, but the PAG was not adequate. In January 2003, the CFLCC PAO raised the issue with CENTCOM PA, the Army Chief of Public Affairs, and the Army G-4.⁶⁸ Although the PAG stated that "commanders may purchase additional equipment, with funds normally available for that purpose," no funds are normally available to purchase NBC equipment for media.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ USCENTCOM J4 Message, Subject: Issuance of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Protective Equipment to Embedded Media Assigned to CENTCOM AOR, 13 February 2003.

⁶⁷ Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA) E-mail, Subject: HOT-NBC Gear for Embed Media (CENTCOM AOR), 11 February 2003.

⁶⁸ The Army G-4 is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

⁶⁹ CFLCC PAO E-mail, Subject: Embedded Media Chemical Protective Equipment, 16 February 2003.

The Army G-4 set aside enough Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) protective suits to accommodate the projected 6,000 to 8,000 government civilians and contractors expected to deploy into the CENTCOM AOR. Most were to be issued at Ft. Benning, Georgia. CFLCC received JSLIST suits to be issued to soldiers already deployed. The number of JSLIST suits received included 5,000 more suits than the CFLCC required for the soldiers. Those suits could be issued to civilians and contractors already in country. The CFLCC PAO received permission for the media to be included as civilians, authorized this issue, and got 620 JSLIST suits for the media on 13 February 2003. About a week later, they were able to draw the boots and gloves.

Not included with the JSLIST suits were masks, gloves, boots, and medical supplies. The CFLCC Deputy PAO made arrangements to pick up in Kuwait on 17 February the necessary medical supplies for each individual (620 sets). These medical supply packages included Antidote Treatment-Nerve Agent Auto-Injector (ATNAA) (3 kits), Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents (CANA) (3 kits), and Ciproflaxin or Doxycycline tablets (30 tablets). However, as of 22 February 2003, the medical logisticians did not consider the PAG proper authorization to issue the embeds NBC equipment, because these items were medical supplies. They were also concerned about issuing this equipment to the media before they had completed issuing it to the soldiers. They wanted approval through medical logistical channels authorizing release of the items.⁷⁰ The Army Surgeon General approved issuance of the controlled items to the media on 25 February.

The U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) would loan the masks to CFLCC for issue to the media as long as the media paid shipping costs—\$4,123 one-way, by sea. The CFLCC PAO wanted all equipment ready to issue by 28 February 2003 at the latest. A sea shipment would not get the equipment there in time, so they requested priority shipment by air at an estimated cost of \$50,000. Some masks came from the SBCCOM depot, and others came directly from the manufacturer. The masks were shipped to Charleston AFB, South Carolina, on 24 February but were then delayed because of a shipment backlog between Charleston AFB and Kuwait. The masks arrived in Kuwait on 7 March.

⁷⁰ CFLCC-PAO E-mail, Subject: Authorization To Issue Medical Biological Chemical Defense Material, 22 February 2003.

Embeds with Army and Marine units were issued the NBC equipment and medical supplies and began training on 8 March. Embedding began on 10–11 March 2003.

Units that had not deployed were told to find the equipment at their locations and issue it to the embeds at home station. Unit PAOs stated that they did this by taking equipment from nondeploying units at the installations. Ordering the equipment would have been difficult, even if all the authorization and funding details were resolved, because the sizes needed by the embeds were not known.

The 18 April 2003 PAG that delegated responsibility for the Embedded Media Program to CENTCOM also contained guidance about recovering equipment issued to the embeds. The PAG stated, “Units remain responsible for the return/collection of equipment issued to media, as well as tracking its return. If equipment is not returned when the reporter disembeds from the unit, the unit will forward a list of equipment issued to specific media member(s) through PA channels to CENTCOM/PA. If the equipment cannot be located, CENTCOM/PA will notify OASD(PA), which will then contact the appropriate bureau chief of the need to return the equipment or pay for it. This, however, does not relieve the issuing unit of the responsibility to continue tracking their equipment until the matter is resolved.”⁷¹

Every embed signed a DA Form 2062 (Hand Receipt/Annex Number) to verify receipt of the NBC equipment they were issued. A requirement for participation in the embed program was that they return the NBC equipment to the CPIC-Kuwait before leaving Kuwait or Iraq. An entry in the 13 April CFLCC PAO SITREP stated, “Many disembedded media are not returning NBC equipment. Ninety five media have disembedded—18 returned complete issue/22 media have made partial returns/55 media returned nothing.” An e-mail letter was sent 24 June 2003 to 392 embeds who had not returned all or a portion of the personal protective equipment (PPE) they were issued.⁷² Each embed was also sent a certified letter to let them know exactly what they had not returned and an address to where they could return the equipment. The final status of the equipment issued by the CPIC-Kuwait is unknown. Some embeds who were interviewed stated that they left the equipment with the unit with which they embedded rather than

⁷¹ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Delegation of Authority for Media Embedding Program in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), 18 April 2003.

⁷² CFLCC CPIC E-mail, Subject: Embed Return of CPIC-Issued PPE Gear, 24 June 2003.

return it to the CPIC-Kuwait. Thus, while the equipment is not specifically accounted for by the issuing organization, it is probably somewhere in the military supply system.

3. Communications Support

During the Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA) stated, "We understand that you'll have equipment problems in the field just like we do. Anything mechanical or electrical has problems from time to time. But you should go prepared to transmit your own products, and, in those rare cases where you have problems and we have the capability to help you out, we're going to do that because it's in our interest to do that too. But your primary means, you need to go self-sufficient, ready to transmit it, whether it's photos or text or whatever it is that you have."⁷³

One of all the embeds' primary needs was to recharge the batteries in their equipment. Embeds either brought an inverter or used a unit's inverter to convert 24-V battery power from the vehicle to conventional alternating current (AC). In some units, the embeds were able to use a generator to recharge their batteries. One embed stated, "Battery recharging was critical. I could not have done my job without the Marines." Commanders who had satellite phones also allowed their embeds to use the phone as a backup to their equipment, when time and circumstances permitted.

The harsh desert environment was also hard on the equipment. Embeds were as concerned about the status of their equipment as they were about their own safety. If anything happened to the equipment, they would not be able to get a story or file it. Keeping it clean was an essential requirement. One embed got in the habit of cleaning his equipment every morning when the soldiers cleaned their weapons. Several embeds said their unit did everything it could to help when they had a problem with their equipment. One embed stated, "After 3 weeks, some of my gear stopped working. I gave it to some of the communications guys in the unit, and they brought it back to life."

Although the large media broadcast organizations could report live, some of the local broadcast media could not do so with the equipment they had. The units assisted those embeds in getting their products back to Kuwait, where the embed had made arrangements for getting it back to his/her station. Likewise, the COD aircraft flew tapes from the aircraft carriers to Bahrain and Cyprus and brought replacement equipment and parts back to the embeds. Getting replacement equipment to embeds in the ground units

⁷³ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

once combat operations began was sometimes more difficult because of the wide dispersion of units on the battlefield.

The Navy provided limited satellite transmission capability to assist in transmitting primarily video products from the broadcast-media embeds.⁷⁴ The Navy provided the embeds access to computers, the Internet, and phones. The embeds were given e-mail accounts, which allowed them to file reports and to receive useful information about shipboard operations from the PAO.

4. Escorts and Safety

Generally, the embedded media were free to go where they wanted and talk to anyone. No escorts were assigned to observe interviews or report on activities of embeds. When an embed first arrived at a unit, an air base, or a ship, someone was usually assigned to get the embed oriented; however, after that, the embed was on his/her own.

The number of PAOs was not enough to escort every embed, but many ground commanders identified an individual to serve as a UPAR. His/her responsibility was to be a POC for the embed and to take care of any needs, concerns, interests in special coverage, information requests, and so forth. He/she was not an escort. Embeds stated that they saw the UPAR perhaps once a week, which was not a problem. In some cases, they met the UPAR when they arrived in the unit and saw him/her again when they disembedded. Nearly all commanders stated that they did not assign escorts but just integrated the embed into the unit. The vehicle commander of the vehicle in which the embed rode was responsible for the embed, just as he was responsible for all individuals in the vehicle. The 1MARDIV had “media buddies” who helped the embeds get around and meet members of the unit, but they did not restrict where the embed could go. Most embeds stated that they did not have an escort and that they could go anywhere in the unit and talk to anyone. Those few who did have an escort appreciated his/her assistance and did not view having an escort as an impediment to doing their job. In the 101ABN, escorts were usually provided during air assault operations for safety reasons. The SOF embeds usually had escorts who helped them get to a location where they could get the best coverage while, at the same time, ensuring that the embeds did not inadvertently interfere with the mission.

⁷⁴ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

The Navy had a small PA team on each aircraft carrier, but the individuals on this team were not escorts. They provided the embeds information and helped them file stories. The embeds had escorts the first 2 to 3 days on the ship, until they learned how to get where they wanted to go. After that, the embeds could go anywhere that was not a restricted area. Because of safety considerations, they were escorted on the flight deck.

The embeds on the air bases had an escort initially to help them learn where everything was and to ensure they understood the safety requirements on the flight line. After that, they had unlimited access and could go anywhere that was not a restricted area.

During the ASD Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 27 February 2003, the DASD(PA) addressed the subject of reporter safety by stating, "We've talked about this with you before, but I don't think we can emphasize it enough. The battlefield's a dangerous place, and it's going to be a dangerous place even embedded with our forces. It will be even a more dangerous place, though, for reporters who are out there not in an embedded status, who are moving around the battlefield, as I call it, running to the sounds of the guns."

Ground commanders stated that they did nothing specific for the safety of the embeds; rather, they had the same level of concern and took the same level of care to protect them as they did their own soldiers and marines. They provided appropriate safety briefings about the vehicles, weapons, and equipment in the unit. The embeds were not restricted from covering operations, although they were often told where they should go so they could get good coverage, be safe, and not interfere with the mission. The NCOs sometimes had to remind the embeds about wearing their helmets and body armor. Some of the embeds also had to be reminded that everywhere on the battlefield was dangerous, and they were not immune from becoming a casualty.

One embed stated, "I thought a lot about how to stay safe and protect myself because I did not want to get a soldier killed or wounded trying to protect me." The embeds did not think the unit did anything special, although some embeds thought that someone was probably watching out for them. One embed was told by a Marine, "We have your back. You are our link to home because of the reports you write, and you let us use your phone to call home. For that, we will protect you." Bureau chiefs/NMRs, primarily from local media organizations, stated that safety was a primary concern for them. They thought their people were safer as embeds than as unilaterals and that they probably would not have sent them to the region as a unilateral because of concern for their safety.

Embeds experienced close calls. The *Atlanta Journal-Constitution's* Ron Martz, while riding on an armored personnel carrier, was flanked by two soldiers who were both hit by bullets. “Had they not been there, I most likely would not be now typing this,” he wrote.⁷⁵ When the *Boston Globe's* Scott Nelson was riding in a convoy that was ambushed, he observed the source of the firing that the Marines had not seen. He pointed it out to an NCO, who killed the gunman and avoided any casualties to the Marines or to him.⁷⁶ The *Los Angeles Times's* David Zucchini was in a truck that plunged into a canal, but he and 24 soldiers were pulled to safety.⁷⁷

Just as the military sustained casualties, so too did the embeds. On 9 April 2003, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that “considering the short duration of the war, this campaign has been the deadliest for the journalists in modern history.”⁷⁸ Four embeds died between the start of the war on 20 March 2003 and the end of major combat operations on 1 May 2003 (see Table VI-1). During the same period, 10 unilaterals representing 8 media organizations lost their lives.

Table VI-1. Embeds Who Died During OIF

Date	Name	Media Type	Media Organization	Embedded Unit
4 April	Michael Kelly	UM	<i>Atlantic Monthly</i>	3rd Infantry Division
6 April	David Bloom	UT	NBC	3rd Infantry Division
7 April	Christian Leibig	IM	<i>Focus</i> (Germany)	3rd Infantry Division
7 April	Julio Parrado	IN	<i>El Mundo</i> (Spain)	3rd Infantry Division

5. Equipment List for Embeds

Several packing lists were available to embeds, but they did not always receive them before getting to Kuwait. MAJ Ted Wadsworth (OASD(PA)) wrote a 7-page document that discusses what is needed to live and work in a harsh environment. It presents planning considerations for the selection of clothing, personal and professional equipment, and supplies and provides a detailed list of recommended items and how to pack them.⁷⁹ DoD did not endorse the document, and OASD(PA) never distributed it to media

⁷⁵ Ron Martz, “I Owe These Heroes My Life,” *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, 5 April 2003.

⁷⁶ Scott Bernard Nelson, “Embedded Reporter Comes Away From Front Lines Torn,” *Boston Globe*, 22 April 2003.

⁷⁷ David Zucchini, “The War: Up Close, and Very Personal,” *Los Angeles Times*, 3 May 2003.

⁷⁸ Mary Wiltenburg, “All the News That’s Dangerous To Gather,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 April 2003.

⁷⁹ MAJ Ted Wadsworth, *Journalism in War—How to Prepare to Live and Work in War Zone*, undated.

organizations in an e-mail or posted it on the Internet. However, it was provided to individuals who wrote to request information. The CFLCC PA Office prepared for the media a 1-page packing list that was more general.⁸⁰ The IMEF PAO sent to the embeds an e-mail that contained in-processing information, which included an equipment list.⁸¹

Ground-unit commanders stated that it would be beneficial for embeds to be provided an equipment list. They needed to know what to bring and how to pack it. The best situation would be that they knew the specific unit of embed assignment so they could get a recommended list from that unit. Even within a division, different types of units take different equipment. Embeds who received equipment lists appreciated the guidelines, although they stated that some lists included too much clothing and equipment. Those embeds who had not traveled with the military before also sought advice from those who had. Most embeds thought that they took the right type and amount of clothing and equipment. Commanders and PAOs observed that the more experienced embeds (those who had covered the military in the field) knew what to bring, while those with little or no experience brought too much.

E. DISEMBEDDING

During the ASD Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA) told the bureau chiefs that embeds could stay embedded with a unit as long as they wanted. He referred to it as an "embed for life" and described an ideal situation: "You would get an embed opportunity with a unit that's leaving from the United States, you would go with that unit, you would be there through their load-out, through their deployment, through their send-offs. You'd follow them into their staging area. You'd be with them as they prepare for combat. You'd go into combat with them. You'd march on whatever capital we happen to march on with them. You would return to the United States with them or to their home base, wherever that might be, and you'd cover the victory parade." If a decision was made to leave a unit because the media organization was no longer interested in reporting on that unit or because it had been covered sufficiently, an embed was free to leave; however, the embed was not guaranteed another embed opportunity with that unit or another unit.⁸²

⁸⁰ CFLCC Public Affairs Office, *Packing List for Media in the Area of Operations (AOR)*, undated.

⁸¹ IMEF PAO E-mail, Subject: 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Media Embed In-Processing Information, 24 February 2003.

⁸² Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

The 10 February 2003 PAG defined a media embed as “a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis—perhaps a week or even months.” It went on to state, “Media may terminate their embed opportunity at any time. Unit commanders will provide, as the tactical situation permits and based on the availability of transportation, movement back to the nearest location with commercial transportation.”

As mentioned, most embeds voluntarily disembedded between 9 April and 1 May 2003. Some individuals scheduled to embed did not arrive at the unit, some with ground units disembedded before the unit crossed the border into Iraq, and some remained to cover SASO. Most Air Force embeds had departed by 13 April, and the last Navy embed departed 16 April.

1. Voluntary Disembedding

The primary reasons for disembedding were as follows:

- Major combat operations were over.
- The freedom of movement possible throughout Iraq did not require being with a unit.
- Many of the large media organizations established bureaus in Baghdad after its capture and had additional media to cover SASO.

A United States Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) report that includes a list of significant events shows 14 April 2003 as the end to major military operations.⁸³ In a DoD News Briefing on 14 April 2003, MG Stanley McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff, stated, “I think that as major combat operations wind down, we’ll still conduct minor combat operations, to include some sharp fights in areas, and then adjust our operations in each area. ... I would anticipate that the major combat engagements are over because the major Iraqi units on the ground cease to show coherence.”⁸⁴ President Bush announced the end of major combat operations on 1 May 2003.

Ground commanders were disappointed that their embeds started leaving so soon after the fall of Baghdad because they missed what they believe was—and continues to be—an important story. Commanders stated that most of their embeds told them their mission was to cover combat operations and that that mission was accomplished. The

⁸³ USCENTAF Report, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers*, 30 April 2003.

⁸⁴ Department of Defense News Transcript, *DoD News Briefing – ASD PA Clarke and Maj. Gen. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff*, 14 April 2003.

phase-out of embeds seemed to depend on what the unit that they were covering was doing. If it was exciting, they stayed. If it was not exciting, they left because their reports were no longer being published or aired. Most embeds were told to come home, while a few were told to become unilaterals. No data are available to determine what each embed did after disembedding. Some commanders stated that the quality of reporting seemed to change after the embeds departed. One commander stated, "When the embeds left, there was no media to report on the unit. That was not a problem for me, but I found out later that it made a difference to the families who looked forward to the reports and counted on them to know what their loved ones were doing and how they were doing." Although OASD(PA) told the bureau chiefs that embeds were not guaranteed a return to a unit, several commanders stated that their embeds did return for follow-up stories on the units' soldiers and operations. Many also were at the home station to cover the return of the unit. Both actions were greatly appreciated by the commanders, Service members, and families. Many of the embeds on the aircraft carriers thought they had all the stories they needed within a few days after the start of the ground war and wanted to go to Iraq to continue covering the war from there or to go home. Embeds with fixed-wing aircraft units departed earlier than those with helicopter units. Embeds with CS and CSS units also departed earlier than those with combat units.

Interviews with bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds indicated that in most cases, the decision to disembed was made during discussions between a representative of the organization and the embed, based on an assessment of the primary reasons stated previously. For small media organizations, cost was also an important consideration. One bureau chief stated, "It did not make sense to keep the embeds with a unit when they were no longer covering a major story." After the fall of Baghdad, the media organizations had other ways to get access to units and their activities without having embeds, so many of the large organizations were sending new people to cover SASO. In some cases, the embeds wanted to stay longer, but the media organization told them to disembed. If they did not think there was any more value in being embedded, they would disembed and return to home or become a unilateral. Several embeds stated that they were ready to come home because their equipment was starting to wear out and they were tired and fatigued. One embed who was embedded for 6 weeks, stated, "I really appreciated what the military guys go through. I can't imagine being over there for a year."

Embeds did not depart a unit immediately once a decision was made to disembed. It usually took 1 or 2 days to arrange transportation back to Kuwait City, Bahrain, or Cyprus. For those embedded with ground units, it was not always an easy process. The embeds either made their way to the PAO's location so he could assist, or they tried to get a ride on any form of unit transportation that was going back to Kuwait City. Many embeds in or near Baghdad were directed to their newly established bureau, and arrangements were made there. Some embeds departed through Jordan.

2. Involuntary Disembedding

Provisions were in place to disembed media involuntarily for violation of the ground rules. Embeds signed a statement agreeing to abide by the ground rules. The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, "Violation of the ground rules may result in the immediate termination of the embed and removal from the AOR." It further stated, "Issues, questions, difficulties, or disputes associated with ground rules or other aspects of embedding media that cannot be resolved at the unit level, or through the chain of command, will be forwarded through PA channels for resolution. Commanders who wish to terminate an embed for cause must notify CENTCOM PA prior to termination. If a dispute cannot be resolved at a lower level, OASD(PA) will be the final resolution authority. In all cases, this should be done as expeditiously as possible to preserve the news value of the situation." Some embeds were permanently disembedded, and others were allowed to return to the unit after a few days. In some cases, the unit commander requested to have an embed disembedded, and, in other cases, it was directed from higher HQ.

Three embeds from three different media organizations were involuntarily disembedded and not allowed to return to a unit. The first embed, with an Air Force unit, was disembedded from an air base for taking pictures in a scheduling area that included pilot names after being told previously not to do so. In addition, the embed went into a secure area and wrote an inappropriate message on a missile. The second embed, with an Army unit, was disembedded for failing to comply with a directive to all embeds to cease using the Thuraya⁸⁵ satellite phone, if they had one, because of security concerns about being able to target U.S. unit locations through the phone's built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinate feature. The embed was warned twice about using the phone and was

⁸⁵ Thuraya is a regional mobile satellite system that provides satellite telephony and data services to Europe, the Mediterranean, Northern Africa, and the Middle East region covering more than 100 countries.

disembedded after using it a third time. The third embed, with a Marine unit, was disembedded for writing about future operations related to troop movements. This embed attempted to appeal to OASD(PA) but was disembedded before he completed the appeal process.

Several more embeds were involuntarily disembedded for short periods of time and then allowed to return to the unit. One broadcast-media embed team reported a casualty incident that identified the unit and provided the name of one of the casualties they interviewed before the family members were notified. A reporter with a second broadcast-media embed team drew a map in the sand depicting future operations. In both cases, after a review of the circumstances and a requirement to be briefed thoroughly on the ground rules, the embeds rejoined their unit. In a third instance, a photographer took a picture of a mortally wounded soldier who died the next day. The media organization printed the picture with the story several days later despite being requested by the military not to do so. The CFLCC commander directed that all five embeds from that media organization, who were located in three different units, be disembedded. Three embeds had already disembedded voluntarily for reasons unrelated to the incident, one embed was disembedded from another unit, and the photographer remained with the unit. The one embed who was disembedded rejoined the unit 3 weeks later.

Unilaterals who registered with the CPIC-Kuwait also signed and agreed to abide by the ground rules. Several of them violated the ground rules, had their CFLCC media badges taken away, and were precluded from any further visits to units. OASD(PA), CENTCOM PA, or the CLFCC did not maintain a list with information about embeds or unilaterals who violated the ground rules. At a military-media conference in August 2003, the CFLCC PAO stated, “We disembedded about 26 reporters throughout the process. Some of them were embedded reporters. Some of them were unilateral reporters who took temporary embed assignments.”⁸⁶

3. Post-Traumatic Stress After Disembedding

For Service members returning from combat, the military has programs that include briefings on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the availability of counseling. Leaders receive briefings on how to recognize symptoms of stress and are

⁸⁶ Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

encouraged to have a Service member seek help if warranted. Although most journalists do not report chronic distress, studies have documented increased rates of psychological distress for some journalists, such as war correspondents.⁸⁷

The topic was discussed with bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds when one of them raised the issue during an interview. All bureau chiefs/NMRs who were asked stated that their media organization had counseling available as part of an employee assistance program. Embeds were less certain about availability of counseling. Several stated it was definitely available, some were not sure, and one said it was not. Embeds employed by large media organizations stated that the programs available to them were very good. When the small sample of embeds who had been with ground units was asked if they had any problems adjusting after returning from Iraq, 9 of 12 (75 percent) stated they did. They mentioned several different problems and effects that lasted from 1 week to 6 months. The embeds who had been at an air base or on an aircraft carrier stated that they did not experience any readjustment problems after they returned home. When asked if they would embed again, most hoped that there would not be another war that would make it necessary but stated that they would do it again.

F. PROGRAM COSTS

1. Military

The cost of the Embedded Media Program to the military was minimal compared with the overall cost of the war, but the military did have associated costs—some that can be determined and some that cannot. Commanders and PAOs stated that the benefits of the program far outweighed any costs.

OASD(PA) did not determine the cost of conducting the four media training courses. The course taught by the Army at Ft. Benning was \$72,000. Based on a course attendance of 60 individuals, the Army's cost was \$1,200 per individual. Assuming that the other Services' costs to conduct their courses was similar, the aggregate amount for conducting the four media training courses was approximately \$288,000. OSD did not provide any funds to the Services for conducting the media training courses.

⁸⁷ Elisa E. Bolton, "PTSD in Journalists," *National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Fact Sheet*, Department of Veterans Affairs, 18 September 2003.

Some embeds traveled with a unit on either military or contracted commercial air transportation to Kuwait. Neither the cost per seat nor the number of embeds who were able to use this transportation is known. Embeds were transported from the CPIC-Bahrain and CPIC-Cyprus via COD aircraft. Those aircraft would have flown the mission anyway, so it is assumed that no increase in cost was incurred to transport the embeds.

All embeds were processed through the CPICs. The respective governments paid the hotel and support costs necessary to operate the CPIC-Kuwait and CPIC-Bahrain.

During the execution of the Embedded Media Program, the military provided bottled water and meal, ready-to-eat (MRE) to embeds allocated to ground units. Based on the CFLCC Daily Status Report, the embeds were with the ground units approximately 18,500 man-days between 10 March and 6 June 2003. Providing each embed 3 MREs per day at a cost of \$6.94 per MRE places the total cost at \$388,500. Embeds on Navy ships paid for their meals. Military water consumption planning data are based on gallons per day per individual but are used to determine total water requirements, not just drinking water. Bottled water was the primary source of drinking water. In June 2004, the 1st Force Service Support Group (1FSSG) was supplying enough bottled water to Marine units to provide 6 bottles per day.⁸⁸ Using 18,500 man-days, embeds were issued 111,000 bottles of water. The cost of the water is unknown because it is bought in large quantities from many vendors through different agencies.⁸⁹ The military also provided fuel for vehicles used by broadcast media that had vehicles in Iraq.

The military provided PPE to the embeds. PPE consisted of the JSLIST garment, protective mask, gloves, boots, and associated medical supplies. The total value of the 620 sets of PPE ordered by the CPIC-Kuwait was \$483,898 (see Table VI-2). The PPE was issued to the embeds when they registered at the CPIC-Kuwait.

Embeds who joined units at their home station were issued PPE by the unit. According to the CFLCC Deputy PAO, they issued 530 of the 620 sets of equipment. The embeds who were issued PPE by the CPIC-Kuwait were required to return the PPE to the

⁸⁸ Lance Corporal Samuel B. Valliere, "Heat Doesn't Mean Ops Cool Down for 1st FSSG in Iraq," *Marine Corps News*, 30 June 2004.

⁸⁹ David Wood, "Designer Water Becomes an Undesigned Logistics Problem for the Army," *Newhouse News Service*, 28 July 2003.

Table VI-2. PPE Clothing and Medical Supplies Issued

Item Description	Unit Cost	Total Cost
JSLIST coat	\$117.25	\$72,695.00
JSLIST trousers	\$107.65	\$66,743.00
Protective mask and filter	\$195.57	\$121,253.40
Rubber gloves	\$25.65	\$15,903.00
Vinyl overboot	\$17.00	\$10,540.00
Ciproflaxin or Doxycycline Tablets (30)	\$267.89	\$166,091.80
ATNAA (3 @ \$8.92 ea)	\$26.76	\$16,591.20
CANA (3 @ \$7.57 ea)	\$22.71	\$14,080.20
Total	\$780.48	\$483,897.60

CPIC before departing Kuwait and/or Iraq after they disembedded.⁹⁰ A similar requirement was imposed on those who were issued the PPE by a unit. Much of the PPE was not returned by the embeds. The CPIC-Kuwait conducted a Report of Survey for the equipment that 392 embeds did not return to them. The status of equipment issued by units is not known.

2. Media

Media organizations incurred most of the costs of the Embedded Media Program. The program was expensive for every organization that covered the conflict, although they accepted that as the cost of reporting on the conflict in a way that has never been done before. One bureau chief stated, “You decide to cover the war or not cover the war, but if you cover it, don’t do it on the cheap.” The bureau chiefs/NMRs did not have cost figures readily available and thought that putting a cost on the Embedded Media Program would be difficult because of the many variables. Some costs were part of the normal cost of doing business, and some were unique to the war. Most of the new equipment that was purchased and used to report from the battlefield can be used in the future. Many media organizations, especially the large ones, had embeds and unilaterals, and the costs (e.g., satellite phone bill) were consolidated. CNN expected to have 250 people in the region (approximately 10 percent of whom were embeds) and set aside \$25 million for war coverage. Broadcast network executives estimated they would spend about \$1 million a day on war coverage and forfeit about that amount in advertising revenue in the first few days of the war by going without commercial interruptions.⁹¹ For some media organizations, OIF coverage was not in the budget, and they had to cut costs

⁹⁰ CPIC-Kuwait E-mail, Subject: Embed Return of CPIC-Issued PPE Gear, 24 June 2003.

⁹¹ Howard Kurtz, “Media Weigh Costs, Fruits of ‘Embedding,’” *Washington Post*, 11 March 2003.

elsewhere. No overall expenditure data were available from any media organization. In some cases, bureau chiefs/NMRs offered a guess, but it was not clear what costs they included in that amount.

Attendees at the media training courses were told that their costs would not exceed \$300, but no data are available on the actual costs charged to the attendees at each course. Based on the \$300 amount, the media organizations that sent the most individuals (15) paid \$4,500, and the total cost to the media for 232 students did not exceed \$69,600. Media organizations that sent embeds to a hostile-environment training courses paid approximately \$3,000 per individual. Centurion Risk Assessment Services charges \$2,500 per person for their 5-day course, and the Pilgrims Group charges \$3,200 per person for their 6-day course.⁹² Another company used by media organizations that offers similar training is AKE Limited.

The military provided embeds the PPE for chemical and biological protection, and the media organizations were responsible for providing body armor, helmets, and any other protective equipment desired. During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA), in response to a question about why DoD would not furnish it, stated, "We have had discussions with many of you in this room about that. To be quite honest with you, there's a fair amount of concern that if we put our military flack vests on you, if we put our military helmets on you, if we provide protective clothing for you beyond the NBC suits, you begin to look very much like a soldier, a sailor, or a marine that's out there, and so we've gotten a fair amount of push-back from that." Estimates of expenditure per individual for body armor and helmet ranged from \$1,000 to \$1,500. Embeds attached to ground units also needed to purchase additional personal equipment if they did not already have it (e.g., a tent, a sleeping bag, a ground pad, canteens, and so forth). For additional protection, OASD(PA) made smallpox vaccine and anthrax vaccine available to embeds. It was voluntary and not a perquisite for embedding. The vaccine cost per dose was \$5.80 for smallpox and \$94.96 for anthrax.⁹³ The smallpox vaccine required 1 dose and the anthrax vaccine required 6 doses, administered over 18 months. Thus, the total cost for all 7 shots was \$575.56. No data were available to indicate how many embeds received the shots.

⁹² Alan Cowell, "Preparing Journalists for Battle," *New York Times*, 25 March 2003.

⁹³ OASD(PA) Letter to the Bureau Chiefs About the Vaccination Program, 12 February 2003.

Although military transportation was authorized for embeds, many flew to and/or returned from Kuwait by commercial air carrier. One-way airfare was usually \$1,500 or more.

The media organizations paid the hotel and meal expenses for embeds in Kuwait, Cyprus, Bahrain, and at U.S. cities and towns adjacent to installations with units that had embeds join them there. Room rates in Kuwait averaged \$200 to \$300 per night. Some embeds stayed in the hotel for several weeks waiting to embed.

As mentioned previously, the military provided MREs to embeds with ground units. Embeds on the aircraft carriers reimbursed the Navy for their meals at about \$10.00 per day.

The biggest expense for the media organizations was the equipment the embeds needed to prepare their reports (e.g., laptop editors and satellite phones, and the satellite charges for transmitting them). The cost of a satellite phone, depending on features, capabilities, and accessories, could range from \$1,000 to several thousand dollars. One embed stated that his satellite phone bill for one month was \$11,500. A bureau chief of a large media organization estimated satellite phone purchase and transmission charges at 7 digits, which covered both embeds and unilaterals. Satellite news-gathering systems that allow the transmission of sound and images to a satellite, which relays them to a network studio, vary in price from \$130,000 to \$1.4 million, depending on functions and capabilities. These systems weigh about 75 lbs.⁹⁴

Most media organizations provided life insurance for embeds, which was extremely expensive for coverage in a combat zone. Cost varied significantly (\$10,000 to \$50,000) depending on the terms of coverage (i.e., amount and period of time).

The last cost to media organizations was the compensation provided to the embeds. Based on interviews with bureau chiefs/NMRs and embeds, this compensation was provided in many different ways. Some embeds received additional pay, additional vacation days or compensatory time off, or a combination of these. Some embeds stated they received neither. The compensation included a bonus, hourly pay for hours worked, payment for 24/7, or a fixed overtime rate. Some embeds received time off when they returned or a paid vacation period.

⁹⁴ Mike Wendland, "TV Journalists' War Gear Grows Smaller, Better," *Detroit Free Press*, 7 March 2003.

Table VI-3 recaps the expense items for the military and the media.

Table VI-3. Embedded Media Program Expense Items for the Military and the Media

Military	Media
Media training course Military or military contract air transportation MRE Bottled water Diesel fuel for broadcast-media vehicles NBC equipment	Media training course Hostile-environment training course Body armor, helmet Commercial air transportation Hotel and meal expenses Meals aboard Navy ships Laptop computers and satellite phones Satellite transmission equipment and charges Life insurance Embed compensation

G. FINDINGS

Most embeds joined a unit, boarded a ship, or went to an air base 7 to 10 days before the war started, while the remainder joined at the unit’s home station. Embedding before the war was very beneficial for the commanders, the Service members, and the embeds. Embedding after the war was more difficult and less effective.

OASD(PA) had a good understanding of the desires and needs of the media and established good working relationships with bureau chiefs/NMRs. Commanders who had PAOs relied on them to implement the Embedded Media Program within their unit. Once ground units entered Iraq, subordinate commanders saw very little of the PAOs because of the wide dispersion of their units. On the aircraft carriers and at the air bases, the PAOs worked closely with the commanders and the embeds.

Support and involvement by commanders at all levels in all components and Services were major factors in the Embedded Media Program’s success. The critical factor was the trust and confidence that developed between the commander and embed.

Commanders were tasked to provide the embeds billeting, rations, medical treatment, military transportation, limited communications support to assist in transmitting media products, and NBC protective equipment. This support was provided, although in some cases not without difficulty or problems.

Ground commanders wanted the PAG changed to allow broadcast-media vehicles on the battlefield, but DASD(PA) disapproved the request submitted by the CFLCC. Despite the guidance, 15 broadcast-media teams from the major broadcast-media organizations took vehicles and additional personnel into Iraq.

The military issued NBC equipment and provided the embeds training in Kuwait before they joined their units. Problems associated with getting appropriate authorizations and funding for the equipment, identifying where it would come from, and shipping it within the relatively short period of time available delayed the start of embedding with ground units in Kuwait until 10–11 March 2003.

Most embeds voluntarily disembedded between 9 April and 1 May 2003 because major combat operations were over, more freedom of movement was possible throughout Iraq, and many large media organizations had established bureaus in Baghdad.

