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COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

CORE COURSE V ESSAY

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COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons must be dramatically reduced, if not eliminated, and greater reliance must be placed on conventional capabilities. But the reduction question is how deep, how fast, and how much risk America is willing to tolerate. The post Cold War world has allowed America to place its nuclear forces in a closet and largely ignore the need to evolve a new nuclear strategy that meets the challenges of a much different world. Russia is on a path of societal reform with the lowest ever intent of using their massive nuclear arsenal. This cooperative relationship is a welcome change after 40 years of on-edge confrontation. America is now the dominate superpower with the massive challenge to reshape new security arrangements in a world that welcomes such change. However, this fresh-air of cooperation also offers the luxury to cease grappling with the 40 year nuclear debate and neglect evolving its strategy. This is a reckless position now widely assumed by many policy makers and military leaders.

Thankfully the world has already emerged from the bipolar, adversarial construct and is swiftly entering a multipolar arrangement which promises cooperative relationships. Conventional military forces have bridged these constructs by shifting toward information-dominate, precision warfare that fits very nicely. But the evolving role of nuclear forces has been neglected. Nuclear weapons seem to be even more troublesome and hard to relate to the new geostrategic context. They simply do not fit with the Gulf War's clean new paradigm of a sterile, precision-attack military instrument that leaves very little collateral mess. Current policy makers would rather ignore the task of evolving a nuclear strategy and opt to put all their national security "eggs" in the conventional military capabilities basket.

But the Cold War's hand-off to a precision-attack paradigm has yet to eliminate the nuclear threat, nor the need to maintain credible nuclear forces. The fact that the nation's survival is at risk -- despite the low probability of actual use -- means nuclear weapons are the nation's highest security issue and strongest military power instrument. The emerging world order faces no greater challenge than the secure disposition of nuclear weapons. As with the conventional force transition, the future nuclear construct must exist on the foundation of a sound, evolved strategy. It is time for the US to see the nuclear age

through this transition and seize the unprecedented opportunity for greater world security. America must advocate an entirely new nuclear strategy for an uncertain 21st century. Cooperative Security. But it is essential to first understand the lessons of the nuclear strategy evolution which helps frame the proper construct for the future.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY EVOLUTION

Hiroshima and Nagasaki unleashed the nuclear genie and within a few short years, the world polarized into an East-West standoff. Nations were now dangerously at odds, threatening each other with the most devastating weapons devised by man. The great challenge was to create a nuclear strategy that could serve definite political objectives without triggering a holocaust. Nuclear strategies were largely in the hands of civilian leaders since the character of such warfare directly involved international politics in extreme crisis (1). Its destructiveness grew well beyond the military leader's operational and tactical objectives.

The growing Cold War and impact of the Berlin Blockade forced the inclusion of atomic weapons into America's war plans, despite President Truman's reluctance to use them in combat. President Truman stated in 1947, "I don't think we ought to use these things unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something that is so terribly destructive beyond anything we have ever had" (2). The Soviet's successful 1949 nuclear test spelled the end of US nuclear advantage and the need for a focused strategy to address the growing hostile nature of communism. 50 years ago in a corner office of the National War College, George Kennan drafted the NSC-68 Containment Strategy to match the Soviets on all fronts. But Kennan focused on reacting to Soviet intentions, to what he believed they would actually do, despite their standing military capability. Paul Nitze disagreed, considering such a course too grave a risk to national security and succeeded in refocusing the containment strategy to match Soviet capabilities first. This led to the development of the hydrogen bomb to reestablish US nuclear superiority and the rebuilding of conventional capabilities, spurred by the Korean War outbreak. Kennan's emphasis on likelihood of use was put aside (3).

