

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

**Military Theory
and
Peace Enforcement Operations**

Longer Essay

CDR G. Roncolato, USN
Class of 1994
CAPT J. N. Petrie, USN
22 March, 1994

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 22 MAR 1994		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 22-03-1994 to 22-03-1994	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Theory and Peace Enforcement Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 44	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

"Military Theory and Peace Enforcement Operations"

INTRODUCTION

Given the experience of crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, there is considerable debate over whether, when, or how the United States, in the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations, should undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions....Nor is there a consensus on the stake that Americans have in those conflicts and the price they should bear in resolving them.¹

As suggested above by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, there is a very real uncertainty surrounding the ongoing debate over methods to resolve a growing number of internal conflicts that plague our world. It permeates all levels of America's policy-making elite. Statements made with a similar flavor have been delivered by several key administration spokesmen, including President Clinton himself.² The situation is too new and the conditions are changing too rapidly. Right now there simply are no answers. What we have seen so far during the Clinton administration is an effort at damage control as crises crash in upon decision makers. Little time has been available to step back from the problem and attempt to develop some sort of theoretical mechanism that could put order into the world community's efforts to stem the tide of violence and war.

There is good reason for this quandry. The world is faced by a three-tier attack on its structure and stability. First, the collapse of communism and the bipolar world that it helped support has let go tectonic forces that are reshaping the international order. Second, preceding the collapse of communism is the growth of what is being called the third industrial revolution, wherein the nature of wealth is being redefined in terms of information rather than industry. This revolution in turn is tending to erode international borders as information and capital increasingly flow around governmental control.³ Third, a perception is growing in the world that individual rights surmount those of states, which is in turn undermining the strength of the nation state which has been the primary organizing mechanism in the world since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.⁴ Thus, the world political structure, its economy and its social order are all being transformed simultaneously, and each transformation is affecting

the others.

Needless to say, old remedies will not necessarily work in this new environment. New solutions need to be developed, and a great deal of work is being done in this direction. However, to say old remedies will not work is not the same as saying that history can no longer be a guide for us. Too often the tendency has been to equate the novel post-Cold War situation with the idea that what has gone before is of little or no value--that what we now face is historically unique, and that it calls for historically unique solutions. A similar frame of mind existed at the dawn of the nuclear age when traditional military theories were widely thought to be irrelevant. This gave rise to a new type of scientist-strategist and discredited classical theory. Time has taught us that even in the face of nuclear weapons, classical military strategic theory and history have much of value for the decision maker. So, too, does military theory apply for the decision maker today. Faced with a new environment, the theoretical framework of war developed over the past centuries may permit us to analyze at least some facets of the security problem facing us today.

While history in general, and classical military theory in particular, can be applicable to a wide range of issues, they are most useful in analyzing the issues associated with what has come to be known as "peace enforcement." Peace enforcement is fundamentally "war" in its new guise. It can be defined as:

...the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression.⁵

Peace enforcement is thus essentially war in a new environment. Treated as such, it falls within the realm of classical strategic theory, and is therefore susceptible of analysis based on the writings of one of the premier military thinkers of all time: Carl von Clausewitz. What is the essence of his theory and how does it apply to the circumstances of peace enforcement today?

THE NATURE OF WAR

WAR DEFINED

*"War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."*⁶ Such is Clausewitz' short definition of war. It cuts to the quick of the issue: war is a *duel* between two or more opponents, much like sports, business competition or politics. The difference is that it uses the violence of military force to achieve its objectives. War means bloodshed--a point Clausewitz takes great pains to make clear from the outset. Understand and accept this point, he implies, and then you can move on to a rational consideration of this very demanding and dangerous human undertaking. The object of war is the destruction of the enemy's will to continue, and this cannot be done without killing his soldiers: "Kindhearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war."⁷

Thus, even when considering the use of force for peace enforcement, we must do so with our minds cleared and ready to accept the fact that what we are really talking about is war. Treating it as something different risks serious mistakes, for in hoping to spare ourselves the pains of going to war, we may well consign a greater number to death, and in the end still achieve nothing.

