US Intervention in Failed States: Bad Assumptions=Poor Outcomes
Abstract
The purpose of this paper will be the application of the Deibel Model, in particular the first level (assumptions) to the problem of failed states and the US, with an objective of identifying future threats and opportunities. The past 20 years have witnessed, among other events, the end of the Cold War, with a corresponding destabilization of the existing bipolar system that maintained a semblance of international order for almost 50 years. One feature of this destabilization has been the failure, in traditional terms, of existing states. States refers to political entities that may or may not correspond to nations (more often referring to people groups); thus a nation-state in strict terms is a state whose territory corresponds to that occupied by a particular nation (Baylis, 1997). No matter the reason or rationale for the breakdowns of these failed states, one consistent factor has been the requirement for external actors to play a part both in the cessation of conflict and the restoration of order. US intervention, both unilateral and bilateral, in these failed states has been a central theme in the ongoing debate over the US global role for the 21st Century. It is apparent from recent involvement by the US, and this paper will go on to demonstrate, that US intervention in failed states has been beset by faulty assumptions about the domestic and international arena leading to significant limitations on the long-term success of these interventions. Failed states present opportunities for shaping the international environment in the short term, but this must be balanced with the longer-term requirements (threat) of the restoration of those states, a facet that is not often regarded in the preparation and planning for intervention.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA441524
Entities
People
- Thomas G. Knight
Organizations
- National War College