The Statecraft of Anwar El-Sadat and the October War
Abstract
Despite the controversy over the utility and meaning of the concept of national interest, there is relatively little dispute that preserving the internal security of a country, its people, territory, and institutions is a basic and unchanging objective of nation states and their leaders, and one pursued with the highest intensity -- in Nuechterlein's terminology a "survival" or "vital" interest. Thus, the recapturing or restoration of Egyptian and Arab lands lost to Israel in the 1967 war was a fundamental national interest in Anwar El-Sadat's mind. However, given Israel's unquestioned military superiority in 1973, a critical assessment of Sadat's decision to begin the October 1973 war should focus on whether his national security strategy set goals that could be accomplished with the resources available to him (i.e., reflected a rational assessment of ends and means). Secondly, given the high costs associated with the use of coercive power, one must question whether Sadat's direct use of military force was necessary to achieve his goals. The answer to both questions appears to be "yes."
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA441370
Entities
People
- Jerry Stacy
Organizations
- National War College