Three of the 692 embeds from the different media organizations were involuntarily disembedded and not allowed to return to a unit. Several embeds were involuntarily disembedded for short periods of time and then allowed to return to the unit. Several unilaterals violated the ground rules and were precluded from any further visits to the units.

The military's cost of the Embedded Media Program, estimated at approximately \$1.2 million, was minimal compared with the overall cost of the war. Commanders and PAOs stated that the benefits of the program far outweighed the costs. Media organizations incurred most of the costs of the Embedded Media Program but accepted it as a cost of covering the war. Although no cost data are available, the biggest expense for the media organizations was the equipment the embeds needed to prepare their reports and the communications equipment and the satellite charges required for transmitting the reports.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Coordinate with ground commanders and broadcast-media bureau chiefs to develop a comprehensive plan for allowing broadcast-media vehicles on the battlefield
- Develop policies and procedures for authorizing, funding, acquiring, and issuing NBC equipment and medical supplies for embeds
- Develop recommended packing lists of personal equipment for embeds—lists for each Service and the different types of units in which the embeds are assigned.

VII. REPORTING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

The military envisioned that the Embedded Media Program would play a major role in its PA plan. Before the war started, concerns were expressed about the objectivity of the embeds and the possibility of them being co-opted by the military. The media hoped the embeds would be granted the access they were promised and would be able to file reports in a timely manner without any censorship.

A. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OSD PA OBJECTIVES

As noted in Section IV, the OASD(PA) PA concept for OIF had three objectives:

1. Dominate the media coverage of the war
2. Counter third-party disinformation
3. Assist in garnering U.S. public and international support.⁹⁵

The Embedded Media Program was only one element of the media coverage during OIF. This part of the report provides an assessment of the Embedded Media Program's role in accomplishing these OSD PA objectives.

1. Dominate the Media Coverage of the War

Commanders and PAOs stated that the war in Iraq would dominate the news with or without the embeds, but that the coverage was better when a large part of the coverage was provided through the soldier's eyes.

Starting about 10 days before the war and during major combat operations, embedded media reports appeared continually in newspapers and magazines and on television and radio—not only in the United States, but also around the world. Many of the 692 U.S. and international embeds were providing daily reports to their media

⁹⁵ The DASD(PA) restated these objectives in slightly different terms at a DASD(PA) military-media conference in August 2003. The PA strategy objectives as listed by the speaker were (1) neutralize the disinformation of our adversaries, (2) build and maintain support for U.S. policy and the global war on terrorism, (3) take offensive action to achieve information dominance, (4) demonstrate the professionalism of the U.S. military, and (5) build and maintain support for the warfighter out there on the ground. Taken from Alicia C. Shepard, "Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War," *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

organizations. Some embeds provided several reports a day, while embeds who represented magazines had their reports published weekly. Broadcast-media embeds usually filed several daily reports that were seen on both local and national TV channels during news segments as well as on the 24-hour news stations. “Appearing for NBC, MSNBC [Microsoft/National Broadcasting Corporation], and CNBC [Consumer News and Business Channel], David Bloom was on the air more than 100 times in 2 weeks. One day, he did 13 live reports in a 19-hour period.”⁹⁶ A Project-for-Excellence-in-Journalism survey of the 5 major networks conducted during 3 of the first 6 days of the war found that 108



Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Times

Figure VII-1. Example of an Internet Web site that has news articles, photographs, journals, and audio reports from embeds and unilaterals, in addition to links to other Web sites

embedded reports were aired during key viewing hours for news.⁹⁷ In addition, most print and broadcast-media organizations also have Internet Web sites where the reports could be read (see Figure VII-1).⁹⁸ As discussed in Section V, many media organizations have arrangements with other media organizations to share stories. Assuming that the embeds were with their units an average of 30 days and each one filed a daily report, 20,760 reports were filed, many of which were read or seen in multiple markets. An example of the number of people who saw the reports is reflected in the daily circulation of the U.S. newspapers that had embeds (exceeds 23.7 million) and the circulation of U.S. magazines that had embeds (exceeds 24.1 million).⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Walt Belcher, “From the Front,” *Tampa Tribune*, Tampa, FL, 10 April 2003.

⁹⁷ “Embedded Reporters: What are Americans Getting?,” *Project for Excellence in Journalism*, Washington, DC, 3 April 2003.

⁹⁸ “Online Reports From a Region in Conflict,” <http://www.sptimes.com/2003/webspecials03/reports/>, *St. Petersburg Times*, St. Petersburg, FL, 2003.

⁹⁹ Based on circulation data contained in the *Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast Media*, Volumes 1–5, The Gale Group, Farmington, MI, 2002.

Despite those types of statistics, trying to determine how much of the war’s media coverage was provided by embeds of all media types would be difficult—if not impossible. A newspaper article stated, “Reports from embeds are getting attention, but they’re really not dominating coverage. CBS estimates that one in three stories are from embeds; ABC, one in four.”¹⁰⁰ While embeds were filing reports, the senior commanders in the field, at CENTCOM HQ in Doha, Qatar, and at the Pentagon were providing military briefings. At the same time, OASD(PA) and CENTCOM PA were also issuing press releases. In addition to printing and broadcasting reports from embeds, the media organizations provided reports from unilaterals on the battlefield, CENTCOM, the Pentagon, the White House, and foreign capitals. Before and during major combat operations, the 692 embeds represented 22.4 percent of the combined total of embeds, the 2,158 unilaterals registered with the CPIC-Kuwait, and the 237 embarks on Navy ships. Commanders assumed and bureau chiefs/NMRs generally agreed that the embeds provided more coverage during that period than the unilaterals and embarks; however, there is no way to quantify that or determine how much coverage they provided compared with all other sources of information. As the embeds began to disembark, the coverage from Iraq came primarily from unilateral reporters.

2. Counter Third-Party Disinformation

The OASD(PA)’s experience during OEF in Afghanistan taught them about the need to counter disinformation. One way to counter disinformation was by having



Photo - AP

**Figure VII-2. Iraqi Information Minister
Mohammad Saeed al-Sahaf**

embedded media with many units independently reporting what they saw. This resulted in independent but accurate and objective incident and combat operations reports that were much different from what the Iraqi Information Minister Mohammad Saeed al-Sahaf (aka Baghdad Bob) was reporting (see Figure VII-2).

The media would ask about something that was reported to unilaterals by the Information Minister, but an

¹⁰⁰ Peter Johnson, “Reporters Go Along With the Military,” *USA Today*, 26 March 2003.

immediate verification or denial of the statement was sometimes not possible. The unilaterals were not able to challenge the Iraqi Information Minister about the veracity of his statements. Using the military's operational chain of command, it took time for CENTCOM HQ to counter the disinformation and provide the facts (e.g., Iraqi claims that U.S. forces killed 30 innocent civilians in a mosque or hospital). As one PAO stated, "The liar has the advantage. It is hard to disprove a negative." Ground commanders were aware of the statements being made by the Iraqi Information Minister. Sometimes, the statements were provided by the PAO, but, often, they were provided by an embed getting it from a unilateral or editor from the same media organization. They appreciated having an embed as an impartial witness and honest broker to record the truth—good or bad—for the world to know. Even bad news stories had the perspective and context that permitted readers and viewers to understand how the tragedy could happen. Timely and accurate reporting minimized the time such a story would be carried by the media organizations. The situation was more difficult for the military when the Iraqis claimed that a U.S. atrocity was caused by a bomb or missile strike. Often, nobody except the Iraqi press was present to report the incident. Senior military leaders wanted to provide the facts, but addressing the allegations based on a battle damage assessment (BDA) was often difficult. The Air Force developed a three-step procedure to handle the media inquiries. They would release a statement with all the known facts within 60 minutes and indicated that an investigation was in progress. They provided an update 2 hours later and advised the media that the next report would be provided when a final determination of the facts was known.

The timely reporting of the facts usually came from the embeds. Another PAO stated, "Any propaganda was nullified when an incident was thoroughly reported by the embeds, which included the background and context for what happened." Media photographs or videos that visually disproved the claims of the Iraqi Information Minister often accompanied a report. An embed stated, "The day after we captured the airport, I was listening to BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] on the radio as we were eating lunch, and there's Baghdad Bob on BBC saying 'there are no soldiers at the airport, we'll show you, we'll take you out there.' So I got on the phone and called my editor and filed a report, 'We're hearing this, and as I speak, I can see U.S. tanks and troops at the airport. This is propaganda.'" Broadcast media would sometimes have a split screen with the Iraqi Information Minister making a statement that was contradicted by the video on the other screen.

The claims of the Iraqi Information Minister were also refuted by the unilaterals. A Reuters article on cnn.com/WORLD reported, “Even as U.S. troops roamed through a presidential complex in the heart of Baghdad on Monday and as tanks rumbled down streets a few hundred meters away, Sahaf was confidently boasting to the world the invaders would be slaughtered.”¹⁰¹ The bureau chiefs/NMRs used the reports from embeds and unilaterals to provide the readers and viewers a more complete picture of the truth. As one bureau chief stated, “When a market was bombed, I had a unilateral reporter there to report on the casualties. Without that, we would have to rely on the statements of the Iraqi Information Minister.”

3. Assist in Garnering U.S. Public Support and International Support

Although public opinion is influenced by what is seen or read in the news, the embedded media were there to report the facts objectively. The incorporation of embeds from foreign news organizations provided coverage in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the world.

Commanders and PAOs stated that they thought the reporting by embeds helped gain public support and respect for the military. The national and international public learned how difficult war can be and saw the military’s efforts to minimize casualties and collateral damage. They witnessed the skill and professionalism of the Service members and gained a better understanding of military operations. A bureau chief stated, “Our reports gained support for the soldier, if not for the war.”

Neither the military nor the media that were interviewed thought that the role of the embeds or the media was to try and influence support for military or government actions. The commanders and PAOs only wanted the embeds to report accurately. An embed stated, “I did not consider it my role to influence opinion or support. Most reporters I know believe in an objective presentation of events, leaving it up to the readers to decide what they think of the war.” One bureau chief stated, “The media does have an impact, but it is not our job to influence public opinion. Our job is to give a fair assessment by reporting the facts.” They saw their role as the messenger and thought that the military, through the embeds, sent a good message.

¹⁰¹ cnn.com/WORLD, *Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, Face of the Iraqi Government*, 8 April 2003.

IDA is not aware of any studies or surveys conducted to determine how much of an effect the Embedded Media Program had on the public in terms of garnering support. In a survey conducted in March 2003, shortly after the war started, one topic was the embedded media. The response to the question *Television and newspaper reporters are traveling with allied military forces in Iraq and submitting dispatches from combat areas. Do you think it's a good thing or a bad thing that reporters are doing this?* was as follows: good thing (58 percent), bad thing (34 percent), and don't know/refused to comment (8 percent). Those who said it was a bad thing thought the reporters were either providing too much information to the enemy or that it was just too much coverage that was not good for the American public to watch.¹⁰² A survey conducted in June 2003 indicated that the American public was in favor of the program. The response to the question *"Do you favor or oppose the policy of embedding journalists in individual military units during the war?"* was as follows: favor strongly (37 percent), favor mildly (28 percent), oppose mildly (12 percent), and oppose strongly (19 percent).¹⁰³



Photo – NHK Television, Japan

Figure VII-3. Embedded journalist Hideki Yui, NHK Television, Japan, files a live report from the 24th Corps Support Group, V Corps

The international embeds and the bureau chiefs/NMRs who represent the major regions of the world stated that it was essential to have the international media to provide coverage of the war (see Figure VII-3). Having embeds added to the depth of their reporting and enabled them to provide their readers and viewers a better understanding of the U.S. military. They further stated that because the world is so diverse now, the reports of a particular print or broadcast media are carried not only in that country, or region, but

worldwide—in print, via satellite broadcast, and on the Internet. International bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that media reports from a U.S. media organization (e.g., NBC News or the *New York Times*) are not necessarily accepted in their country as being an

¹⁰² The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey Report, *TV Combat Fatigue on the Rise, but “Embeds” Viewed Favorably*, Washington, DC, 28 March 2003.

¹⁰³ First Amendment Center, “State of the First Amendment 2003,” Survey conducted 3–15 June 2003 by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis, Nashville, TN, 2003.

independent view or assessment. An international bureau chief stated, “There is more credibility for their own reporters than U.S. reporters. Besides, most do not follow U.S. news. They follow our news. The exposure was positive and showed what the military can do and was doing. A detailed account, because of access to the unit, helps the public make their own decisions, based on the facts.”

The readers and viewers in foreign countries were more willing to accept what was being reported by their embeds than to accept what was being reported in the U.S. media. In addition to the fact that the average foreign reader or viewer does not follow the news provided by U.S. media organizations, the international embeds stated that they had a better understanding of what their followers wanted. One embed stated, “I could write for my paper with more believability and objectivity. Readers of my paper followed the war through my eyes, a fellow countryman. I wrote in a way they could understand and provided a cultural perspective. I was viewed as credible and reliable, and it was easier for them to understand what I wrote.”

B. EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM EFFECT

1. Effect on Troop Morale

Commanders stated that the embeds had a positive effect on unit morale. One commander referred to the embeds as a “combat multiplier.” The Service members would get word from home that their family had seen a report and was proud of them. Since the Service members had limited ability to communicate with their families, they appreciated the fact that their families could read and see what they were doing and gain an understanding of what was happening in their unit. The Service members enjoyed being interviewed and having their pictures taken because they were proud of what they were doing and wanted the public to know about them and their unit. U.S. public opinion on the war mattered to them. They also appreciated the embeds’ feedback about what else was being reported at home.

One of the biggest boosts to morale was the ability to call home using the embed’s satellite phone or to send an e-mail using his/her laptop. Most embeds were willing to let the Service members use the phone whenever they were not filing a report. The opportunity to do so varied among the units. Some commanders had no problem letting as many individuals as possible call home. While still in Kuwait, a commander stated that more than 50 soldiers were waiting in line to use the embed’s phone. Some

commanders restricted calls only for emergencies and special occasions because it was not possible for everyone to call home. In some units, calls were only allowed while the unit was still in Kuwait and after the fall of Baghdad, while, in other units, it was permitted any time circumstances allowed. Some commanders who did not have access to a military satellite phone or a laptop used the embed's phone or laptop to call or send an e-mail to the rear detachment commander, the Army Family Readiness Group (FRG) coordinator, or the Marine Key Volunteer Network (KVN) coordinator.

One embed wrote in the embedded media survey, "When things slowed down at the end, the guys in my unit finally got some phone calls out. Quite a few told us that their wives and relatives watched our reports on TV and it was a great comfort to them to know what was going on. The marines all said that having us along made them feel more connected to the real world. So I'd like to think we had a positive effect on their morale as a side benefit to our being there doing our jobs."¹⁰⁴

2. Effect on Military Families

Several commanders stated that coverage by embedded media was a double-edged sword. The families appreciated being able to follow a unit's action on a daily basis, but sometimes they became overloaded with information. It was also especially difficult when the families learned that a unit had sustained casualties.

a. Overall Effect

Although the military command link to the families was through the Rear Detachment Commander (RDC) to the FRG and KVN, the embeds provided another valuable source of information. When commanders and Service members found out which embeds were covering their unit, they would get word to the families. Commanders received feedback from their wives that the families liked the print and broadcast reports filed by embeds in their unit because they had an opportunity to see what the unit was doing, understand the hardships, and feel close to their loved ones. One commander stated, "The families were starving to know what their husbands or sons were doing. When the wives found out who [which embed and media organization] was covering the unit, the wives followed closely on television, the Internet, and the local newspaper. They even set up a roster to watch the 24-hour news channel so they would not miss any

¹⁰⁴ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

coverage of the unit.” As interested as the families were in the overall progress of the war, they were more interested in the reports about the units and the human-interest stories provided by the embeds. During a phone call, the wife of one commander told him call that 487 wives read the Web site for his embed’s media organization. At FRG meetings, she would pass out copies of the articles she printed from the Web site to give to wives who did not access to the Internet. Commanders, primarily of ground units, also received reports that the families sometimes had a difficult time coping, especially when embeds were reporting on intense combat operations, but overall they would rather have more news than less news.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs from local media organizations knew how much the families at the nearby military installation wanted to read about and see their loved ones. Embeds from some of the local television stations would send the station the names of the soldiers on the videotape, along with the name and phone number of the wife and/or parents. The station would try to contact them to let them know the date and time they would show the video. Because the local newspapers focused so much on the individuals and human-interest stories, the families who stayed at the installation read the daily articles in the newspaper. The local media organizations received a significant amount of positive feedback.

The embeds stated they and/or their media organization received many e-mails (most reported in excess of 100 and one received more than 1,200), primarily from families of the Service members but also from parents, friends of the Service member, veterans of the unit, and citizens expressing their gratitude for the coverage they were provided. One e-mail response to several embedded media reports on a media organization’s Web site was as follows: “I would like to thank you again for reports from [embed’s name]. We have been very worried about our nephew. These reports have allowed us to keep up with where he is and to know that he is doing OK from the reports that all the Service members in the unit are doing well and that no one has been hurt. He was allowed to call home yesterday by [an embed] who loaned him a phone. He and five others got to talk to their wives. Thank you for the reports. I have great admiration for the men and women [embeds] who put their lives on the line along with our great soldiers to give reports to us.” In addition to gratitude, they received requests to pass a message to their loved one in the unit or provide the status of that individual. One embed stated, “One of the most rewarding parts of my embed experience was the feedback I received. They were grateful to see their son or husband’s name in print and read about what was

happening. I felt more connected to my audience than at any other time in my career.” In response to the question in the embedded media survey about the single best aspect of being an embed, one embed wrote, “The information I was able to provide the families and friends back home about their loved ones. I received e-mail from more than 700 people thanking me for being there with the battalion because it was their only news they had about their husbands, wives, sons, and daughters.”¹⁰⁵ The e-mail response to the coverage was nearly all positive. Only two embeds reported receiving negative e-mail. One e-mail complained about the soldier’s profane language, and the other complained because they were not providing coverage of more units.

Commanders’ wives stated that hearing from the commanders and soldiers directly was best because they were confident about what they were being told. When a spouse received an e-mail or phone call about what the unit was doing, he/she would disseminate that information to the other spouses in the unit and even to other units.

Spouses thought the Embedded Media Program was successful because it gave them an opportunity to understand and appreciate what the Service member was doing. It also sometimes gave them the opportunity to see him/her live during a television interview or read about him/her and see a photograph on the Internet or in a newspaper or magazine. However, spouses also saw disadvantages of embed reporting. One spouse stated, “The program was a double-edged sword. It was nice to have information about activities of the unit and the human-interest stories, but it was also detrimental to the wives’ morale with respect to casualty reporting. All wives seemed happy with the embeds but not about the slow casualty reporting process of the Army.”

Even though spouses knew that all the information would not be positive, having more information was better than having less information. The reports helped their families feel connected and know what was happening; otherwise, they would have been in the dark. Embeds were their source of information during the combat phase since they had little communication with the unit or their husbands. They understood what their husbands were doing, where they were, and what their daily life was like. Some wives were disappointed that their husband’s unit was not being covered by an embed. However, the reports were good for those wives and families from units that did not have embeds because they at least had a better understanding of what was happening. The FRG and KVN usually had an e-mail distribution list through which they distributed a list

¹⁰⁵ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

of embeds and their media organizations and news articles from the Internet. If they did not know which embeds were with their spouse's unit initially, they soon found out and set up systems to follow reports. If a spouse received information that a story would be on television, he/she would spread the word so all spouses could watch. Wives followed the stories of all embeds in the unit, but those filed by local embeds were appreciated because the local embed seemed to understand the type of reports in which the spouses and families were most interested.

Many family members in the FRG who did not work stayed at home and watched the OIF-related news constantly. Often, these were the younger wives of the enlisted soldiers. They were all alone, scared by what they saw, and not sure what was happening to their spouses. To stop watching television was difficult because they did not want to miss the possibility of seeing their loved ones. The commanders' wives worried about the effect this was having on them and their children and encouraged them to watch less television.

When the embeds left the unit, it was hard on the families because they had become accustomed to having constant coverage of the unit. For the first 3 weeks of the war, the embeds provided much of the coverage, but that coverage declined rapidly. The wives wished that the embeds' detailed coverage of the units would have continued after the combat phase was over. When the embeds left, the wives missed that connection via the media, so their husbands' e-mails became more important. Wives felt that without the embeds covering the unit's activities, the American public would lose interest and would not back the military's efforts. To the wives, the war was definitely not over as long as their husbands were there. One commander's wife stated, "After major combat ended, I saw primarily the negative part of the war instead of all the successful rebuilding during stability operations. I wish the American public could see all the great things the soldiers are doing. What they see on the news is not what is happening."

b. Effect of Casualty Reporting

The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, "Embedded media may, within OPSEC limits, confirm unit casualties they have witnessed. Battlefield casualties may be covered by embedded media as long as the Service member's identity is protected from disclosure for 72 hours or upon verification of next-of-kin (NOK) notification, whichever is first."

Commanders stated that the ground rules about reporting casualties were clear. In only one known incident did an embed violate the CFLCC ground rules on casualty reporting. However, these ground rules presented a challenge for the families. They liked the detailed coverage they saw about their loved one's unit but became stressed when casualties were reported (e.g., a unit was in a fire fight, a tank was hit, or a helicopter crashed or was shot down, and several casualties were sustained). The issue is the fear and anxiety of knowing someone was killed or wounded but not knowing who.

The issue of reporting casualties was hard on the military families because they knew from media reports, almost as soon as an incident occurred, that a spouse's unit may have sustained casualties. Commanders expressed frustration about the slow pace of the military casualty notification system; however, they wanted the information to be correct before any notification was made. One commander stated, "We need to realize we are in the information age and do better at casualty reporting within the military. Reporters and photographers are seeing and reporting casualties live without reporting names or showing faces. Whenever there is a casualty reported, there is always a period of stress for the families, until the notification is made. In the FRG, they knew there were casualties in the unit and they all wondered if it was their husband."

Commanders stated that if they had a Service member who was seriously wounded or injured, the standard casualty notification procedures were followed. If the individual was not seriously wounded or injured and was returned to duty, they would notify the RDC, who would notify the spouse and FRG. Some commanders would let the soldier use his [the commander's] phone to call his [the soldier's] wife and let her know he was all right.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs agree that the military expressed clearly their concerns and restrictions about casualties. They had numerous discussions and made every effort not to violate the reporting requirements. At the request of some commanders, embeds would write about casualties at a higher level (e.g., "the 3ID sustained casualties") instead of the specific brigade or battalion. They also would delay releasing names of casualties—sometimes beyond the 72-hour ground rule—until the commander told them notifications had been completed. The embeds recognized that casualty reporting was one of the most troublesome issues for the military. The military cannot get ahead of media reporting because of their real-time battlefield reporting about a unit that sustained casualties. *Marine Corps Times* reporter Gordon Lubold wrote that the casualty notification system "provided casualty reports that were thin on details or incorrect. Often, information came

long after a family had gotten word through unprecedented live news coverage of combat operations.”¹⁰⁶ The embeds often had details of a firefight, ambush, or accident that took the military sometimes 2 to 3 days to verify and pass up the chain of command. One embed stated, “I filed a story with my newspaper about a marine who had been wounded. I also provided details of the incident and his medical condition. The newspaper contacted the parents to report on their feelings. They appreciated the information provided by the paper because the military had notified them that their son was wounded but had not provided any other details.”

The commanders’ wives agreed that the media was careful not to release names. They also thought the 72-hour restriction before the media could report the names of casualties was good. Even if the report only indicated a particular division, spouses would immediately try to determine which specific unit had sustained the casualties. The military had no way to get ahead of the real-time reporting. Even if the embed refers to the higher-level unit, the wives, since they know what unit the embed is covering, assume the casualty to be in the embed’s unit. Also, when the embeds reported the location of the combat action, the wives usually figured out which unit was involved. They would identify markings on a unit’s vehicles or aircraft, distinctive uniform markings, or other small details others might not notice. This would either alleviate their worst fears or cause them to worry until notifications were complete. Even so, spouses stated that it was better to generalize that casualties occurred in a division or brigade rather than a battalion or company. One wife stated, “If it is too specific, a few wives are frozen with fear until the final word arrives. When you know the unit, but not which specific unit, it helps the wives wait together and console each other during the waiting period before notification occurs.”

Spouses in charge of Army FRGs and Marine KVNs often got advance word of casualties before the official notification was made (without being told the name of the soldier or marine killed or seriously wounded) so they would be ready to offer assistance. Until all notifications were complete, the FRG or KVN of units that did not have casualties could not be notified, so they did not know that their loved ones were all right and that the casualty was from another unit.

¹⁰⁶ Gordon Lubold, “Families First,” *Marine Corps Times*, 23 February 2004.

Before all notifications had been completed and the Pentagon had released the names of casualties, the media sometimes located the primary NOK before the secondary NOK notifications had been made, so casualty information was on the news before the Pentagon informed other relatives, the unit, and the public. Sometimes, locating the primary and secondary NOK took time. “Nearly 75 percent of the time, the Pentagon notified the next of kin and released a Service member’s name before the ‘72-hour rule’ freed reporters to make it public. In the 25 percent of the cases in which the family wasn’t notified within 72 hours, news organizations almost always refrained from publishing the name. Delays ranged from 5 to 17 days. Some were attributable to the ‘fog of war’; others to trouble in locating relatives.”¹⁰⁷

Despite the slow pace of the military casualty notification system compared with media reporting, the spouses wanted the military to be 100-percent correct rather than make a notification and then have to correct it. One military wife, testifying before Congress, stated, “While no one argues that all casualty notification must be 100-percent accurate, the time from the incident until the Department of the Army approves notification of the next of kin is unacceptable given today’s media and communications capability.”¹⁰⁸

Commanders and spouses realize that no perfect answer exists and that the issue of prompt casualty notification will always be difficult. They know that DoD can never develop rules to cover every conceivable circumstance. The interviews did not produce any recommendations for improvement—only a desire to do everything possible to improve the system and expedite NOK notification. The ASD(PA) stated, “The Pentagon’s performance in releasing names to the news media will never be as fast as some people like. It will never be as complete as some people will like. Identifying casualties is based to a huge extent on the dignity and respect with which we want to treat these issues. Next-of-kin notification is incredibly important to us, and we’ll take the time to do it right.”¹⁰⁹ In the past year, DoD has developed new software and has instituted new

¹⁰⁷ Arlington National Cemetery, “Next of Kin Notification,” <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/nok-notification-process.htm>, 17 April 2003.

¹⁰⁸ Witness Testimony by Joyce Dolinish, former Service member, now spouse, 101st Corps Support Group, appearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, *Hearing on Military Families*, Washington, DC, 2 June 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Arlington National Cemetery, “Next of Kin Notification,” <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/nok-notification-process.htm>, 17 April 2003.

procedures that should improve the process by permitting faster notification with more details and fewer errors about the incident in which the casualty occurred.

c. Interaction With the Media

During the period of major combat operation in Iraq, the media contacted many military spouses. Military spouses stated that during pre-deployment briefings for the Service member and spouses, many commanders discussed media contact. At the briefings, spouses were told that the media might try to contact them to get their reaction about a topic, write a story about how they were coping, and so forth. If they did decide to talk to the media, they were asked to think about what they would say and how it would reflect on their husband or wife and the unit. They were also told that they did not have to talk to the media if they did not want to. This information was reiterated during Army FRG and Marine KVN meetings after the units deployed.

Commanders' wives who were interviewed stated that they got numerous calls from local and national media. The media would track them down based on a report that included their husband's name or unit. They called not only commanders' wives, but also any spouse for whom they could get a name and phone number. The media were not allowed on base without a PAO escort, so they would often try to arrange to meet wives off post. The media often stopped wives when they were shopping off post and asked if they would be willing to be interviewed. Many wives were contacted by their hometown newspaper.

Some Army units arranged training for the wives of commanders and senior NCOs. Sometimes the post PAO contacted commanders' wives because a reporter had asked permission to write a story about the families. Those who agreed usually met at the PA office for an interview. The wives of commanders, XOs, and ombudsmen on some aircraft carriers were offered media training because they knew that the media would be interested in writing stories about a family from the perspective of the deployed member and the family member(s) at home.

One commander's wife stated that some journalists would try to find a wife who was depressed; however, most of them wrote balanced and appropriate stories. One wife stated that she did not like media stories that concentrated on the wives' struggles rather than the wives' strength in going on with their lives and taking care of their families, homes, finances, and so forth. One reporter interviewed several wives and wrote a story

that was published in a national paper. The reporter called the wives to apologize because the editor modified the article and eliminated many of the positive things he had written.

C. OBJECTIVITY OF EMBEDS

The SECDEF and the CJCS message to commanders and the 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “We need to tell the factual story—good or bad ...”¹¹⁰

Soon after the Embedded Media Program was announced, discussions began in the media about the possibility that embeds would lose their objectivity and be co-opted by the military. Skeptics predicted that the embeds would form a bond with their units and be less willing to report negative events. Embeds would be living, eating, sleeping, and traveling with the units they covered. They would share the same hardships, face the same dangers, and endure the same privations as the fighting men and women they were covering. The embeds were also dependent on the Service members for their safety. It was only natural that close bonds would develop. Some reasoned that bonding would lead to a loss of objectivity.

Based on interviews with commanders, bonds of friendship and trust did develop with the embeds. Commanders viewed the bonding as a positive benefit because it allowed the embeds to understand the unit and the Service members better. By spending 24 hours a day with the men and women in the unit, the embeds gained insights they could not get any other way. However, the commanders did not think the bonding led to any loss of objectivity on the part of the embeds. One commander stated, “They definitely maintained their objectivity. Sometimes, I think they went out of their way to be objective because their peers who were not embedded were scrutinizing their stories to see if they were co-opted and had lost their objectivity.” Commanders thought that the embeds were professional and that they accepted their responsibility to report the truth. They thought that the embeds reported incidents fairly and accurately—exactly as they happened. One commander stated, “I do not think anything happened, good or bad, that was not reported. I do not know of any report that was overly skewed because of an embed’s relationship with the unit or an individual or of any embed who did not report a major problem. As a commander, there were some things I would rather my embed not report, but the reports were accurate and fair.”

¹¹⁰ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Commanders and Public Affairs, 21 February 2003.

The embeds were not afraid to report the good and the bad. The unit commanders were not overly concerned about this because they were proud of their unit and their soldiers and knew that many positive stories would emerge. Even though embeds filed stories about unfavorable incidents, commanders knew that the embed understood the background and context of what happened. Reports included stories about the soldier who threw a hand grenade into a tent and killed and wounded several members of his unit, the shooting of a civilian family at a military checkpoint, the killing of journalists at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad, friendly fire incidents caused by unsafe acts, and so forth. However, the reports filed were objective, accurate, and fair. No animosity was directed toward the embeds for filing those stories. Commanders and Service members knew that the embeds had a job to do despite the friendships that had developed. One senior commander stated, “The measure of effectiveness is not how many positive or negative stories are done but, rather, the number of accurate vice inaccurate stories reported. All we should ask is that they get it right. The best way to get accurate stories is to have the journalist there when things happen over time rather than a quick in and out to get a story, with no verification of alleged circumstances.” The military’s actions will determine if the story is positive or negative. The media’s responsibility is to report accurately.

Some commanders saw articles written by their embeds before or after they were filed; however, when they got home they discovered that a family member had usually accumulated the articles written about the unit or had taped what was broadcast. Based on a review of the material, they stated that the embeds had reported fairly and accurately.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs did not think that their embeds were co-opted or had lost their objectivity or that any bonding had detracted from the embeds’ ability to report fairly and accurately. One bureau chief stated, “The military did suffer through some tough stories that did not reflect well on them, but they never flinched. I do not think the embeds got co-opted, even though they understood the military was protecting them.” They stated that a professional journalist would not lose his/her objectivity and that they sent experienced people to ensure that this would not happen. Some bureau chiefs talked to their embeds about this issue before they left on their assignment.

Veteran reporter Joe Galloway, an embed during Vietnam and the first Gulf War and co-author of *We Were Soldiers Once and Young*, stated, “Any reporter who has the

courage to go into combat is tough enough not to be co-opted by anyone.”¹¹¹ The embeds who were interviewed reinforced that view and reflected the comments of the commanders. The embeds did establish close relationships with members of the unit, but none thought they were co-opted or had lost their objectivity. Bonding did not hinder their ability to do what they were sent to do—report the truth. Their goal was not to be a cheerleader or a critic but to record what happened. One embed stated, “I addressed a military audience and was asked why I gave aid and comfort to the enemy by reporting negative incidents and, subsequently addressed a conference of journalists and was asked why my reports were not objective.”

Many of the embeds stated that they never had a negative incident to report, but they would have done so if necessary. Several embeds filed reports about negative incidents. It did not matter that they liked the people in the unit. They still had to report what happened. They benefited from knowing the background and context of what happened and wrote a story that they thought might not have been reported as well by a unilateral. An embed with the 3ID, *Los Angeles Times* reporter Geoffrey Mohan, stated, “Being an embed was a win/win for the military because it produced a lot of firsthand accounts—and really compassionate accounts—of what it is like to be a soldier or what it is like to be on the battlefield. The military knew they would get that kind of positive reporting. There was just as much negative reporting. We wrote about friendly fire, we wrote about civilian casualties, we did not pull punches on these topics, and we questioned all those incidents along the way.”¹¹² A couple of embeds noted that their objectivity was only related to one half of the story because they could not report anything from the Iraqi side. However, they did not see that as their responsibility as an embed.

As part of the research into why soldiers fight, conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, the study team interviewed more than a dozen embeds with Army units. The monograph states that “once a level of personal trust was established via the emotional bonds with the soldiers, the embedded media felt as if they could accomplish their job better. As far as becoming too close to the unit and losing objectivity, the embedded media saw that the trust that comes with cohesion works both ways. They could trust the soldiers, but the soldiers could trust the media to report

¹¹¹ James Janega and Tim Jones, “Pentagon Gambles on Open-War Policy,” *Chicago Tribune*, 26 January 2003.

