Anwar Sadat's 1973 Decision To Go To War: A Case Study in National Security Strategy
Abstract
The Arab assault across the Suez and Golan on 6 October 1973 caught Israeli and American decision-makers by surprise, despite intelligence indicators and years of Arab public diplomacy warning of coming war. The military imbalance in the Middle East made it inconceivable to many that the Arabs would initiate hostilities so soon after their defeat in 1967. To understand the evolution of events leading to war, it is necessary to review the national security strategies of the actors involved. This paper focuses on Egyptian strategy between 1970 and 1973 from the following three analytic perspectives: -The Rational Actor Model: National security strategy as the product of a state's interests, its relative power, and the international environment. -The Leadership Model: Individual decision-makers' perceptions, willingness to take risks, and political maneuvers as they influence strategy. -The Process Model: The coordination and execution of strategy as factors affecting its content. Each of the methodologies outlined above emphasizes fundamentally different, albeit related, aspects of reality. Collectively, these perspectives illustrate how the diplomatic and military tools of Egyptian statecraft, each limited in isolation, proved more than the sum of their parts when combined in a coherent strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA441510
Entities
People
- David Leatherwood
- Harvey Johnson
Organizations
- National War College