The Eisenhower Administration inherited from President Truman a mixed foundation for nuclear strategy. By developing the hydrogen bomb, America was carrying much further than the atomic bomb

itself the policy of exterminating civilian populations" (4) Conversely, because Western peoples would eventually face this threat of extermination, it was fortunate Truman had already prepared conventional forces to defend Western interests far less dependent on nuclear weapons Taken together, this formed the long-term view that the role of nuclear weapons was to deter their use by the enemy (5) Both nations began to respect nuclear war as unacceptable and placed it at a level well above conventional tolerance The essential question now became to what degree and by what manner would this deterrence be sustained

The first of several solutions was Massive Retaliation In January 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that America would deter future aggression by depending "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing" (6) Unfortunately, this strategy was generally interpreted as a threat to devastate Soviet and Chinese economic and political centers in response to any aggression, no matter how limited. This interpretation was not completely accurate and the Eisenhower Administration failed to dispel it. It was never envisioned the US would immediately turn any small-scale confrontation into an all-out nuclear war (7)

But as the decade wore on, America's nuclear advantage again eroded and the massive retaliation position of strength shifted towards a "balance of terror" deterrence. Potential aggressors would remain sufficiently in awe of nuclear war's outcome and not test America's resolve. In the mid 1950s, nuclear weapons were actually viewed as viable options The Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman observed "Today atomic weapons have virtually achieved a conventional status within our armed forces" In March 1955, President Eisenhower commented that "where these things are used strictly on military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything else " But this opinion soon changed firmly back to the view that these weapons cannot be used like conventional forces Their widespread destruction and pervasive after-effects could not be tolerated in conventional-use terms (8)

President Kennedy inherited a strategy for general nuclear war involving a massive and indiscriminating attack on the peoples of the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe; there was no other option Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that if nuclear war occurred every effort must be made to limit damage to civilians A different strategy was needed Yet his analysis of large civil defense

programs showed the advantages still lie with the offense. Developing effective defenses would most likely fail and be a provocative act to the Soviets. Hence, McNamara put his efforts into reinforcing stability through the Mutual Assured Destruction strategy -- a counterforce, second-strike capability to avoid the mass destruction of cities and civilian populations (9)

Essentially, Mutual Assured Destruction was described as "the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the US or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor" (10). This second-strike strategy was made possible through the development of survivable systems. ICBMs deployed and dispersed in hardened silos and SLBMs hidden in submarines under the seas. These systems allowed a credible second strike capability and the option to avoid a single, massive strike including populations. But MAD suffered not just from its title, but also from criticism of it still threatening another's population rather than defending one's own. Yet this seemed the best nuclear strategy available as any other course would lead to instability. Further, as anti-ballistic missile systems became a possibility to counter seemingly invulnerable nuclear missiles, ABM deployments seemed an imprudent policy. McNamara believed the Soviets would react by increasing their offensive capability as a counter to this defense (11).

But another strategy solution soon emerged from the Kennedy Administration that offered a promising alternative: Escalation control and flexible response. Escalation control presented a manageable movement across a limit that has been previously accepted by both sides. It offered an attempt to prevail in a conflict by dominating at any particular level of escalation and putting the onus on the other side to move to a higher, more dangerous level (12). It created a flexible, manageable spectrum of conflict further away from a sole, massive attack. Escalation control also drew on the uncertainty in the escalation process to achieve deterrence through the threat that things could get out of control. The basic idea. A nuclear conflict could be conducted in a controlled, discriminating manner.

McNamara also believed central authority should remain in control of a crisis and that a nuclear war should be approached in much the same manner as conventional warfare options. In 1961 before a Congressional committee, he described the need for a strategic force "to be of a character which will permit us its use, in event of attack, in a cool and deliberate fashion and always under the complete control of the

constituted authority ” (13) These words formalized what would become the direct National Command Authority command-control link to control and execute the on-alert nuclear forces McNamara also desired a range of options which would offer a flexible response to crises. This range promised to attack military targets, avoid cities, and maintain the nuclear protection umbrella for Europe A marriage was made between a flexible range of options that provided a controllable escalation of violence, while maintaining the potential of assured destruction

This flexible response, escalation control marriage became the basic foundation for America’s nuclear strategy that saw the Cold War to completion There was no need to delve further into the question of what should be done if deterrence failed Flexible options and escalation structures were present and nations were intent on avoiding such use, there was little reason to believe deterrence would fail (14). The Nixon Administration’s Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger developed a range of selective nuclear options to further reduce dependence on assured destruction, possibly using such options to impede a Soviet land war advance in Europe and warn against continued aggression