¹¹² Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, *Embedded – The Media at War in Iraq: An Oral History*, The Lyon Press, Guilford, CT, 2003.

fairly.”¹¹³ The Cardiff School of Journalism, in a report done for the BBC, found “no evidence to support the claim that the embeds were less likely than other reporters to maintain their objectivity.”¹¹⁴

Another measure of the embeds’ objectivity comes from the viewers and readers of their reports. A Pew Research Center (PRC) war tracking survey conducted 2–7 April 2003 asked the following question: “*Do you think that reporters who are traveling with the troops in Iraq are taking the side of these troops too much, are being too critical of the troops they are traveling with, or are they being fair and objective in their reporting?*” The response was as follows: fair and objective (81 percent), taking the side of the troops too much (7 percent), too critical (7 percent), don’t know or did not answer (5 percent).¹¹⁵ A *Project for Excellence in Journalism* survey of the 5 major networks conducted during 3 of the first 6 days of the war found that 93.5 percent of 108 embedded reports were factual.¹¹⁶

D. OPSEC AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

The media told the ASD(PA) that what they wanted most was access if the U.S. went to war in Iraq. When the Embedded Media Program was discussed during the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 30 October 2002, the DASD(PA) stated, “At the highest levels of this department, we are committed to the concept of embedding media and ensuring that there is access to what our troops may be doing on the battlefield.”¹¹⁷ The 10 February 2003 PAG states, “Commanders and PAOs must work together to balance the need for media access with the need for operational security. Media will be given access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing, whenever possible.” As discussed previously, the embeds had nearly unlimited access to

¹¹³ Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. Potter, *Why Soldiers Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2003.

¹¹⁴ Justin Lewis, *The Role of Embedded Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War: Summary Report*, Cardiff School of Journalism, United Kingdom, November 2003.

¹¹⁵ The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press News Release, “War Coverage Praised, but the Public is Hungry for Other News,” Washington, DC, 9 April 2003.

¹¹⁶ “Embedded Reporters: What are Americans Getting?,” *Project for Excellence in Journalism*, Washington, DC, 3 April 2003.

¹¹⁷ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 30 October 2002.

Service members and freedom to go unescorted nearly everywhere within the unit in which they were embedded. Confusion arose concerning access to information.

1. OASD(PA) Guidance on Access to Classified and Sensitive Information

The 10 February 2003 PAG had extensive guidance about security and procedures related to embeds' access to classified and sensitive information. The PAG ground rules stated, "Embargoes may be imposed to protect OPSEC, and will be lifted as soon as the OPSEC issue has passed." OPSEC, which is practiced by commanders at all levels, is a process that identifies critical information that would be useful to an enemy and states the measures that will be taken to eliminate or reduce the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy exploitation.¹¹⁸ The ground rules listed 19 categories of information that were "not releasable since their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives." That restriction applied to the embed, who could not release the information. One of the categories of information that cannot be released is "information regarding future operations." Another category states, "During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives [cannot be released]. Information on ongoing engagements will not be released unless authorized for release by the on-scene commander."

The PAG states, "U.S. military personnel shall protect classified information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure." A detailed paragraph about how to handle situations where embeds have access or are exposed to sensitive information concludes by stating, "This paragraph does not authorize commanders to allow media access to classified information." Classified information is information that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure. Sensitive information is information that requires special protection from disclosure because it could compromise or threaten the security of U.S. forces. Embeds were not granted a security clearance, which is an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access to classified information. Without a clearance, they were not allowed access to classified information.

¹¹⁸ Summarized from the definition contained in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 June 2004).

The PAG states, “Security at the source will be the rule.” Security at the source is not defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms but is explained in Joint PA Doctrine relating to discussions with the media. “Security at the source serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released which jeopardizes operations security or the safety and privacy of Joint military forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.”¹¹⁹ At a meeting with foreign bureau chiefs on 30 January 2003, the DASD(PA) explained security at the source by stating, “Security at the source means that our commanders in the field are going to try not to expose you [an embed] to classified information or sensitive information that would compromise the mission. There may be times when, because of where you are, you may be privileged to sensitive information, at which time the commander, we hope, will enter into a discussion with you as to what is appropriate to be able to report, what’s not appropriate to be able to report, or when something can be reported.”¹²⁰ PAG issued on 9 March 2003 makes specific mention of security at the source and classified information. It states, “Security at the source will be the rule. U.S. military personnel will protect and not disclose classified information to members of the media.”¹²¹

The PAG is clear in prohibiting commanders from allowing an embed to have access to classified information. It provides guidance on sharing sensitive information with embeds and the parameters for reporting on that type of information. The commander is granted some flexibility in providing an embed access to sensitive information if he deems it in the best interest of the DoD; however, the embed must agree to a security review. If he/she does not voluntarily agree to a security review, access may not be granted. The PAG states that a security review “will not involve any editorial changes. It will be conducted solely to ensure that no sensitive or classified information is included in the product. If such information is found, the media will be asked to remove that

¹¹⁹ Joint Pub 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997.

¹²⁰ Department of State Foreign Press Center Transcript, *Department of Defense Media Support Plan: DASD(PA) Meeting With Foreign Press Representatives*, 30 January 2003.

¹²¹ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Public Affairs Guidance for Possible Combat Operations in Iraq, 9 March 2003.

information from the product and/or embargo the product until such information is no longer classified or sensitive.”

In a 19 March 2003 ASD conference call with bureau chiefs, the ASD(PA) expressed concerns about OPSEC:

“Over the last couple of days, there have been some people who have either said and/or people who have reported a greater specificity of location and timing and things like that that get to the heart of our concerns with operational security. I just want to emphasize again the importance of all of us being very, very careful with information that could affect operations, information that we all know could put lives at risk. So we have reissued our guidance; we’ve done conference calls with as many of our public affairs officers in the region as we could. I met with the Service PAOs right before this call to emphasize it again. And I really hope and encourage all of you to do the same with your correspondents.” The DASD(PA) added, “It’s not just the reporters out there, but we also need the news managers who play a role in this to be very cognizant of this. I think that you all have our public affairs guidance and what we consider to be sensitive information and information that could aid the enemy, so I appreciate everything that you’re doing as editors, as bureau chiefs out there, to question reports when they come in and make sure that we’re not doing something that’s going to even compromise your reporters that are out there with our units.”¹²²

Appendix K contains the complete definition of the security-related terms discussed above (see Table K-1) and an extract of the 10 February 2003 PAG that includes all pertinent guidance about security of information (see Table K-2).

2. Embed Access to Classified and Sensitive Information

Based on interviews with commanders, they all understood the desire of the SECDEF and CJCS to provide access to the media. Commanders at each level reinforced this guidance to their subordinate commanders. As one senior commander stated, “The press will write a story, so it is better to give them access and help them understand or they may get it wrong.” Most commanders had not read the 10 February 2003 PAG, but they were either briefed on it and/or received PowerPoint slides or handouts that outlined the details of the embed program. Commanders understood the intent of the Embedded Media Program even though they did not think the guidance was clear about what infor-

¹²² Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs (Conference Call)*, 19 March 2003.

mation the embeds could be provided. They interpreted the phrase “security at the source” as best they could, based on what they thought it meant. Based on the access they allowed embeds, it appears that their main concern was ensuring that the embeds did not release any information that would compromise the mission or the safety of their personnel—the basic foundation for most of the ground rules. Detailed information about future operations, even if these operations were to occur within the next 24 hours, was classified. Some commanders wondered what would have happened if some information that had an adverse effect on a mission or the safety of the troops did get publicized. The commander could have been held accountable for violating the PAG’s written guidance, but they did not think that this would be fair or reasonable. Fortunately, none had to face this issue, primarily because of the trust and confidence they had established with the embeds and the one-on-one discussions they had about the ground rules.

Approximately 70 percent of the commanders provided embeds access to classified and sensitive information. Some commanders decided they would give their embeds unfettered access until they demonstrated that they did not deserve it. Other commanders were more comfortable establishing a closer working relationship before permitting that type of access. Commanders wanted the embeds to understand the background and context for an operation, so they could report factually and provide insight to readers and viewers about the operation when they observed its execution. One commander stated, “If you don’t let the embed in on the plan, you have no idea what he will write. He may figure out some of the details of an operation on his own by observing what is going on or talking to the soldiers and then write about it. So it is better to provide him the information and have him delay releasing it.” Lower-level commanders also reasoned that if an embed inadvertently released information useful to the enemy, it might affect his unit, which would not be good, but it would most likely not affect the entire ground war. The SOF commanders also provided embeds access to operational details, along with specific guidance on what they could and could not report. Commanders permitted embeds access to the Army TOCs and Marine Combat Operations Centers (COCs) to attend operations order briefings, intelligence and operations update briefings, see map overlays, and observe mission rehearsals (see Figure VII-4). In return, they expected the embeds not to violate the ground rules. The embeds were accepted, as some commanders stated, “as part of the team,” and they did not want to have to take the time to determine how to parse the information to which the embeds should and should not have access. Commanders assumed a certain amount of risk, but the embeds did not violate the commander’s trust.

The 30 percent of the commanders who did not give embeds access to classified



By Insun Kang – Chosun Ilbo

Figure VII-4. Embedded correspondent Insun Kang, *Chosun Ilbo* (*Daily News*), South Korea, attends a briefing at the Assault CP, 3rd COSCOM, V Corps

and sensitive information still provided an overview of the operation without disclosing classified information. They would provide a sanitized version of the plan (e.g., without specific times, locations, and routes). They might let the embeds sit in on portions of a briefing and then ask them to leave, but the embeds would still be provided enough details so they understood the concept of the operation and the commander's intent. These commanders had a stricter interpretation of the phrase "security at the source."

A senior PAO stated, "Embeds learned how important it was to protect information, so as not to put forces at risk, and they even told that to bureau chiefs or editors who wanted information before it was releasable." PAOs were concerned that embedding so many individuals shortly before the war started could be viewed as a strategic indicator that something was about to happen. They had to work out a way that allowed embeds to continue to report but would not indicate to the enemy that an attack was imminent. The embeds assigned to ground units continually reported about unit activities and movements (usually related to ongoing training) and could not report the specifics of future operations. Thus, it was assumed the enemy could not read anything into the embeds' reports.

Before the media were embedded, the DoD's offer of virtually unfettered access was met with a natural skepticism. Some embeds feared that once they were placed in the unit, they would be at the mercy of the commander, who could dictate with whom they could speak, where they could go, and when they could file. Embeds were satisfied with the access they received. Approximately 60 percent of the embeds stated that they had access to classified information, including include briefings, rehearsals, map overlays, and so forth. *USA Today* reporter Elliot Smith, who was embedded with the 1st Tank Battalion, 7th Regimental Combat Team, 1st Marine Division, wrote, "His [the battalion operations officer's] HUMVEE was equipped with two radios, allowing us to monitor intelligence and command frequencies as well as a satellite-connected laptop computer

that tracked all movements by Marines, the British to our east, and the Army to our west.”¹²³ The embeds attributed that access to the relationship of trust they had established with the commander. The commanders, or someone on the staff, would tell them what they could and could not report with respect to specific information. They could report most information after a short but specified period of time. Commanders were good about explaining why some information could not be reported if it was not obvious to the embed.

Most embeds stated that they knew the unit’s mission and plan of execution before crossing the border into Iraq and knew subsequent plans as they were developed. They all understood the importance of not releasing information about times, locations, and future operations. They knew that doing so would also put them at risk. One embed stated, “All I needed to know was what I could not release and when I could release something. Being there was incentive enough not to give your location.” Most of the classified or sensitive information that the embeds received was perishable and would not be of value to the enemy after 24 to 96 hours. At the appropriate time, the embeds could report that information.

The embeds who did not have access to classified information stated that they did get enough information to understand what would happen. The operational details, even in general terms and without classified information, provided the background for their reports and made these reports more meaningful. They appreciated the information they were provided, and, for many, it was much more than they expected. Only a few embeds stated that their unit was not helpful in providing information. Most foreign embeds stated they had the same access to information that the U.S. embeds had.

In ground and naval fixed-wing aviation units, embeds wanted access to the pilots in addition to information about the mission. Commanders generally allowed this access before the pilots received their mission briefing and after they returned from the mission. They wanted to keep the pilots focused on the mission and did not want them distracted by giving an interview after the mission briefing. Commanders also had some concern that during an interview after the mission brief, an embed might get some information that might be released too soon and put the pilot in harm’s way. The ground rules should have eliminated that concern, but commanders wanted to err on the side of safety.

¹²³ Elliot B. Smith, “Into Iraq,” *USA Today*, 8 April 2004.

The DINFOS embedded media survey included the following question: “*How would you rate your access and information while embedded with your unit?*” The response was as follows: excellent (32.6 percent), very good (22.5 percent), good (17.8 percent), fair (13.2 percent), and poor (4.7 percent).¹²⁴ The Cardiff School of Journalism, in a report done for the BBC, found that “for most journalists embedded with U.S. units, the system worked very well. They were given more access to military commanders and more information than they expected.”¹²⁵

3. Weapons Systems Video, Gun Camera Video, and Lipstick Cameras

A SECDEF and CJCS message to commanders stated, “Put in place mechanisms and processes for the rapid dissemination of weapons systems video, ISR footage, and operational combat camera footage before coalition forces move. We will delegate the authority for the declassification and release of these products to the lowest possible level. Operational planning should incorporate and support these efforts and include a push/pull mechanism to make the products readily available to a wider DoD audience for eventual use in a variety of public communication activities.”¹²⁶ The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Use of lipstick and helmet-mounted cameras on combat sorties is approved and encouraged to the greatest extent possible.” The 9 March 2003 PAG stated, “To accelerate the release of gun camera, weapon system, UAV/RPA [unmanned aerial vehicle/remotely piloted aircraft] video and other BDA-related imagery or ISR products, declassification will be done in theater. The CENTCOM commander is the release authority. This authority may be delegated to component commanders.”¹²⁷

Based on interviews, CENTCOM never delegated release authority to component commanders, although those interviewed thought it should have been delegated. After the video was transmitted to the CENTCOM intelligence officer for review and analysis, selected products were used for briefings at CENTCOM and the Pentagon. Classified data on the video was masked in the Joint staff multimedia center, which rendered it unclassified. A two- to three-line summary of the multipage intelligence assessment that

¹²⁴ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

¹²⁵ Justin Lewis, *The Role of Embedded Reporting during the 2003 Iraq War: Summary Report*, Cardiff School of Journalism, United Kingdom, November 2003.

¹²⁶ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Commanders and Public Affairs, 21 February 2003.

¹²⁷ OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Public Affairs Guidance for Possible Combat Operations in Iraq, 9 March 2003.

described what is seen on the video was prepared. It could not be determined why the other video was not released to the media. One PAO thought that the reason was concern about not being able to respond to media queries about specifics of the video because it was classified information, and, therefore, it was easier not to provide the video. However, it appears that unclassified video clips with a short narrative summary, other than those already shown by CENTCOM or the Pentagon, could have been provided to the media. They could then decide what they wanted to use.

Some embeds in aviation units and onboard carriers were permitted to view the video during or after a pilot's post-mission debriefing. One ground commander permitted his embed to view gun target video after the intelligence officer ensured him that nothing classified would be seen. He stated, "I wanted the embed to see it so he would understand what the unit was doing and accomplishing. That was better than having him speculate. It helped him to see how difficult it was to engage the enemy at night. He could not record anything from the video, but he could see it." A PAO stated that it was frustrating for an embed to view a video during the pilot debriefing, which was later shown at CENTCOM or the Pentagon, but not be able to report about or show it as part of a story. An embed wanted to put together a start-to-finish story (crew pre-briefing, take-off, bombs hitting the target, aircraft returning and landing, and crew de-briefing) but an important part of the story could not be told.

Mounting lipstick cameras on Navy aircraft was at the discretion of the Air Wing Commander and the individual pilot. The embed had to provide the lipstick camera and the control unit. Where and how the camera was mounted in the cockpit determined what was recorded. On two of the aircraft carriers, the lipstick camera could only be used if mounted facing the pilot. One concern was that if the camera faced forward, it could capture data from the heads-up display (HUD), which showed target displays and key target and technical parameters.

A news article indicated that the Air Force was sending up lipstick cameras with flight crews and putting the results on an Air Force Web site.¹²⁸ Based on interviews, the Air Force did not allow embeds to place lipstick cameras in the cockpits of aircraft or on a pilot's helmet. A primary reason for not having lipstick cameras in the aircraft was a concern for pilot safety. A specific location in the cockpit, which may vary by type and

¹²⁸ Christopher Cooper and David Cloud, "Branches of U.S. Military Fight Over Media Attention in Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 March 2003.

model of aircraft, must be certified and approved before the camera can be mounted. If the camera is mounted in the wrong place, it can distract the pilot or make it difficult for him/her to turn the camera on and off. A lipstick camera is not on a pilot checklist, and most of them have not been trained in how to use them.

4. Screening Embedded Media Reports

One of the DoD Principles of Information states that “a free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship.” The 10 February PAG stated, “Media products will not be subject to security review or censorship.” As discussed previously, an exception to this policy was when a commander granted an embed access to sensitive information. In exchange for that access, the embed had to agree voluntarily to a security review, which does not involve any editorial changes.

Commanders and PAOs did not censor reports, and most of them did not screen or conduct a security review of any reports. They trusted the embeds to follow the ground rules. Because of the effect of inadvertently releasing information that outlined the plans for such large forces over an extended period of time, embeds at the CFLCC and IMEF HQ had to agree to have their reports reviewed in exchange for unlimited access. An embed with the IMEF Command Element, *Washington Post* foreign correspondent Peter Baker, wrote, “With access to all this classified information, we were leery of the security review. Submitting stories to a military censor goes against every journalistic grain. Yet, it worked out surprisingly well, and they made no substantive changes to the files we sent in.”¹²⁹ Based on the interviews, at the first commander-embed meeting, 12 percent of the commanders told their embeds that they wanted to review the reports before they were sent to ensure that the reports did not contain any classified information. The embeds did not have a problem with that, but those commanders stated that they only reviewed the reports on one or two occasions. After that, because they trusted the embeds and because they were too busy, those commanders did not review the embeds’ reports any more.

A few commanders asked their embeds to show them any controversial stories as a courtesy. Most of the commanders stated that the embeds often asked them or someone else in the unit to review a story or look at a video once it was completed but before it was transmitted to their media organization. The embeds asked a lot of questions to

¹²⁹ Peter Baker, “Inside View,” *American Journalism Review*, May 2003.

clarify details and to ensure they had their facts and terminology correct. They wanted to be sure they understood what they were seeing and what was happening because they wanted to maintain credibility with their readers and viewers. The embeds also did not want to violate the ground rules and wanted to be sure the report was right from an OPSEC perspective—in terms of content and time of filing. Broadcast media often checked to see if it was all right to report live. A couple of PAOs indicated that they followed the embed reports on the Internet. They occasionally downloaded these reports and provided them to the commanders as part of the command information program, so that the commanders could see what was being reported. It was also a morale boost for the troops.

Interviews with the embeds reinforced what the commanders had stated. They wanted to report accurately and not violate the ground rules. Embedded media at all levels often asked the unit commander or XO to review a report. They did not want to accidentally mention something that would jeopardize a mission or put the unit at risk. They also wanted to be sure they had the facts correct. Even if a story might be controversial or reflect unfavorably on the unit or someone in the unit, the embed was not under any pressure to report anything other than the facts. One embed stated, “I never felt any pressure about what to report or not report. I was never asked not to report something. The unit wanted their story told. I could always get clarification about anything in the story.” The international embeds noted that having anyone review their material would be difficult because it was written or spoken in a foreign language. One international embed stated that a linguist monitored what he said and reported but that there was no interference because he obeyed the ground rules.

Even though the military commanders reviewed very few embed reports before they were filed, a survey conducted in June 2003 indicated the U.S. public thought it would be acceptable. The response to the statement “*The government should be able to review in advance what journalists report directly from military combat zones*” was as follows: strongly agree (44 percent), mildly agree (23 percent), mildly disagree (15 percent), and strongly disagree (15 percent).¹³⁰

¹³⁰ First Amendment Center, “State of the First Amendment 2003,” Survey conducted 3–15 June 2003 by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis, Nashville, TN, 2003.

E. FILING REPORTS

During the major combat operation phase of the war, embeds from both print- and broadcast-media organizations filed countless reports from the units in which they were embedded (see Figure VII-5). Earlier in this report, it was estimated that more than 20,000 reports were filed. Most print-media embeds stated they usually filed at least one report a day, but many filed two to three times a day. Most broadcast-media embeds filed multiple reports. One embed representing a radio station stated that he transmitted an average of six stories per day. An embedded photographer representing a newspaper transmitted 10 images per day for the 5 weeks he was embedded. The rapid advances in technology permitted most embeds to file real-time reports from the battlefield. The only limits were a function of OPSEC and communications transmission difficulties.




Photo – U.S. Army

Figure VII-5. An embed prepares to file a report while soldiers of the 2nd Bde Cbt team, 3rd Inf Div conduct combat operations in Baghdad, Iraq, 7 April 2003

1. Timeliness

During the ASD Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, a bureau chief asked any blackout periods would be imposed when embeds would not be able to file. The ASD stated, "The fundamental principles on which we will say 'no, you can't transmit at this time or that time, and hopefully we can do that somewhat in advance' is based on operational security, success of the mission, and safety of the people involved. Those

are the only reasons why we would put restrictions on when and how you can transmit your product back. Those are the principles on which we would make those decisions.”¹³¹ The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Embargoes may be imposed to protect operational security.” On 18 March 2003, a PAG was issued that stated, “Commanders with embedded media in their units are encouraged to embargo any media coverage of activities that may reveal operational details, particularly the timing of any future operations, at this time. Media coverage and reporting of routine activities does not need to be—nor should it be—embargoed. Media should still be permitted to report on preparations and operational activities within the constraints of operational security.”¹³² The only other time restriction imposed on embed reporting was related to casualties. The embeds could not report the Service member’s identity for 72 hours or upon NOK notification, whichever came first.

A significant reason for the extensive amount of media coverage, in addition to having the embeds with so many different units, was the communications technology available during OIF. All the print-media embeds and most of the broadcast-media embeds were able to file their reports in real time from the battlefield, from an aircraft carrier, or from an air base. One PAO stated, “The Embedded Media Program was maybe too successful in terms of getting the story out. Media reports were reaching military leaders at higher HQ before they received the same information from the operational chain of command.” The unilaterals at CENTCOM HQ or the reporters at the Pentagon were asking questions concerning events about which the leaders there were not yet aware or, if they knew about the event, did not have answers to the detailed questions.

CENTCOM could not compete with the medias’ technology. This technology allowed CENTCOM to see frontline tactical operations in a time frame they could not create themselves (e.g., when units began crossing the Euphrates River). However, when the media asked questions based on reports from embeds, this helped CENTCOM filter what was important to the media and focus on the details they needed from subordinate commanders. The attack into the center of Baghdad (“Thunder Run”) by units of the 3ID was a result of a commander’s intent, not the result of an order given by CENTCOM. Thus, CENTCOM did not know it was happening until they saw the images (at the same time the media were seeing these images). A ground commander stated, “One time,

¹³¹ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 14 January 2003.

¹³² OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Public Affairs Guidance Imminent Operations, 18 March 2003.

I received a call from CENTCOM through division to cut a live camera transmission from a broadcast embed who was in a vehicle behind me while we were traveling down a road. They were concerned that the enemy may be able to determine where the unit was and attack us.”

One commander stated that because of deadlines for stories at his embeds’ media organizations, he allowed them to write a story about what would happen and transmit it in advance, but only after a guarantee that the story would not appear in their papers before the operations occurred. As a further protection, these articles were written in more general terms than the articles would have been if written after the fact. This was another outcome of the trust and confidence established between the commander and the embeds. While one embed’s unit was still in Kuwait, he transmitted a story and picture to his paper at 2:00 a.m. and saw it on CNN at 5:00 a.m. The news anchor was reading his story while the still picture was being shown. Onboard one of the aircraft carriers, they watched a segment of a national news broadcast on the ship’s television while they watched the embed do the live interview and film flight-deck operations. A wire-service embed sent pictures via the ship’s e-mail system and was able to see the pictures on the organization’s Web site 4 hours later.

As discussed previously, many ground commanders briefed the embeds in their unit shortly before the initiation of hostilities. Because they were future operations, they were not permitted to file stories until after units had crossed the border and, in some cases, were restricted until the unit made contact with the enemy. The embeds who were interviewed reported no restrictions beyond the limitations specified by OASD(PA). The delays they did experience were technical. These delays were a function of the time needed to acquire a satellite signal so they could file a report or the time needed to transmit the report. One embed stated that he had to dial 50 times on one occasion to acquire a satellite. The embeds also found that writing or typing their stories and then filing them on the move was nearly impossible, so they had to wait until the unit was stationary for a period of time.

The Navy developed a concept of rolling blackouts, which the Chief of Navy Information described as “an arbitrary and capricious reporting windows rule.” He told the bureau chiefs that beginning the first week of March “we’ll roll the dice and you’ll be able to hear from your reporter and then you won’t be able to hear from him for 2 hours or 12 hours or 24 hours or whatever it is. That way, back at the bureau, you or your assignment editors shouldn’t and won’t read anything into not being able to contact your

reporter for several hours.”¹³³ A rolling blackout meant that it would vary randomly among and within the CSG in terms of when it was done and the length of time it would last, depending on the ongoing operations. This would permit the Navy to shut off all reporting (i.e., all transmissions by phone, e-mail or satellite) at the start of the initial strike without letting the enemy know that a strike was imminent. The enemy would have become accustomed to the blackouts, just like the media. During subsequent missions, the aviators were reluctant to have reports released while aircraft were still flying. They wanted to account for all aircraft and be sure they were inbound to the aircraft carrier, so temporary filing restrictions were implemented during these periods. The embeds usually had little warning when a blackout would occur or how long it would last. Although many broadcasts were live from the ship, broadcast tapes were also flown to Bahrain or Cyprus via the COD aircraft and transmitted back to the media organization from there. The DINFOS Embedded Media Survey included the following question: “*Were you able to get your stories, photos, and /or video material back to your company for timely release to the public?*” The response was as follows: yes (86.8 percent), no (8.5 percent), and no response (4.7 percent).¹³⁴

2. Communications Capability

The communications equipment and technology available for media coverage during OIF was far superior to any used in previous conflicts. For example, NBC Correspondent Kerry Sanders, embedded with TF Tarawa, IMEF, stated, “A year ago in Afghanistan, the gear we needed to go live filled 75 to 100 cases. With the technology improvements we’ve seen since then, we can now fit everything we need in five or six.”¹³⁵ During the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meeting on 30 October 2002, the ASD stated, “It is our strong preference, and, from what I have heard from many news organizations, it is their strong preference that to the extent possible they have the means and the technology to get their product back. If we are going to the trouble to get media embedded, it is in our interest to help them get the product back as quickly as possible and appropriate.”¹³⁶ The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Media will deploy with the necessary equipment to

¹³³ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 27 February 2003.

¹³⁴ Defense Information School, *Operation Iraqi Freedom Embedded Survey*, 16 January 2004.

¹³⁵ Mike Wendland, “TV Journalists’ War Gear Grows Smaller, Better,” *Detroit Free Press*, 7 March 2003.

¹³⁶ Department of Defense News Transcript, *ASD(PA) Meeting With Bureau Chiefs*, 30 October 2002.

collect and transmit their stories.” Depending upon the type of media organization and the type of stories to be reported, each embed brought what he/she needed to do the job. Commanders were surprised at the extent of embedded media’s real-time or near-real-time reporting.

Embeds for print-media organizations usually had a laptop computer and a satellite phone. A reporter who was not teamed with a photographer often had a digital camera. If a reporter was teamed with a photographer, the photographer also had a digital camera. Some embeds also brought a small satellite dish. The redundancy of equipment varied among embeds. Some embeds only had a laptop computer and satellite phone. One embed who was interviewed had two of everything. Many embeds had two different satellite phones. Based on interviews with embeds, most thought the satellite phone that



By Joseph Raedle – Getty Images

Figure VII-6. Photographer Joseph Raedle/ Getty Images prepares to transmit photographs while embedded with TF Tarawa, IMEF

worked the best was the Thuraya, but embeds also used Iridium and Inmarsat phones. The most common method of filing a story was to write the story on the laptop, transfer pictures from the digital camera to the laptop, and then transmit those files through the satellite phone (see Figure VII-6). To provide more real-time coverage, the embed would call on the satellite phone and dictate a short story about the incident. The embeds experienced two major problems when filing a report: the time needed to get connected to the satellite and the time needed to transmit the data once a connection was established. Delays were usually minimal, but one embed stated that it took him

2.5 hours one day to connect to a satellite. Another stated he could not get a signal for one 5-day period. Data are transmitted at a data speed of 2.4 kbps. Written text was transmitted quickly, but photographs could take 5 to 10 minutes depending on the file size. If the satellite signal was lost during transmission, the entire file had to be resent. Embeds on the aircraft carriers were provided a computer station, an e-mail account, and Internet access to file reports. Transmitting photographs was slow, but apparently fewer problems were experienced with satellite access. Some embeds brought portable

generators or solar panels, but the military provided their generators and inverters to help the embeds recharge batteries for their equipment.

Many of the major media broadcast teams that embedded with ground units brought their own vehicle that usually accompanied the combat trains. Once the unit was stationary and they could link up with the vehicle, the embeds could transmit video they had taken previously and also do live broadcasts (see Figure VII-7). Those embeds without their own vehicle usually attached satellite transmission equipment to one of the unit's vehicles. Embeds representing foreign or local broadcast media usually had to send video over a satellite connection or arrange to have the video sent back with a military resupply vehicle to Kuwait so it could be transmitted from there. Some of the embeds had video editing software on a laptop. They would edit their video in order to transmit a smaller file via the satellite phone or by using a small satellite dish. One embed stated that she edited the video and then transmitted it in three segments. It took about 5 hours to transmit the video to the local television station where it was spliced together. Another embed stated that it took about 20 minutes to transmit each minute of video.



Army Times Photo by Warren Zinn, © 2003

Figure VII-7. CNN reporter Walter Rogers, embedded with the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cav, 3rd Inf Div, files a report near Baghdad, Iraq, 5 April 2003

The difficulty for broadcast-media who were embedded on aircraft carriers was finding a location on the ship where they could transmit live broadcasts. The PAOs helped identify locations on the ship where they could get a line of sight to the satellite (see Figure VII-8). The embeds were not permitted to set up their satellite equipment on the flight deck, so if they wanted to broadcast from there, cables had to be run to satellite dish locations. Safety and the length of cable became controlling factors. When time



By Hasashi Tsuya – NHK Television

Figure VII-8. Cameraman Takemori Kataoka, NHK Television, Japan, embedded aboard the USS *Kitty Hawk*, transmits video via satellite dish

permitted, the embeds could transmit their video using the ship's capabilities; however, with multiple broadcast-media teams wanting to transmit, they fared better if they had their own satellite dishes. The Navy also flew broadcast-media tapes to Bahrain or Cyprus for subsequent transmission to the networks.

The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, "No communications equipment for use by the media in the conduct of their duties will be specifically prohibited." Temporary restrictions the military could impose for OPSEC reasons

have already been discussed. On 2 April 2003, the CFLCC directed that the use of all Thuraya satellite phones be discontinued on the battlefield because intelligence reports indicated the Iraqi Intelligence Services had the ability to monitor and track individual phones. This affected more than 500 Thuraya phones being used by U.S. forces and embeds. Military units were directed to assist the media with transmission of their products using military means. Information about restrictions on using Thuraya phones was also provided in a news release from CFLCC and CENTCOM HQ, along with guidance for media organizations to deliver alternate communications means, if necessary, to the CPIC, which would attempt to deliver it during resupply operations.¹³⁷ Commanders implemented this guidance immediately. Most commanders told the embeds they could no longer use their Thuraya phones and trusted them not to use it; however, some commanders confiscated the Thuraya phones to ensure they would not be used. On 17 April, the CFLCC determined that the security concerns had been reduced to a level where they again authorized embeds to use their Thuraya phones, as long as certain technical information for each phone was provided to a PA representative.¹³⁸ During the time period when the Thuraya was banned, the embeds who brought back-up communications could continue to file their reports. Commanders who had Iridium

¹³⁷ CFLCC News Release, "Use of Thuraya Phones Discontinued," Camp Doha, Kuwait, 2 April 2003.

¹³⁸ CFLCC News Release, "Thuraya Phone Ban Lifted By Coalition Forces," Camp Doha, Kuwait, 17 April 2003.

phones permitted the embeds to use them as time and circumstances permitted. Some embeds were able to get a replacement phone shipped from their media organization, but this took time. Also, embeds who had either an Iridium or Inmarsat phone would share their phone with those embeds who only had the Thuraya. Having to use the commander's or another embed's phone usually meant a longer wait before the embeds could file a report, but at least they were able to continue to send reports from the battlefield.

As communications technology advances, the capability to file more live reports and to file reports faster will increase. The need for media vehicles on the battlefield may also be eliminated because the transmission equipment will be more compact.

F. REPORT CONTENT

Before, during, and after the war, one of the major drawbacks mentioned by those who criticize(d) the Embedded Media Program is that an embed could not file reports that would provide his/her readers or viewers an in-depth understanding of what was happening on the battlefield. They were limited to a very narrow view of the war, often referred to as the “soda straw” view.

1. Embeds: The “Soda Straw” View

At a DoD Press Conference on 21 March 2003, the day after the war started, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld stated, “What we are seeing is not the war in Iraq. What we’re seeing are slices of the war in Iraq. We’re seeing that particularized perspective that that reporter or that commentator or that television camera happens to be able to see at that moment. And it is not what’s taking place. What you see is taking place, to be sure, but it is one slice. And it is the totality of that that is what this war is about and being made up of.”¹³⁹

Based on interviews with commanders and embeds, the embeds never intended to report on anything other than what they observed. One embed stated, “I could not write about the war in a broader context, because I did not know anything about it. I was there to write about the soldiers, the unit, and the war fought by that unit.” When indirect fire weapons are fired at an unseen enemy, an embed seldom has the time or the mobility

¹³⁹ Department of Defense News Transcript, *DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers*, 21 March 2003.

needed to reconstruct what happened and tell a complete story.¹⁴⁰ The embeds knew that their responsibility was to provide input to their editor or producer, who would take their report and combine it with other reports to develop a coherent explanation of the war. As the NBC Executive Director for News, David Verdi, wrote, “The embeds’ role was similar to that of a close-up in one of our spots. Their reporting did not tell the entire story, but it helped define our overall coverage by adding detail and intimacy.”¹⁴¹ The embeds filed human-interest stories and operational reports. The reports varied to some extent depending on the type of military unit from which the embed was reporting, the type of media organization (national/regional, local, or international), and the media type (newspaper, magazine, wire, or news service, television, or radio).

