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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

REAGAN AND THE AWACS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN ACTION

CORE COURSE 3 ESSAY

LT COL S TACO GILBERT III CLASS OF 96
COURSE 3
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Reagan and the AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia Bureaucratic Politics in Action

Introduction

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United States would sell advanced air defense armaments, including F-15 improvements, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Despite strong opposition in Congress, the administration successfully concluded the sale. Fundamental to the success of the policy debate was the President's careful orchestration of efforts to secure a majority of support within the Senate.

The thesis of this paper is that the President assumed a bureaucratic politics model in the orchestration of his policy support on Capitol Hill. In order to confirm this thesis, it is essential to first understand the Constitutional roots to the struggle between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy. Over the past 100 years, these roots have blossomed into legislation specifically targeting one area of foreign policy -- Foreign Military Sales (FMS). While the Constitution and subsequent legislation provided the legal foundations upon which President Reagan maneuvered, he had several strategies available depending on his underlying assumptions of governmental action. In his selection from the three generally accepted models, President Reagan's policy strategy points toward a Bureaucratic Politics paradigm. Therefore, this paper will explore the President's choice of models by, first, describing the Constitutional conflict over foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches. Then, it will broadly sketch the legislation that resulted in the area of FMS. Finally, it will describe President Reagan's efforts to secure the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia and how those efforts conform to a Bureaucratic Politics model of governmental action within the United States -- a nation with struggle as a centerpiece of its Constitution.

Invitation to Struggle: Constitutional Confrontation

The basis for the conflict between the President and the Congress over FMS finds its roots in the opening moments of our government. While the Constitution is imprecise over responsibility for foreign affairs, the document suggests a sharing of powers with the Executive to take the lead. Article II, Section 3 gives the President the exclusive right to recognize foreign powers through the power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. Though the Congress has challenged this power in the past, as in when Senator Goldwater (Rep., AZ) attempted to block recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, the Supreme Court has held the power to reside with the Executive branch alone.¹ While Section 3 would suggest autonomy in foreign affairs, Section 2 clouds the issues as it incorporates some of the checks and balances of our Constitution into the arena of foreign affairs. Section 2 gives the President the powers of

Commander in Chief and the ability to make treaties with foreign states. However, these powers are expressly not exclusive.

Article I, Section 8, in its enumeration of Congressional powers grants the legislative branch the power to declare war, raise armies, maintain navies, and authorize any expenditures made by the government. Article II, Section 2 states that the Senate must ratify any treaty with a two-thirds majority. So the power of the president exists in shades of gray depending upon the individual issue in the foreign policy arena. This sharing of powers in the foreign affairs arena surfaced at the earliest point in the AWACS sale review in Congress. In his questioning of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Senator Pell (Dem., RI) stressed, "Our system of government involves a sharing of responsibility, particularly with the Senate under the Constitution in the field of Foreign affairs."² Secretary Haig did not argue the point, but asserted that his presence at the hearing constituted executive agreement and a quest for legislative-executive consensus on the issue.³

While most policy debates in contemporary politics stem from the above powers, Article I, Section 8, gives one additional power to the Congress -- the power to regulate international commerce. Though Congress has delegated much of this power to the president, such as the power to determine Most Favored Nation trading status, the Congress retains oversight authority as evidenced by the debate over support for China's trading status in 1993 and 1994.⁴ This power also clouds the issue of FMS. For though arms sales have a special character and are frequently viewed as foreign policy issues, they are in fact business transactions of great magnitude. When hearings began in Congress in the Fall of 1981, the proposed sale of military equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the largest sale of military equipment in the history of the United States.⁵ Such a sale, in addition to being a tool of foreign policy, also constituted a significant trade issue.