The Carter Administration’s Defense Secretary Harold Brown unveiled the countervailing strategy which considered the possibility of fighting a protracted nuclear war and refined options against political and economic assets. President Carter believed that should the Soviets move up the escalation ladder, America would be able to respond effectively at each level, there would be no intermediate escalation point where the Soviets could be victorious (15) The Reagan Administration took the flexible response process a stage further through the European deployment of ground launched cruise missiles. This policy tried to extend the limited nuclear strike arena away from the immediate European battlefield and turn the course of a land war By the close of the Cold War, nuclear thinkers had still failed to develop a single, convincing strategy to fight a nuclear war should deterrence fail The national security strategy challenge would be much easier in a world that was more dependent on conventional forces and less reliant on the razor-edge intensity of nuclear weapons (16)

There are two prime lessons that can be gleaned from these agonizing years of strategy debate. First, it is much more easy to plan for and control the level of conventional war violence than a nuclear war Civilian and military leaders are much more comfortable with the conventional paradigm Nuclear

weapons are too devastating, unforgiving, and difficult to justify their actual use. That in itself presented a revolution in military affairs that leaders vigorously wrestled with but never mastered. That revolutionary challenge is now being largely ignored. Conventional weapons are much more escalation controllable, tolerable, and acceptable by the will of the people. Further, as technology has advanced, precision weapons have significantly reduced the collateral damage factor to create a new "sterile" form of warfare that leaders happily embrace.

The second lesson is rooted in capability. Deterrence was victorious in the Cold War not as a result of a perfectly designed strategy. It prevailed because both nations held awesome, on-alert nuclear forces that were ready to respond within seconds. This position of nuclear strength -- on the runways, in the silos, and under the seas -- was the stark reality that made both nations "sweat" and allowed these evolving strategies to be acceptable by all. Many leaders, especially military, are too steeped in their new precision-attack revolution to appreciate this fact.

EMERGING REALITIES AND A STRATEGY OF RISK

The Cold War's close set in motion a dramatic new shift in the geostrategic context. Bipolar stability has burst into a multipolar world with diverse interests, threats, and challenges. The interests are no longer polarized around a free-world relying on military forces to contain a spreading communist world. There is an unprecedented air of cooperation as nations search for new alliances to achieve their security, now based more on economic powers and trade. Although communism's expansionist threat has all but vanished, other more complicated challenges have emerged. Ethnic and nationalist desires have been unleashed to create internal conflicts and population strife.

Yet the future disposition of nuclear forces is the single greatest threat and challenge to this new, multipolar construct of cooperative nations. There is tremendous potential for the proliferation of these weapons and delivery systems. The information revolution provides easy access to nuclear know-how to any desiring nation. The more immediate danger is the ready access to thousands of existing weapons from Russian and other nuclear powers, many held by little or no accountability. But the broader concern with this easy weapons access is rooted in the threat from those nations which possess and desire them.

America must base its evolving nuclear strategy squarely on the potential and emerging threat which has fundamentally shifted with the Cold War's end. To the relief of most western nations, Russia is slowly emerging as a cooperative, engaging nation, albeit with huge problems that are not easily solved. It is difficult for Russia to relinquish superpower status and step into the mire of economic and political uncertainty as it moves towards an openmarket society. Human rights, democratic ideals, and cooperative world leadership are not in Russia's national "genetic structure", they are a country with historically opposite roots. It will be a long and difficult process to sincerely reclothe their nation. Meanwhile, Russia will clearly not relinquish anytime soon their one national instrument of superpower status. nuclear weapons. Their strategic nuclear forces remain large, strong, and modernizing at the expense of tremendous conventional force reductions and degeneration (17). Further, they maintain reliance on their landbased ICBM forces, with survivable SS-24 rail and SS-25 road mobile systems (18). The *reality* of Russia sustaining this massive capability must continue to temper the pace of bold, *idealistic* initiatives between Russia and the US.