Clausewitz has been the focus of much criticism for such seemingly narrow thinking.⁸ Is all war really about killing the enemy? Are there not other ways to victory? Can it really be that simple? The answer is that, in keeping with his unique style, Clausewitz overstates his case. Throughout his book he takes the reader on a roller coaster ride that first stipulates an extreme theoretical position, then caveats that position so much that in the end one is left with an exceedingly complex, but realistic and flexible appreciation for the phenomenon of war. So too in this instance. True, combat and killing are not always necessary, and when they are, it is unlikely to be continuous throughout a war. True also that there are many more

variables and considerations that go into war than just the fact that defeating enemy forces brings victory.⁹ However, none of this detracts from the central theme of Clausewitz' work: It is the violent application of armed force, *either actual or threatened*, that distinguishes war from other human endeavors. It is this central fact that makes war, and it is this fact that we neglect at our peril when considering the application of armed force.

FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF WAR

To Clausewitz, war is a duel--an interaction of opposed wills. It is this interaction that is a key concept: You can plan out a war, but seldom does that plan survive the first contact in war. As Alan Beyerchen, in his superb analysis of Clausewitz' work, illustrates: "The course of a given war becomes thereby not the mere sequence of intentions and actions of each opponent, but the pattern or shape generated by mutually hostile intentions and simultaneously consequential actions."¹⁰

Clausewitz uses the analogy of two wrestlers to describe the effects of this interaction of opponents in war. Beyerchen elaborates on that analogy: "...the bodily positions and contortions that emerge in wrestling are often impossible to achieve without the counterforce and counterweight of an opponent."¹¹ Thus, it can be seen that war is an interaction of opponents that distorts their plans and objectives to generate unforeseen consequences and circumstances. Moreover, it should be noted that actual combat or "action" need not take place. The mere threat of action may be, and often has been, enough to change the course of events.

Of course, the interaction between opponents is not the only dynamic at work in war. There is also an interaction between policy and its tool, strategy (and between strategy and tactics). As strategies are executed, circumstances, conditions, and perceptions change. Policy, if it is to achieve its objectives, is forced to adapt to new situations. The result is a

web of horizontal and vertical interactions that determine the course of any war, a web that defies prediction. Uncertainty, then, is seen to be inherent in any attempt to use military force.

How is this manifested in reality? In some cases, it might be called mission creep.¹² The decision to pursue a complete unification of Korea after the success of the Inchon invasion in 1950 and the determination to shift from humanitarian assistance to nation building in Somalia serve as examples. In other cases it becomes blindness, as a war seems to take on a life of its own--witness World War I, or in the American case, Vietnam. Another example might be the fears of the nuclear strategists that a small confrontation--such as between two opposing ships at sea--could escalate into a general nuclear war. Even that master of political maneuvering, Hitler, had to acknowledge that once war was begun over Poland in 1939, he no longer had the control over the course of events that existed before the German invasion. All of these examples go to show that war, being the interaction of actively opposed wills, is exceedingly difficult to conduct, and seldom proceeds along the lines planned on before the fighting started. This is why war has normally been considered a tool of policy--but one of dubious value and uncertain utility.¹³

The fundamental nature of war--the qualities inherent in the phenomenon which cannot be canceled out--demands caution in the application of military force. War is the realm of uncertainty, of interaction, of danger, violence and exertion. It is this very real nature, too often discounted by analysts in their quest for certainty, that gives reign to the moral forces in war. Given the uncertainties and the continuous interaction of goals and means, mere calculations of hardware, or even of traditions and experience cannot of themselves identify winners and losers. Chance permeates every aspect and level of war, for we can never know all of the initial conditions. In such an environment, it is all too easy for the seemingly strong to fall victim to the weak; and of the certain to give way to confusion. The decision

for war, then, demands the most careful of considerations of risks and potential benefits, and argues for minimizing risk where it can be done. This is why General Colin Powell, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted upon the application of overwhelming force whenever American military forces were employed.¹⁴ The cost of losing is too high, and the uncertainty inherent in war too real to advise otherwise.