Few members of Congress get involved in FMS. For most, the issues are too salient to warrant attention. Others that do seek involvement do so for moral reasons. Of the small percentage that regularly involve themselves in such sales, the majority are motivated by ethnic politics. Frequently the driving force behind these members are powerful ethnic lobbies, such as those of Greek or Jewish Americans.⁶

Several factors preceded the AWACS sale to make these lobby efforts even more powerful in FMS matters. The breakdown in party discipline over the past twenty-five years has allowed more and more members to freely prosecute their own agendas. Further, Congressional perceptions of excess Executive power in the wake of the Vietnamese conflict led to increased efforts by Congress to reign in traditional presidential independence in the field of foreign affairs. Finally, the promulgation (WC) of the Nixon Doctrine⁷ significantly increased the volume and import of FMS as an instrument of foreign policy as the US sought to have other nations fight our battles for us.⁸ All of these factors led to legislative restrictions, giving more definite form to the Congressional invitation to struggle.

Prelude to a Battle: The Trail of Legislative Restrictions

Though FMS legislation dated to 1898,⁹ Congress took initial steps to codify its position in the expanding role of FMS in 1974 with the Nelson Amendment. The amendment, modified in 1976,¹⁰ required the President to “notify Congress 30 days prior to enacting major weapon sales.” During this time, the Congress could veto the sale with a concurrent resolution. During the Congressional hearings on the AWACS, Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (Dem., NY), House sponsor of the Nelson Amendment, recounted the initial motivations for the legislation and traced the roots back to the Nixon administration. He reminded those present at the hearing how then President Nixon had expanded the FMS program and thereby “eroded” the control the Congress had built over military assistance program through their power of the purse.¹¹ Nixon signed the bill into law on December 30, 1974. However, the amendment left the executive branch great latitude with FMS.

Though the bill solidified Congressional involvement in significant military sales, the amendment also limited their ability to stifle executive initiatives. By specifying a veto, not approval of the sale, the President could continue with his preferred policies unless Congress mustered the votes to override his decision. Therefore, he could command policy with a simple majority in either house of Congress.¹² The policy implications of the Nelson Amendment did not escape President Reagan.

Opening Moves: Prelude to the 1981 AWACS Sale

By the mid-1970s, arms sales to the Persian Gulf region had already demonstrated a new era for FMS as a tool of foreign policy. By 1974, 60 percent of all FMS was to Gulf states.¹³ Furthermore, the character of these sales had radically changed. Whereas in previous decades, nations only sold older, less capable weapons abroad, by the mid-1970s, the Gulf states were fielding the latest in Western technology. Iran received its first F-14 fighter aircraft only 21 months after the US Navy, and received other equally sophisticated equipment to augment their air, land, and sea forces throughout the decade.¹⁴

Economic factors during the 1970s were also important to the transformation in FMS. Post-Vietnam cuts in US defense expenditures cut domestic arms sales at the same time that OPEC price increases (and their resulting profits) and the Middle East War boosted foreign demand for US military hardware. American firms became more dependent on foreign sales, not just to sustain production and achieve economies of scale, but to recoup research and development costs.¹⁵ One 1976 governmental study predicted that the loss of FMS would increase national unemployment by 0.1 percent and reduce GNP by 1.0 percent.¹⁶ Through the decade of the 1980s, FMS accounted for five percent of total annual exports.¹⁷ There were, and still are, significant economic benefits to FMS.

But the benefits from these sales did not come without conflict. President Nixon's failed attempt to sell top-of-the-line F-4 aircraft to Saudi Arabia was a principal motivator for the Nelson Amendment. In

the waning days of the Ford administration, the US proposed to sell AWACS aircraft to Iran. Carter countered the move upon his election. Then in the latter days of the Carter administration, the executive began negotiations on the AWACS sale to the Saudi Air Force.¹⁸ Carter, stung by the sudden upheaval in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and poor public approval ratings, could not muster sufficient support in Congress. He eventually withdrew the sale from consideration with the concurrence of Congressional leadership.¹⁹ When President Reagan re-initiated the sale in 1981, the Congress reacted strongly. How he reacted depended on his underlying model of governmental action.