Despite an unprecedented opportunity to reduce nuclear forces, our cooperative international construct is facing a grave new threat fundamentally different from the Cold War era. The world has shifted from a bipolar, balanced standoff with an emphasis on nuclear non-use towards something quite different: A multipolar, disparity of nuclear forces with a growing character *to actually use them*. This multipolar proliferation has fallen into the hands of some unstable nations who also lack the Cold War's nuclear discipline and control arrangements. Iraq and Iran actively used mass destruction weapons against each other in recent wars, Iraq waged ballistic missile warfare in the Gulf, backed by a very serious mass destruction program threat (19). India and Pakistan are at determined odds over Kashmir and are most blunt about their likely use of nuclear weapons. North Korea is a desperate, communist holdout who is equally ambiguous about its nuclear program and intentions. Despite the great hope of reduced numbers, the emerging nuclear world order is unbalanced and severely lacks the Cold War's "nuclear discipline", it is a more risky, unpredictable security environment with a high likelihood of nuclear use (20).

Even more dangerous is the Clinton Administration's apparent lack of a clear nuclear vision. It has not wrestled with the nuclear strategy debate but shown a desire to ignore or starkly reduce arsenals in

isolation of evolving threats. The Administration's proclivity toward nuclear marginalism poses a grave risk to national security. Marginalism's objective is to place less dependence on nuclear weapons and more reliance on conventional force capabilities, but its timing is much too premature.

The Nuclear Posture Review's members advocated a reduced, but balanced triad force structure as a hedge against a Russian reform breakout and the disposition of emerging threats. But the NPR's recommendations were almost end-run by Assistant Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, the Clinton Administration's panel co-chairman, who advocated a most radical course (21). Dr. Carter introduced a monad concept of just 10 Navy submarines and eliminating all US ICBMs and nuclear capable bombers, originally proposed by him as a Harvard professor. This would have created a 1550 warhead force structure, well under the NPR-stipulated goal of 3500 nuclear weapons (22). Dr. Carter's stated view is for the US to "ride out a first strike until the enemy has done his worst, and then patiently wait for the President, or his successors, to deliberate" (23). It took a host of Republican Senators appealing directly to the President to reject the Assistant Secretary's proposal. Dr. Carter's approach ignored the recommendations of experienced cross-government NPR panel members, demonstrated the Administration's narrow focus on eliminating nuclear weapons in isolation of serious world threats, and irresponsibly jeopardized national security at a critical crossroads in the nuclear age.

The US must retain a nuclear "strong card" as it seeks to multilaterally drawdown world arsenals. Without credible nuclear forces and the resolve to use them in the future's likely extreme circumstances, America will have no credible military power to counter the world's growing list of nations with mass destructive capabilities. Among potential adversaries, *perceptions* are reality. The perception of annihilation -- backed by on-alert nuclear forces -- enabled deterrence to prevail in the Cold War. It provided the diplomatic power to force the Soviets to "blink" during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The fact of US nuclear strength was used by Secretary of State Baker as a strong warning to restrain warfare's bounds and forced Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction during the Persian Gulf conflict. Iraqi officials have admitted this fact (24). There is no force more responsive, blunt, or brutally destructive than nuclear weapons. Rational or irrational actors respect that position of strength.

The Clinton Administration correctly places dominate reliance on conventional force capabilities, a Desert Storm-orchestrated conventional campaign can produce precise, impressive destruction. It is the foundation for the future's precision, battlefield-dominate war and other evolving forms of warfare US planners must pursue. But that strike capability is based on some major assumptions achieved over an extensive buildup period. To succeed at such a feat, a nation assumes. You have the luxury of significant time to respond, you have sufficient forces, the capability to swiftly deploy them, the assets and locations to receive and base them, and the ability to again achieve a Desert Storm land and aerospace superiority. Further, potential adversaries have learned the Gulf War's lessons, the next crisis will present a much more formidable foe. There may come a day when those assumptions and timelines can be "cocked" and flexibly ready to execute a conventional response to a hostile nuclear detonation crisis. But that day is far from present and current conventional forces are not a credible deterrent against an adversary's awesome capability of mass destruction weapons. They present a shallow threat *perception* among the emerging multipolar adversaries.