Before the start of the war, the embeds did profiles on individuals in the unit and explained the unit to their readers or viewers in terms of the unit’s mission, organization, weapons and equipment, and preparation and training for war. The embeds stated that they reported on the daily activities and the war through the “eyes of the soldier, marine, sailor, or airman.” However, before the war, it was also reported through the eyes of the embed as he/she learned about the unit and its members and explained that to his/her audience. Once the war started, the embeds transitioned to reporting on the operational aspects of the unit—the mission, the plan, and the execution. As they covered battles in which the unit was engaged, they continued to report on the human element of war.

Most embeds with ground units were at brigade, battalion, or company level. Only 31 of 542 embeds (5.7 percent) were located at a division or higher HQ. The reports of the embeds at division and higher-level HQ tended to focus more on the operations because they had access to the larger concept of operation and scheme of maneuver and followed it from the planning phase through execution. They reported on the war through the “eyes of the general.” All embeds at division and higher-level HQ represented large national media organizations, except for one embed from an international newspaper.

Before the war, embeds aboard aircraft carriers and at air bases filed primarily human-interest stories, but, similar to embeds in ground units, they reported on the different elements of a CSG or air expeditionary wing that made them an effective fighting

¹⁴⁰ Paul Friedman, “The Real-Time War, TV: A Missed Opportunity,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June 2003.

¹⁴¹ David Verdi, “The Benefits of Embedding Reporters,” msnbc.msn.com, 15 March 2004.

force. After the war started, they filed human-interest stories and reports on air operations—from mission briefings through the return of the aircraft from a mission.

The embeds received guidance from their media organization bureau chiefs or editors about the types of stories they wanted. Embeds from local newspaper and television media organizations did a lot of interviews and sent back primarily human-interest stories and profiles of hometown Service members. These stories provided the military families insights into the daily lives and activities of their loved ones and the unit. The local media organizations relied on other sources to provide additional details about the war's progress to their readers and viewers.

Most of the national/regional media organizations had embeds in more than one unit and usually with more than one military Service. They were able to get a variety of stories from their embeds depending on the type and level of military unit, the Service, and the involvement in combat operations. They tended to focus more on the unit and its operations and less on the human-interest stories and individual profiles, although they filed both types of reports. While the newspapers were reporting on events each day, the magazines had the time to provide an overview of a week's activities and enrich it with stories about the Service members. The international media embeds provided reports primarily on operations and feature stories. Their readers and viewers wanted to know about the war, but the human-interest stories had less meaning to them since the Service members were not representing their country. The international embeds did, however, include reports that provided some insights about war at the individual level.

Embeds assigned to ground units stated that once the war began, they occasionally received requests from their media organization for more combat coverage. They had to explain that they could only report what they saw happening in their unit. If the unit was not in contact with the enemy, they could not move to cover another unit that was. The embeds were sometimes frustrated at not being allowed to see what was taking place a few miles away.

2. The “Big Picture”

PAOs and senior commanders thought that providing an integrated view of what was happening at the tactical, operational, and strategic level during the war was a shared responsibility between the military and the media. The military thought that putting the print and broadcast reports filed by embeds into context with the entire war was necessary. What embeds showed or wrote was only a slice of the war and not necessarily

representative of everything that was occurring. The military's challenge, at times, was that it could confirm what was being shown on television but that interpreting it was not as easy. While the media organizations were getting reports simultaneously from everywhere, the reports sent to CENTCOM HQ and the Pentagon came through the military chain of command. They also thought the public had an obligation to read and/or watch different coverage if they wanted to get a thorough and balanced understanding of the war. One PAO cautioned, "The media and public need to understand that a squad firefight, which will always get live coverage, is only a squad firefight and may not and probably is not representative of the entire conflict. It will play well on TV, but it may not be a critical event from the perspective of a senior commander." A division has more than 250 infantry squads widely dispersed on the battlefield, but these squads are not all necessarily engaged in combat at the same time.

The bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that it was primarily their responsibility to provide the broad view of the war. Their task was to provide comprehensive, thorough, and complete coverage of events. They did not expect embeds to provide a big picture. One bureau chief stated, "Critics who complain that all that is being reported is a soda-straw view of the war are wrong. Nobody said that an embed's report is the story of the war. To get the overall picture requires inputs from many locations and sources. The overall view is the main story, with the embed stories as sidebars. Nobody expected them to do the big picture." Summaries of the war's events depended on the media organization. The 24-hour news organizations provided these summaries several times a day. The newspapers were challenged by deadlines and time-zone differences but did it each day. The magazines had more time to prepare a weekly or monthly summaries and more in-depth analysis.

The bureau chiefs' objective was to give their viewers and readers comprehensive and balanced coverage of OIF. One bureau chief stated, "We focused on three areas: (1) troops on the ground, sea, and air; (2) the big picture overview; and (3) analysis and thematic stories." How they did this varied by the type of media organization.

Large media organizations had several embeds and even more unilaterals in the region and reporters at the Pentagon, White House, Congress, and foreign capitals. These organizations took reports from all these locations and pieced them together to provide their readers or viewers an understanding of what was happening. Reports were either edited or unedited when they were submitted from the field. When the reports arrived at

one central location, decisions were made about what material would be used and how it would be presented.

Many small media organizations only had one or two embeds and no unilaterals. They might have a reporter in Washington to cover the Pentagon and the White House. Small newspapers relied on the wire services and affiliations they had with other newspapers or a news service, and the local television stations relied primarily on the major network with which they were affiliated. The international media relied on their own embeds and unilaterals and arrangements they had with U.S. media organizations. All these media organizations relied on the embed to provide the close-up view of the war and on the other sources to provide the broader coverage and perspective.

One benefit noted by ground commanders at brigade level and lower was that their embed would provide them the “big picture” received from their media organizations, either during satellite phone conversations or in e-mails sent to them. While they knew what was happening one or two levels higher in the chain of command, they appreciated knowing more about the overall progress of the war. Embeds from larger media organizations who could communicate with other embeds and unilaterals in the region also shared information with each other and with the commander and members of the unit. Many embeds stated that they monitored the BBC radio station and provided commanders with a summary of the news from that source. Some embeds also provided the soldiers and marines with information about current events, sports, and entertainment.

3. Name, Rank, and Hometown

During the ASD Bureau Chiefs’ meetings on 30 October 2002 and 19 March 2003, bureau chiefs asked about the policy for providing a Service member’s name and hometown during interviews. The ASD(PA) stated they would not issue a blanket policy stating that everyone will provide a name and hometown. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force PA Chiefs stated that the policy for their Service was this: If an individual consents to an interview, he/she should consent to providing their name and hometown. If he/she is not comfortable doing so, he/she should not give the interview, or the embeds should interview someone else. The military and the media felt that giving call signs made individuals seem like cartoon figures. The readers and viewers liked to know who was representing them in war and wanted to be proud of their hometown heroes. The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Releasable information includes a Service member’s name and hometown with the individual’s consent.”

During interviews, the only time the topic of a Service member's name and hometown arose was related to fixed-wing pilots. They were encouraged to provide name, rank, and hometown, but it was all right to provide rank and first name. The primary reason for not wanting to provide a last name and hometown was out of concern for the pilot's family. Pilots worried that if they were associated with the results of an air strike, someone might harass or harm their family. Another reason for their reluctance to provide the information was that the enemy may mistreat them if they were shot down and became a prisoner. Embeds stated that it was never a problem. Some pilots gave all the information, and some gave rank and first name. Embeds interviewed some pilots who did not want to provide any information, and some pilots declined to be interviewed. The SOF units had similar concerns about the possibility of action being taken against their families and had the option to provide the information or not.

G. EMBEDS AND UNILATERALS

The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, "Having embedded media does not preclude contact with other media. Embedded media, as a result of time invested with the unit and ground rules agreements, may have a different level of access." The 9 March 2003 PAG stated, "Embedding is not the only method available. Independent coverage by local, national and international media will be facilitated to the maximum extent possible, consistent with force protection and mission security."¹⁴² Two types of unilaterals on the battlefield were those who registered with the CPIC-Kuwait and those who did not register (e.g., unilaterals who had been reporting from and continued to report from Baghdad). Treatment of the two types of unilaterals was not specifically discussed, but, based on interviews with commanders, the registered unilateral received a warmer welcome from the unit.

Ground commanders at all levels expressed concerns about unilaterals. Some unilaterals linked up briefly with units before the fall of Baghdad, usually seeking security and sometimes food or fuel, but always a story. Most encounters occurred once the ground units were in control or nearly in control of a major city and primarily after 9 April 2003 when Baghdad fell. The ground commanders briefed the unilaterals and allowed them to talk to members of the unit. They encouraged them to accompany the

¹⁴² OASD(PA) Message, Subject: Public Affairs Guidance for Possible Combat Operations in Iraq, 9 March 2003.

units on patrols and on the civil-affairs-type missions they performed in support of SASO.

The embeds and the unilaterals were treated differently. The major reason was the fact that the unilaterals did not have the personal relationship with commanders and Service members that the embeds had. The unilaterals had little or no knowledge about the unit and the individuals in the unit. They lacked the commander's trust and confidence that allowed the embed unfettered access to information. In some units, an embed could enter the TOC, but a unilateral was denied access. Commanders did not have confidence that a unilateral would report fairly and accurately. The soldiers and marines were reluctant to talk to unilaterals because they were not sure if they had some sort of agenda or what type of story they would write. After 9 April 2003, commanders stated that numerous unilaterals would show up at their unit for a short period of time, usually less than a day. If their embed had not departed and the potential for a good story was present, the commander would try to ensure that the embed got the story because of the sense of loyalty he had to the embed for covering his unit.

Commander's opinions about the unilaterals were based on perceptions and, in some cases, on seeing the reports filed by the unilaterals. One senior commander stated, "We would show the unilaterals 10 positive things and 1 negative thing, and they would report on the negative thing. What assumed trust there was, was lost. It seemed like the second string coming in trying to make a name, get a headline, and establish a reputation. I sensed a purposeful intent to report the negative." Commanders faulted the unilaterals for not getting all the facts about what they reported. One commander stated, "The unilaterals seemed more interested in selling the story than telling the story. Even when I tried to explain something to them, they did not seem to want to listen." Several mentioned that they thought unilaterals would share the same story. One commander stated that his embed told him that the unilaterals staying in a Baghdad hotel were filing their stories after getting most of their information from a wire-service report, rather than going out and observing what they reported. One commander, in contrasting his embed and a unilateral who came to his unit a few times, stated, "The unilateral seemed to be constantly reporting what was going wrong or bad, while the embed tried to report more objectively and report what was going right."

The commanders did not have such negative opinions about all unilaterals. They thought that some made a concerted effort to understand what the unit was doing and why and then file objective and accurate reports. The unilaterals who returned to the

same unit more often were able to establish a much better relationship than those who only came to the unit one time. Similar to the embeds, the personal relationships that developed were critical in determining the openness of the commander and the unit with a unilateral.

Within the Navy and the Air Force, the commanders stated that they tried to treat the embarks who visited Navy ships and unilaterals who came to the air bases the same as they treated the embeds. The embarks who came aboard the ships had the same access as the embeds had. Commanders stated that the embeds filed better reports than the embarks because they spent more time on the ship (an average of 25 days for embeds and 6 days for embarks). This led to a better understanding of what they saw and an ability to file more in-depth reports.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs realized that unilaterals would not have the same access to the military units as the embeds had, but they appreciated that the military did provide the unilaterals some security. One bureau chief stated, "The media should understand that the embed has earned the trust and confidence of the commander and unit and will get the better story. The unilateral is the new guy and has to earn his way in." Not that many unilaterals were forward during the war because it was not safe to be roaming the battlefield, even if a vehicle was marked "Press." All media prefer to be independent and free to go where they want to get a story. Unilaterals could not do that effectively during the war, but moving about the cities and countries was easier once SASO commenced. Many of the small media organizations did not have unilaterals in Iraq primarily out of concern for their safety. The larger organizations had them to provide a different perspective of the war. Each group had different missions, and no one expected that they would provide the same type of reports. The bureau chiefs expressed concerns about how some unilaterals were being treated during the SASO phase of OIF in terms of ground rules, access, taking equipment, and so forth.

Embeds understood the advantages and disadvantages for themselves and the unilaterals, and they all agreed that both groups were essential for providing thorough coverage of the war. The embeds realized that the stories would be different and knew that they had greater access than the unilaterals to what was happening during the war. Embeds could report on a small part of the war through the eyes of the unit and Service members. A unilateral could not do that by spending only a few hours with a unit, but they could report on the war from the perspective of the Iraqis. One embed stated, "Neither side has a monopoly on the truth." *Washington Post* correspondent Peter Baker

wrote, “The embed versus unilateral debate is a false construct. It presumes that one is better than the other. In fact, each has its strengths and weaknesses, and the reader is best served by having both. The coverage was richer because embedded reporters were able to go places with the military and see things with their own eyes and because unilateral reporters were able to talk to Iraqis and search out stories their colleagues tied to fast-moving military units invariably would miss.”¹⁴³

The embeds appreciated the relative safety they had by being embedded and understood the risk the unilaterals took to get a wider view of the war and its effect on the Iraqi people. The embeds stated that they had little opportunity to interview Iraqis during the war. The speed of the operations often left them no time. When there was an opportunity, either the Iraqis were reluctant to talk to them because they knew they were traveling with the U.S. forces or they were unable to communicate because they did not have a translator. Navy embeds stated that the embarks generally had the same access as they had and were treated the same by the Navy.

Even though discussions about embeds and unilaterals continue among the media about topics such as objectivity, being co-opted, access to information, detailed reporting and context, the embeds realize the two groups complement each other.

H. FINDINGS

Commanders assumed and bureau chiefs/NMRs generally agreed that the embeds provided more coverage during major combat operations than the much larger number of unilaterals and embarks. However, no data are available to determine how much they provided compared with all other coverage.

The embedded media provided independent but accurate and objective reports about incidents and combat operations they witnessed—reports that were significantly different from what was being reported by the Iraqi Information Minister.

Commanders and PAOs thought that the embeds’ reporting helped gain public support and respect for the military. Neither the military nor the media thought that the role of the embeds or the media was to try and influence support for military or government actions.

¹⁴³ Baker, Peter, “Inside View,” *American Journalism Review*, May 2003. (He was embedded with the IMEF Command Element.)

The Embedded Media Program had a positive effect on troop morale and military families. Troops liked having their loved ones back home see them on television.

The ground rules about reporting casualties were clear. In only one known incident did an embed violate the CFLCC ground rules on casualty reporting. Commanders and spouses were frustrated by the slow military NOK notification system for casualties compared with the media's ability to report battlefield casualties in real time. They want everything possible done to improve the NOK notification system and expedite the notification process.

Commanders, embeds, and bureau chiefs/NMRs did not think embeds lost their objectivity or were co-opted. The bond of friendship and trust that developed between a commander and an embed was a positive benefit because it improved the quality of the reports. Embeds reported both good and bad, but, when they reported on unfavorable incidents, they understood the background and context of what happened.

Embeds had nearly unlimited access to Service members and the freedom to go unescorted nearly everywhere within the unit, on the ship, or at the air base. The PAG prohibited commanders from allowing an embed access to classified information, but commanders thought the guidance was unclear. Most commanders provided embeds access to classified information and, in return, expected the embeds not to violate the ground rules, which they did not.

Commanders and PAOs did not censor reports, and most of them did not screen or conduct a security review of any reports. However, the embeds often asked a leader in the unit to review a story or look at a video once it was completed to ensure that it was accurate and did not violate any ground rules. No pressure was placed on embeds to report anything other than the facts.

PAOs and senior commanders thought that the military and the media shared responsibility to provide an integrated view of what happened at the tactical, operational, and strategic level during the war. The bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that it was primarily their responsibility to provide the broad view of the war. They did not expect embeds to provide a big picture, and the embeds never intended to report anything other than what they observed.

The embeds and the unilaterals were treated differently because the unilaterals lacked the commander's trust and confidence that allowed the embed unfettered access to information. Commanders did not have confidence that a unilateral would report fairly and accurately.

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Evaluate and clarify the policy on embedded media access to sensitive and classified information
- Conduct a study of media communications technology to ensure that it will not interfere with battlefield systems and operations
- Revise professional military education and MOB training to include working with embeds and unilaterals.

VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Embedded Media Program conducted during the major combat phase of OIF was a success for the military, the media, the military family members, and the public. It provided a view of the war from the perspective of the warfighters and small units—a view that could not have been accomplished any other way. However, embeds were only with their units for a relatively short period of time. Most of them embedded in mid-March 2003 and disembedded between 9 April and 1 May 2003. A magazine journalist at a military-media conference in August 2003 stated, “Ultimately, this [the Embedded Media Program] is untested. The real test will come in a conflict of longer duration, perhaps against an enemy that is far more competent and where there is potential for real harm to U.S. troops in terms of casualties.”¹⁴⁴

Key questions remain unanswered. What if major combat operations continued for an extended period of time (e.g., 6 months to a year)? What if the threat to U.S./coalition forces had been greater? Since this Embedded Media Program was unique in its scope and implementation and was accepted well by the military, the media, and the public, will it be implemented in future conflicts? If so, will it be done the same way?

A. WHAT IF MAJOR COMBAT DURING OIF HAD LASTED LONGER OR THE THREAT TO U.S./COALITION FORCES HAD BEEN GREATER?

This was a short conflict and a successful effort for U.S. and coalition forces. If major combat lasted longer, would the embeds have remained for the duration of the war?

Also, the enemy did not pose a serious threat, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not employed, and casualties were less than anticipated. No major incidents of civilian casualties or collateral damage to cities and protected buildings occurred. However, if these things had occurred, would the military have changed the way in which it implemented the Embedded Media Program?

¹⁴⁴ Alicia C. Shepard, “Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War,” *Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report*, McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2004.

1. What If the War Had Gone Badly?

Commanders and PAOs stated that U.S. citizens have a right to see what and how the Service members—their sons and daughters, husbands and wives, fathers and mothers—are performing, in accordance with the SECDEF’s guidance to “tell the factual story—good or bad.” Even if failures and shortcomings were experienced during combat operations, the national and international public had a right to see the war firsthand. Doing so would validate the Embedded Media Program and further the accomplishment of the OSD PA objectives. Continued access by the embeds would be necessary so the world would understand what happened and why.

Commanders at all levels stated that they would want their embeds in the unit without any changes in the ground rules—even if things went badly. As discussed previously, the benefit of the embed from the commander’s perspective was that the embed understood the context and background about what he/she was reporting. However, they had mixed opinions about how the senior DoD leadership would react to embed reporting if combat operations did not go well. Some commanders were not sure if the senior leadership would have imposed any restrictions on embed reporting (e.g., provide less access to information or limit coverage of events). They stated that the senior leadership should accept the fact that embeds would write negative stories and not get upset with a commander’s or Service member’s comment in a news report. Other commanders did not think that the Embedded Media Program would be changed. One commander stated, “I felt like there was support all the way up the chain of command. I did not think I would ever suffer any adverse consequences just because there was a negative story in the press.” Most commanders did not think that their immediate superiors would get overly concerned as long as embeds continued to provide fair and unbiased reporting and that they would be supportive no matter how the embeds reported on the war. If the commanders and soldiers felt threatened by the senior leadership, they might begin to impose their own limitations on embeds. In either case, if changes were initiated by DoD or were self-initiated, this would create a bad environment for everyone and probably cause a rapid deterioration in otherwise positive military-media relations.

Commanders thought that problems would arise if the ground rules were changed significantly just because things went badly for an extended period of time. It would reflect poorly on the military if guidance were issued to restrict access to operations, screen reports, or impose delays before the reports were filed. The negative publicity from making such changes would not be good. If significant changes in ground rules

were made, commanders assumed that embeds would disembed and continue to report—but without the context and background information or access that made their reporting credible. If the embeds are not allowed to see and report what is happening, they will find a way to get the information anyway.

The commanders did not think the military should do anything to affect the relationship they had with the embeds. They knew that things could go bad and mentioned reports about friendly fire incidents, accidental killing of civilians, suicide bombers, the sand storm, and logistical resupply problems. Commanders stated that the embeds reported those events objectively and accurately. Because of the trust and rapport the commanders had with the embeds, they thought the relationship would endure even if operations were not as successful as anticipated. The embeds would remain professional and objective, and the reporting would continue to be fair, honest, and unbiased. If the war went badly, the embeds would still report on the Service members doing their best and trying to do what was right. As long as the embeds understand the facts and circumstances, the reporting will always be better than that without embeds—even during adverse situations. No matter what happened, the embeds could report what they saw and provide an independent and credible account of events to the public. However, commanders noted that if they ever sensed that the reporting was becoming slanted rather than factual, just because of operational setbacks, that would have a serious effect on their relationship with the embeds.

Sustaining a significant number of casualties was one area where ground commanders expressed concern. They were not worried about the embeds violating the ground rules or reporting unfairly; however, they did worry about the effect that reports of casualties would have on military families. For the casualties that occurred during OIF, the problem for the military families was not the embed reporting but the slow military NOK notification process. Commanders knew that the effect of seeing large numbers of casualties reported in the news—compounded by the notification process—would have an adverse effect on the families and would affect unit morale. A few commanders thought that if embeds were reporting heavy casualties in real time, even though accurate, a conflict could develop between commanders and embeds because the commander wants to look out for the welfare of his troops and the embed wants to file the report. Commanders did not know if casualty reporting ground rules would need to be amended.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that the media needed to tell the story of the American soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. A key factor in the media's ability to do that was the Embedded Media Program. They noted that DoD implemented the program even though they went into combat with an expectation of active Iraqi resistance and the possibility of many casualties and the employment of WMD. The military did not flinch at some stories that reflected unfavorably on them.

During OIF, keeping the Embedded Media Program without changes—even with many negative reports—worked to the military's advantage. If the combat situation was bad and no embeds were assigned to the units, the enemy could report what they wanted, and an independent verification of the facts might not happen. The bureau chiefs/NMRs thought the Embedded Media Program would have to continue no matter what happened. After everything that the military did to plan and implement the program, multiple reports of censorship, less access, confiscating film, and so forth would undermine the military's credibility. Although the military might not want to see or read negative reports, having the appearance of a cover-up would be worse. Having fewer embeds or trying to restrict their reporting would give the perception that the military wanted to sanitize the facts or put a positive spin on them. Even if an embed's report was not a good story from the military's perspective, the embed would provide the facts along with the background and context about a situation.

If DoD tried to change the Embedded Media Program because of negative reporting by embeds, the bureau chiefs/NMRs would have complained. The military should not blame the messenger if they do not like the news and must be prepared to accept the bad news along with the good news. Bureau chiefs/NMRs did not think OASD(PA) would direct that embeds be disembedded or have their access restricted. If things did not go well for an extended period of time, trying to predict what the commanders would do on their own would be difficult. It would be personality dependent. Bureau chiefs/NMRs thought that most commanders would want keep the embeds and continue to allow them unfettered access because of the relationship they had established. A bureau chief from a local media organization stated, "Because we covered the division in peace and war, and had a reputation for fair and honest reporting, the relationship between our embed and the commanders would continue to be a positive one."

2. Embed for Life or Rotate and Replace Embeds?

During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 14 January 2003, the DASD(PA) explained that once an embed leaves a unit, "there are no guarantees that you'll get another opportunity with that unit or necessarily even with another unit. We will try, as people leave, to give other reporters and other news organizations an opportunity to rotate into that embed if they so desire." During the ASD(PA) Bureau Chiefs' meeting on 27 February 2003, the DASD(PA) was asked again if an embed could return to the same unit after he departed. The DASD(PA) stated, "They would be unlikely to be able to return to the embed [unit] because the intent is to give you the opportunity to stay as long as you want to. Once you no longer are interested in that, there may be another news organization that has a reporter who hasn't had a chance to embed, and, to the extent that the logistics and tactical situation will allow us, we would certainly want to give that reporter that opportunity."

Because media organizations sent mostly well-qualified embeds who were willing to tolerate harsh conditions, commanders thought that the embeds would stay embedded as long as there was a story and the media organization editor, bureau chief, or producer would allow them to stay. Most embeds began disembedding after the capture of Baghdad and the beginning of SASO because the media organizations thought that the combat reporting was done and that they could cover SASO effectively without embeds.

If major combat had lasted a long time, commanders stated it probably would have become necessary to establish some sort of plan to replace embeds. That is contrary to the embed-for-life policy and details of how and when it could be done would have to be determined. One commander stated, "Any replacement should be conditions based, not time based." They could accommodate replacements, but timing would be important and would depend on the combat situation. It could not be done on a prearranged schedule or with a precise date set far in advance. For example, if the plans were that embeds would be replaced every 4 weeks and a unit was involved in major combat, replacing embeds at that time could adversely affect operations. Commanders realized that some embeds would be frustrated and want to change units if they were with units that never saw any significant action. In those situations, the military and the media organization might benefit by rotating the embed to another unit, on a by-exception basis, if mutually agreed to by the commander and the embed.

Military commanders want the media there to cover events as they occur and would be willing to take a replacement embed, if necessary, rather than have no embed. Because most commanders were satisfied with their embeds, their preference would be to have a replacement from the same media organization. If that did not happen, at least they would want to maintain a good mix of media types. The trust and rapport that had been established with a previous embed would not exist and building a relationship with a new embed would take time. The new embed would take several days to get acclimated to the unit and its operations and to gain the trust and confidence of the commander and Service members. Also, this transition would be more difficult than it was for the embeds who joined the unit before the war started. The Navy and Air Force commanders and PAOs would like to have embeds for an extended period of time, even if embeds had to be replaced. However, they realized that this might not be possible because an embed can only report on so much while aboard a ship or at an air base (e.g., flights taking off and returning, tomahawks being launched, and so forth). Any embed replacements would probably not come from the same media organization but from one that wanted to cover those type of operations and stories and did not have a previous opportunity.

A few bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that if the military had been more realistic about what they would encounter after Baghdad was captured, more embeds might have stayed longer. The media was committed to covering the war and the units who had embeds as long as they sensed a valuable story. If combat operations had lasted longer, they would have wanted someone embedded continuously; however, they were not sure the same person could have been embedded the entire time. They did not think that being embedded for life with no other option was realistic, but this would be an issue since the policy stated that an embed who left the unit could not be replaced by someone else from the same media organization. The only way it could happen under the existing policy was if no other media organizations wanted to embed someone. The media would have asked DoD to change the policy and permit embeds to be replaced by someone from the same organization.

Media organizations sent embeds who generally were well prepared and trained for the task. The bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that they would have embeds serve with a unit as long as they could. As discussed previously, embeds disembedded for numerous reasons related to media organization and individual embed decisions (e.g., concerns about safety, the cost of covering the war, the physical and psychological effect on the individual, time away from families, and so forth). In most units, the bureau chiefs/NMRs

would want to replace an embed; however, in some units in which the combat action or activity on which to report was limited, they would want to send a replacement to another unit. They thought some sort of plan should be developed that allows media organizations to rotate individuals in and out of a unit or among units. The time to replace an embed should be determined on an individual basis, with consideration for the health and physical condition of the embed and for the tactical situation in the unit.

The bureau chiefs/NMRs understand that replacing embeds would sacrifice the trust relationship for a short period of time and result in a temporary loss of access. Reestablishing the trust and rapport between the commander and the embed would be more difficult during combat operations. To a certain extent, the relationship established between the commander and embed probably would extend to the embed's media organization. If the outgoing embed informed the commander about the background and qualifications of his/her replacement, this recommendation would facilitate the transition process and perhaps shorten the time to form an effective working relationship.

One embed stated, "Like soldiers and marines, it is hard to leave your new buddies on the battlefield." Some embeds thought the war would be over in a short period of time, so being an embed for life was not a concern when they embedded. Other embeds planned to stay and assumed that they would stay at least 6 months. After that time, they would probably need or want to be replaced, even though they knew they would relinquish an excellent relationship. The embeds realized that replacing personnel during combat operations might be difficult, but they thought the military should develop some sort of replacement plan. As an alternative to being replaced, a few embeds mentioned the possibility of spending some period of time outside the combat zone and then returning to the same unit.

As discussed in a previous section, some individuals who embedded with units were not on the original OASD(PA) embed list. Although some of those individuals filled embed assignments left vacant by other organizations, the CPIC-Kuwait, in coordination with major ground-unit PAOs, arranged for additional embed opportunities. The interviews and a review of the available data did not give any indication whether the new embeds replaced other embeds who disembedded or if they were offered an opportunity to embed in a unit that previously did not have an embed. Also, trying to determine how many embeds were in either category is not possible. Since most embed assignments were coordinated by OASD(PA) before the start of the war, it is assumed that the number is small. The nine embeds who embedded in two different major units

essentially rotated to the second unit. Most of the embed assignments coordinated by the CPIC-Kuwait occurred before or during the war. Because most disembedding began after the start of SASO and most media organizations did not see a need to embed at that time, not many new embeds emerged during SASO. Based on interviews, several embeds returned during SASO to the same unit in which they had been previously embedded. They received a positive reception because the unit assumed that the embed would provide the same type of balanced coverage about SASO that they did during combat. It would also be better than the reporting by unilaterals. No embeds were replaced aboard aircraft carriers or at air bases.

B. IS THIS EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM THE MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?

Although this report assesses the Embedded Media Program during major combat operations in OIF, the military should consider if and how an Embedded Media Program might be handled in future operations. During an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor* in April 2003, the DASD(PA) was asked about the future of the Embedded Media Program. He stated, “I think that regardless of how we pursue it in the future, this experience will have its impact and I would like to think that from the initial success I see that we may have a good model for going forward. Just as past conflicts were not terribly useful when we were prepared for this one, I think every conflict is unique in its nature, mission, and purpose, and each environment is potentially very different. Regardless of the lessons that we learned here, they’ll still have to be applied over whatever a future situation might be, to determine whether or not, or to what extent what we did in this conflict will be able to be repeated.”¹⁴⁵

1. The Future of an Embedded Media Program

The commanders and PAOs stated that the Embedded Media Program should be continued in any future conflicts, with an understanding that it may not be executed in exactly the same way. A senior commander stated, “This was a policy decision for this war, but it may not be the same for the next war. Each conflict is different and unique, but the going-in proposition should be that there will be embeds and there should be some sort of embed plan for future operations. Then, DoD should figure out how to do it

¹⁴⁵ Department of Defense News Transcript, Bryan Whitman, DASD PA (Media Operations), Interview With Liz Marlantes, *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 April 2003.

and make it work.” Because of previous unfettered access by so many embeds, the media may be suspicious if they are not allowed similar access to report what they see and hear. However, commanders cautioned that the media organizations should not assume the same level of access for all future operations. In the future, the United States may fight an enemy who uses the media as part of their information operations—not just to report what they are told, but also by providing more access to operations. They wondered what would happen if an independent news organization put embedded media on the U.S. coalition side and on enemy side of a conflict.

A PAO stated, “We need to be careful that we do not become victims of our success.” Commanders and PAOs did not think the public or the media organizations would accept not having an Embedded Media Program as part of any future conflict because this program had been successful. If DoD did not have a program, the media organizations would ask *Why not? Is there something you are trying to hide?* Arguments against continuing the program in the future (e.g., problems with logistics, communications, and safety) would be hard to justify considering that the military dealt with all these issues successfully during OIF.

Commanders saw the Embedded Media Program as a combat multiplier and wanted embeds in their units. They realize that if DoD has an Embedded Media Program in the future, the media organizations will decide if they want to participate. They understand that the media want to report on something newsworthy and cover events in the way that best meets their needs and that their determination of what is newsworthy may differ from what the military thinks is newsworthy. Media participation will also depend on the type of conflict, but the commanders know that the media organizations will have someone on the battlefield to cover it.

Commanders and PAOs stated that individuals who have previously embedded in a unit should be permitted to embed with that unit again in any future conflict if this arrangement is mutually agreeable to the unit, the media organization, and the embed. The time spent learning about the unit and establishing relationships would minimize the time needed to get oriented in the unit and provide credibility for the embed, even if the commander and many of the Service members are no longer in the unit. Media organizations could still identify their embeds, but some coordination would be required to ensure that media organizations would get an embed allocation with the unit. One embed stated, “The embeds need to maintain contacts and should go back to the unit every so often to

do a story. The norm in journalism is to cultivate and maintain sources. They need to stay linked to a unit. If they break contact, they lose the investment they made.”

Commanders and PAOs stated that if DoD intends to have an Embedded Media Program during future conflicts, having a draft plan ready to implement would be a good idea. The corporate memory about the details of implementing the Embedded Media Program will be lost because of the passage of time and the transfer of personnel, and a plan would eliminate the requirement to start from scratch. Each Embedded Media Program will be different depending on the conflict, but much of it could be incorporated into a standard operating procedure (SOP) or template. When Annex F (Public Affairs) is prepared for an Operational Plan (OPLAN), some form of embedded media plan should be included in the annex. The embedded media plan at the combatant command level should include a process for getting host-nation approval to allow embeds to enter those countries and have access to installations and accompany units during operations. This plan should also include a set of ground rules tailored to each country—rules that would alleviate concerns caused by host-nation sensitivities. Those issues need to be resolved as soon as final planning begins for potential combat operations.

The Air Force is rethinking how an embed program might work for air expeditionary forces during future combat operations. In hindsight, putting embeds in different types of units (e.g., fighter, bomber, refueling, and airlift) rather than at an air base, may have been a better idea. The embeds would be with the unit regardless of where it is based for the combat operation. It might be in the United States, at a forward staging base, or in the AOR. They would have the opportunity to learn about the unit and its personnel, similar to how embeds joined the 101ABN at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, before the commencement of OIF. If the unit is repositioned, the embeds would deploy with the unit. For those embeds in nonfighter aircraft units, the Air Force would like to develop a plan to get more embeds to accompany a crew on a mission. They also want embeds at the higher HQ to report on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process (e.g., What goes into mission planning?, How it is integrated with ground operations?, and so forth).

The special operations community is concerned that too much reporting by embeds could reveal TTPs and might be counterproductive in getting the right message about SOFs to the enemy. The challenge is to let the public know what a great force multiplier these forces are but not let the adversary get over confident about dealing with SOF because they learn so much about their operations from detailed reporting by embeds.

Bureau chiefs/NMRs realize that the Embedded Media Program for OIF was unique, and they are not assuming it will always work the same way in the future. The momentum to use the program again is present because it was successful. One bureau chief state, “Once you have seen what is possible in terms of access and freedom to report from the battlefield, it would be hard to change.” Although circumstances could change, they stated that the Embedded Media Program should continue in some form. If not, the media would still be present on the battlefield but would coordinate in a less formal manner with OASD(PA).