The President's Choice of Political Models

In his seminal work, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Dr. Graham Allison of Harvard University postulated three theories of government action (see appendices for further information). His work detailed the 'Rational Actor,' 'Organizational Process,' and the 'Bureaucratic Politics' paradigms. As one moved from the Rational Actor toward the Bureaucratic Politics model (from the nation as a single actor, to organizations of the government, to finally individuals within the government), the depth at which one explored the internal workings of the government increased with possible changes in predicted outcomes from the same scenario.

Had President Reagan assumed a rational actor scheme of policy formulation, he would assume that governmental action would be a choice designed to maximize value associated with national objectives. Though the objectives could change, the natural metric against which they would likely be measured would be the National Security Strategy of the United States. As such, one could assume that as the drafter of this strategy, his choices to support that scheme would prevail as "value maximizing." Therefore, the AWACS sale would require little, if any, executive involvement besides communicating how the transaction was connected to the national values. However, this simplistic approach assumes a national/governmental consensus on the value system and on the linkage of the sale to those values. Given the traditional competition over priorities in the Middle East, such assumptions are ill founded. Greater depth is required for adequate analysis.

A second option existed -- the Organizational Process Model. This model assumes that governmental action is the result of organizational outputs. Output is predictable since it is the result of standard operating procedures. Given the parochial priorities of organizations, turnover in personnel should not change the basic operating procedures.²⁰ Hence, the shift in control of the Senate in the 1980 elections (the Democrats retained leadership in the House) would not alter governmental action. Additionally, uncertainty avoidance inherent to the organizational process model would make the Congress averse to the risks associated with a shift in policy.²¹ Because the best prediction of current action (t) is the most recent action ($t - 1$),²² had President Reagan used this model he would have looked at the recent Congressional history to predict the action the "government" would take on the AWACS sale.

In this analysis, one still has to make a few assumptions as to how to define the standard operating procedures. A first cut could be to define standard operating procedures to be Congressional votes along party lines. However, given the rapid erosion of party discipline in the 1970s and 1980s, partisan lines were increasingly poor predictors of voting behavior. Instead of looking at voting behavior across the spectrum of political questions, voting behavior within the more narrowly defined area of arms sales would be a better predictor of the outcome of this policy question. Past behavior ($t - 1$) was not promising for the President's proposal. During the latter days of the Carter administration, the Congress had suppressed an even less contentious arms sale package to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based on concerns for technology transfer, regional instability, and the perceived threat to the state of Israel. The Organizational Process Model would, therefore, predict Congressional veto of the FMS package regardless of Presidential action.

However, President Reagan assumed a Bureaucratic Politics Model of governmental action (see Appendix A for further information) and structured his actions accordingly. The Bureaucratic Politics Model realizes that action is a political resultant of bargaining. The three fundamental characteristics of this model are (1) that there are always conflicts in values and goals that must be reconciled before a decision, (2) there are competing groups of people within groups with competing goals and values, and (3) the relative power of the groups are relevant to the final decision.²³ From these basic assumptions on the model emerge several key premises. First, positions define power as well as opportunities to influence outcomes.²⁴ Second, the goals and interests of each player affect their position and the outcome of the process.²⁵ Third, deadlines and events force players to take stands rather than enjoy a leisurely evaluation of options.²⁶ Fourth, power is a function of bargaining advantages, skill and will.²⁷ Reagan was conscious of these aspects of the 'game' as he orchestrated his AWACS gameplan.

The Presidential Gameplan

The bureaucratic politics model framed the President's outlook, for the characteristics of the model provided the context in which the President operated. This context included key players, their goals and values, and the conflicts within and between organizations and individuals. The President saw his position clearly. He used the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to articulate these views before the Congress and the public. In statements before both the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs, Secretary Weinberger linked the sale to our "vital national interests."²⁸ He further stated that the administration sought to create regional stability by allowing the Saudis to defend their oil fields from foreign aggression. The sale also sought to build confidence in the US as a "reliable partner in the region." The arms transfer was further intended as a foundation for closer political and military cooperation between the two nations. Finally, the AWACS and associated equipment would "increase the effectiveness of our own military capabilities if we were ever called upon to deploy U S forces to the area."²⁹ Secretary Haig added that the sale was intended to encourage Saudi participation

in the Middle East peace process³⁰ In the context of the on-going Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the administration also sought to contain Soviet and Islamic fundamentalist influence in the Gulf region