THE TRINITY

The fundamental nature of war as an interaction of two opposed wills is played out in an environment composed of violence, chance, and rational thought. These three elements comprise what Clausewitz termed his "paradoxical trinity:"

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, *which makes it subject to reason alone.*¹⁵

Since Clausewitz' time, this trinity has been represented in a world of nation-states by the people, the military, and the government. Each war is different; in each, the various factors combine to suspend war at a different point in space between the three competing poles. In a total war such as World War I, the pull of the military component might move war closer to that pole, and lessen the influence of policy. On the other hand, in a limited war such as Vietnam, a nation's commitment may be weaker, thus making the will to continue relatively more sensitive to popular support than military considerations. As Clausewitz described it, war thus is like an object suspended between three magnets. In such a situation, the object moves continuously between the three equal poles, reacting now to one, now to another. While the poles remain of equal strength, it is the movement of the pendulum between them that generates the relative strengths of each of those poles on the pendulum--on war in this case:

Clausewitz' message is not that there are three passive points, but three interactive

points of attraction that are simultaneously pulling the object in different directions and forming complex interactions with each other....The nature of war should not be conceived as a stationary point among the members of the trinity, but as a complex trajectory traced among them.¹⁶

The different interactions of the magnets combined acting upon war mean that each war follows its own trajectory within this trinity. All that can be said for sure is that *every* war must operate within this context, regardless of the mask that it wears.

Ignoring any one of the elements of the trinity risks disastrous failure. It is the idea of will that binds the trinity together. If that will is broken at any point, the whole collapses. Thus we see that if the military loses its confidence in victory and will to continue (France in 1940), or if the government loses its nerve and seeks a separate peace (France in 1871), or if the people no longer are willing to put up with the sacrifices demanded (Vietnam, 1973), the war will be lost.¹⁷ When contemplating the use of military force, each element of the trinity must be considered. A three legged stool does not stand when one of the legs is removed.

Yet, despite this wisdom borne of historical example, it has become popular in recent years to argue that such "Trinitarian" war is a thing of the past.¹⁸ These arguments are based on the rash of intra-state (vice inter-state) wars of the late 20th century, and to an extent on the idea that the proliferation of democracies somehow means that wars between states is a thing of the past. Perhaps, as some suggest, the information revolution and economic globalization are eroding the value of those things for which nations once went to war; or perhaps other non-state actors are increasingly conducting war for different purposes.¹⁹ These critics see trinitarian war as composed of the people, the military and the government, which no longer form the central factors in the emerging form of war.²⁰ Such structures are hard to identify in an intra-state war, and by their interpretation of Clausewitz' trinity, these critics are right.

However, in a very fundamental sense they have misconstrued Clausewitz. A more accurate rendition of his concept is that war is *primordial violence and the play of chance*

brought under some control by rational political thought, and for his purposes in describing war as a social phenomenon, Clausewitz *represented* these concepts by the people, the military, and the government. Even in intra-state war, these concepts are present on the part of all parties--all the more so if we, as an external power, intervene with military force.

Rather than an "end to Trinitarian war," what we are in fact seeing is a transformation of trinitarian war in which the characteristics remain even while the characters change their names.

Internal wars where we are considering intervention are a new type of war for us, but a type of war that nonetheless conforms to Clausewitz' trinitarian concept. Calling them operations other than war merely obscures that fact. If we are wont to consider these interventions operations other than war, it is through a disregard of theory and history, for political convenience, or as a result of bureaucratic politics.²¹ It essential to our success in planning for peace enforcement operations that we realize that the concept of strife as a social phenomenon that can be characterized by a paradoxical trinity remains valid whenever some rational force seeks to use organized violence and passion for political purposes.

WAR IS A CONTINUATION OF POLICY

War is thus an instrument of policy subjected to reason. It is difficult at times to perceive the "rational" element of policy, especially among some actors. Is the Irish Republican Army a rational actor? How can they bomb innocent civilians if they are? The truth is that from their perspective, their policies may be the essence of rationality. So too was Hitler "rational" in the sense that he sought to use the power of the state to achieve his political goals. When we say that policy is rational, we mean that it is the instrument which furthers the interests of a particular state or entity *from the perspective of that state or entity*. It is not to say that it is particularly reasonable from our perspective.