2. Embedded Media Plans for Different Types of Military Operations

The military and the media agree that the Embedded Media Program should continue in the future but that it would probably be structured differently. Many issues should be considered before an Embedded Media Program is implemented again. Not all of them are considered here, but the discussion provides an initial framework for planning.

To develop an embedded media plan for OASD(PA) and to include it with Annex F of an OPLAN, consideration should be given to if and how an Embedded Media Program would be executed. Would the planning be centralized at OASD(PA), with authority for execution delegated to the combatant command PAO? Would it be controlled by OASD(PA) for the duration of the operation? Once the PAG is issued, would the combatant command be responsible for the planning, preparing, and implementing the program?

In developing future embedding plans, the military should review past operations and assess how an Embedded Media Program could have been applied during operations when it was not used or applied differently during operations when it was used. Would it have been more advantageous for the military and the media to have an embed program during an operation as opposed to how the media actually covered the war? How will the Embedded Media Program differ if it is implemented during combat, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping operations? A list of advantages and disadvantages could be developed for each operation to use as a starting point for future planning.

From a military perspective, an assessment of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) would be useful in making this determination. For example, when considering terrain, how difficult or easy is it to move about the battlefield? In operations such

as those conducted in Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia, the media generally had freedom of movement and could link up with a unit or travel fairly easily around the country. During large-scale combat operations in Iraq, moving safely around the battlefield was difficult for the media unless they were embedded—as was discovered by the unilaterals. During SASO, the ability to travel freely has varied significantly depending on the changing military and political situation. When considering time, will an embed rotation policy be required if the military anticipates that operations will last a long time, or will the embed-for-life concept remain the policy? For the OIF Embedded Media Program, planning and preparation occurred over a 4-month period. How would an Embedded Media Program be planned and implemented if there was less time? Each factor should be considered in detail.

For different operations, the number of embeds that the military could accommodate in units and the number of embeds that media organizations would want to send to those units might be different. As embedded media plans are developed for various OPLANs, or after they have been drafted, the military should coordinate with the media to determine the degree of support for the program in each particular plan. There would be no point in preparing for a large number of embeds to support a specific OPLAN if the media thought they could cover the operation better with unilaterals. As was seen during OIF, the media organizations did not provide embeds for all the allocations. Is 4 embeds per battalion, 30 embeds per aircraft carrier, or 8 embeds per Air Force unit a good planning figure and is it the right one for all types of operations? Will military transformation and changes in organizational structures make a difference in the number of embeds who can be accommodated? The Army and Marine Corps would like to have embeds with combat, CS, and CSS units. Most media organizations and embeds wanted to be with combat units; however, some did not want to be with combat units because of safety concerns. If the number of embeds was large, should the largest media organizations, which receive many allocations, provide embeds to the different types of units in return for having so many allocations?

What will be the procedure for determining which media organizations are offered embed allocations? Would it be similar to what was done for OIF, or would the distribution of allocations depend on the operation? To what extent should media organizations be permitted to express their preference for embed allocations (e.g., component, level of organization, and type of unit)? Should a list of international media organizations from each region be developed based on regional market share and/or

global coverage similar to what was done for the national media, and should they be invited to participate if they do not ask? What will be the process to ensure that all media types from national, international, and local media have an opportunity to embed? What priority, if any, should be given to organizations that cover the Pentagon, to local media organizations that cover units at nearby installations, or to media organizations that have an established history of covering military operations? If all media organizations that want to participate in a future Embedded Media Program are unable to participate because of the scope of the operation, should DoD make an effort to provide more media organizations an opportunity by rotating embeds?

Would the DoD National Media Pool be activated before putting embeds in units? Would the pool members make their products available for release to all media organizations, or would they be considered as the initial embeds and file reports only with their media organizations? If reports were filed for all media organizations, how would it be done? How and when would a decision be made to stop pooling reports since not all embeds would join units simultaneously? What is the best way to distribute embed allocations in an operation such as OEF in Afghanistan, where the number of fewer embeds are fewer because a much smaller force is involved in ground operations? In an operation involving mostly SOFs with small, widely dispersed units, how many embeds should participate and should reports be the domain of the media organization to which the embeds belong or be provided by means of a pool? During OIF, only 25 embeds were with SOF units and the 173ABN, and they were selected by name for limited duration based on the missions. Should that be the template for covering these types of operations in the future?

What will be the effect on any future program of the communications technology in the military and the media? Should broadcast media be allowed to bring their own vehicles to accompany ground units? What policies and procedures need to be established to ensure that embeds could use lipstick cameras in the aircraft cockpits? Will embeds want to use lipstick cameras in Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicles on the helmets of vehicle commanders or drivers, and, if so, will the policies be the same?

These are just a few of the many questions that could and should be addressed before implementing an Embedded Media Program in the future.

C. FINDINGS

If the war had gone badly, commanders at all levels stated they would still want embeds in their unit. Even if the story was not a good from the military's perspective, the embeds would provide the facts along with the background and context.

If major combat had lasted a long time, commanders, embeds, and bureau chiefs/NMRs stated that replacing embeds and establishing a replacement/rotation policy would probably have become necessary. The timing of the rotation would be important and would depend on the combat situation. Commanders want the media to cover events as they occur and would be willing to take a replacement embed rather than have no embed.

The commanders, PAOs, bureau chiefs/NMRs, and embeds stated that the Embedded Media Program should be continued in any future conflict, with an understanding that it may not be executed in exactly the same way. Drafts of embedded media plans should be ready to implement for different types of military operations.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop an embed replacement/rotation plan as part of any future Embedded Media Program
- Develop an embedded media policy that addresses the spectrum of conflict in different regional areas
- Develop an embedded media plan for inclusion in the PA Annex of OPLANs
- Involve the media in the development of embedded media policy.

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GLOSSARY

Ground Units		Air Bases		Media Organizations	
101ABN	101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	AAS	Ali Al Salem Air Base	IM	International Magazine
173ABN	173rd Airborne Brigade	AJ	Al Jaber Air Base	IN	International Newspaper
15MEU	15th Marine Expeditionary Unit	AU	Al Udeid Air Base	IR	International Radio
1AD	1st Armored Division	CS	Doha Int'l Airport (Commando Solo)	IT	International Television
1CAV	1st Cavalry Division	INC	Incirlik Air Base	IW	International Wire
1MARDIV	1st Marine Division	PSAB	Prince Sultan Air Base	UE	U.S. Electronic Web
IMEF	1st Marine Expeditionary Force	SI	Shaikh Isa Air Base	UM	U.S. Magazine
2ACR	2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment			UN	U.S. Newspaper
3ACR	3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment			UP	U.S. Photo
82ABN	82nd Airborne Division			UR	U.S. Radio
3ID	3rd Infantry Division			US	U.S. News Service
3MAW	3rd Marine Air Wing			UT	U.S. Television
4ID	4th Infantry Division			UW	U.S. Wire
VCORPS	V Corps				
1FSSG	1st Force Service Support Group				

AADCOM	Army Air Defense Command
AAMDC	Army Air and Missile Defense Command
AAR	After Action Report
AB	Air Base
ABC	American Broadcasting Company
AC	alternating current
ACCE	Air Component Coordination Element
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AFB	Air Force Base

AFP	Agence France Presse
aka	also known as
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
AP	Associated Press
ARCENT	U.S. Army Forces, U. S Central Command
ASD(PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
ATNAA	Antidote Treatment-Nerve Agent Auto-Injector
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDA	battle damage assessment
CA	Civil Affairs Command
CANA	Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
Cdr	Commander
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Command
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CFMCC	Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command
CG	Commanding General
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Coalition Joint Task Force
CMCL	customer contract listing
CNBC	Consumer News and Business Channel
CNN	Cable News Network
CO	Commanding Officer
COC	Combat Operations Center
COD	Carrier On-board Delivery (aircraft flights to/from carriers)
COSCOM	Corps Support Command (U.S. Army)

CP	Command Post
CPIC	Coalition Press Information Center
CS	combat support
CSG	Carrier Strike Group
CSS	combat service support
CTC	Combat Training Center
DA	Department of the Army (e.g., DA Form 2062)
DASD(PA)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
DEPORD	deployment order
DINFOS	Defense Information School
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DPA	Deutsche Press Agentur
DSN	Defense Switched Network
DTG	Date-Time Group
ENCOM	Engineering Command
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
FCS	Future Combat Systems
FM	Field Manual
FOB	forward operating base
FPC	Foreign Press Center
FRG	Family Readiness Group
FSSG	Force Service Support Group
GPS	Global Positioning System
HQ	headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HUD	heads-up display
IAW	in accordance with
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IMEF CE	IMEF Command Element
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITAR	Information Telegraph Agency of Russia
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JPALL	Joint Public Affairs Lessons Learned
JSLIST	Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
JSOTF-N	Joint Special Operations Task Force-North
JSOTF-W	Joint Special Operations Task Force-West
KVN	Key Volunteer Network
LAR	Light Armored Reconnaissance
LNO	Liaison Office
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEG	MEF Engineer Group
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MOB	media on the battlefield
MOGAS	motor gasoline
MRE	meal, ready-to-eat
MSNBC	Microsoft/National Broadcasting Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT	U.S. Naval Forces CENTCOM
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical National Broadcasting Company
NDU	National Defense University
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge

NMR	news media representative
NOK	next-of-kin
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OCJCS	Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIC	officer in charge
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
PAD	Public Affairs Division
PAG	Public Affairs Guidance
PAO	public affairs office/officer
PEJ	Project for Excellence in Journalism
POC	point of contact
POI	program of instruction
PPAG	Proposed Public Affairs Guidance
PPE	personal protective equipment
PRC	Pew Research Center
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RDC	Rear Detachment Commander
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
REDHORSE	Rapid Engineering Deployable Heavy Operation Repair Squadron Engineers
RPA	remotely piloted aircraft
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SBCCOM	U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy

SIC	Sociedade Independente de Comunicacao
SITREP	situation report
SOCCENT	Special Operations Command Central Command
SOF	Special Operations Force
SOP	standard operating procedure
TASS	Telegrafnoje Agentstvo Sovietskovo Soiuza
TF	Task Force
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TSC	Theater Support Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TV	television
U.S.	United States
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UK AD	United Kingdom Armored Division
UPAR	Unit Public Affairs Representative
UPI	United Press International
URL	universal resource locator
USCENTAF	United States Central Command Air Forces
WSV	weapons systems video
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
XO	Executive Officer
ZDF	Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen

APPENDIX A.
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Table A-1. Military Personnel Interviewed

Individual	Position and Organization
OASD(PA) (4)	
MAJ Timothy Blair	Media Embed POC
Lt. Col. Dave Lapan	CENTCOM LNO
LTC Gary Keck	Media Training (Boot Camp)
Lt. Col. Michael Halbig	Media Embed PAG
Dept of State (1)	
COL Rick Machamer	DoD LNO to Foreign Press Center
OCJCS (2)	
Capt. T. McCreary	Special Assistant for Public Affairs
CDR Chris Dour	PAO
CENTCOM and SOCCENT (8)	
BG Vince Brooks	Deputy J-3, CENTCOM
LTC John Robinson	PAO Plans Chief, CENTCOM
LTC Jim Yonts	PAO Plans Officer, CENTCOM
Maj. Pete Mitchell	PAO Plans Officer, CENTCOM
CDR Kevin Aahndahl	PAO, SOCCENT
LTC Scott Malcom	PAO, 5th Special Forces Group and JSOTF-W
LTC Tim Nye	PAO, 10th Special Forces Group and JSOTF-N
LT Tamsen McCabe	PAO, Naval Special Warfare Task Group
CFLCC and CPIC-Kuwait (10)	
COL Rick Thomas	PAO, CFLCC, ARCENT, and 3rd Army
LTC Greg Julian	Deputy PAO, CFLCC, ARCENT, and 3rd Army
LTC Henry Huntley	Deputy Director Media Rel/Dep CFLCC
MAJ Rich Steele	CLFCC PAO, Plans and Operations
CPT Darryl Wright	CFLCC PAO, Dep Plans Officer
COL Guy Shields	Director, CPIC-Kuwait
COL Gary Hovatter	Director of Operations, CPIC-Kuwait
LTC Franklin Childress	Operations Officer, CPIC-Kuwait
MAJ William Ritter	OIC, NBC Equip Issue, 318th PAD, CPIC-Kuwait
SSG Claudette Roulo	NCOIC, Regis Database, 318th PAD, CPIC-Kuwait
Army (59)	
LTG Charles Mahan	G-4, Headquarters, Department of the Army
MG Larry Gottardi	Chief, Army Public Affairs
MAJ Chris Conway	Media Rel Br, (Media Embed POC)
LTG Scott Wallace	Commanding General, V Corps
LTC Joe Richard	PAO, V Corps
MAJ Dean Thurmond	Deputy PAO, V Corps
MG Buford Blount	CG, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Mike Birmingham	PAO, 3rd Infantry Division
MSG Emma Krouser	PAO NCOIC, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Erik Berdy	CG's Aide, 3rd Inf Div

Table A-1. Military Personnel Interviewed (Continued)

Individual	Position and Organization
Army (59) (Continued)	
LTC Peter Bayer	G-3, 3rd Inf Div
COL Lyle Cayce	SJA, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Terry Ferrell	Cdr, 3rd Sqdm, 7th Cav, 3rd Inf Div
COL William Grimsley	Cdr, 1st Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Darrin Theriault	Cdr, HHC, 1st Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Michael Kelly	Cdr, C Co, 2nd Bn, 7th Inf, 1st Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Chris Carter	Cdr, A Co, 3rd Bn, 7th Inf, 2nd BCT, 3rd Inf Div
COL David Perkins	Cdr, 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Eric Schwartz	Cdr, 1st Bn, 64th Armor, 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
MAJ Michael Donovan	XO, 1st Bn, 64th Armor, 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Stephen Twitty	Cdr, 3rd Bn, 15th Inf (M), 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
COL Dan Allyn	Cdr, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CSM Mark Baker	CSM, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
MAJ Andre Tymniak	S-1, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Matt Rawlins	Asst S-1, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
LTC John Charlton	Cdr, 1st Bn, 15th Inf (M), 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
CPT Russell	S-1, 1st Bn, 15th Inf (M), 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Sgt Martin	Opns Analyst, 1st Bn, 15th Inf (M), 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Jeffrey Sanderson	Cdr, 2nd Bn, 69th Armor, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
MAJ Ken Duxbury	XO, 2nd Bn, 69th Armor, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
MAJ Jim Desjardens	XO, 1st Bn, 30th Inf (M), 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
LTC Craig Finley	Cdr, 1st Bn, 39th Field Artillery, 3rd Inf Div
CPT George Woods	Rear Det Cdr, 1st Bn, 39th Field Artillery, 3rd Inf Div
MG David Petraeus	CG, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
MAJ Hugh Cate	PAO, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC Chris Hughes	Cdr, 2nd Bn, 327th Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
COL Joe Anderson	Cdr, 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC Stephen Bruch	Cdr, 2nd Bn, 502nd Inf, 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
COL Michael Linnington	Cdr, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC Chip Preysler	Cdr, 2nd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC Patrick Fetterman	Cdr, 3rd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
CPT Daniel Kidd	Cdr, B Co, 3rd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
CPT Felix Perez	Cdr, D Co, 3rd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
CPT Christian Teutsch	Cdr, C Co, 3rd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC Michael Clawson	Cdr, 1st Bn, 101st Avn Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
COL William Forrester	Cdr, 159th Avn Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
CPT Anna Haberzettl	S-1, 159th Avn Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
LTC James Marye	Cdr, 7th Bn, 101st Avn Regt, 15th Avn Bde, 101st Abn Div
LTC Rodney McCants	Cdr, 2nd Bn, 44th Air Def Arty, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
MAJ Jimmy Cummings	PAO, 82nd Abn Div

Table A-1. Military Personnel Interviewed (Continued)

Individual	Position and Organization
Army (59) (Continued)	
COL Arnold Bray	Cdr, 2nd Bde, 82nd Abn Div
LTC Eric Nantz	Cdr, 1st Bn, 325th AIR, 2nd Bde, 82nd Abn Div
MAJ David Gercken	PAO, 1st Armored Division
LTC Bill MacDonald	PAO, 4th Inf Div
LTC Victor Harris	PAO, 1st Cav Div
LTC Tim Collins	PAO, Southern European Task Force
MAJ Rob Gowan	PAO, 173rd Abn Bde
MAJ Ron Elliott	PAO, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
CPT Bren Workman	PAO, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
Marine Corps (27)	
Lt. Col. Steve Kay	MC PA Media Branch Ch (POC, Media Embed Program)
Lt. Col. Rick Long	PAO, IMEF
Maj. Jeff Nyhart	Deputy PAO, IMEF
Brig. Gen. John Kelly	Deputy Cdr, 1st Mar Div
Capt. Joe Plenzler	PAO, 1st Mar Div
Sgt. James Goff	PAO NCO, 1st Mar Div
Col. Joseph Dunford	CO, 5th Regt, 1st Mar Div
Lt. Col. Mike Oehl	CO, 2nd Tank Bn, 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
1st Lt. Richard Wilkerson	Adj, 1st Bn, 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
1st Lt. David Denial	Rifle Plat Cdr, 1st Bn, 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
SSgt. Jason Kappan	Opns Ch, D Co, 1st LAR, 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
Lt. Col. Michael Belcher	CO, 3rd Bn, 7th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
Lt. Col. Clardy	CO, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
1st Lt. K. E. Nobile	Adj, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
Capt. C. J. Blume	FSC, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
Capt. J. A. Custis	CO, A Co, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
1st Sgt. D. J. Wimberly	1st Sgt, A Co, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
Capt. C. Rodriguez	CO, B Co, 3rd LAR, 1st Mar Div
Lt. Col. K. W. Hymes	CO, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar Regt
Maj. McDaniel	XO, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar Regt
Col. Richard Spencer	CO, 39th Mar Air Group, 3rd MAW, IMEF
Col. Michael Anderson	CO, Mar Wing Air Support Group 37, 3rd MAW, IMEF
Maj. T. V. Johnson	PAO, 3rd Mar Air Wing, IMEF
Lt. Col. Glenn Starnes	CO, 1st Bn, 10th Mar (Arty), RCT2, TF Tarawa
Lt. Col. Neil Nelson	CO, 8th Engr Support Bn, 1st FSSG
BG Thomas Waldhauser	CO, 15th Mar Expeditionary Unit, IMEF
Capt. Jay Delarosa	PAO, 15th Mar Expeditionary Unit, IMEF
Navy (18)	
RADM Steve Pietropaoli	Navy Chief of Information
CAPT Brian Cullin	Plans Officer, Chief of Information

Table A-1. Military Personnel Interviewed (Continued)

Individual	Position and Organization
Navy (Continued)	
LCDR Van Leunen	Director, Media Operations (Media Embed POC)
CAPT Roxie Merritt	OIC, CPIC, Bahrain
CDR Jeff Alderson	PAO, CFMCC, NAVCENT, and 5th Fleet
CAPT John Miller	CO, USS <i>Constellation</i>
CDR D.P. Maloney	XO, USS <i>Constellation</i>
LT Wendy Snyder	PAO, CVSG <i>Constellation</i>
JO1 Wells	PAO Chief, USS <i>Constellation</i>
CAPT Faris Farwell	CO, USS <i>Bunker Hill</i>
LTJG Jon Groveman	Training Officer, USS <i>Mobile Bay</i>
CDR Jeff Bender	PAO, USS <i>Abraham Lincoln</i>
CAPT Michael Groothousen	CO, USS <i>Harry S. Truman</i>
CAPT Ladd Wheeler	XO, USS <i>Harry S. Truman</i>
LCDR Brenda Malone	PAO, USS <i>Harry S. Truman</i>
JOC Gary Boucher	PAO Chief, USS <i>Harry S. Truman</i>
CAPT Mark Vance	CO, Carrier Air Wing 3
CDR James Pelkofski	CO, USS <i>Deyo</i>
Air Force (7)	
Brig. Gen. Ronald Rand	Chief, Air Force Public Affairs
Lt. Col. Sam Hudspath	Deputy Director, Media Operations (EJP POC)
Cpt. Richard Johnson	PAO, 9th Air Force and CENTAF
Col. Noel Jones	Cdr, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Lt. Col. Jennifer Cassidy	PAO, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Lt. Col. Byron Risner	Cdr, 15th Air Spt Opns Sqdn, 3rd Inf Div
Lt. Col. Mike Marra	Cdr, 86th Air Mobility Sqdn (Aviano)
Spouse (6)	
Mrs. Holly Petraeus	FRG, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT)
Mrs. Brenda Linnington	FRG, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mrs. Lisa Preysler	FRG, 2nd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mrs. Maruerite Hughes	FRG, 2nd Bn 327th Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mrs. Chelsea Harkins	FRG, D Co, 2nd Bn, 327th Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Mrs. Natalie Finley	FRG, 1st Bn, 39th Field Artillery, 3rd Inf Div

Table A-2. Bureau Chief/NMRs Interviewed

Individual	Organization	Media Type
Bureau Chief/NMR (38)		
Ms. Kathryn Kross	CNN (GA)	UT
Mr. Adam Yamaguchi	Asahi TV (Japan)	IT
Mr. Jamie Crawford	Channel One News (CA)	UT
Mr. Carl Fincke	<i>Virginian-Pilot</i> (VA)	UN
Mr. James Smith	<i>Boston Globe</i> (MA)	UN
Mr. Cullen Murphy	<i>Atlantic Monthly</i> (MA)	UM
Mr. James MacLaughlin	<i>Boston Herald</i> (MA)	UN
Mr. Francis Kohn	<i>Agence France-Presse (AFP)</i> (France)	IW
Ms. Sandy Johnson	AP, AP Photo, AP TV, AP Radio (NY)	UW/UT/UR
Ms. Robin Sproul	ABC News (CA)	UT
Mr. Clark Hoyt	Knight-Ridder (CA)	UW
Mr. Patrick Whalen	Getty Images (WA)	UP
Mr. Richard Ellis	Getty Images (WA)	UP
Mr. Yusuke Takahashi	NHK (Japan)	IT
Ms. Insun Kang	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i> (South Korea)	IN
Mr. Hafez Al-Mizari	<i>Al-Jazeera</i> (Qatar)	IT
Ms. Barbara Ferguson	<i>Arab News</i> (Saudi Arabia)	IN
Mr. Gerhard Spoerl	<i>Der Spiegel</i> (Germany)	IM
Mr. Chuck Lewis	Hearst Newspapers (CA)	US
Mr. Carl Leubsdorf	<i>Dallas Morning News</i> /BELO Broadcasting (TX)	UN/US/UT
Mr. Jean-Louis Atlan	<i>Paris Match</i> (France)	IM
Mr. Jim Michael	<i>USA Today</i> (VA)	UN
Mr. Peter Kovaks	<i>Times-Picayune</i> (LA)	UN (L)
Mr. Tom Ferriter	<i>News and Observer</i> (NC)	UN (L)
Mr. Matt Vita	<i>Washington Post</i> (DC)	UN
Mr. Robert Rosenthal	<i>San Francisco Chronicle</i> (CA)	UN
Mr. Terry Atlas	<i>U.S. News & World Report</i> (DC)	UM
Mr. Robert Ruby	<i>Baltimore Sun</i> (MD)	UN
Mr. Michael Cutler	WTVF-Ch 5 Nashville (CBS) (TN)	UT (L)
Mr. Michael Burbach	<i>Columbus Ledger-Enquirer</i> (GA)	UN (L)
Ms. Thomya Hogan	<i>Leaf-Chronicle</i> (TN)	UN (L)
Ms. Ellen Ratner	Talk Radio News (DC)	UR
Mr. Tom McCarthy	<i>Los Angeles Times</i> (CA)	UN
Mr. Roger Cohen	<i>New York Times</i> (NY)	UN
Ms. Susan Stevenson	<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i> (GA)	UN
Mr. Michael Duffy	<i>Time</i> (NY)	UM
Ms. Leslie Collins	WAGA-Ch 5 Atlanta (Fox) (GA)	UT (L)
Mr. James Harding	<i>Financial Times</i> (United Kingdom)	IN

Table A-2. Bureau Chief/NMRs Interviewed (Continued)

Individual	Organization	Media Type
Other (2)		
Mr. John McWethy	ABC News, Chief National Security Correspondent	UT
Mr. Joe Galloway	Knight-Ridder, Senior Military Correspondent	US

Table A-3. Embedded Media Interviewed and Embedded Unit

Individual	Media Organization	Position	Type	Service	Embedded Unit
Mr. Matthew Fisher	National Post (Canada)	Moscow Bureau Chief	IN	MC	3rd LAR Bn, 1st Mar Div
Mr. Darrin Mortenson	North County Times (San Diego, CA)	Staff Writer	UN	MC	3rd Bn, 1st Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
Mr. James Crawley	San Diego Union Tribune (CA)	Staff Writer	UN	MC	1st LAR Bn, 5th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Div
Ms. Deborah Block	Voice of America (DC)	Reporter/Producer	UR	MC	3rd Bn, 11th Mar Regt (Arty), 1st Mar Div
Mr. Samuel Harper	Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (GA)	Military Reporter	UN	A	HQ, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Ron Martz	Atlanta Journal-Constitution (GA)	Staff Writer	UN	A	C Co, 1st Bn, 64th Armor, 2d Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Mike Boettcher	CNN (GA)	National Correspondent	UT	SO	ODA 565, 5th SF Grp, JSOTF-N
Mr. David Rust	CNN (GA)	Cameraman	UT	SO	ODA 565, 5th SF Grp, JSOTF-N
Mr. Ken Robinson	CNN (GA)	Senior Terrorism and National Security Analyst	UT	JT	CFLCC HQ
Ms. Alex Quade	CNN (GA)	Producer/Reporter	UT	AF	332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Mr. David Allbritton	CNN (GA)	Photographer	UT	MC	B Co, 1st Bn, 2nd Mar Regt, TF Tarawa
Mr. John Diedrich	Gazette (Colorado Springs, CO)	Military Affairs Reporter	UN	A	HQ, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regt
Mr. Miguel Navrot	Albuquerque Journal (NM)	Military Affairs Reporter	UN	A	2nd Bn, 43rd ADA, 11th ADA Bde, 32nd AACOM
Ms. Noelle Phillips	Savannah Morning News (GA)	Military Reporter	UN	A	3rd FSB, 1st Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Wes Allison	St. Petersburg Times (FL)	National Writer	UN	A	2nd Bn, 327th Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Ms. Tracy Wilcox	Fayetteville Observer (NC)	Photographer	UN	A	1st Bn, 325th Inf, 2nd Bde, 82nd Abn Div
Mr. Kevin Maurer	Fayetteville Observer (NC)	Staff Writer	UN	A	HQ 2nd Bde and 3rd Bn, 325th Inf, 82nd Abn Div
Mr. David Bauman	Press-Enterprise (Riverside, CA)	Staff Photographer	UN	MC	7th Engr Spt Bn, 1st FSSG, IMEF
Mr. Michael Coronado	Press-Enterprise (Riverside, CA)	Staff Writer	UN	MC	7th Engr Spt Bn, 1st FSSG, IMEF
Mr. Tony Perry	Los Angeles Times (CA)	San Diego Bureau Chief	UN	MC	HQ, 1st Mar Div and HQ, 1st Mar Regt
Ms. Janet Choi	Channel One News (CA)	Correspondent/Anchor	UT	N	USS Constellation
Mr. Freddy Weinberg	Channel One News (CA)	Producer	UT	N	USS Constellation
Mr. Bill McMichael	Navy Times (VA)	Hampton Roads Bureau Chief	UN	N	USS Constellation and Bunker Hill
Mr. Matt Dolan	Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk)	Staff Writer	UN	N	USS Truman, Roosevelt, and Cape St. George

Table A-3. Embedded Media Interviewed and Embedded Unit (Continued)

Individual	Media Organization	Position	Type	Service	Embedded Unit
Mr. Chris Tyree	<i>Virginian-Pilot</i> (Norfolk)	Photographer	UN	N	USS <i>Truman</i> , <i>Roosevelt</i> , and <i>Cape St. George</i>
Mr. Leroy Sievers	ABC News Nightline (DC)	Producer, ABC News Nightline	UT	A	HQ, 3rd Inf Div
Ms. Katherine Skiba	<i>Milwaukee Sentinel Journal</i>	Washington Correspondent	UN	A	4th Bn, 159th Avn Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mr. Benjamin Arnoldy	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i> (MA)	Asian Editor	UN	AF	332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
Mr. James Lacey	<i>Time</i> (NY)	Correspondent	UM	A	HQ, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mr. Peter Sleeth	<i>Portland Oregonian</i>	Reporter	UN	A	B Co, 307th Engr Bn, 2nd BCT, 82nd Abn Div
Ms. Sandy Bauers	<i>Philadelphia Enquirer</i>	Reporter	UN	N	USS <i>Truman</i>
Mr. Kuni Takahashi	<i>Boston Herald</i>	Photographer	UN	MC	1st Tank Bn and 3rd Bn 4th Mar, 7th RCT, 1st Mar Div
Mr. Brian McQuarrie	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Reporter	UN	A	1st Bn, 10th Field Arty, 3rd BCT, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Jules Crittenden	<i>Boston Herald</i>	Reporter	UN	A	A Co, 4th Bn, 64th Armor, 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Chris Tomlinson	Associated Press (AP) (NY)	Reporter	UW	A	A Co, 3rd Bn, 7th Inf, 2nd BCT, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Scott Nelson	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Reporter	UN	MC	2nd Bn, 11th Mar Regt (Arty), 1st Mar Div
Mr. Christian Jacks	Fox News (NY)	Producer	UT	MC	NMCB 74, TF-M, Mar Engr Grp, IMEF
Mr. David Kamerman	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Photographer	UN	A	1st Bn, 27th Field Artillery, V Corps
Mr. Hideki Yui	NHK (Japan)	Correspondent/Anchor	IT	A	24th Corps Spt Group, V Corps
Mr. Alexander Perry	<i>Time</i> (NY)	South Asia Bureau Chief	UM	A	C Co, 1st Bn, 30th Inf, 3rd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Robert Schmidt	ABC News Radio (CA)	Reporter	UR	A	3rd Bn, 69th Armor, 1st Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Mr. Greg Jarrett	KOGO Radio (CA)	Reporter	UR	MC	HMM-364, Marine Air Group 39, 3rd MAW, IMEF
Ms. Insun Kang	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i> (South Korea)	Correspondent	IN	A	ACP, 3rd Corps Support Command, V Corps
Mr. Amr El-Kahky	<i>Al-Jazeera</i> (Qatar)	Correspondent	IT	MC	HQ, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
Mr. Steve Meyers	<i>New York Times</i> (NY)	Moscow Bureau Chief	UN	A	1st Bde, 3rd Infantry Division
Mr. Byron Pitts	CBS News (NY)	Correspondent	UT	MC	HMLA-169, MAG 39, 3rd MAW and RCT 7, 1st Mar Div
Mr. Frederick Wilkinson	ABC News (CA)	Cameraman	UT	MC	3rd Bn, 2nd Marines, RCT 2, TF Tarawa, IMEF
Mr. John Berman	ABC News (CA)	Journalist	UT	MC	3rd Bn, 2nd Marines, RCT 2, TF Tarawa, IMEF
Mr. Ross Simpson	AP Radio (NY)	Reporter	UR	MC	1st Bn, 5th Marines, RCT-5, 1st Mar Div

Table A-3. Embedded Media Interviewed and Embedded Unit (Continued)

Individual	Media Organization	Position	Type	Service	Embedded Unit
Mr. Steve Helber	AP Photo (NY)	Photographer	UW	N	USS <i>Kitty Hawk</i>
Ms. Kim Hefling	AP (NY)	Reporter	UW	A	HQ, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Ms. Barbara Ferguson	Arab News (Saudi Arabia)	Washington Correspondent	IN	MC	Wing Support Group 37, 3rd MAW, IMEF
Mr. Brett Lieberman	<i>Patriot-News</i> (PA)	Correspondent	UN	MC	2nd Bn, 25th Marines, TF Tarawa, IMEF
Ms. Gina Cavallaro	Times News Service (VA)	Staff Writer, Army Times	UN	A	HQ, 4th Inf Div
Mr. Jim Dao	<i>New York Times</i> (NY)	National Correspondent	UN	SO	NSWTG and JSOTF-W
Mr. Kerry Sanders	NBC News (NY)	Reporter	UT	MC	2nd Bn, 8th Marines, TF Tarawa, IMEF
Mr. Claus Malzahn	<i>Der Spiegel</i> (Germany)	Foreign Correspondent	IM	A	565th Engr Bn, 130th Engr Bde, V Corps
Ms. Ellen Ratner	Talk Radio News (DC)	Bureau Chief	UR	N	USS <i>Kitty Hawk</i>
Mr. Geoffrey Mohan	<i>Los Angeles Times</i> (CA)	Metro Reporter	UN	A	C Co, 4th Bn, 64th Armor, 2nd Bde, 3rd Inf Div
Ms. Dana Kaye	WTVF-TV (CBS Affiliate) (TN)	Military Reporter	UT	A	22nd Bn, 187th Inf, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)
Mr. Claus Malzahn	<i>Der Spiegel</i> (Germany)	Foreign Correspondent	IM	A	565th Engr Bn, 130 th Engr Bde, V Corps
Ms. Tamala Edwards	ABC News (CA)	Correspondent	UT	AF	332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait

APPENDIX B.
NEWS ARTICLES ABOUT THE EMBEDDED MEDIA PROGRAM

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Rhem, Kathleen T.	"Media Cover Media Learning To Cover War"	<i>American Forces Press Service</i>	Nov 22, 2002
Dart, Bob	"Boot Camp a Tough Check for Reporter"	<i>Cox Washington Bureau</i>	Nov 24, 2002
Martin, Susan Taylor	"Media Access an Issue in Possible War in Iraq"	<i>St. Petersburg Times</i>	Nov 24, 2002
Branigin, William; Finer, Jonathan	"Marine War Games: Film At 11"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Nov 28, 2002
Neuman, Johanna	"Pentagon Plans to Deploy Journalists in Iraq"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Dec 4, 2002
DeFoore, Jay	"Access Vs. Independence: Thoughts on Media Boot Camp"	<i>Photo J News</i>	Dec 11, 2002
Richard, Byrne	"Em-Bed With the Pentagon"	<i>Boston Phoenix</i>	Dec 12, 2002
Kurtz, Howard	"Most Back Wartime Media Restrictions"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Jan 17, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Battle Plan for the '03 Campaign"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Jan 20, 2003
Janega, James; Jones, Tim	"Pentagon Gambles on Open-War Policy"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	Jan 26, 2003
Associated Press	"Reporters Wary of Pentagon Promises"	<i>New York Times on the Web</i>	Jan 27, 2003
Bauder, David	"Combat Tips for Reporters"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Jan 27, 2003
Cunningham, Brent	"The Press Prepares for War"	<i>Columbia Journalism Review</i>	Jan-Feb 2003
Dunphy, Kathleen	"The Press Preps for War – Hopeful, Skeptical"	<i>News Media and the Law</i>	Feb 2003
McEntee, Marni	"Journalists Converge on Front Only To Find Themselves on Sidelines"	<i>European Stars and Stripes</i>	Feb 9, 2003
McEntee, Marni	"Journalists Get in Shape For Front-Line Missions"	<i>European Stars and Stripes</i>	Feb 9, 2003
Brightman, Carol	"U.S. Military Plans the War of Words"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Feb 16, 2003
Levins, Harry	"Shivering With the Company"	<i>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</i>	Feb 16, 2003
Offley, Ed	"Live From Iraq: The Chaos and Bloodshed of War"	<i>Defense Watch</i>	Feb 19, 2003
Wycliff, Don	"Journalist Train for War Coverage"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	Feb 20, 2003
Evans, Harold	"War Stories"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Feb 21, 2003
Rhem, Kathleen	"If War Starts, Battle Coverage To Be Unprecedented"	<i>American Forces Press Service</i>	Feb 26, 2003
Geyer, Georgie Anne	"'Embedded' in the Iraq Conflict"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	Feb 28, 2003
Bushnell, Andrew; Cunningham, Brent	"Being There, Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, But the Devil's in the Details"	<i>Columbia Journalism Review</i>	Mar 1, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Richiardi, Sherry	"Preparing for War"	<i>American Journalism Review</i>	Mar 1, 2003
Getler, Michael	"Reports From the 'Embedded'"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 2, 2003
Jacobs, Andrew	"My Week at Embed Boot Camp"	<i>New York Times Magazine</i>	Mar 2, 2003
Labash, Matt	"Boot Camp For Journalists"	<i>Weekly Standard</i>	Mar 3, 2003
Madore, James T.	"Journalists: Back to the Front"	<i>Long Island Newsday</i>	Mar 3, 2003
Kelly, Michael	"Battle Stations for the Press"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 5, 2003
Woolley, Wayne	"Pentagon Now Welcomes the Company of Media"	<i>Newark Star-Ledger</i>	Mar 5, 2003
Editorial	"Foxhole Journalists"	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	Mar 6, 2003
Giordono, Joseph	"Troops Split on Issue of Embedding Journalists"	<i>European Stars and Stripes</i>	Mar 6, 2003
McKay, Floyd J.	"New Media-Military Rules Carry Risks For Both"	<i>Seattle Times</i>	Mar 6, 2003
Glasser, Susan B.	"Reporters Join Troops as Media and Military Try Experiment in Openness"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 7, 2003
Leiby, Richard	"The Hilton's Strange Embed Fellows"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 7, 2003
Wendland, Mike	"TV Journalists' War Gear Grows Smaller, Better"	<i>Detroit Free Press</i>	Mar 7, 2003
Powers, William	"On the Media: Pyle On"	<i>National Journal</i>	Mar 8, 2003
Christenson, Sig	"General Says Heroes' Saga To Be Told"	<i>San Antonio Express-News</i>	Mar 9, 2003
Page, Clarence	"Covering a War With 'Help'"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	Mar 9, 2003
Safire, William	"On Language ... And So Embed"	<i>New York Times Magazine</i>	Mar 9, 2003
Alter, Jonathan	"In Bed With the Pentagon"	<i>Newsweek</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Flint, Joe	"CNN Gears Up To Fight a War of Its Own In Iraq"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"After Invading Kuwait, Reporters Need Boot Camp"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 10, 2003
McMichael, William H; Crawley, Vince	"Reporters in the Ranks"	<i>Army Times</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Poole, Oliver	"TV Crews to Broadcast Live"	<i>London Daily Telegraph</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Rhem, Kathleen	"Media Coverage of Military"	<i>American Forces Press Service</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Stone, Andrea	"Lights, Cameras, Get Ready for War"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 10, 2003
Crittenden, Jules	"Journalist Gets Up Close With Soldiers on the Eve of War"	<i>Boston Herald</i>	Mar 11, 2003
Getlin, Josh	"Public Would Get a Closer Look at War"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Mar 11, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Kurtz, Howard	"Media Weigh Costs, Fruits of 'Embedding'"	Washington Post	Mar 11, 2003
Nelson, Scott Bernard	"New Rules Of Engagement Between Media and Military"	Boston Globe	Mar 11, 2003
Nolte, Carl	"Media Join Troops Preparing for War"	San Francisco Chronicle	Mar 11, 2003
Storm Jonathan	"TV's Battle Plan"	Philadelphia Inquirer	Mar 11, 2003
Nelson, Emily	"TV Crews Make Plans for an All-Digital War"	Wall Street Journal	Mar 12, 2003
McGrath, Dermot	"Covering the Next War Online"	Online Journalism Review	Mar 13, 2003
Harper, Jennifer	"Introspection on War Spices Up Coverage"	Washington Times	Mar 14, 2003
Unattributed	"Reporting Team Brought Home"	Fayetteville (NC) Observer	Mar 14, 2003
Levins, Harry	"Retired General Urges Military To Engage the Press"	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Mar 15, 2003
Dilanian, Ken	"Seeking the Inside Story in An Iraq War"	Philadelphia Inquirer	Mar 16, 2003
Mohan, Geoffrey; Williams, Carolyn J.; Perry, Tony	"Where The Media and Military Meet"	Los Angeles Times	Mar 16, 2003
Scharnberg, Kirsten	"A War and Its Repercussions"	Chicago Tribune	Mar 16, 2003
Brightman, Carol	"In Bed With the Pentagon"	The Nation	Mar 17, 2003
Harrison, Crayton	"Reporter Packing High-Tech Gear"	Dallas Morning News	Mar 18, 2003
Campagna, Joel	"Media Concerns About Covering the War"	Boston Globe	Mar 19, 2003
De Young, Karen	"Bush Message Machine is Set To Roll With Its Own War Plan"	Washington Post	Mar 19, 2003
Rutenberg, Jim	"Left and Right Look For Signs of Bias in Reporting"	New York Times	Mar 19, 2003
Farhi, Paul	"Many Mideast Nations Roll Up Journalists' Welcome Mat"	Washington Post	Mar 21, 2003
Maynard, John	"Networks' Heavy Artillery"	Washington Post	Mar 21, 2003
Stanley, Alessandra	"Networks Make the Most of Their Frontline Access"	New York Times	Mar 21, 2003
Getlin, Josh; Wharton, David	"With Media in Tow, Does Objectivity Go AWOL?"	Los Angeles Times	Mar 22, 2003
Folkenflik, David	"Glimpses Into the Life of Combat"	Baltimore Sun	Mar 23, 2003
Swanson, Doug J.	"Front Lines To Front Page: Is Embedding Working?"	Dallas Morning News	Mar 23, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Balfour Frederik	"Reporter's Notebook: A Journalist Among Soldiers"	<i>Business Week</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Flint, Joe	"Move To 'Embed' Reporters Assists Networks, Pentagon"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Hamilton, William	"War Reporting Can Backfire"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Harmon, Amy	"Improved Tools Turn Journalist Into a Quick Strike Force"	<i>New York Times</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Conflict Constantly Tests Media Boundaries"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Media's Battlefield Reporting Outpaces Pentagon Officials"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Labash, Matt	"The Long Night"	<i>Weekly Standard.com</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Rutenberg, Jim	"After Days of Buoyant Images, Reporting Enters a Second and More Ominous Act"	<i>New York Times</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Sides, Hampton	"Un-Embedded"	<i>New Yorker</i>	Mar 24, 2003
Author Unknown	"How Embedded Reporters Are Handling the War"	<i>BBC News</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Cowell, Alan	"Preparing Journalists for Battle"	<i>New York Times</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Harper, Jennifer	"Embedded Media Get Mixed Reviews In Early War Stages"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Lochhead, Carolyn	"It's All There in Living Color"	<i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Murray, Alan	"The Fog of War is Very Dense Despite Embedded Reporters"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Shafer, Jack	"The PR War"	<i>Slate Magazine</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Truscott IV, Lucian K.	"Using The News as a Weapon"	<i>New York Times</i>	Mar 25, 2003
Cooper, Christopher; Cloud, David	"Branches of U.S. Military Fight Over Media Attention in Iraq"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Garamone, Jim	"Press and Military Seem To Appreciate Media Embeds"	<i>American Forces Press Service</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Getlin, Josh; Jensen, Elizabeth	"Media and Government Make Uneasy Bedfellows"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Hinds, Julie	"The Pentagon Is Cooperating With Journalists Like Never Before, but the 24-hour Results May Not Show the Big Picture"	<i>Detroit Free Press</i>	Mar 26, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Hughes, John	"A New Kind of War Coverage—So Far, a Plus for Viewers"	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Reporters Go Along With Military"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Editorial	"Survivor: Iraq"	<i>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</i>	Mar 26, 2003
Hoagland, Jim	"The CNN Factor"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 27, 2003
Johnson, Mark	"Embedding Keep Families Close To Soldiers"	<i>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</i>	Mar 27, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Unembedded Journalist's Report Provokes Military Ire"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 27, 2003
Hoon, Geoff	"No Lens is Wide Enough To Show the Big Picture"	<i>London Times</i>	Mar 28, 2003
Marlantes, Liz	"War-Front News Rivets and Repels"	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	Mar 28, 2003
Allison, Graham	"A War Played To Many Audiences"	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Carr, David	"Reporters' New Battlefield Access Has Its Risks and Rewards"	<i>Army Magazine</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Harper, Jennifer	"Inside Politics"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"War Reporters Find the Going Tough"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Embedded and Taking Flak"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Linnebank, Geert	"Counteract Drawbacks of 'Embedded' Reporters"	<i>USA Today</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Poniewozik, James	"Real Battles in Real Time"	<i>Time</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Rose, Matthew; Fialka, John J.	"Even With More Play-By-Play, Truth Remains Elusive in Iraq"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Weisman, Jonathan	"Open Access For Media Troubles Pentagon"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Mar 31, 2003
Cox, Liz	"The Things They'll Carry"	<i>Columbia Journalism Review</i>	Mar-Apr 2003
Judge, Clark S.	"P.R. Lessons From The Pentagon"	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	Apr 1, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Away From The Battlefield, Covering The Big Guns"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Apr 1, 2003
Laurence, John	"Embedding: A Military View"	<i>Columbia Journalism Review</i>	Mar-Apr 2003
Murray, Steve	"Embedded Journalists' Access Has Conditions"	<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i>	Apr 1, 2003
Editorial	"Front-line Reporters Serve the Public Interest"	<i>San Diego Union-Tribune</i>	Apr 1, 2003
Galloway, Joseph L.	"Embedding Could Be Only Sure Winner in Conflict"	<i>Editor and Publisher</i>	Apr 2, 2003
Getlin, Josh; Wilkinson, Tracy	"'Embedding' Allows Unscripted Look At War"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Apr 2, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Gittler, Juliana	"For Better Or Worse, Embedded Journalist are Bringing the War Home"	<i>Pacific Stars and Stripes</i>	Apr 3, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Military Experts Draw Unfriendly Fire"	<i>USA Today</i>	Apr 3, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Front Line Reports Mostly Accurate"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Apr 3, 2003
Marquis, Christopher	"Access For Media Brings Chorus of Criticism and Queries on War"	<i>New York Times</i>	Apr 3, 2003
Butler, Amy	"Lack of Embedded Reporters a Hurdle for Air Force Media Ops"	<i>Inside the Air Force</i>	Apr 4, 2003
Zinsmeister, Karl	"They're in the Army Now, Not Really"	<i>American Enterprise</i>	Apr 4, 2003
Martz, Ron	"I Owe These Heroes My Life"	<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i>	Apr 5, 2003
Shaw, David	"Embedded Reporters Make for Good Journalism"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	Apr 6, 2003
Alter, Jonathan	"The Other Air Battle"	<i>Newsweek</i>	Apr 7, 2003
Ewers, Justin	"Is The New News Good News?"	<i>U.S. News & World Report</i>	Apr 7, 2003
Hess, Stephen	"Pentagon Gamble Pays Off—So Far"	<i>Baltimore Sun</i>	Apr 7, 2003
Jensen, Robert	"Embedded Media Give Up Independence"	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Apr 7, 2003
MacKinnon, Douglas	"'Embedded' Journalists Put Our Troops In Danger"	<i>Baltimore Sun</i>	Apr 7, 2003
McCarthy, John	"Embedded Journalists Early Victors In Iraq War"	<i>Florida Today</i>	Apr 8, 2003
Editorial	"Journalists in War: Some Make Ultimate Sacrifice for Their Dedication"	<i>Detroit Free Press</i>	Apr 8, 2003
Ryan, Suzanne C.	"Despite Perils, Most Vow To Stay On"	<i>Boston Globe</i>	Apr 8, 2003
Sanderson, Ward	"Journalist Traveling With Units Gain Better Understanding, Officials Think"	<i>European Stars and Stripes</i>	Apr 8, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"As More Correspondents Die, Media Rethink Their Positions"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Apr 9, 2003
Wiltenburg, Mary	"All The News That's Dangerous To Gather"	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	Apr 9, 2003
Editorial	"Covering The War"	<i>New York Times</i>	Apr 10, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Critics of War Tend To Be Critics of Coverage"	<i>Washington Post</i>	Apr 10, 2003
Marbella, Jean	"Waiting on the Home Front"	<i>Baltimore Sun</i>	Apr 10, 2003
Carter, Bill	"News Organizations Remove Some Reporters From Units"	<i>New York Times</i>	Apr 11, 2003
Wilson, George C.	"Iraq Is Not Vietnam"	<i>National Journal</i>	Apr 12, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Hortsch, Dan	"The Outcome of Embedding Reporters Valid"	Portland Oregonian	Apr 13, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Who Won, and Who Lost, In The Media Battle"	USA Today	Apr 14, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"Down in the Trenches, Up in the Public's Opinion"	Washington Post	Apr 14, 2003
Mnookin, Seth	"Periscope"	Newsweek	Apr 14, 2003
Ricks, Thomas E.	"Rumsfeld, Myers Again Criticize War Coverage"	Washington Post	Apr 18, 2003
Clarke, Victoria	"Outlaw Embed"	Washington Post	Apr 19, 2003
Bauder, David	"Iraq Embed Program Hailed as a Success"	Associated Press	Apr 20, 2003
Chamberlain E.W.	"Band of Brothers"	Chicago Tribune	Apr 20, 2003
Rutenberg, Jim; Carter, Bill	"Spectacular Success or Incomplete Picture?"	New York Times	Apr 20, 2003
Scott, William B.	"Out of Sight"	Aviation Week & Space Technology	Apr 21, 2003
Tomkins, Richard	"War Reflection: With the Marines in Iraq"	UPI.COM	Apr 21, 2003
Mnookin Seth	"Even if Embedding is Here to Stay, We Still Have to Learn a Lot About the System"	Newsweek	Apr 22, 2003
Neill, Alex	"Successful Media Experiment Led To 'Interesting Dynamic,' Brooks Says"	Navy Times	Apr 22, 2003
Nelson, Scott Bernard	"Embedded Reporter Comes Away From Front Lines Torn"	Boston Globe	Apr 22, 2003
Colimore, Edward	"Iraq War Coverage Spurs Interest in Enlistment"	Philadelphia Inquirer	Apr 23, 2003
Marlantes, Liz	"The Other Boots on the Ground: Embedded Press"	Christian Science Monitor	Apr 23, 2003
Wilson, George C.	"Talking About Defense"	National Journal	Apr 26, 2003
Young, Perry	"How the Media Won the War"	Durham (NC) Herald-Sun	Apr 26, 2003
Harris, Ron; Cutraro, Andrew	"Up Close Personal; Imperfect"	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Apr 27, 2003
Sawyer, Jon	"Comprehensive, Clear Picture of War Was Elusive at Times"	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Apr 27, 2003
Kurtz, Howard	"In Iraq, Too Much Coverage, or Just Right?"	Washington Post	Apr 28, 2003
Unattributed	"Franks Praises Embedded Journalists"	USA Today	Apr 29, 2003
Lieberman, Brett	"Story Dispute Forces Reporter to Leave Iraq"	The Patriot-News	Apr 29, 2003
Dalglis, Lucy	"We All Benefited from Embeds: So What Took So Long?"	The News Media and the Law	May 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
LeFleur, Jennifer	"Embed Program Worked, Broader War Coverage Lagged"	<i>The News Media and the Law</i>	May 2003
Shafer, Jack	"Embeds and Unilaterals"	<i>Slate Magazine</i>	May 1, 2003
Sharkey, Jacqueline E.	"The Television War"	<i>American Journalism Review</i>	May 2003
Zucchini, David	"The War, Up Close and Very Personal"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	May 3, 2003
Dilanian, Ken	"Reporter's War Journey Ends With Relief and Respect for U.S. Troops"	<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>	May 4, 2003
Lieberman, Brett	"Covering Echo Showed Slice of War in Iraq"	<i>The Patriot-News</i>	May 4, 2003
Sheridan, Mary Beth; Atkinson, Rick; Layton, Lyndsey; Finer, Jonathan; Vogel, Steve	"Embedded in Iraq: Was It Worth It?"	<i>Washington Post</i>	May 4, 2003
Cox, Matthew	"Reflections of a Reporter Embedded With the 101st"	<i>Army Times</i>	May 5, 2003
Lardner, Richard	"Warfighting Strategy in Iraq Tied To Aggressive Media Campaign"	<i>Inside Defense.com</i>	May 6, 2003
Baker, Peter	"Peeking Behind the Curtain"	<i>National Journal</i>	May 10, 2003
Eckhart, Jacey	"Seeing the Real Military Through Embedded Reporters"	<i>Norfolk Virginian-Pilot</i>	May 10, 2003
Arkin, William	"Good News Front the Front"	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	May 11, 2003
Foreman, Jonathan	"Bad Reporting in Baghdad"	<i>Weekly Standard</i>	May 12, 2003
Martz, Ron	"Embed Catches Heat"	<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i>	May 15, 2003
Swanson, Jim	"Media Access Helps Military"	<i>USA Today</i>	May 15, 2003
Braiker, Brian	"Embeds' Reflect on Covering War"	<i>Newsweek</i>	May 16, 2003
Tamayo, Juan	"A Unique Perch"	<i>National Journal</i>	May 17, 2003
Janega, James	"The Mail Would Have Been More Welcome"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	May 18, 2003
Osnos, Evan	"A Small Slice of the Big War"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	May 18, 2003
Quintanilla, Ray	"When Fear is Your Partner"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	May 18, 2003
Scharnberg, Kirsten	"A Woman Goes To War in a Man's World"	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	May 18, 2003
Fehrenbach, T.R.	"Reporting From the Front Lines Changes Media"	<i>San Antonio Express-News</i>	May 25, 2003
Kelly, Jack	"Embedded Benefits"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Jun 2, 2003
Heinatz, Stephanie	"Panel Discusses Embedded Media"	<i>Newport News Daily Press</i>	Jun 4, 2003

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Roberts, Roxanne	"Broadcasters Dish With the Newsmakers"	Washington Post	Jun 5, 2003
Escoto, Chantal	"Military, Media Benefit From 'Embed'"	Leaf-Chronicle	Jun 14, 2003
Associated Press	"Pentagon Ponders Embedded Reporter Policy"	New York Times on the Web	Jun 18, 2003
Rees, Elizabeth	"Pentagon Mulls Adding 'Media Embed' Idea To Public Affairs Doctrine"	Inside the Air Force	Jun 20, 2003
Bridges, Richard M. Col (Ret.)	"Maintaining Impartiality In War Reporting"	Army Magazine	Jul 2003
Sperry, Paul	"Marine General Slams 'Chicken Little' News"	WorldNet Daily	Jul 2, 2003
Brown, Malina	"Marines Upbeat on Experience With Embedded Media in Iraq War"	Inside The Navy	Jul 7, 2003
Butler, Amy	"Air Force Could Use Cockpit Cameras To Relay War Data to Media"	Inside The Air Force	Jul 18, 2003
Lisa, Burgess	"Deployment Comments Under Investigation"	Stars and Stripes	Jul 25, 2003
Perry, Tony	"Creaking Toward Iraq"	Los Angeles Times	Aug 10, 2003
Cook, John	"Military, Media Meet Off Battlefield To Debate War Coverage"	Chicago Tribune	Aug 18, 2003
Skiba, Katherine M.	"Journalists Embodied Realities of Iraq War"	Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	Sep 14, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Amanpour: CNN Practiced Self-Censorship"	USA Today	Sep 15, 2003
Johnson, Peter	"Clarke Aims for Clearer View"	USA Today	Sep 25, 2003
Glick, Caroline	"America's Unheralded Victory"	Jerusalem Post	Oct 3, 2003
Jontz, Sandra	"Iraq Fratricide Rates Too High, U.S. Says"	Pacific Stars and Stripes	Oct 4, 2003
Burt, Tim	"Embedded Reporters Gave More Balanced War Coverage"	London Financial Times	Nov 6, 2003
Ritea, Steve	"Media Troop Withdrawal"	American Journalism Review	Dec 2003
Frank, Reuven	"Pentagon, Press Wage War Over Coverage"	Miami Herald	Dec 10, 2003
Grossman, Elaine	"Growing Security Needs in Iraq May Force Reporting Compromises"	Inside the Pentagon	Dec 11, 2003
Cooper, Christopher	"The Marines Raise a Caution Flag Over Use of Embedded Journalists"	Wall Street Journal	Dec 16, 2003
Folkflik, David	"Military, Media Have Often-Rock Relationship"	Baltimore Sun	Dec 24, 2003
Ayers, Tiffany	"The War in Primetime"	Military Officer	Feb 2004

Table B-1. News Articles About the Embedded Media Program (Continued)

Name	Article Title	Publication	Date
Plenzler, Capt. Joseph M.	"Conducting Expeditionary Public Affairs"	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>	Feb 2004
Stone, Steve	"Virginian-Pilot War Correspondent Dennis O'Brien Dies"	<i>Virginian-Pilot</i>	Feb 1, 2004
Kirkland, Michael	"No 'Right' for Media To Embed With Troops"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Feb 4, 2004
Reid, Chip	"Recalling Life as an Embedded Reporter"	www.msnbc.msn.com	Mar 15, 2004
Harper, Jennifer	"Liberal War Wonks Dissect News"	<i>Washington Times</i>	Mar 17, 2004
Bryant, Walter	"Marine Commandant Urges Support for Troops"	<i>Birmingham News</i>	Mar 24, 2004

APPENDIX C.
DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTED

Table C-1. Data Sources and Data Collected

<p>OASD(PA) PAG related to the embedded media program Database – embedded media allocation to major units Database – roster of bureau chief/NMRs POCs Database – master list of embedded media assignments E-mails and document files – media embed POC Media training course information and data Transcripts of bureau chief meetings and briefings</p> <p>JCS PAO Briefing to ASD(PA) – Iraq PA Planning</p> <p>DINFOS Media training course survey results Post OIF embedded media survey results</p>
<p>CENTCOM PAO OPLAN, Annex F (Public Affairs) Initial Component Embed Planning Numbers</p> <p>SOCCENT PAO Briefing – OIF Media Operations Roster – SOF embed assignments SOCCENT Ground Rules PAO Activity SITREPS</p> <p>CFLCC PAO OPLAN, Annex F (Public Affairs) PAO Briefing – Public Affairs Planning CFLCC ground rules and related documents Broadcast media vehicles with CFLCC – memos and e-mails Embedding media in CFLCC HQ Concerns about ground rule on casualties – memos and e-mails Media Embed Plan (3–5 days) during Operation Desert Spring, Dec 02</p> <p>CPIC-Kuwait Media Registration Database NBC Equipment Issue database, memos, and e-mails</p>
<p>Army Unit PAOs V Corps Separate Unit Embedded Media Distribution Plan V Corps “Working with the Media” Reference Guide 3rd Inf Div initial embed assignment plan 3rd Inf Div plan for media vehicles 3rd Inf Div embed training – Nov–Dec 2002 – Kuwait 3rd Inf Div OIF AAR, Embedded Media Chapter 3rd Inf Div – 3rd BCT Briefing for Media Embeds 101st Abn Div Briefing – Unit PA Representative Training 101st Abn Div initial embed assignment plan 101st Abn Div Memo to embeds – “Embedding With the 101st” 82nd Abn Div initial embed assignment plan</p>

Table C-1. Data Sources and Data Collected (Continued)

<p>Army Unit PAOs (Continued)</p> <p>3rd ACR initial embed assignment plan 3rd ACR memo to embeds 3rd ACR "Media on the Battlefield" reference card 3rd ACR Briefing – Principles That Guide Public Affairs Combat Training Center Briefings – Media on the Battlefield Training</p>
<p>Marine Corps Unit PAOs</p> <p>IMEF embed assignments IMEF Public Affairs Plan and briefing IMEF Media In-processing procedures IMEF proposed policy on media vehicles IMEF and subordinate unit PA lessons learned IMEF Tri-fold card – Dealing with the media and ground rules 1st Mar Div Embed Reception and Integration Plan 1st Mar Div Packing List and Guidelines for Embeds 15th MEU Briefing – Media Embeds 3rd MAW Briefing for Commanders – Media on the Battlefield</p>
<p>Navy PAOs</p> <p>Data and e-mail files from Navy Embedded Media POC Combined CPIC embed/embark database CPIC-Bahrain media database and SITREPS CPIC-Cyprus media database and SITREPS CVSG lessons learned USS <i>Constellation</i> Media Training for Officer, Chiefs, and Sailors USS <i>Constellation</i> Embed Roster USS <i>Constellation</i> Media Squadron Assignments</p>
<p>Air Force PAOs</p> <p>Original plan for AF embeds Actual AF embeds by location CENTAF PA Brief on Embedding Media with Air Force Units AF PA Center of Excellence Embedded Journalist Study</p>
<p>Other</p> <p>DoD and Service PA directives and publications 240+ media articles about the Embedded Media Program USAWC Symposium "Reporters on the Ground" NDU Symposium "The Military and the Media" MRE Conference "After the Embed, Iraq and Beyond" Council on Foreign Relations and College of William and Mary Seminar: "Embedded Journalists in Iraq: Reality TV or Desert Mirage?" Brookings Institution Forum "Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq: Press Reports, Pentagon Rules and Lessons Learned for the Future" McCormick Tribune Foundation, <i>Cantigny Conference Series Conference Report</i> "Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media and the Iraq War" Freedom Forum Report, <i>The Relationship between the Media and the Military</i></p>

Table C-1. Data Sources and Data Collected (Continued)

<p>Other (Continued) Cardiff University Study, "The Role of Embedded Reporting" PEJ Study, "Embedded Reporters, What Are Americans Getting" Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Surveys</p>

APPENDIX D.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING
POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS
IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM)
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR), 10 FEBRUARY 2003

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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA//
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//
AIG 8777
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//PA//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPA//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PA//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//
NSC WASHINGTON DC
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPO//

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).

REFERENCES: REF. A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03, SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE CENTCOM AOR FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS.

1. PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES ON EMBEDDING NEWS MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CENTCOM AOR. IT CAN BE ADAPTED FOR USE IN OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND AORS AS NECESSARY.

2. POLICY.

2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-TERM, MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND, AND NAVAL FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED COUNTRIES, WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL THE FACTUAL STORY – GOOD OR BAD – BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY – ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE

EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL LIVE, WORK, AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

2.B. MEDIA WILL BE EMBEDDED WITH UNIT PERSONNEL AT AIR AND GROUND FORCES BASES AND AFLOAT TO ENSURE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO OPERATIONAL COMBAT MISSIONS, INCLUDING MISSION PREPARATION AND DEBRIEFING, WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS – PERHAPS A PERIOD OF WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, RATIONS, AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED MEDIA COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED.

2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS.

2.C.2. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SPACE ON MILITARY TRANSPORTATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MEDIA EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO COVER A PARTICULAR OPERATION. THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOADING AND CARRYING THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT AT ALL TIMES. USE OF PRIORITY INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA TO COVER STORIES, AS WELL AS TO FILE STORIES, IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGED. SEATS ABOARD VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, AND NAVAL SHIPS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALLOW MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF U.S. TROOPS IN THE FIELD.

2.C.3. UNITS SHOULD PLAN LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN MOVING MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE BATTLEFIELD SO AS TO TELL OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN THE EVENT OF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES, MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO FILE STORIES VIA EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY SIGNAL/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL WHEN THE MEDIA ARRIVE AT THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT.

3. PROCEDURES.

3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA)) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING AND VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED SLOTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE DISCRETION OF OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION AS TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED SLOTS WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS ORGANIZATION.

3.A.1. IAW REF. A, COMMANDERS OF UNITS IN RECEIPT OF A DEPLOYMENT ORDER MAY EMBED REGIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA DURING PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT, [ACTUAL] DEPLOYMENT, AND ARRIVAL IN THEATER UPON RECEIPT OF THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM AND APPROVAL OF THE COMPONENT COMMAND. COMMANDERS WILL INFORM THESE MEDIA, PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYING EMBED, THAT OASD(PA) IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL COMBAT EMBEDS AND THAT THEIR PARTICULAR EMBED MAY END AFTER THE UNIT'S ARRIVAL IN THEATER. THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION MAY APPLY TO OASD(PA) FOR CONTINUED EMBEDDING, BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE AND THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND PAY FOR THE JOURNALISTS' RETURN TRIP.

3.B. WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, DEPLOYING UNITS WILL IDENTIFY LOCAL MEDIA FOR POTENTIAL EMBEDS AND NOMINATE THEM THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) (POC: MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253; COMM. 703-697-1253; EMAIL TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL). INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FORWARDED INCLUDES MEDIA ORGANIZATION, TYPE OF MEDIA, AND CONTACT INFORMATION, INCLUDING BUREAU CHIEF/MANAGING EDITOR/NEWS DIRECTOR'S NAME; OFFICE, HOME, AND CELL PHONE NUMBERS; PAGER NUMBERS; AND EMAIL ADDRESSES. SUBMISSIONS FOR EMBEDS WITH SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD INCLUDE A UNIT'S RECOMMENDATION AS TO WHETHER THE REQUEST SHOULD BE HONORED.

3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE ASSIGNED.

3.D. FREELANCE MEDIA WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO EMBED IF THEY ARE SELECTED BY A NEWS ORGANIZATION AS THEIR EMBED REPRESENTATIVE.

3.E. UNITS WILL BE AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MEDIA AFTER ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL BY OASD(PA).

3.E.1. UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA AND THEIR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SIGNED THE "RELEASE, INDEMNIFICATION, AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT AND AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE", FOUND AT [HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB2003/D20030210EMBED.PDF](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/feb2003/d20030210embed.pdf). UNITS MUST MAINTAIN A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT FOR ALL MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH THEIR UNIT.

3.F. EMBEDDED MEDIA OPERATE AS PART OF THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. AN ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER. THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO PRECLUDE MEDIA ACCESS TO OPERATIONS.

3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM COMBAT AREAS.

3.H. IF, IN THE OPINION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER, A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES, THE COMMANDER OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE MAY LIMIT THE REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATION WITH OPERATIONAL FORCES TO ENSURE UNIT SAFETY AND INFORM OASD(PA) THROUGH PA CHANNELS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GENDER WILL NOT BE AN EXCLUDING FACTOR UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE.

3.I. IF FOR ANY REASON A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION, HE/SHE WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION.

3.J. COMMANDERS WILL OBTAIN THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM/PA FOR MEDIA EMBARKING ON MILITARY CONVEYANCE FOR PURPOSES OF EMBEDDING.

3.K. UNITS HOSTING EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL ISSUE INVITATIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS, AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) GEAR. SEE PARA. 5. FOR DETAILS ON WHICH ITEMS ARE ISSUED AND WHICH ITEMS THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES.

3.L. MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THEIR OWN PASSPORTS AND VISAS.

3.M. MEDIA WILL AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE CENTCOM/OASD(PA) GROUND RULES STATED IN PARA. 4 OF THIS MESSAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR COMMAND/UNIT-PROVIDED SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO SERVICE MEMBERS, INFORMATION, AND OTHER PREVIOUSLY STATED PRIVILEGES. ANY VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES COULD RESULT IN TERMINATION OF THAT MEDIA'S EMBED OPPORTUNITY.

3.N. DISPUTES/DIFFICULTIES. ISSUES, QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES, OR DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND RULES OR OTHER ASPECTS OF EMBEDDING MEDIA THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE UNIT LEVEL, OR THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH PA CHANNELS FOR RESOLUTION. COMMANDERS WHO WISH TO TERMINATE AN EMBED FOR CAUSE MUST NOTIFY CENTCOM/PA PRIOR TO TERMINATION. IF A DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT A LOWER LEVEL, OASD(PA) WILL BE THE FINAL RESOLUTION AUTHORITY. IN ALL CASES, THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE NEWS VALUE OF THE SITUATION.

3.O. MEDIA WILL PAY THEIR OWN BILLETING EXPENSES IF BILLETED IN A COMMERCIAL FACILITY.

3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO COLLECT AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES.

3.Q. THE STANDARD FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE TO ASK “WHY NOT RELEASE” VICE “WHY RELEASE.” DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE ASAP, PREFERABLY IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS.

3.R. THERE IS NO GENERAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR MEDIA PRODUCTS. SEE PARA 6.A. FOR FURTHER DETAIL CONCERNING SECURITY AT THE SOURCE.

3.S. MEDIA WILL ONLY BE GRANTED ACCESS TO DETAINEES OR EPWS WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949. SEE PARA. 4.G.17. FOR THE GROUND RULE.

3.T. HAVING EMBEDDED MEDIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH OTHER MEDIA. EMBEDDED MEDIA, AS A RESULT OF TIME INVESTED WITH THE UNIT AND GROUND RULES AGREEMENT, MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT LEVEL OF ACCESS.