Congress had goals as well On the policy front, there was strong backing for Israel and a fear that any arms transfer would significantly impair that state's defense position Representative LeBoutillier (Rep , NY) voiced the concern of many when he tried to frame the issue in terms of constituency support He argued that the 1980 election was a rejection of President Carter's policies, which included support to Saudi Arabia³¹ Senators Pell (Dem , RI), Mathias (Rep , MD), and Biden (Dem , DE) all made pointed statements seeking to reassert Congressional involvement in Foreign affairs Senator Biden's were the most telling when he seemed to lecture the Secretary of Defense that Executive agreements with foreign powers were only "as good as the willingness of Congress to agree"³² There were also strong concerns over the potential loss of a valuable technological advantage, particularly in the wake of the fall of Iran and the loss of the F-14/Phoenix air-to-air missile system³³ Furthermore, the Democratic party saw an opportunity to reassert leadership after its losses in the 1980 election and the opening days of the Reagan Presidency³⁴ The fundamental policy differences and the partisan influences on the debate did not fully define the lines of disagreement

Within each body there were also differences in the assessments of values which presented internal challenges and external opportunities Within the executive department, the President held great influence, but still had minor officials who sought to undercut his policy The most visible opposition was an oft-quoted letter from 12 USAF F-15 pilots who opposed the transfer of leading air-to-air technologies to an, as yet, unreliable nation³⁵ Furthermore, opposing Senators were quick to exploit radio statements by senior Air Force leaders on the adequacy of American AWACS support to the Kingdom to present the image of a divided executive branch³⁶ Similar breeches in the administration position emerged as Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Harold H Saunders argued against the sale from the perspective of long-term interests in the area, presenting the image of a divided Department of State³⁷ General George Keegan, retired, former Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Force Intelligence, similarly opposed the sale because of the loss of technology, the perceived slant away from Israel, and the long-term commitment it implied to the Arab world³⁸ Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency fueled the fires of opposition with fears about the loss of control over valuable technologies³⁹ However, the President, by virtue of his position, commanded the resources of the executive branch and was able to minimize public opposition to the plan from within the agencies and White House, and orchestrated high level testimony to reinforce his position

In the Congress, the interests tended to vary, but opposition was strong Within the House of Representatives, the disapproval resolution enjoyed 255 co-sponsors, or 37 more votes than necessary to prevail⁴⁰ The many interests hinged on perceived constituency support, as voiced by Representative LeBoutillier (Rep , NY) in the House hearings when he rejected the notion of Presidential freedom in

foreign affairs⁴¹ The issue of satisfying important lobby interests also surfaced, as both Jewish and Arab interest groups presented their testimony before Congressional committees⁴²

Rather than accept the organization as a whole, Reagan identified and targeted key actors and structured his efforts to achieve his goal His goal was limited by the scope of existing legislation He didn't have to win, he just had to prevent a loss in both houses of Congress

First, he saw a strongly Democratic House of Representatives Though the party included a number of "boll weevils," or conservative members,⁴³ it was still a difficult battle The administration accepted an uncontested loss in the House and concentrated on the Senate⁴⁴ The House passed the disapproval legislation by a wide margin (28 to 8 in committee with one "present", and 301 to 111 on the floor)⁴⁵

Reagan elected to fight in the Senate He targeted key leaders in the Republican-led body, such as Senators Mark Andrews (Rep , ND), William Cohen (Rep , ME), Slade Gorton (Rep , WA), Roger Jepson (Rep , IO), Larry Pressler (Rep , SD), and Edward Zorinsky (Dem , NE)⁴⁶ Targeting key leaders and swing votes could carry the day The President enjoyed a reputation as an effective lobbyist⁴⁷ and he personally pushed his program Furthermore, he built three "lobby" teams to cover the Senate, the red, white, and blue teams Each team contained someone from the Executive leadership and the Departments of Defense and State, as well as someone to answer any technical questions The teams briefed every Senator and/or his office staff⁴⁸ But efforts did not stop there⁴⁹