The ultimate US interest should be to dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weapons and place greater reliance on conventional forces. But it will not be achieved by ignoring the nuclear strategy debate, prematurely placing nuclear weapons in a closet, and forgetting the Cold War's lessons of their powerful deterrent value. Currently, a unilateral policy of marginalism would seriously risk national security. The potential threat from Russia is too great and from proliferated nations too risky. To advance the nuclear age into a secure future, US leaders must accept the reality that: 1) There remains a serious world nuclear threat; 2) Conventional forces cannot meet this multipolar challenge alone; 3) Nuclear weapons are a proven deterrent and the only credible force against such capabilities -- cooperative nations must embrace, not ignore this international instrument. A comprehensive strategy is desperately needed to see the nuclear age into our new, multipolar world and seize the opportunity for a more secure future.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE 21ST CENTURY NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Cooperative Security is America's 21st century nuclear strategy because it breaks from the hostile strategies of a bipolar world and embraces multi-national nuclear security, founded on growing cooperation. This strategy will securely lead the nuclear age through the threats and opportunities of an

uncertain world. The US must cease its current nuclear neglect and accept these weapons as the only credible military instrument to deter weapons of mass destruction. It has come time for America to again engage the nuclear debate and clearly define a comprehensive strategy that matches the new world context. The Cooperative Security strategy will bridge the bipolar-multipolar gap and provide a focused direction to lead from a position of cooperative nuclear strength, not ignorance. America must join with world nations to sustain a peaceful Russian evolution and correct the growing list of emerging mass destruction states who hold a reckless resolve and lack nuclear discipline.

The Cooperative Security strategy is based on the new world context of *cooperation*, not Cold War confrontation. The strategy is not a piecemeal approach, but gathers all components of potential nuclear policy into a comprehensive plan. This cooperation is achieved through creating an alliance among nuclear powers to oversee and execute policy initiatives. The strategy's greatest challenge is meeting the security needs of a new multipolar group of nuclear states with varying arsenals and limited safeguards. Hence, Cooperative Security emphasizes the opportunity to starkly reduce nuclear arsenals, and where reduction is not possible, enhance the security of those threat environments.

This strategy is presented assuming the most optimistic geostrategic context. It is essential that Russia and America remain on the same side -- not apart -- of critical national security issues, especially nuclear weapons. Russia must continue to mature as a nuclear ally, not return as an adversary. Without this matured, multipolar US-Russian teamwork, the Cooperative Security strategy and its dramatic nuclear reductions will fall short of completion. Should multinational cooperation dramatically diminish, this strategy's core principles and policies must be conservatively adjusted to match the current geostrategic realities. But the core principles of reducing arsenals and enhancing security through multipolar cooperation remain lasting precepts of this strategy and the emerging world order.

Finally, the Cooperative Security strategy is based on a position of nuclear strength, *not weakness*. Despite a current low likelihood of nuclear use, there is tremendous potential for such a scenario, especially among nations with a demonstrated resolve for rash action. This strategy relies on credible nuclear forces with an equal resolve for their alliance-supported use against uncooperative states, the respected lesson of Cold War deterrent strength. But unlike the Cold War's bipolar strategies, this emerging concept must

address a multipolar set of regional nuclear challenges. Hence, a range of sub-strategies and policies must be developed, based on a specific region's unique culture, political dynamics, and interests (25). These multipolar force structures will be deliberately reduced as Cooperative Security policies lower the threat, but this strategy will not risk national or international security through a rash marginalism policy. The Cooperative Security strategy is founded upon four core principles: Cooperative Alliance, Security Enhancement, Nuclear Reduction, and Unequivocal Deterrence.

COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE:

21st century nuclear security is achieved through cooperative alliances, not adversarial standoffs. This strategy's success is predicated on effective world leadership by creating a new organization, the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance among declared and emerging powers. All nuclear weapons states will be welcomed and encouraged as equal participating members of the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance, steered by a senior council of experienced nuclear superpowers: The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China. This alliance will be a "multipolar nuclear NATO", the catalyst to coalesce world backing against reckless nuclear powers and establish greater security through this strategy's core principles. Like NATO, the alliance is based upon a gathering of nuclear powers that share a common desire to enhance security and prevent nuclear use.

