Airpower Strategy in the Interwar Years: Not Ready for Prime Time
Abstract
Although there are no hard and fast rules in the development of military strategy, a common pattern has developed over the history of warfare that suggests a chronological relationship between military theory, strategy, and execution. Theories are often devised to adapt to the new character of war demonstrated by a recent major conflict. These theories illuminate new strategies, which are then executed in the following war. The strategist's job is to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts and practical application. Given this cycle, it would not be surprising to find that the changing character of war experienced in World War I would produce a new body of theories. The impetus for new theory was even more compelling due to the development of a revolutionary new weapon of war the airplane. This paper describes the character of World War I and the airpower theories that followed. It posits U.S. airpower strategy followed theory almost to a fault, and that limitations in airpower technology, institutional issues, and failure to adequately challenge assumptions of the early airpower theorists resulted in a strategy that fell short of expectations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA441608
Entities
People
- David W. Allvin
Organizations
- National War College