The Administration, realizing that power is relative, also sought to undercut the power of the opposition While many of the Democrats tried to oppose the sale based on Israeli security and technology transfer, the administration attacked aggressively President Reagan personally entered the fray, boasting his previous support for Israel and went so far as to blame Israeli President Begin for interfering in American affairs The Democratic party plan backfired as those members came to be viewed as pawns of the Jewish lobby⁵⁰ Representative Floyd Fithian (IN) even went so far as to publicly refute that the sale was a " Jewish issue " and to deny any ties to Jewish constituencies⁵¹ Reagan also mobilized Democratic party support, most notably from former President Carter, to undercut party loyalty⁵² On the technology issue, the administration effectively defused the issues with a series of compromises Americans would crew the aircraft for several years into the future, and would also be responsible for all training of the Saudis Defusing the opposition's strongest arguments increased the relative power of the President's position While refusing to emphasize the point, the Administration also conveyed the point that the sale would keep the AWACS production line open and prevent the Saudi Air Force from seeking the British Nimrod aircraft as a substitute.⁵³

Finally, the President orchestrated the context of the executive-legislative interaction to play to his power. As the model notes, timing is a factor. Barry Blechman, in his study *The Politics of National Security* notes that the timing of arms sales are critical to the success of the proposal Proposals in the first six months of an administration have much greater chances of approval because post-election power is high

while pre-election maneuvering among the Congress is low.⁴⁴ He also points to presidential popularity as key to success.⁴⁵ Following the 1980 elections, the President's strong popularity produced extraordinary party discipline [in the Senate].⁴⁶ Blechman also found that the administration's skill in deal making, the aspirations of party members, and the effectiveness of lobby groups were key. He found the AWACS sale a turning point in Israeli lobby efforts, finding their efforts ineffective. They strengthened efforts in subsequent years.⁴⁷ The Reagan administration optimized their efforts in each of these areas.

Though the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent the measure to the floor with a recommendation to disapprove the sale (9 to 8), the Senate rejected disapproval (allowed the sale to proceed) with a vote of 52 to 48.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The Constitution invites struggle between the President and the Congress in the field of foreign relations. This struggle has produced a body of legislation regulating one area of that field, foreign military sales. The Constitution and resulting law structured the environment in which President Reagan sought to secure approval to sell advanced air defense armaments to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To orchestrate a successful policy approval strategy, the President first had to make an assumption about federal governmental action in the United States. Had he assumed a rational actor model, he would have taken minimal action, except to communicate how the sale optimized the return for the United States, and then relied on the "value-maximizing" behavior of the government to reach a decision. Had he assumed an Organizational Process Model, the administration could predict disapproval. The Congress had most recently rejected an almost identical package. Given that most recent behavior is the best predictor of actions, Reagan could not hope to overcome the standard operating procedures and actions of the legislative branch.

However, by assuming a bureaucratic politics model, the President was able to target the key actors in the process and orchestrate the interchange to optimize his power. Avoiding the House where he had little ability to sway the decision, he instead fought an aggressive fight within the Senate, using strong personal and organizational lobby efforts to reinforce his power and undermine the opposition, and forcing the timing to his advantage. By assuming that governmental action was the result of a bargaining process, he was able to develop and implement a strategy for success.

Appendix A

The Bureaucratic Politics Model Assumptions and Actors in the AWACS Sale

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

Dr. Graham Allison of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, postulated a new model of policy formulation in his seminal work, *The Essence of Decision*. Building on the framework of the Rational Actor and the Organizational Process Models, he developed the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model.⁵⁹ Rather than seeing a government as a single, rational actor, or even as a collection of separate agencies with predictable procedures and predictable results, he proposed that decisions came as the result of complex maneuvering between individual actors. The relative power of each actor, exercised through bargaining in each situation, was crucial to predicting the outcome of any policy contest.⁶⁰ Though he would not suggest rejection of the previous models, he would argue that his would provide a more realistic view of the policy process at the upper levels of government.