The Alliance will formalize positive cooperation with Russia and other nuclear states as the security foundation to enable dramatic nuclear arsenal reductions. It will also jointly develop specific policies to act on security issues and provide safeguard discipline among the world's new nuclear powers. The Cooperative Nuclear Alliance is this strategy's cornerstone mechanism to seize the unprecedented opportunity to resolve the nuclear challenge. The world now needs this unique, multinational security organization to cooperatively orchestrate, in one forceful voice, the growing list of critical nuclear initiatives.

SECURITY ENHANCEMENT:

The Cooperative Security strategy must first succeed at creating greater regional and world security as a foundation to achieve the ultimate objective of dramatic nuclear reductions and cooperative nuclear deterrence. The emerging multipolar nuclear states sorely lack the Cold War's nuclear discipline.

and restraint. Such attitudes and measures must be adapted to this emerging nuclear construct, led by the Cold War experience of Russia and the US. Numerous security enhancement initiatives can help "diffuse" near term threats and lead to more stable regional relations, setting the foundation for weapons reduction. The Cooperative Nuclear Alliance will develop and pursue a range of security enhancement policies, including:

- Sharing early warning arrangements supported by US Space Command
- Sharing Theater Missile Defense technology and fielding deployable Alliance TMD systems as part of their nuclear umbrella protection
- Sharing nuclear safeguard procedures and techniques, such as Permissive Action Links on weapons
- Installing "hotlines" between tense regions, such as India and Pakistan
- Supporting intrusive inspection regimes that compliment the nonproliferation and reduction efforts of the strategy's Nuclear Reduction principle (e.g., the NPT, MTCR, START Treaties)

NUCLEAR REDUCTION:

The Cooperative Security strategy is rooted in dramatically reducing the number of world nuclear weapons. Since the inception of these weapons, there has never been a greater opportunity to dramatically diminish their importance. However, where reduction or elimination is not possible, this strategy relies on enacting measures to greatly enhance security surrounding these regions. These are not simply bilateral efforts, but a comprehensive multi-regional plan, sanctioned by all Cooperative Nuclear Alliance members, to reduce weapons and enhance international security.

*** US-Russia Framework:** The strategy's reduction policy centers on the US-Russian force structure and sustained cooperation between both nations. Arms reduction treaties and the Nunn-Lugar program will be fundamental efforts supporting this reduction policy. However, the Nunn-Lugar program concept for Russian weapons destruction will be broadened to reduce other nations' weapons, supported by Alliance funding. The current START treaty has placed a 6000 cap on US-Russian nuclear warheads. The START II treaty will drop strategic force levels to no more than 3500 weapons, this must be done mutually and verifiably. The Cooperative Security strategy's challenge is to use START III and IV as the tool to dramatically reduce superpower arsenals without jeopardizing either nation's national security.

START III: As Russia continues reliance on its responsive ICBM forces, the US must retain an NPR-recommended triad balance, but reduce overall forces to a 1500 warhead cap for both nations. Drop from 500 to 200 Minuteman III single warhead ICBMs split between Malmstrom and F.E. Warren AFBs. Eliminate all B-52s and field 20 B-2 bombers at Whiteman AFB, 10 Trident submarines split between naval bases at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each submarine will deploy 24 D-5 missiles with five warheads each -- a 1200 SLBM warhead force

START IV: START IV will be the ultimate long-term nuclear framework and sets the stage for the possible final step to eliminate strategic nuclear forces. START IV cannot be achieved without a matured Russian nation with strong, cooperative leadership in world affairs. This treaty proposes a 300 warhead cap force structure for both nations, who will operate together to provide the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance's future security umbrella for all member states. Eliminate all US and Russian land-based ICBMs, retain a small portion of both nation's bomber forces as a nuclear-conventional flexible instrument for the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance against rogue nations, place daily alert reliance on a six submarine SLBM force structure for both nations. Each submarine will deploy 24 D-5 missiles, 12 missiles with three warheads and 12 with one warhead, providing a flexible 288 warhead force. The Russians will arrange a similar 300 cap SLBM warhead force. Both US and Russian submarine forces will be planned, deployed, and operated in harmony as it acts as the joint deterrent force for all Cooperative Nuclear Alliance nations

