Sadat's October War - A Road to Peace
Abstract
Through his foresighted statecraft, Anwar el-Sadat, President of Egypt, started the October War, a conflict Egypt could not "win" in the conventional sense, but which would rescue his nation from the untenable position it occupied in 1973. Egypt's situation at that time was characterized by the following: (1) a continuing hostility with Israel because Israel's past wartime successes both stiffened her resolve to insist on settlement terms that her neighbors could not accept, and robbed Egypt (and others) of the flexibility they needed to come to terms with the Israelis; (2) an ineffective and dependent relationship with the Soviet Union; and (3) potential unrest at home because of economic disequilibrium stemming from enormous military expenditures and loss of Suez canal revenues. To his great credit, Sadat, though he was operating from a position of extreme weakness, rectified these problems to the advantage not only of Egypt, but of her region and the rest of the world. The steps he took defied conventional logic. He deliberately cut himself off from the only superpower that would sell him arms, while he began a war he knew he could not win militarily. In doing so, he opened the door for the successful intervention of the United States, which he correctly identified as the only authority capable of balancing regional power by bringing both Egypt and Israel to the negotiating table. Sadat's success stemmed from his correct identification of the real issues at stake and his recognition of Egypt's real priorities.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA441378
Entities
People
- Michael D. Metelits
Organizations
- National War College