Essential to any application of the Allison model is the identification of the actors in any policy conflict. In the Saudi AWACS sale, some of the more important actors were the members of Congress, particularly the committees which would recommend approval or disapproval of the sale to their respective bodies. These members are listed below.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Charles H. Percy (Illinois) Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr. (TN)
Jesse Helms (NC)
S. I. Hayakawa (CA)
Richard G. Lugar (IN)
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (MD)
Nancy L. Kassebaum (KS)
Rudy Boschwitz (MN)
Larry Pressler (SD)

Claiborne Pell (RI)
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (DE)
John Glenn (OH)
Paul S. Sarbanes (MD)
Edward Zorinsky (NE)
Paul E. Tsongas (MA)
Alan Cranston (CA)
Christopher J. Dodd (CN)

Appendix A (cont)

House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

Clement J. Zablocki (Wisconsin) Chairman



L. H. Fountain (NC)	William S. Broomfield (MI)
Dante B. Fascell (FL)	Edward J. Derwinski (IL)
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (NY)	Paul Findley (IL)
Lee H. Hamilton (IN)	Larry Winn, Jr. (KS)
Jonathan B. Bingham (NY)	Benjamin A. Gilman (NY)
Gus Yatron (PA)	Robert J. Lagomarsino (CA)
Stephen J. Solarz (NY)	William F. Goodling (PA)
Don Bonker (WA)	Joel Pritchard (WA)
Gerry E. Studds (MA)	Millicent Fenwick (NJ)
Andy Ireland (FL)	Robert K. Dornan (CA)
Dan Mica (FL)	Jim Leach (IO)
Michael D. Barnes (MD)	Arlen Erdahl (MN)
Howard Wolpe (MI)	Toby Roth (WI)
Geo. W. Crockett, Jr. (VI)	Olympia J. Snowe (ME)
Bob Shamansky (OH)	John LeBoutillier (NY)
Sam Gejdenson (CT)	Henry J. Hyde (IL)
Mervyn M. Dymally (CA)	
Dennis E. Eckart (OH)	
Tom Lantos (CA)	
David R. Bowen (MS)	

Key members of the executive branch include Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, President Reagan, and key Congressional liaison officials.

However, of some significance are the lesser governmental and extragovernmental participants, who entered into the policy arena for various reasons. In this case, these actors included American military officers, Jewish and Arab lobby groups, and notable scholars. Each of these participants entered into the policy discussion with assumptions about how the process would work.

Appendix B

Overview of Allison's Three Models⁶¹

Summary Outline of Models and Concepts			
The Paradigm	Model I	Model II	Model III
	National government  Goals (objective function) Options Consequences Choice	National government  Organizations (A-G) (as its SOP's and programs)	National government  Players in positions (A-F) Goals, interests, stakes and stands (i-z) Power Action channels
Basic unit of analysis	Governmental action as choice	Governmental action as organizational output	Governmental action as political resultant
Organizing concepts	National actor The problem Static selection Action as rational choice Goals and objectives Options Consequences Choice	Organizational actors (constellation of which is the government) Factored problems and fractionated power Parochial priorities and perceptions Action as organizational output Goals - constraints defining acceptable performance Sequential attention to goals Standard operating procedures Programs and repertoires Uncertainty avoidance (negotiated environment - standard scenario) Problem directed search Organizational learning and change Central coordination and control Decisions of government leaders	Players in positions Parochial priorities and perceptions Goals and interests Stakes and stands Headlines and faces of issues Power Action channels Rules of the game Action as political resultant
Dominant inference pattern	Governmental action = choice with regard to objectives	Governmental action (in short run) = output largely determined by present SOP's and programs Governmental action (in longer run) = output importantly affected by organizational goals SOP's, etc	Governmental action = resultant of bargaining
General propositions	Substitution effect	Organizational implementation Organizational options Limited flexibility and incremental change Long range planning Goals and tradeoffs Imperialism Options and organization Administrative feasibility Directed change	Political resultants Action and intention Problems and solutions Where you stand depends on where you sit Chiefs and Indians The 51-49 principle Inter and intra national relations Misperception, misexpectation, miscommunication and reticence Styles of play