*** Multipolar Framework:** As superpower force structures are lowered, similar reduction proposals will be agreed to among the remaining multipolar nuclear powers. The Alliance will be key to orchestrating these reductions into a comprehensive security arrangement agreed to and shared by all Alliance members. The focus is to ban and eliminate all land-based ICBMs and create a US-Russian SLBM nuclear protection umbrella for all, led by the senior council nations. This credible security umbrella will help eliminate nuclear arsenals in many nations. It will end bipolar standoffs and initiate a new framework of shared nuclear security in a world with dramatically reduced nuclear weapons. The Alliance must first develop specific near-term frameworks to engage the challenges of emerging and undeclared states. The India-Pakistan conflict must be a priority effort to absolve their nuclear ambiguity, declare arms limits, and reduce weapons levels. The Alliance will also lend strong, formal endorsement to

ongoing arms reduction efforts such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technical Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group efforts. These programs will be incorporated into the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance to provide a stronger world backing and enforcement.

UNEQUIVOCAL DETERRENCE:

The US must lead from a position of *strength*. But in a multipolar nuclear world, it must be joint leadership including the sanction of the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance. Nations who pursue interests through the irrational use of mass destruction weapons will *not be tolerated*. Such powers are put on notice by the Cooperative Nuclear Alliance, in no uncertain terms, that the Alliance's employment of nuclear weapons is *clearly an option* to swiftly end such an irrational act. The Alliance will use overwhelming force, from conventional to nuclear, to appropriately *punish* a nation from crossing the nuclear-use line.

The Alliance will develop a protocol describing strict rules of engagement so its nuclear use policy and resolve is *unequivocally* understood by all. A nation resorting to nuclear weapons use will *absolutely* not be tolerated. As learned in the Cold War era, a credible deterrence can only be achieved through credible, responsive nuclear forces. The uncertainty placed in an adversary's mind, due to the *certainty* of the other side's resolve, is the best hope to stop his rash act, otherwise, the costs are too high to his interests.

CONCLUSION

Since the close of World War II, leaders have wrestled with the nuclear debate with great anguish and little clear direction. No single strategy prevailed, they all evolved. Thankfully the Cold War's victory was achieved without a single nuclear shot primarily due to credible, on-alert nuclear forces, not perfect strategies. But the emerging, multipolar world offered the luxury for American leaders to let down its strategy guard and ignore the potential future contributions of nuclear forces. This has now degenerated into a risky attitude that relies solely on more easily understood and employed conventional capabilities that fit well. Many leaders now hold a growing view that nuclear weapons serve no purpose in the new world order and can even be unilaterally eliminated. They have largely ignored the potential threat from a precariously evolving Russia who is firmly sustaining its mass nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear

proliferation into states with a dangerous resolve. Such a policy position poses grave risk to international security and threatens losing a rare opportunity to achieve unprecedented future nuclear security

Most leaders share the ultimate international interest to place greater emphasis on conventional military forces and dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weapons. But this can only be achieved from a position of strength, not risk. While the Cold War strategies centered on building greater nuclear forces based on a confrontational standoff, the Cooperative Security strategy focuses on reducing nuclear forces founded on multipolar cooperation. Their common denominator. Both rely on a position of nuclear deterrent strength.

Cooperative Security is not the strategy that will close the nuclear era. It is a first step towards an evolving, comprehensive strategy that reconciles nuclear weapons with the new world realities and embraces, not ignores, the lessons of the nuclear debate. The world has an unprecedented opportunity to dramatically reduce the nuclear threat -- through cooperation. But to succeed, the US must create a comprehensive new Cooperative Security strategy for an uncertain world that builds upon the proven security of nuclear deterrence while nations cooperatively reduce, if not eliminate, the nuclear age

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