3.U. CENTCOM/PA WILL ACCOUNT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE TIME THE MEDIA IS EMBEDDED IN THEATER. CENTCOM/PA WILL REPORT CHANGES IN EMBED STATUS TO OASD(PA) AS THEY OCCUR.

3.V. IF A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS KILLED OR INJURED IN THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE UNIT WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY OASD(PA), THROUGH PA CHANNELS. OASD(PA) WILL CONTACT THE RESPECTIVE MEDIA ORGANIZATION(S), WHICH WILL MAKE NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL’S WISHES.

3.W. MEDIA MAY TERMINATE THEIR EMBED OPPORTUNITY AT ANY TIME. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS AND BASED ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT BACK TO THE NEAREST LOCATION WITH COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION.

3.W.1. DEPARTING MEDIA WILL BE DEBRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AS APPLICABLE TO ONGOING AND FUTURE OPERATIONS, WHICH THEY MAY NOW HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING.

4. GROUND RULES. FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. GROUND RULES WILL BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED BY MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MAY RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND REMOVAL FROM THE AOR. THESE GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO PREVENT RELEASE OF DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, NEGATIVE, OR UNCOMPLIMENTARY INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE STANDARD GROUND RULES WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA CHANNELS TO CENTCOM/PA FOR APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND RULES ARE:

4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE RECORD. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE

AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF MISSIONS; HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO THESE MEDIA GROUND RULES.

4.B. PRINT OR BROADCAST STORIES WILL BE DATELINED ACCORDING TO LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM.

4.C. MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH U.S. FORCES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO CARRY PERSONAL FIREARMS.

4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER.

4.E. EMBARGOES MAY BE IMPOSED TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY. EMBARGOES WILL ONLY BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE HAS PASSED.

4.F. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE RELEASABLE.

4.F.1. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES.

4.F.2. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FIGURES BY SERVICE. EMBEDDED MEDIA MAY, WITHIN OPSEC LIMITS, CONFIRM UNIT CASUALTIES THEY HAVE WITNESSED.

4.F.3. CONFIRMED FIGURES OF ENEMY PERSONNEL DETAINED OR CAPTURED.

4.F.4. SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION CAN BE DISCLOSED USING APPROXIMATE TERMS. SPECIFIC FORCE OR UNIT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT NO LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION.

4.F.5. INFORMATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.

4.F.6. GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS, SUCH AS "LAND-BASED."

4.F.7. DATE, TIME, OR LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS AND ACTIONS, AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS, IS RELEASABLE ONLY IF DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS.

4.F.8. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS.

4.F.9. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR SORTIES FLOWN IN CENTCOM'S AREA OF OPERATION.

4.F.10. TYPE OF FORCES INVOLVED (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, INFANTRY, ARMOR, MARINES).

4.F.11. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, GROUND UNITS, ETC.) AFTER APPROVAL OF THE ALLIED UNIT COMMANDER.

4.F.12. OPERATION CODE NAMES.

4.F.13. NAMES AND HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS.

4.F.14. SERVICE MEMBERS' NAMES AND HOME TOWNS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S CONSENT.

4.G. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT RELEASABLE SINCE THEIR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST COULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONS AND ENDANGER LIVES:

4.G.1. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS IN UNITS BELOW CORPS/MEF LEVEL.

4.G.2. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN UNITS AT OR BELOW THE AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING LEVEL.

4.G.3. SPECIFIC NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL SUPPLIES (E.G., ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS, WATER, ETC.).

4.G.4. SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN UNITS BELOW THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP LEVEL.

4.G.5. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CENTCOM COMMANDER. NEWS AND IMAGERY PRODUCTS THAT IDENTIFY OR INCLUDE IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES OF THESE LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE.

4.G.6. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS.

4.G.7. INFORMATION REGARDING FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS (EXCEPT THOSE WHICH ARE VISIBLE OR READILY APPARENT).

4.G.8. PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWING LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS.

4.G.9. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

4.G.10. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COMPROMISING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, OR PROCEDURES.

4.G.11. EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN REPORTING WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES TO MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL SURPRISE. LIVE BROADCASTS FROM AIRFIELDS, ON THE GROUND OR AFLOAT, BY EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE PROHIBITED UNTIL THE SAFE RETURN OF THE INITIAL STRIKE PACKAGE OR UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER.

4.G.12. DURING AN OPERATION, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OR LIVES. INFORMATION ON ONGOING ENGAGEMENTS WILL NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY ON-SCENE COMMANDER.

4.G.13. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS, UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY, OR TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR OPERATIONS, ANGLES OF ATTACK, AND SPEEDS; NAVAL TACTICAL OR EVASIVE MANEUVERS, ETC. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "LOW" OR "FAST" MAY BE USED.

4.G.14. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE.

4.G.15. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELED OPERATIONS.

4.G.16. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING VESSELS WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS ARE BEING PLANNED OR UNDERWAY.

4.G.17. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.

4.G.18. NO PHOTOGRAPHS OR OTHER VISUAL MEDIA SHOWING AN EPW OR DETAINEE'S RECOGNIZABLE FACE, NAMETAG, OR OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURE OR ITEM MAY BE TAKEN.

4.G.19. STILL OR VIDEO IMAGERY OF CUSTODY OPERATIONS OR INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY.

4.H. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES APPLY TO COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL:

4.H.1. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE REMINDED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF USING NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL CASUALTIES OR PHOTOGRAPHS THEY MAY HAVE TAKEN THAT CLEARLY IDENTIFY CASUALTIES UNTIL AFTER NOTIFICATION OF THE NOK AND RELEASE BY OASD(PA).

4.H.2. BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES MAY BE COVERED BY EMBEDDED MEDIA AS LONG AS THE SERVICE MEMBER'S IDENTITY IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE FOR 72 HOURS OR UPON VERIFICATION OF NOK NOTIFICATION, WHICHEVER IS FIRST.

4.H.3. MEDIA VISITS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, OPERATIONS ORDERS, AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. IF APPROVED, SERVICE OR MEDICAL FACILITY PERSONNEL MUST ESCORT MEDIA AT ALL TIMES.

4.H.4. PATIENT WELFARE, PATIENT PRIVACY, AND NOK/FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE GOVERNING CONCERNS ABOUT NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL IN MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES OR OTHER CASUALTY COLLECTION AND TREATMENT LOCATIONS.

4.H.5. MEDIA VISITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES BUT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY COMMANDER AND ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AND MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL TREATMENT. REQUESTS TO VISIT MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE UNIFIED COMMAND PA.

4.H.6. REPORTERS MAY VISIT THOSE AREAS DESIGNATED BY THE FACILITY COMMANDER, BUT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN OPERATING ROOMS DURING OPERATING PROCEDURES.

4.H.7. PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW OR PHOTOGRAPH A PATIENT WILL BE GRANTED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR FACILITY COMMANDER AND WITH THE PATIENT'S INFORMED CONSENT, WITNESSED BY THE ESCORT.

4.H.8. "INFORMED CONSENT" MEANS THE PATIENT UNDERSTANDS HIS OR HER PICTURE AND COMMENTS ARE BEING COLLECTED FOR NEWS MEDIA PURPOSES AND THEY MAY APPEAR NATIONWIDE IN NEWS MEDIA REPORTS.

4.H.9. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR ESCORT SHOULD ADVISE THE SERVICE MEMBER IF NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.

5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR.

5.A. MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ENSURE THAT MEDIA ARE PROPERLY IMMUNIZED BEFORE EMBEDDING WITH UNITS. THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)-RECOMMENDED IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDE HEPATITIS A, HEPATITIS B, RABIES, TETANUS-DIPHTHERIA, AND TYPHOID. THE CDC RECOMMENDS MENINGOCOCCAL IMMUNIZATIONS FOR VISITORS TO MECCA. IF TRAVELING TO CERTAIN AREAS IN THE CENTCOM AOR, THE CDC RECOMMENDS TAKING PRESCRIPTION ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS. ANTHRAX AND SMALLPOX VACCINES WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA AT NO EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT (THE MEDIA OUTLET WILL BEAR THE EXPENSE). FOR MORE HEALTH INFORMATION FOR TRAVELERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GO TO THE CDC WEB SITE AT [HTTP://WWW.CDC.GOV/TRAVEL/MIDEAST.HTM](http://www.cdc.gov/travel/mideast.htm).

5.B. BECAUSE THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, SUCH AS HELMETS OR FLAK VESTS, IS BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHOICE, MEDIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING/USING SUCH EQUIPMENT. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, AS WELL AS CLOTHING, WILL BE SUBDUED IN COLOR AND APPEARANCE.

5.C. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED WITH, ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE UNIT WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED. UNIT PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE BASIC INSTRUCTION IN THE PROPER WEAR, USE, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMBED, INITIATED BY EITHER PARTY, THE NBC EQUIPMENT SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE EMBEDDING UNIT. IF SUFFICIENT NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA, COMMANDERS MAY PURCHASE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, WITH FUNDS NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND LOAN IT TO EMBEDDED MEDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PARAGRAPH.

6. SECURITY.

6.A. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW OR CENSORSHIP EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN PARA. 6.A.1. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE RULE. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE. MEDIA-PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE TO AN ADVERSARY OR WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY REVEAL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WILL BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OR DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION. WHEN IN DOUBT, MEDIA WILL CONSULT WITH THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

6.A.1. THE NATURE OF THE EMBEDDING PROCESS MAY INVOLVE OBSERVATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS, BATTLE PREPARATIONS, MATERIEL CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES AND OTHER INFORMATION AS LISTED IN PARA. 4.G. WHEN A COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A MEDIA MEMBER WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, PRIOR TO ALLOWING SUCH ACCESS, HE/SHE WILL TAKE PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THAT INFORMATION. THE PRIMARY SAFEGUARD WILL BE TO BRIEF MEDIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT WHAT INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS ARE FOR COVERING THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION. IF MEDIA ARE INADVERTENTLY EXPOSED TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, THEY SHOULD BE BRIEFED AFTER EXPOSURE ON WHAT INFORMATION THEY SHOULD AVOID COVERING. IN INSTANCES WHERE A UNIT COMMANDER OR THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINES THAT COVERAGE OF A STORY WILL INVOLVE EXPOSURE TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MAY BE PROTECTED BY PREBRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING, BUT COVERAGE OF WHICH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE DOD, THE COMMANDER MAY OFFER ACCESS IF THE REPORTER AGREES TO A SECURITY REVIEW OF THEIR COVERAGE. AGREEMENT TO SECURITY REVIEW IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS TYPE OF ACCESS MUST BE STRICTLY VOLUNTARY, AND, IF THE REPORTER DOES NOT AGREE, THEN ACCESS MAY NOT BE GRANTED. IF A SECURITY REVIEW IS AGREED TO, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES; IT WILL BE CONDUCTED SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE PRODUCT. IF SUCH INFORMATION IS FOUND, THE MEDIA WILL BE ASKED TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION FROM THE PRODUCT AND/OR

EMBARGO THE PRODUCT UNTIL SUCH INFORMATION IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE. REVIEWS ARE TO BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL SO AS NOT TO INTERRUPT COMBAT OPERATIONS NOR DELAY REPORTING. IF THERE ARE DISPUTES RESULTING FROM THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS, THEY MAY BE APPEALED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OR THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD/PA. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT AUTHORIZE COMMANDERS TO ALLOW MEDIA ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

6.A.2. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE IMPOUNDED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMPROMISED AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REFUSES TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION, NOTIFY THE CPIC AND/OR OASD(PA) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THE ISSUE MAY BE ADDRESSED WITH THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION'S MANAGEMENT.

7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

7.A. OASD(PA) IS THE INITIAL EMBED AUTHORITY. EMBEDDING PROCEDURES AND ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO CENTCOM PA AT A LATER DATE. THIS AUTHORITY MAY BE FURTHER DELEGATED AT CENTCOM'S DISCRETION.

7.B. THIS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZES BLANKET APPROVAL FOR NON-LOCAL AND LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD DOD AIRLIFT FOR ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA ON A NO-COST, SPACE-AVAILABLE BASIS. NO ADDITIONAL COSTS SHALL BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IAW DODI 5410.15, PARA 3.4.

7.C. USE OF LIPSTICK AND HELMET-MOUNTED CAMERAS ON COMBAT SORTIES IS APPROVED AND ENCOURAGED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA IS MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253, CMCL 703-697-1253, EMAIL TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL.

APPENDIX E.
EMBED ALLOCATION DATA BY MEDIA TYPE AND
THE NUMBER OF UNITS
TO WHICH THEY RECEIVED ALLOCATIONS

Table E-1. Media Organization Allocations by Media Type and the Number of Units to Which They Received Allocations

Media Type	Number of Organizations	Number of Different Units to Which a Media Organization Received Allocations															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13			
IM	8	6	2														
IN	45	32	13														
IP	1	1															
IR	4	3			1												
IT	32	26	3	1	2												
IW	9	5	2							1							1
UE	2	1	1														
UM	17	4	8	2				1	1	1							
UN	70	16	13	18	9	4	3	2		2	1						2
UP	4	3			1												
UR	9	2	1	2	1	1	2										
US	9	1	2	1	2	1	1				1						
UT	25	12	5	1	2									2	2		1
UW	2		1														1
Total	237	112	49	26	15	8	5	6	1	2	3	4	1	1	5		

Note for Table E-1: Local Media are not included in these data.

APPENDIX F.
EMBEDS ON NAVY SHIPS

Table F-1. Media Organizations With Embeds on Multiple Ships

Media Type	Media Organization	Embeds	Ships	Carrier	Small Boy
UT	ABC News	1	2	1	1
IT	Abu Dhabi	2	2	1	1
UT	CBS	2	4	2	2
IW	Central News Agency Taiwan	1	2	1	1
UN	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	1	2	1	1
UT	CNN	2	3	1	2
US	Gannett	1	2	1	1
UP	Getty	1	3	1	2
US	Knight-Ridder	2	2	1	1
IN	<i>London Daily Telegraph</i>	1	2	1	1
UN	<i>Minneapolis Star Tribune</i>	1	3	2	1
UM	<i>National Journal</i>	1	2	1	1
UT	NBC	2	2	1	1
IW	Reuters	1	2	1	1
US	Times News Service	1	2	1	1
IN	<i>Tokyo Shimbun</i>	1	2	1	1
UW	UPI	1	2	1	1
UN	<i>Virginian-Pilot</i>	1	3	2	1
UN	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	1	2		2
IN	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	1	2	1	1
20	Total	25	-	-	-

Table F-2. Distribution of Embeds and Embarks on Different Ships

Fleet	Strike Group	Ship	Number	Description	Embeds	Media Orgs.	Embarks	Media Orgs.
5	Lincoln	USS Lincoln	CVN-72	Aircraft Carrier	27	16	5	3
5	Lincoln	USS Mobile Bay	CG-53	Guided Missile Cruiser	1	1	2	1
5	Lincoln	USS Shiloh	CG-67	Guided Missile Cruiser			5	4
5	Constellation	USS Constellation	CV-64	Aircraft Carrier	22	16	25	14
5	Constellation	USS Bunker Hill	CG-52	Guided Missile Cruiser	4	4		
5	Constellation	USS Higgins	DDG-76	Guided Missile Destroyer			3	2
5	Constellation	USS Millius	DDG-69	Guided Missile Destroyer			6	3
5	Kitty Hawk	USS Kitty Hawk	CV-63	Aircraft Carrier	29	19	10	6
5	Kitty Hawk	USS Cowpens	CG-63	Guided Missile Cruiser	5	4		
5	Kitty Hawk	USS McCain	DDG-56	Guided Missile Destroyer	2	1	5	2
5	Nimitz	USS Nimitz	CVN-68	Aircraft Carrier	1	1	6	3
5	TGW	USS Boxer	LHD-4	Amphibious Assault Ship			4	4
5	TGW	USS Bonhomme Richard	LHD-6	Amphibious Assault Ship			22	17
5	TGW	USS Pearl Harbor	LSD-52	Dock Landing Ship			1	1
5	TGW	USS Anchorage	LSD-36	Dock Landing Ship			5	5
5	TGW	USS Comstock	LSD-45	Dock Landing Ship			1	1
5	TGW	USS Tarawa	LHA-1	Amphibious Assault Ship			8	8
5	TGE	USS Gunston Hall	LSD-44	Dock Landing Ship	3	2	4	2
5	TGE	USS Ponce	LPD-15	Amphibious Transport Dock	3	2	11	10
5	TGE	USS Bataan	LHD-5	Amphibious Assault Ship			2	2
5	TGE	USS Saipan	LHA-2	Amphibious Assault Ship			5	4
5	TGE	USNS Comfort	T-AH20	Hospital Ship	1	1	49	31
5	USCG	USCGC Boutwell	WHEC-719	Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutter	2	1	12	12
5	USCG	USCGC Walnut	WLB-205	Boat Tender	1	1	14	9
6	Truman	USS Truman	CVN-75	Aircraft Carrier	18	12	57	34
6	Truman	USS San Jacinto	CG-56	Guided Missile Cruiser	4	3		
6	Truman	USS Deyo	DD-989	Destroyer	3	2		
6	Truman	USS Cook	DDG-75	Guided Missile Destroyer			1	1

Table F-2. Distribution of Embeds and Embarks on Different Ships (Continued)

Fleet	Strike Group	Ship	Number	Description	Embeds	Media Orgs.	Embarks	Media Orgs.
6	Roosevelt	USS Roosevelt	CVN-71	Aircraft Carrier	15	13	40	28
6	Roosevelt	USS Anzio	CG-68	Guided Missile Cruiser	1	1	2	1
6	Roosevelt	USS Cape St. George	CG-71	Guided Missile Cruiser	2	2		
6	Roosevelt	USS Winston Churchill	DDG-81	Guided Missile Destroyer			4	2
	NSF	USS Chinook	PC 9	Patrol Coastal Ship			10	7
Total*					144	102	319	217
Total Ships					19	19	28	28
Total Individual Embeds, Embarks and Media Organizations					110	63	237	120

Note for Table F-2: Total includes multiple counts for the embeds and embarks who were on more than one ship and multiple counts for the organization they represented.

APPENDIX G.
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND (CFLCC)
SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) –
EMBEDDED MEDIA STATUS REPORT

Explanatory notes for the status report table on pages G-5 through G-12

HQ CFLCC began reporting as HQ CJTF-7 on 4 May 2003.

Color coding:

Yellow: First date when the CPIC or a unit reports embed data

Violet: Dates with data that does not total properly:

3/5/03–3/9/03 – Discrepancies in total unilateral and embedded; some embeds are probably already in the units but not being reported yet.

3/11/03 – 371 embeds, 154 reported by unit; 217 not embedded with or reported by unit.

3/12 – 395 embeds, 375 reported by unit; 20 not embedded with or reported by unit.

Pink: Total embed numbers with ground units, excluding SOF and UK embeds

Green: The number of embeds in the unit is increasing.

Orange: The number of embeds in the unit is decreasing.

Light Blue: Total embeds with IMEF, not including the UK embeds. IMEF reported the UK embed daily status because they were under their operational control.

Numbers (other than the dates in the first row) in bold print: The date when the unit reported the most embeds present

Unit abbreviations not previously used:

CJTF	Coalition Joint Task Force
32AAMDC	32nd Army and Air Defense Missile Command
377TSC	377th Theater Support Command
416ENCO M	416th Engineer Command
352CA	352nd Civil Affairs Command
1FSSG	1st Forward Service Support Group
3MAW	3rd Marine Air Wing
MEG	MEF Engineer Group
UK AD	United Kingdom Armored Division

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report

Unit/Date (2003)	3/1	3/2	3/3	3/4	3/5	3/6	3/7	3/8	3/9	3/10	3/11	3/12	3/13	3/14
Total CPIC Registration	603	668	743	783	853	909	959	1,005	1,020	1,069	1,142	1,215	1,414	1,480
Unilateral	442	466	481	499	557	416	464	510	664	705	771	820	982	1,004
Total Embedded	161	202	262	284	296	493	495	495	356	364	371	395	432	476
Total Embed (w/o UK)													367	370
HQ C-JTF-7												17	1	2
HQ CFLCC												11	11	12
82ABN												10	6	4
32AAMDC												8	8	9
377TSC/Arifjan														
416ENCOM														
352CA														
IMEF											154	162	230	273
IMEF CE											4	38	4	4
1MARDIV											71	75	75	75
1FSSG											28	30	33	33
TF TARAWA											15		17	17
3MAW											18	19	19	19
15MEU											8		7	7
MEG											10		10	12
1st UK AD													65	106
24MEU														
IMEF total w/o UK											154	162	165	167
V CORPS						10		28				167	176	176
HQ & Sep Bdes												39	43	43
3ID												71	76	76
101ABN												57	57	57
82ABN														
4ID														
3ACR														
1AD														
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	3/15	3/16	3/17	3/18	3/19	3/20	3/21	3/22	3/23	3/24	3/25	3/26	3/27	3/28
Total CPIC Registration	1,539	1,605	1,646	1,695	1,775	1,888	1,949	2,006	2,065	2,101	2,133	2,155	2,195	2,196
Unilateral	1,062	1,127	1,146	1,175	1,254	1,373	1,431	1,494	1,552	1,589	1,626	1,648	1,688	1,697
Total Embedded	477	478	500	520	521	515	518	512	513	512	507	507	507	499
Total Embed (w/o UK)	371	372	394	414	413	408	411	405	406	405	400	400	404	396
HQ C-JTF-7														
HQ CFLCC	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
82ABN	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	14	14	14	14	14	14
32AAMDC	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
377TSC/Arifjan	9	9	9	9	9	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	7	3
416ENCOM						3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
352CA									1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF	273	273	292	304	302	299	303	298	298	295	295	295	291	287
IMEF CE	4	4	4	7	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
1MARDIV	75	75	91	88	86	86	88	89	88	87	87	87	87	84
1FSSG	33	33	33	37	37	38	38	36	36	36	36	36	36	36
TF TARAWA	17	17	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
3MAW	19	19	19	26	26	25	25	20	20	18	18	18	18	18
15MEU	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
MEG	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	13	14	14	14	14	14	13
1st UK AD	106	106	106	106	108	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	103	103
24MEU														
IMEF total w/o UK	167	167	186	198	194	192	196	191	191	188	188	188	188	184
V CORPS	177	178	181	189	192	192	192	190	188	190	185	185	185	185
HQ & Sep Bdes	44	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
3ID	76	76	76	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
101ABN	57	57	60	60	63	63	63	61	59	61	56	56	56	56
82ABN														from CFLCC
4ID														
3ACR														
1AD														
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	3/29	3/30	3/31	4/1	4/2	4/3	4/4	4/5	4/6	4/7	4/8	4/9	4/10	4/11
Total CPIC Registration	2,240	2,250	2,252	2,297	2,329	2,364	2,386	2,396	2,448	2,458	2,487	2,512	2,567	2,602
Unilateral	1,744	1,758	1,757	1,791	1,818	1,840	1,862	1,869	1,917	1,929	1,961	1,987	2,116	2,160
Total Embedded	496	492	495	506	511	524	524	527	531	529	526	525	451	442
Total Embded (w/o UK)	393	389	392	403	408	421	421	424	428	426	423	422	416	407
HQ C-JTF-7														
HQ CFLCC	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
82ABN	to V Corps													
32AAMDC	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2
377TSC/Arifjan	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
416ENCOM	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
352CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF	287	287	288	286	289	302	300	303	303	303	300	297	222	214
IMEF CE	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
1MARDIV	84	83	83	83	85	85	85	85	85	85	84	85	85	85
1FSSG	36	36	36	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	33	30
TF TARAWA	20	20	20	20	20	21	21	24	24	24	20	20	18	13
3MAW	18	18	19	15	17	17	16	16	16	16	14	13	13	13
15MEU	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	11	9	9	9
MEG	13	14	14	14	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	11	11	11
1st UK AD	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	35	35
24MEU						13	12	12	12	12	14	14	14	14
IMEF total w/o UK	184	184	185	183	186	199	197	200	200	200	197	194	187	179
V CORPS	196	192	194	207	209	209	209	209	213	211	211	213	213	214
HQ & Sep Bdes	44	42	42	42	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	40
3ID	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	80	80	80	80	66
101ABN	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	50	50	50	50	50	59
82ABN	14	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	6
4ID			2	15	15	15	15	15	25	25	25	25	25	41
3ACR												2	2	2
1AD														
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	4/12	4/13	4/14	4/15	4/16	4/17	4/18	4/19	4/20	4/21	4/22	4/23	4/24	4/25
Total CPIC Registration	2,621	2,646	2,670	2,700		2,700								
Unilateral	2,185	2,246	2,302	2,373		2,434								
Total Embedded	436	400	368	327		266	225	219	211	199	182	161	162	139
Total Embed (w/o UK)	401	365	333	292		231	215	209	201	189	172	151	152	129
HQ C-JTF-7														
HQ CFLCC	5	5	5	5		5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
82ABN														
32AAMDC	2	2	2	2		0								
377TSC/Arifjan	3	3	3	3		3	3	0						
416ENCOM	2	2	2	2		2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
352CA	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF	212	179	168	137		111	74	74	66	55	54	33	33	21
IMEF CE	4	2	2	2		0								
1MARDIV	85	59	58	40		36	36	36	28	28	27	7	7	3
1FSSG	30	27	24	21		15	15	15	12	9	9	9	9	2
TF TARAWA	13	13	8	4		1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4	3
3MAW	11	11	9	9		9	9	9	9	1	1	1	1	1
15MEU	9	7	7	7		4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MEG	11	11	11	11		11	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
1st UK AD	35	35	35	35		35	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
24MEU	14	14	14	8		0								
IMEF total w/o UK	177	144	133	102		76	64	64	56	45	44	23	23	11
V CORPS	211	208	187	177		144	144	142	142	141	125	125	126	115
HQ & Sep Bdes	39	37	35	35		34	34	31	31	30	27	27	27	26
3ID	66	63	43	43		37	37	38	38	38	25	25	25	16
101ABN	59	59	58	48		22	22	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
82ABN	4	6	5	5		5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
4ID	41	41	41	41		41	41	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
3ACR	2	2	5	5		5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	4
1AD														
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	4/26	4/27	4/28	4/29	4/30	5/1	5/2	5/3	5/4	5/5	5/6	5/7	5/8	5/9
Total CPIC Registration														
Unilateral														
Total Embedded	129	124	122	123	123	123	108	101	74	71	71	69	63	63
Total Embed (w/o UK)	129	124	122	123	123	123	108	101	74	71	71	69	63	63
HQ C-JTF-7									1	1	1	1	1	1
HQ CFLCC	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						
82ABN														
32AAMDC														
377TSC/Arifjan														
416ENCOM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						
352CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF	10	8	6	6	6	6	6	6	3	1	1	1		
IMEF CE									1	1	1	1	0	
1MARDIV	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0					
1FSSG	2	2	2	0										
TF TARAWA	3	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0				
3MAW	0													
15MEU	1	0												
MEG	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0					
1st UK AD	0													
24MEU														
IMEF total w/o UK	10	8	6	6	6	6	6	6	3	1	1	1	0	
V CORPS	116	113	113	114	114	114	99	92	69	68	68	66	61	61
HQ & Sep Bdes	25	25	25	26	26	26	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2
3ID	18	17	17	17	17	17	25	18	9	18	18	18	13	13
101ABN	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
82ABN	2	0												
4ID	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	34	24	24	23	23	23
3ACR	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4
1AD														
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	5/10	5/11	5/12	5/13	5/14	5/15	5/16	5/17	5/18	5/19	5/20	5/21	5/22	5/23
Total CPIC Registration														
Unilateral														
Total Embedded	39	39	40	39	39	39	33	35	35	35	29	32	31	26
Total Embed (w/o UK)	39	39	40	39	39	39	33	35	35	35	29	32	31	26
HQ CJTF-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
HQ CFLCC														
82ABN														
32AAMDC														
377TSC/Arifjan														
416ENCOM														
352CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF														
IMEF CE														
1MARDIV														
1FSSG														
TF TARAWA														
3MAW														
15MEU														
MEG														
1st UK AD														
24MEU														
IMEF total w/o UK														
V CORPS	37	37	38	37	37	37	31	33	33	33	27	30	29	24
HQ & Sep Bdes	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3ID	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	6
101ABN	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
82ABN														
4ID	21	21	22	22	22	22	16	16	16	16	11	11	10	8
3ACR	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3
1AD								1	1	1	1	4	4	3
2ACR														

Table G-1. CFLCC SITREP – Embedded Media Status Report (Continued)

Unit/Date (2003)	5/24	5/25	5/26	5/27	5/28	5/29	5/30	5/31	6/1	6/2	6/3	6/4	6/5	6/6
Total CPIC Registration														
Unilateral														
Total Embedded	27	27	24	24	24	24	23	23	23	19	19	19	19	19
Total Embed (w/o UK)	27	27	24	24	24	24	23	23	23	19	19	19	19	19
HQ CJTF-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
HQ CFLCC														
82ABN														
32AAMDC														
377TSC/Arifjan														
416ENCOM														
352CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IMEF														
IMEF CE														
1MARDIV														
1FSSG														
TF TARAWA														
3MAW														
15MEU														
MEG														
1st UK AD														
24MEU														
IMEF total w/o UK														
V CORPS	25	25	22	22	22	22	21	21	21	17	17	17	17	17
HQ & Sep Bdes	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3ID	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
101ABN	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
82ABN														
4ID	8	8	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1
3ACR	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2
1AD	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
2ACR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

APPENDIX H.
COMPARISON DATA BY MEDIA TYPE –
INITIAL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS WITH ALLOCATIONS AND
FINAL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS WITH EMBEDS

Table H-1. Comparison Data – Initial Media Organizations With Allocations and Final Media Organizations With Embeds

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Media Type	Media Orgs w/Initial Allocations	Initial Allocations	Media Orgs That Did Participate	Initial Allocations	Embeds	Media Orgs Did Not Participate	Initial Allocations Not Filled	Media Orgs w/o Initial Allocations	Embeds	Total Media Orgs w/ Embeds	Total Embeds
IM	8	10	5	5	9	3	5			5	9
IN	45	59	22	30	28	23	29	8	9	30	37
IP	1	1				1	1				
IR	4	8	2	6	5	2	2	1	1	3	6
IT	32	86	22	66	68	10	20	11	22	33	90
IW	9	62	8	61	45	1	1			8	45
UE	2	3				2	3				
UM	18	53	14	45	37	4	8	3	3	17	40
UN	70	247	49	206	158	17	33	10	12	59	170
UN (L)			4	8	6			13	20	17	26
UP	4	9	3	8	8	1	1			3	8
UR	9	34	8	33	17	1	1			8	17
UR (L)								1	1	1	1
US	9	47	7	43	20	2	4			7	20
UT	24	191	15	168	169	9	23			15	169
UT (Doc)								2	5	2	5
UT (L)								14	36	14	36
UW	2	29	2	29	22					2	22
Local	Unk	78									
Total	237	917	161	708	592	76	131	63	109	224	701

Note for Table H-1:

B = D + G
C = E + H
K = D + I
L = F + J

- To get the correct totals for UN in columns B and C, add UN and UN (L) in column D and E, respectively.
- There were no UN (L) in the OASD(PA) initial allocations, but some of the embeds were actually from local newspapers and are accounted for in the UN (L) row.
- There were 692 embeds who filled 701 embed assignments. Nine embeds were in two different units.

APPENDIX I.
MEDIA ORGANIZATION:
TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPATION AND EMBED
ALLOCATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS BY COMPONENT

Table I-1 provides information about the media organizations that participated in the embedded media program.

The **Media Training** column indicates those organizations that sent individuals to one of the media training courses. As explained in the report, just because an organization sent an individual(s) to one of the media training courses does not mean that all those individuals were subsequently embedded within a unit.

The **Allocations** columns indicate all the allocations, by Component, that OASD(PA) gave to a media organization initially, based on the number of embeds that each major unit could accommodate.

The **Embeds** columns indicate the distribution, by Component, for an embed(s) from each media organization who was actually embedded in a unit.

As explained in the report, the numbers do not necessarily equate to the same individual if the number appears in multiple categories. For example, a media organization may have sent two individuals to the media training course, but only one individual was ultimately embedded with a unit along with an individual who did not attend the media training course. A media organization may have received three allocations but had five embeds. Two of the individuals identified to fill an allocation may not have participated, but the organization sent two other individuals in their place, while also receiving two additional embed opportunities.