¹ Jen-kun Fu, *Taiwan and the Geopolitics of the Asian-American Dilemma*, (New York: Praeger, 1992) 69-70. Senator Goldwater and 25 other Republican senators challenged President Carter's abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty of 1954 without Congressional consultation. An amendment to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 clouded the issue with its requirement that the president not terminate any defense treaty without first consulting Congress. The senators challenged the Constitutionality of the president's actions and tied it to the larger conflict over the balance between Executive and Legislative control of foreign policy. U.S. District Judge Gasch ruled in favor of the senators on October 17, 1979. However, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the decision, on presidential appeal, on January 1, 1980, asserting presidential control over treaty termination.

² United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session, Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15, 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981) 20. Senator Pell's remarks were during the hearings on October 1, 1981. Representative Tom Lantos of California echoed those sentiments from the House of Representatives in his testimony before the Senate committee when he stated, "I think that the administration made a tremendously serious mistake by making the Saudis believe that it could deliver on a promise without ascertaining the sentiments of the Congress." His testimony occurred on October 1, 1981 (same document, page 21). Representative Clarence D. Long of Maryland concurred in the testimony that followed, arguing for a Congressional reassessment of arms sales policy (same document, page 31).

³ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20.

⁴ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, *United States-China Act of 1994: Adverse Report, August 1, 1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 1-3. In a review of the United States-China Act of 1994, Mr. Gibbons, from the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives provided a concise history of the Executive-Legislative debate on trade policy, with emphasis on China. In general, the President has the authority to grant Most Favored Nation trade status, but must certify certain freedom of emigration standards in communist states. Following Presidential notification, the Congress has 60 days to consider veto action. The document also communicates the role of Congress in regulating international commerce, as well as the conflict over control of foreign policy. For additional information on the debate over China's trade status, see President Clinton's *Communication from the President of the United States: Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of China* dated 6 June 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

⁵ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9. Remarks by Senator Patrick Moynihan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 1, 1981.

⁶ Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 113.

⁷ The Nixon Doctrine was an outgrowth of Vietnamization of the Vietnam Conflict. The U.S. would shape a triangular balance of power between the U.S., Soviet Union, and China. "The United States would then delegate certain regional allies the manpower burden of defending their neighborhoods against communism." For more information on the Nixon Doctrine, see Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) 239-245. As a result of the Nixon Doctrine, FMS expanded and became a more important tool of American foreign policy.

⁸ Blechman, 113.

⁹ For a comprehensive discussion of the development of FMS legislation and the executive-legislative dynamic, see Robert D. Shuey, "Alternative Criteria for U.S. Arms Export Controls," Congressional Research Service, 1978. His March 7, 1978 unpublished paper (report number 78-126F) is available at the National Defense University Library.

¹⁰ Blechman, 121. Modifications to the bill in 1976 required the President to notify Congress 30 days prior to completing all sales valued at \$14 million or more for single weapons, and \$50 million or more for sales of "defense articles and services."

¹¹ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Proposed Sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements to Saudi Arabia: Hearings and Markup*

before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East September 28, October 1, 6 and 7, 1981 (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1981) 5 Representative Bingham's remarks were during hearings on September 28, 1981

¹² Following the *Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha*, 1983, Congress amended the Nelson provisions, changing the concurrent resolution to a joint resolution requirement The change allowed the President to veto their actions and eliminated the 'legislative veto'

¹³ Robert Berman, "U S Arms to the Persian Gulf," *Current Issues in U S Defense Policy*, ed David T Johnson and Barry R Schneider (New York Praeger Publishers, 1976) 99

¹⁴ Berman, 103

¹⁵ Keith Krause, *Arms and the State Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (Cambridge U K Cambridge University Press, 1992) 105-107

¹⁶ United States, Congressional Budget Office, *The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U S Economy*, staff working paper (Washington, D C Congressional Budget Office, 23 July 1976) For more information see Krause, page 108

¹⁷ Blechman, 115

¹⁸ Blechman, 122-123

¹⁹ For further discussion of the Executive-Legislative battle over the AWACS during the Carter Administration, see Blechman, 122-124 The battle largely centered around a power struggle between President Carter and Senator Robert Byrd (Dem , WV), the majority leader Byrd opposed the sale and viewed Presidential determination to proceed as a challenge to his leadership In the face of certain defeat, the President withdrew the sale from consideration Also see Charles Mc Mathias, Jr , "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 59, No 5 (Summer 1981) 994-995

²⁰ Graham T Allison, *Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston Little, Brown and Company, 1971) 81 Organizations tend to recruit members who share the unit's value system Additional group pressures and rewards drive members to conform to the expected norms

²¹ Allison, 72

²² Allison, 91

²³ Allison, 157

²⁴ Allison, 165

²⁵ Allison, 167

²⁶ Allison, 168

²⁷ Allison, 168

²⁸ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 65 Testimony occurred on October 1, 1981

²⁹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 54 Testimony occurred on October 1, 1981

³⁰ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 184 Testimony occurred on October 5, 1981, one week after an Iranian air attack on Kuwaiti oil fields

³¹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 152 Testimony occurred on October 7, 1981

³² Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20, 30, and 76 Testimony of Senators Pell (page 20), Mathias (page 30), and Biden (page 76) occurred on October 1, 1981

³³ See Senate Foreign Relations Committee Remarks from Senators Biden, Glenn, and Presler throughout the hearings in October consistently reinforce these concerns

³⁴ Blechman, 124

³⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 16-17 Once this letter was placed into the public record on September 28, 1981, it was subsequently cited in Senate testimony

³⁶ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28. Senator Mathias' remarks were in testimony on October 1, 1981

³⁷ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 108. Testimony occurred on October 5, 1981

³⁸ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 265 Testimony occurred on October 6, 1981

³⁹ Blechman, 122

⁴⁰ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25. Representative Long's remarks occurred during testimony on 28 September 1981

⁴¹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 152. Testimony occurred on October 7, 1981

⁴² Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 140-159 Testimony included the National Association of Arab Americans (140), the Jewish American Veterans (153), and the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (159) Further witnesses included numerous academics and lobbyists Cited testimony occurred on 5 October 1981

⁴³ Fischer, 191

⁴⁴ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Allegations of Improper Lobbying by Department of Defense Personnel of the C-5B and B-1B Aircraft and Sale to Saudi Arabia of the Airborne Warning and Control System Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, Hearings Held September 14, 15, 16, 30, and November 30, 1982* (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1983) 150 Also see Blechman, 124

⁴⁵ Blechman, 124

⁴⁶ Blechman, 124

⁴⁷ Louis Fisher, *The Politics of Shared Power Congress and the Executive*, Second Edition (Washington, D C Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993) 202 Comments by Senator Mark Hatfield, Republican of Oregon

⁴⁸ House Armed Services Committee, 150

⁴⁹ The aggressiveness and success of the Administration's lobby efforts led to hearings by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives on December 30, 1982 These hearing found that the Administration did exceed the legislative restrictions on executive lobbying

⁵⁰ United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session, Part 2, October 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15, 1981* (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1981) 1 Also see the *NY Times*, October 4, 1981 for the story which intensified interest in the Presidential tactics The story is cited in the Committee report on page 182

⁵¹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Part 2, 3 Testimony occurred on October 14, 1981

⁵² Blechman, 124

⁵³ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 59 General David C Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on October 1, 1981 that the Saudis would seek British Nimrod aircraft if the United States refused to sell the AWACS While members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tried to defuse the point with arguments that the Nimrod was not a compatible system, the administration planted the seed that American jobs were at stake Further testimony briefly even addressed the length of time the order would keep aircraft production lines in operation

⁵⁴ Blechman, 128-129

⁵⁵ Blechman 129

⁵⁶ Fischer, 190

⁵⁷ Blechman, 129

⁵⁸ Blechman, 124

⁵⁹ Allison, 144-147.

⁶⁰ Allison, 173

⁶¹ Allison, 256