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations					Embeds							
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total	
<i>Al-Hawadeth</i>	IM	Lebanon			2							2					0
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	IM	Germany			1							1					1
<i>Focus</i>	IM	Germany			1							1					1
<i>Jane's Defence Weekly</i>	IM	United Kingdom				1						1					1
<i>Maclean's</i>	IM	Canada				1						1					0
<i>New Zealand Herald</i>	IM	New Zealand				1	1					2					0
<i>Paris Match</i>	IM	France			1							1					2
<i>Stern</i>	IM	Germany			1							1					4
<i>Aftonbladet</i>	IN	Sweden			1							1					1
<i>Age</i>	IN	Australia			1							1					0
<i>Al Quds Al-Arabi</i>	IN	United Kingdom				1						1					0
<i>Al Sharq Al-Awsat</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1	1						2					0
<i>Al-Ahram</i>	IN	Egypt			1	1						2					0
<i>Al-Hayat</i>	IN	United Kingdom				1	1					2			2		2
<i>Anatolia</i>	IN	Turkey		1	1							1					0
<i>Apple Daily News</i>	IN	Hong Kong				1						1					2
<i>Arab News</i>	IN	Saudi Arabia				1						1					1
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	IN	Japan				1	1					2			1	1	2
<i>Australian</i>	IN	Australia					1					1					0
<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>	IN	South Korea			1							1					1
<i>Corriere Della Sera</i>	IN	Italy			1							1					1
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	IN	United Kingdom		1	1		1					2			1	1	2
<i>El Correo</i>	IN	Spain		1								0					1
<i>El Mundo</i>	IN	Spain		1								0			1		1
<i>Financial Times</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1							1					1
<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	IN	Germany			1							1					0
<i>Globe and Mail</i>	IN	Canada			1							1					0
<i>Guardian</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1							1			1		1
<i>Ha'aretz</i>	IN	Israel				1						1					0

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations						Embeds						
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total	
<i>Helsingin Sanomat</i>	IN	Finland			1						1	1					1
<i>IL Giornale/IL Foglio</i>	IN	Italy			1						1	1					0
<i>India Globe</i>	IN	India				1	1				2	2					0
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	IN	France			1	1					2	2					0
<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	IN	Israel			1		1				2	2		1			2
<i>Jiji Press</i>	IN	Japan					1				1	1					0
<i>Joong Ang Ilbo</i>	IN	South Korea			1						1	1					1
<i>La Razon</i>	IN	Argentina									0	1					1
<i>Le Figaro</i>	IN	France		1		1					1	1		1			1
<i>Le Monde</i>	IN	France			1						1	1					1
<i>Lidove Noviny</i>	IN	Czech Republic				1					1	1					1
<i>Maariv Daily</i>	IN	Israel			1						1	1					0
<i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>	IN	Japan					1				1	1		1			1
<i>Milijet</i>	IN	Turkey									0	1					1
<i>National Post</i>	IN	Canada			1	1					2	2		1			1
<i>Nepszabadsag</i>	IN	Hungary		1							1	1					0
<i>Nikkei</i>	IN	Japan					1				1	1					0
<i>Observer</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1						1	1					0
<i>Press</i>	IN	New Zealand					1				1	1					0
<i>South China Morning Post</i>	IN	Hong Kong				1	1				2	2					0
<i>Straits Times</i>	IN	Singapore			1						1	1					0
<i>Stuttgarter Zeitung</i>	IN	Germany			1						1	1					0
<i>Sunday Telegraph</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1						1	1		1			1
<i>Sunday Times</i>	IN	United Kingdom				1					1	1					1
<i>Sydney Morning Herald</i>	IN	Australia			1	1					2	2					1
<i>Times</i>	IN	United Kingdom			1		1				2	2		1		1	2
<i>Tokyo Shimbun</i>	IN	Japan									0	0			1		1
<i>Verdens Gang</i>	IN	Norway									0	0					2
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	IN	Japan			1	1					2	2		1			1

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations						Embeds							
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total		
Gamma Presse	IP	France			1							1						0
BBC Radio	IR	United Kingdom			1	2	1	1				5	1	3				4
Europe 1	IR	France										0	1					1
Polish Public Radio	IR	Poland		1	1							1						0
Radio Del Peru	IR	Peru			1							1						0
Radio France Internationale	IR	France			1							1	1					1
Abu Dhabi TV	IT	UAE		1			2					2		4	2			6
Al-Jazeera	IT	Qatar		1	2	2	2	2				8		2				2
ARD	IT	Germany					2					2			2			2
Australian Broadcasting Corp.	IT	Australia				2						2		2				2
BBC TV	IT	United Kingdom		2	2	2	2	2				8	3	4	2			9
CAPA TV	IT	France										0		1				1
CBC	IT	Canada		1		2	2					4		2				2
CNN Turk	IT	Turkey										0	2					2
CTV	IT	Canada										2	2					2
Danish Broadcasting	IT	Denmark										0	2					2
Dutch TV	IT	Netherlands			2							2						0
European Broadcast Union	IT	Switzerland			2							2						0
France 2	IT	France			2							2						0
Fuji TV	IT	Japan			2		2					4	2					2
Image Media	IT	Kuwait										0	2					2
ITN - Channel 4 News	IT	United Kingdom			2							2	4					4
KBS	IT	South Korea			2							2						0
Kuwait TV	IT	Kuwait			2							2		3				3
LBC	IT	Lebanon			2							2						0
MBC	IT	UAE								2		2		3				3
NDTV	IT	India			2							2						0

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations					Embeds					
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF
NHK	IT	Japan		2	2	2				4	2				4
NTV	IT	Japan			2					2	2				2
NTV	IT	Turkey								0	2				2
ORT Channel 1	IT	Russia			2					2					0
Peruvian State TV	IT	Peru								0	1				1
Phoenix TV	IT	Hong Kong			2					2	2				2
RAI	IT	Italy			2					2	2				2
Reuters TV	IT	United Kingdom				2	2	2		6	2	3			5
RTL	IT	Germany			2					2	2				2
RTR	IT	Russia								0		2			2
SAT 1	IT	Germany			2					2	2				2
SBS	IT	South Korea								0		2			2
SIC Television	IT	Portugal		1						0					0
Sky News	IT	United Kingdom			2					2	4	2			6
Sky TV	IT	Australia				2				2					0
Sun	IT	United Kingdom								0		1			1
Televisa	IT	Mexico		1	2					2					0
TF1	IT	France			2					2	2				2
Tokyo Broadcasting System	IT	Japan				2				2		3			3
TV 2	IT	Norway			2					2	2				2
TV Asahi	IT	Japan		1						2					0
TVE	IT	Spain								0	4				4
TVN 24	IT	Poland								0					1
ZDF	IT	Germany		1		2				2		2			2
AFP (Agence France-Presse)	IW	France		10	10	6	4	4		24	6	3	1		16
Agencia EFE	IW	Spain				1				1					1
ANSA	IW	Italy			1					1					0
Central News Agency	IW	Taiwan					1			1		1			1

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations					Embeds					
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF
DPA	IW	Germany		1		1	1				2				1
ITAR-TASS	IW	Russia		1		1	1				1				1
Kyodo News	IW	Japan		1		1	1				3				3
Reuters	IW	United Kingdom		10		14	6	4	4		28				21
Xinhua News Agency	IW	China				1					1				1
Aerospace Daily	UE	Washington	DC		1			1			2				0
Salon.com	UE	San Francisco	CA		1						1				0
American Enterprise	UM	Washington	DC		1						1				1
Army Magazine	UM	Arlington	VA								0				1
Atlantic Monthly	UM	Boston	MA		1			1			2				1
Aviation Week	UM	New York	NY			1		1			2				1
Business Week	UM	New York	NY	2	1						1				1
Defense Week	UM	Washington	DC		1	1					2				1
Esquire	UM	New York	NY								0				1
Inside Washington	UM	Arlington	VA		2						2			1	1
Men's Journal	UM	New York	NY			1	1				2				0
National Journal	UM	Washington	DC		1	1	1				3	1	1	1	3
New Yorker	UM	New York	NY		2						2				0
Newsweek	UM	New York	NY	4	6	1	1				8	6	2		9
People	UM	New York	NY	1	2		1				3	3	1		4
Proceedings	UM	Annapolis	MD			1					1				1
Rolling Stone	UM	New York	NY		1	1	1				3				1
Signal	UM	Fairfax	VA		1						1				1
Time	UM	New York	NY		4	1	1	1			7			1	6
U.S. News & World Report	UM	Washington	DC	4	5	1	1	1	1		9	3	1	1	6
Vanity Fair	UM	New York	NY		1			1			2				0
Weekly Standard	UM	Washington	DC		1		1				2				0
Albuquerque Journal	UN	Albuquerque	NM								0		2		2

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations					Embeds							
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total	
<i>Albuquerque Tribune</i>	UN	Albuquerque	NM		1							1					0
<i>Arizona Republic</i>	UN	Phoenix	AZ		2	1		1				4					0
<i>Arkansas Democrat-Gazette</i>	UN	Little Rock	AR		1							1					0
<i>Atlanta Journal Constitution</i>	UN	Atlanta	GA		2	1						3	1	1			2
<i>Augusta Chronicle</i>	UN	Augusta	GA		1							1		1			1
<i>Baltimore Sun</i>	UN	Baltimore	MD	2	2	1	1	1				5	1	2			3
<i>Boston Globe</i>	UN	Boston	MA	2	3	1		1				5	2	1			3
<i>Boston Herald</i>	UN	Boston	MA	1	1	1		1				3	1	1			2
<i>Buffalo News</i>	UN	Buffalo	NY	1	2							2	1				1
<i>Charlotte Observer</i>	UN	Charlotte	NC		2							2	1				1
<i>Chicago Sun Times</i>	UN	Chicago	IL		2	1						3					0
<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	UN	Chicago	IL	2	4	1	1	1				7	4	1	1		6
<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	UN	Boston	MA	1	1			1				2	2		1		3
<i>Columbus Ledger-Enquirer</i>	UN	Columbus	GA	1	1							1	1				1
<i>Contra Costa Times</i>	UN	Walnut Creek	CA		1	1						2	1	1			2
<i>Corpus Christi Caller-Times</i>	UN	Corpus Christi	TX		1							1					0
<i>Daily Titan</i>	UN	Fullerton	CA		1							1	1				1
<i>Dallas Morning News</i>	UN	Dallas	TX	1	4	1						5	2	2			4
<i>Denver Post</i>	UN	Denver	CO	1	2	1		1				4	1	1			2
<i>Detroit Free Press</i>	UN	Detroit	MI		2	1						3	2	1			3
<i>Detroit News</i>	UN	Detroit	MI									0		1	1		2
<i>El Nuevo Dia</i>	UN	Santurce	PR			1						1					0
<i>Engineering News-Record</i>	UN	New York	NY		1							1	1				1
<i>Florida Times Union</i>	UN	Jacksonville	FL		1	1						2					0
<i>Fort Worth Star-Telegram</i>	UN	Ft. Worth	TX		3							3					0
<i>Gazette</i>	UN	Colorado Springs	CO	1	2			1				3	2				2
<i>Hartford Courant</i>	UN	Hartford	CT									0	1				1
<i>Hill</i>	UN	Washington	DC							1		1					0
<i>Houston Chronicle</i>	UN	Houston	TX	2	3	1	1	1				6	1				1

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations					Embeds							
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total	
Indianapolis Star	UN	Indianapolis	IN		1	1											0
Kansas City Star	UN	Kansas City	MO		1	1		1									2
Knoxville News Sentinel	UN	Knoxville	TN		2												1
Ledger	UN	Lakeland	FL														1
Lexington Herald-Leader	UN	Lexington	KY														1
Los Angeles Times	UN	Los Angeles	CA	5	7	2	1										8
Miami Herald	UN	Miami	FL		2	1											2
Military Times Media Group	UN	Springfield	VA	2	3	1	1	1									12
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	UN	Milwaukee	WI	2	1	1	1	1									2
Minneapolis Star Tribune	UN	Minneapolis	MN	1	2	1	1	1									4
New York Daily News	UN	New York	NY	1	2	2	1	1									3
New York Post	UN	New York	NY	1	3	1											3
New York Times	UN	New York	NY	8	7	2	2	2	2	15	6	3	2				12
News and Observer	UN	Raleigh	NC		1	1											2
News Press	UN	Stillwater	OK		1												0
News Tribune	UN	Tacoma	WA	1													1
Newsday	UN	Meville	NY	3	3	2	1	1									5
Omaha World-Herald	UN	Omaha	NE	1	1	1	1										0
Orange County Register	UN	Santa Ana	CA			2											2
Oregonian	UN	Portland	OR		3												2
Orlando Sentinel	UN	Orlando	FL		2	1											2
Philadelphia Daily News	UN	Philadelphia	PA		1	1											1
Philadelphia Inquirer	UN	Philadelphia	PA		1	1	1	1									3
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette	UN	Pittsburgh	PA		1												1
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review	UN	Pittsburgh	PA														1
Press-Enterprise	UN	Riverside	CA														2
Providence Journal	UN	Providence	RI		1	1											1
Record	UN	Hackensack	NJ		1												0
Richmond Times-Dispatch	UN	Richmond	VA														1

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations						Embeds					
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total
Rocky Mountain News	UN	Denver	CO	1	3			1			4	2			2	
Salt Lake Tribune	UN	Salt Lake City	UT		2						2	1			1	
San Antonio Express-News	UN	San Antonio	TX	1	2			1			3	3	1	1	5	
San Diego Union-Tribune	UN	San Diego	CA		1	1					2		2		2	
San Francisco Bay Guardian	UN	San Francisco	CA		1						1				0	
San Francisco Chronicle	UN	San Francisco	CA	1	2	1		1			4	1	1		2	
Seattle Post Intelligencer	UN	Seattle	WA					2			2			2	2	
Seattle Times	UN	Seattle	WA			1		1			2				0	
South Bend Tribune	UN	South Bend	IN		1						1		1		1	
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	UN	St. Louis	MO	1	2	1		1	1		5	2	2		4	
St. Petersburg Times	UN	St. Petersburg	FL	1	1	1		1	1		4	1	1		2	
Star-Ledger	UN	Newark	NJ		2	1					3		1		1	
Stars & Stripes	UN	Washington	DC	4	1			1	1		3	3	1	1	6	
Sun Herald	UN	Biloxi	MS								0		1		1	
Tampa Tribune	UN	Tampa	FL		2	1					3				0	
Telegraph	UN	Macon	GA	1							0				0	
Tennessee	UN	Nashville	TN								0	1			1	
Times-Picayune	UN	New Orleans	LA	1	1	1					3	1			1	
USA Today	UN	Arlington	VA	2	5	3		1	1		10	3	2	1	6	
Ventura County Star	UN	Ventura	CA								0		1		1	
Virginian-Pilot	UN	Norfolk	VA	1				2	1		3		1	1	2	
Wall Street Journal	UN	New York	NY	4	7	2		1	1		11	4	2	1	7	
Washington Post	UN	Washington	DC	7	7	2		2	2		15	4	2	1	9	
Washington Times	UN	Washington	DC	5	1	1		1	1		4	4	1		5	
Coastal Courier	UN	Hinesville	GA								0	1			1	
Fayetteville Observer	UN	Fayetteville	NC								0	4			4	

Table I-1. Media Organization: Training Course Participation and Embed Allocations and Assignments by Component (Continued)

Media Organization	Media Type	U.S. City or Foreign Country	State	Media Training	Allocations						Embeds						
					A	MC	N	AF	SOF	Total	A	N	MC	AF	SOF	Total	
Telemundo	UT	Hialeah	FL				2				2						0
Tribune Broadcasting	UT	Chicago	IL				2				4						0
Univision	UT	Los Angeles	CA			1	2				3						0
Voice of America TV	UT	Washington	DC				2				2			2			2
WBMM-Ch 2 (CBS)	UT	Chicago	IL								0						2
KING-Ch 5 (NBC)	UT (L)	Seattle	WA								0						2
KTVT-Ch 11 (CBS)	UT (L)	Dallas	TX								0						5
KVLY-Ch 11 (NBC)	UT (L)	Fargo	ND								0						2
WAGA-Ch 5 (Fox)	UT (L)	Atlanta	GA								0						2
WDAY-Ch 6 (ABC)	UT (L)	Fargo	ND								0						2
WKRN-Ch 2 (ABC)	UT (L)	Nashville	TN								0						2
WRAL-Ch 5 (CBS)	UT (L)	Raleigh	NC								0						4
WSAV-Ch 3 (NBC)	UT (L)	Savannah	GA								0						2
WSMV-Ch 4 (NBC)	UT (L)	Nashville	TN								0						3
WTVB-Ch 11 (ABC)	UT (L)	Durham	NC								0			4			4
WTVF-Ch 5 (CBS)	UT (L)	Nashville	TN								0						2
WZTZ-Ch 17 (Fox)	UT (L)	Nashville	TN								0						2
AP/AP Photo	UW	New York	NY	15	12	6	4	4	1	27	7	8	4	1			20
UPI	UW	Washington	DC	3	57	21	1	1		2		1	1				2
Local Media											78						0
Totals				232	463	203	153	83	15	917	332	210	110	24	25		701

APPENDIX J.
MEDIA TRAINING COURSE

Table J-1. Media Training Course Program of Instruction

Subjects To Be Trained

Perform first aid
Protect against nuclear, biological, chemical attack
React to direct and indirect fire
Embark/debark a helicopter with personal gear
Participate in a 5-mile tactical road march with a minimum 25-lb rucksack
Identify mine hazards and describe countermeasures
Identify individual weapons and describe their capabilities
Perform individual camouflage
Describe basic cover and concealment measures
Perform survival-level navigation
Perform unit physical fitness training
Identify military rank insignia and uniforms
Describe military customs and courtesies
Explain the code of conduct
Discuss law of war and rules of engagement
Identify major Service weapons systems and platforms
Describe equipment required for living in the field (overnight in the field)
Describe basic field sanitation and health measures
Use of civilian communication on the battlefield
Describe JIB structure, role, and operations
Explain the role and capabilities of PAOs
Explain OPSEC procedures/requirements and the security classification system
Describe media embed procedures
Discuss media ground rules
Describe the primary mission and basic force structure of each Service

Table J-2. Media Organization Allocations for the Media Training Course

Media Type	Media Organization	Class 1 (Navy)	Class 2 (Army)	Class 3 (AF)	Class 4 (MC)	Total Trained
IN	<i>Anatolia (Turkey)</i>			1		1
IN	<i>Daily Telegraph (UK)</i>			1		1
IN	<i>El Correo</i>				1	1
IN	<i>El Mundo</i>				1	1
IN	<i>Le Figaro (France)</i>			1		1
IN	<i>Nepszabadsag (Hungary)</i>			1		1
IR	<i>Polish Public Radio</i>			1		1
IT	<i>Abu Dhabi TV (UAE)</i>	1				1
IT	<i>Al-Jazeera (Qatar)</i>		1			1
IT	<i>Asahi TV (Japan)</i>		1			1
IT	<i>BBC (UK)</i>		1		1	2
IT	<i>CBC (Canada)</i>		1			1
IT	<i>NHK (Japan)</i>				2	2
IT	<i>SIC Television (Portugal)</i>			1		1
IT	<i>Televisa (Mexico)</i>		1			1
IT	<i>ZDF (Germany)</i>			1		1
IW	<i>Agence France Presse (AFP)</i>	3	2	2	3	10
IW	<i>Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA)</i>				1	1
IW	<i>ITAR-TASS (Russia)</i>	1				1
IW	<i>Kyodo News (Japan)</i>				1	1
IW	<i>Reuters</i>	4	1	2	3	10
UM	<i>Business Week</i>		1		1	2
UM	<i>National Geographic</i>				1	1
UM	<i>Newsweek</i>	1	1	1	1	4
UM	<i>People</i>				1	1
UM	<i>U.S. News & World Report</i>	1	1	1	1	4
UN	<i>Baltimore Sun</i>		1		1	2
UN	<i>Boston Globe</i>		1	1		2
UN	<i>Boston Herald</i>			1		1
UN	<i>Buffalo News</i>			1		1
UN	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>		1	1		2
UN	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>		1			1
UN	<i>Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (GA)</i>		1			1
UN	<i>Dallas Morning News</i>	1				1
UN	<i>Denver Post</i>		1			1
UN	<i>Gazette (Colorado Springs)</i>			1		1
UN	<i>Houston Chronicle</i>	1		1		2
UN	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	2	2	1		5
UN	<i>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</i>		1		1	2
UN	<i>Minneapolis Star Tribune</i>			1		1
UN	<i>New York Daily News</i>	1				1
UN	<i>New York Post</i>			1		1
UN	<i>New York Times</i>	2	2	2	2	8
UN	<i>News Tribune (Tacoma)</i>				1	1

Table J-2. Media Organization Allocations for the Media Training Course (Continued)

Media Type	Media Organization	Class 1 (Navy)	Class 2 (Army)	Class 3 (AF)	Class 4 (MC)	Total Trained
UN	<i>Newsday</i>	1	1	1		3
UN	<i>Omaha World-Herald</i>			1		1
UN	<i>Rocky Mountain News</i>				1	1
UN	<i>San Antonio Express-News</i>	1				1
UN	<i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>			1		1
UN	<i>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</i>		1			1
UN	<i>St. Petersburg Times</i>			1		1
UN	<i>Stars & Stripes</i>			1	3	4
UN	<i>Telegraph (Macon, GA)</i>		1			1
UN	<i>Times News Service</i>	1	1			2
UN	<i>Times-Picayune (New Orleans)</i>			1		1
UN	<i>USA Today</i>		1		1	2
UN	<i>Virginian-Pilot</i>	1				1
UN	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	1	1	1	1	4
UN	<i>Washington Post</i>	3	2	2		7
UN	<i>Washington Times</i>	2	1	1	1	5
UP	Getty Images	1	1	1		3
UR	ABC News Radio		1	1		2
UR	AP Radio	1	1	1		3
UR	CBS News Radio	1	1		1	3
UR	NPR	1	1	1	1	4
UR	Voice of America Radio		1			1
US	Copley News Service	1	1			2
US	Cox News Service	1	1	1	1	4
US	Gannett News Service			1		1
US	Hearst News Service			1	1	2
US	Knight-Ridder	1	1	1	1	4
US	Newhouse News Service	1			1	2
US	Scripps-Howard News Service	1	1	1	1	4
UT	ABC News	3	3	3	1	10
UT	CBS News	3	3	3		9
UT	CNN	3	3	1	3	10
UT	Fox News	3	3	3	3	12
UT	MTV				2	2
UT	NBC News	3	3	3	4	13
UW	AP/AP Photo	5	3	3	4	15
UW	UPI	1	1	1		3
	Total Individuals	58	60	60	54	232
	Total Organizations	34	44	46	35	81
	Females	8	11	13	9	41

Table J-3. Number of Attendees by Type of Media Organization

Media Type	Number of attendees												Total
	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	12	13	15	
UM	2	1		2									5
UN	20	7	1	2	2	1	1						34
UP			1										1
UR	1	1	2	1									5
US	1	3		3									7
UT		1						1	2	1	1		6
UW			1									1	2
IN	6												6
IR	1												1
IT	7	2											9
IW	3								2				5
Total	41	15	5	8	2	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	81

Example: For the five U.S. magazines that sent individuals to the media training course, two had one allocation, one had two allocations, and two had four allocations.

**Table J-4. Media Training Course Survey:
Demographic Information and Question Responses**

Demographics and Experience with Journalism and the Military

My age is:	#	%
20-25 years old	6	0.1
26-30 years old	37	0.3
31-35 years old	55	0.2
36-40 years old	37	0.2
41-45 years old	37	0.2
46 years old or older	54	0.3
No Response	10	

My gender is:	#	%
Female	40	18.3
Male	179	81.7

I consider myself to be:	#	%
Hispanic	10	4.6
African-American	6	2.8
Caucasian	179	82.1
Asian	6	2.8
Other	17	7.8
No Response	20	

My overall years of experience in journalism is:	#	%
5-10 years	66	29.3
11-15 years	63	28.0
16-20 years	31	13.8
21-25 years	40	17.8
More than 26 years	25	11.1
No Response	11	

My experience level in working and reporting on the military:	#	%
No Knowledge/ No Experience	21	9.3
Minimal Knowledge/ Minimal Experience	49	21.7
Some Knowledge/ Some Experience	65	28.8
Good Knowledge/ Good Experience	72	31.9
Extremely Knowledgeable/ Extremely Experienced	19	8.4
No Response	10	

My experience in the "field" with military units	#	%
No Knowledge/ No Experience	68	30.4
Minimal Knowledge/ Minimal Experience	30	13.4
Some Knowledge/ Some Experience	57	25.5
Good Knowledge/ Good Experience	50	22.3
Extremely Knowledgeable/ Extremely Experienced	19	8.5
No Response	12	

My knowledge level on the information presented in this course before attending	#	%
No Knowledge/No Experience	12	5.3
Minimal Knowledge/ Minimal Experience	47	20.8
Some Knowledge/ Some Experience	83	36.7
Good Knowledge/ Good Experience	70	31.0
Extremely Knowledgeable/ Extremely Experienced	14	6.2
No Response	10	

Survival and Safety

Protect yourself against NBC attack	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	0	0.0
Somewhat Valuable	16	7.1
Very Valuable	50	22.3
Extremely Valuable	158	70.5
No Response	10	

React to direct and indirect fire	#	%
No Value	1	0.4
Minimal Value	0	0.0
Somewhat Valuable	26	11.6
Very Valuable	56	24.9
Extremely Valuable	142	63.1
No Response	11	

Perform first-aid	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	7	3.1
Somewhat Valuable	35	15.3
Very Valuable	49	21.4
Extremely Valuable	41	60.3
No response	7	

Identify mine hazards and describe countermeasures	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	8	3.9
Somewhat Valuable	38	18.5
Very Valuable	54	26.2
Extremely Valuable	106	51.5
No Response	10	

Perform survival-level navigation	#	%
No Value	2	0.9
Minimal Value	17	7.5
Somewhat Valuable	31	13.7
Very Valuable	85	37.4
Extremely Valuable	92	40.5
No Response	9	

Describe basic cover and concealment measures	#	%
No Value	1	0.4
Minimal Value	8	3.5
Somewhat Valuable	45	19.8
Very Valuable	78	34.4
Extremely Valuable	95	41.9
No Response	9	

Safely embark/debark a helicopter with personal gear	#	%
No Value	5	2.2
Minimal Value	22	9.7
Somewhat Valuable	46	20.3
Very Valuable	58	25.6
Extremely Valuable	96	42.3
No Response	9	

Basic Military Knowledge

Identify major service weapons systems and platforms	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	25	11.4
Somewhat Valuable	87	39.6
Very Valuable	80	36.4
Extremely Valuable	28	12.7
No Response	16	

Identify individual weapons and describe their capabilities	#	%
No Value	5	2.2
Minimal Value	26	11.5
Somewhat Valuable	82	36.1
Very Valuable	86	37.9
Extremely Valuable	28	12.3
No Response	9	

Understand the primary mission and basic force structure of each Service (Services 101)	#	%
No Value	8	3.9
Minimal Value	32	15.4
Somewhat Valuable	85	40.9
Very Valuable	55	26.4
Extremely Valuable	28	13.5
No Response	28	

Understand the Military Code of Conduct	#	%
No Value	6	3.0
Minimal Value	35	17.5
Somewhat Valuable	82	41.0
Very Valuable	47	23.5
Extremely Valuable	30	15.0
No Response	36	

Understand the Law of Armed Conflict	#	%
No Value	9	4.5
Minimal Value	24	12.1
Somewhat Valuable	67	33.7
Very Valuable	58	29.2
Extremely Valuable	41	20.6
No Response	37	

Explain OPSEC procedures/requirements and the security classification system	#	%
No Value	9	4.4
Minimal Value	46	22.7
Somewhat Valuable	72	35.5
Very Valuable	53	26.1
Extremely Valuable	23	11.3
No Response	33	

Physical Fitness

Participate in a 5-mile tactical road march with a minimum 25-lb rucksack	#	%
No Value	1	0.4
Minimal Value	11	4.8
Somewhat Valuable	55	24.1
Very Valuable	69	30.3
Extremely Valuable	92	40.4
No Response	8	

Understand physical fitness requirements in working with the military	#	%
No Value	4	1.9
Minimal Value	14	6.8
Somewhat Valuable	45	21.8
Very Valuable	78	37.9
Extremely Valuable	65	31.6
No Response	20	

Living in the Field

Describe equipment required for living in the field (overnight in the field)	#	%
No Value	2	0.9
Minimal Value	11	4.9
Somewhat Valuable	53	23.6
Very Valuable	79	35.1
Extremely Valuable	80	35.6
No Response	11	

Describe basic field sanitation and health measures	#	%
No Value	5	2.2
Minimal Value	19	8.5
Somewhat Valuable	70	31.3
Very Valuable	71	31.7
Extremely Valuable	59	26.3
No Response	12	

Perform individual camouflage	#	%
No Value	11	4.6
Minimal Value	50	21.0
Somewhat Valuable	100	42.0
Very Valuable	51	21.4
Extremely Valuable	26	10.9
No Response	10	

Military and the Media

Understand media embed procedures	#	%
No Value	7	3.1
Minimal Value	12	5.4
Somewhat Valuable	40	17.9
Very Valuable	75	33.5
Extremely Valuable	90	40.2
No Response	12	

Understand the impact of civilian communications equipment on the battlefield	#	%
No Value	8	3.8
Minimal Value	18	8.6
Somewhat Valuable	69	33.0
Very Valuable	70	33.5
Extremely Valuable	44	21.1
No Response	27	

Explain the role and capabilities of PAOs	#	%
No Value	17	7.5
Minimal Value	56	24.8
Somewhat Valuable	90	39.8
Very Valuable	42	18.6
Extremely Valuable	21	9.3
No Response	12	

Understand the Joint Information Bureau structure, role and operations	#	%
No Value	16	7.3
Minimal Value	63	28.9
Somewhat Valuable	61	28.0
Very Valuable	53	24.3
Extremely Valuable	25	11.5
No Response	18	

Overall Value of the Course

The overall personal value in attending this course	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	2	0.9
Somewhat Valuable	21	9.2
Very Valuable	90	39.5
Extremely Valuable	115	50.4
No Response	8	

The overall value of attending this course for other journalists	#	%
No Value	0	0.0
Minimal Value	0	0.0
Somewhat Valuable	14	6.6
Very Valuable	87	40.9
Extremely Valuable	112	52.6
No Response	21	

Add a Subject and Remove an Element

Add a subject	#	%
Land Navigation/Field Training	32	16.3
First Aid	29	14.8
Surviving Hostile Desert Environment	21	10.7
PT	19	9.7
Chem/Bio Suit	12	6.1
Embedding	12	6.1
More Hands On	11	5.6
Landmine	9	4.6
Lecture Handouts	9	4.6
Urban Warfare	7	3.6
Hostage Situations	6	3.1
Field Communications	4	2.0
Terrorism Training	4	2.0
Combat	4	2.0
Map Reading	3	1.5
Weapons Training	3	1.5
Hearing Live Fire	3	1.5
Iraqi Situation	2	1.0
NBC	1	0.5
Basic Survival Techniques	1	0.5
NBC	1	0.5
Anti Terrorism Techniques	1	0.5
Rank Insignia	1	0.5

Remove an element	#	%
Power Point Presentations	34	23.0
Services 101	19	12.8
Less Classroom Time	15	10.1
Field Sanitation/Latrines	14	9.5
Cultural Sensitivity	9	6.1
MRE	9	6.1
Weapon and Firearm Systems	6	4.1
Land Navigation	6	4.1
JIB	6	4.1
PT	6	4.1
PAO Presentation	5	3.4
Helicopter Tour	4	2.7
Overnight Campout	3	2.0
Rank Insignia	3	2.0
Nuclear Element	2	1.4
Law Armed Conflict	1	0.7
Direct/Indirect Fire	1	0.7
Compass Reading	1	0.7
Press Embeds and Media Ops	1	0.7
Functions of Contingencies	1	0.7
LOAC Section	1	0.7
Combat Camera	1	0.7

**APPENDIX K.
OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) AND
ACCESS TO INFORMATION**

Table K-1. Definitions

Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 June 2004)

<p>Classified information — Official information that has been determined to require, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and that has been so designated.</p>
<p>Operations security — A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC.</p>
<p>Security clearance — An administrative determination by competent authority that an individual is eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified information.</p>
<p>Security review — The process of reviewing news media products at some point, usually before transmission, to ensure that no oral, written, or visual information is filed for publication or broadcast that would divulge national security information or would jeopardize ongoing or future operations or that would threaten the safety of the members of the force.</p>
<p>Sensitive — Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity.</p>

Joint Pub 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, Appendix A. Guidelines for Discussions with the Media*, 14 May 1997

<p>2. "Security at the source" serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released that jeopardizes operations security or the safety and privacy of joint military forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.</p>
<p>4. Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations must be protected from disclosure to the media. In more general terms, information in the following categories of information should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of host-nation and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. While these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the media, they may also be used as ground rules for media coverage. The list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation.</p>

**Table K-2. Extract of 10 February 2003 PAG –
Guidance About Security of Information**

101900Z FEB 03

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA//

Subject: Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments In The U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) Area Of Responsibility (AOR).

1. Purpose. This message provides guidance, policies and procedures on embedding news media during possible future operations/deployments in the CENTCOM AOR. It can be adapted for use in other Unified Command AORs as necessary.

2. Policy.

2.a. ... commanders and public affairs officers must work together to balance the need for media access with the need for operational security.

2.c.4. Unit commanders may impose temporary restrictions on electronic transmissions for operational security reasons.

3. Procedures.

3.r. There is no general review process for media products. See para 6.a. for further detail concerning security at the source.

3.w.1. Departing media will be debriefed on operational security considerations as applicable to ongoing and future operations that they may now have information concerning.

4. Ground rules.

4.a. All interviews with service members will be on the record. Security at the source is the policy.

4.e. Embargoes may be imposed to protect operational security. Embargoes will only be used for operational security and will be lifted as soon as the operational security issue has passed.

4.g. The following categories of information are not releasable since their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.

4.g.6. Information regarding future operations.

4.g.12. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. Information on ongoing engagements will not be released unless authorized for release by on-scene commander.

**Table K-2. Extract of 10 February 2003 PAG –
Guidance About Security of Information (Continued)**

6. Security.

6.a. Media products will not be subject to security review or censorship except as indicated in para. 6.a.1. Security at the source will be the rule. U.S. military personnel shall protect classified information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Media provided access to sensitive information—information that is not classified but that may be of operational value to an adversary or when combined with other unclassified information may reveal classified information—will be informed in advance by the unit commander or his/her designated representative of the restrictions on the use or disclosure of such information.

6.a.1. The nature of the embedding process may involve observation of sensitive information, including troop movements, battle preparations, materiel capabilities and vulnerabilities, and other information as listed in para. 4.g. When a commander or his/her designated representative has reason to believe that a media member will have access to this type of sensitive information, prior to allowing such access, he/she will take prudent precautions to ensure the security of that information. The primary safeguard will be to brief media in advance about what information is sensitive and what the parameters are for covering this type of information. If media are inadvertently exposed to sensitive information, they should be briefed after exposure on what information they should avoid covering. In instances where a unit commander or the designated representative determines that coverage of a story will involve exposure to sensitive information beyond the scope of what may be protected by prebriefing or debriefing, but coverage of which is in the best interests of the DoD, the commander may offer access if the reporter agrees to a security review of his/her coverage. Agreement to security review in exchange for this type of access must be strictly voluntary, and, if the reporter does not agree, then access may not be granted. If a security review is agreed to, it will not involve any editorial changes; it will be conducted solely to ensure that no sensitive or classified information is included in the product. If such information is found, the media will be asked to remove that information from the product and/or embargo the product until such information is no longer classified or sensitive. Reviews are to be done as soon as practical so as not to interrupt combat operations or delay reporting. If there are disputes resulting from the security review process, they may be appealed through the chain of command, or through PA channels to OASD/PA. This paragraph does not authorize commanders to allow media access to classified information.

6.a.2. Media products will not be confiscated or otherwise impounded. If it is believed that classified information has been compromised and the media representative refuses to remove that information, notify the CPIC and/or OASD/PA as soon as possible so the issue may be addressed with the media organization's management.

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