Given that understanding of "rational," it becomes clear that policy sets the goal for the use of military force--it gives purpose to war. In so doing, policy also determines the level of effort to be expended in attaining that goal. In other words, war must be subservient to policy; it must bend to the will of policy with respect to objectives, means and resources. To do otherwise would give war a life of its own. From our review of the concept of the trinity, it should be clear that separating policy and strategy, or reversing their roles, runs counter to the fundamental nature of war, and therefore cannot long avoid failure: "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."²²

The subordination of war to policy also suggests why the military result of war is never final.²³ War is an instrument of policy--a tool of state power. Its purpose comes from policy, and it is but one of the methods available to policy to further the interests of the state. War is entered into as a choice of policy to attain a specific goal. The achievement of this goal, however, does not mean an end to the political discourse between nations, nor even necessarily an end to conflict. Some would argue that the object of war is a better peace. This is only partially correct. The object of war is whatever policy sets out for it. A better peace cannot normally be attained by military force alone. Military force can only serve to return a situation to the point where political and diplomatic options can once again rise to the fore. It is up to the diplomatic, social, political and economic tools to build a lasting peace. In this way, war can be seen as truly one of many tools of policy, and a tool, moreover, suited to certain specific tasks. Trying to use it in a way for which it is ill suited cannot but fail.

WAR AS A PRODUCT OF SOCIETY

War has been seen to form a trajectory within the confines of a trinity composed of

violence, chance and rational thought. Each war is different, and so too is the general nature of war in each age. The 18th Century saw wars of maneuver which moved closer to the rational thought pole of the trinity, and farther from the passion of the people. In the 19th and early 20th centuries wars increasingly approached the theoretical absolute as the passions of the people, unleashed by the French Revolution, contested the primacy of rational policy in directing the application of military force. Now we are faced with a weakening of the state itself, and organized violence seems to no longer be within the purview solely of the national government. While in all of these examples, war conformed to its fundamental nature and acted within the trinity, each was greatly different from the other. The aims, the resources, and the methods a warring party uses

...must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character. Finally, they must always be governed by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself.²⁴

The wars of our age has put on a different mask than that of our fathers' and grandfathers'. It is still war in its fundamental sense, but we are challenged to understand the relative importance of its different facets as we seek to devise strategies and policies for its employment. The key here is that the theory of war as built up in blood through the ages remains as valid now as it was in 1941 or in 1815. Theory, as Clausewitz wrote, "...need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of *manual* for action," but should instead serve as a guide through the uncharted waters we now face.²⁵ The wisdom is there for the taking. It alone cannot meet our challenges, but it can provide a means of approaching them in a structured way that improves the chances of success.

COMBAT IS THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF WAR

The nature of war and its subordination to policy is now clear. What remains is to discuss the instrument of war and its impact on planning and operations. That instrument is

combat. As stated above, war is the use of force to compel the enemy to do our will. The method of compelling is combat--either actual or implied: "Everything that occurs in war results from the existence of armed forces; *but whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals*, are used, the idea of combat must be present."²⁶ Deterrence, conventional or nuclear, works because the opponent perceives that certain action on his part will result in the use of force against him, and thus, it is hoped, he decides not to act. In that mechanism, combat is present as an implied consequence of acting or failing to act. Of course, in war itself, combat is used to destroy enemy forces, to occupy territory, and so forth.

The idea of combat must undergird any plans for the employment of military force. Even if the purpose of employing those forces is peaceful, their mere use (except perhaps in certain disaster relief roles) implies the potential use of combat. That being the case, forces deployed should be structured to succeed if combat actually were to occur. This, combined with a demonstrated will to act, is what makes deterrence work.

A word about the interaction between strategy, tactics and combat. Clausewitz posits that the purpose of an engagement is determined by strategy, but that the means of that engagement is *always* the destruction of enemy forces.²⁷ This distinction is important: the killing of enemy soldiers is merely a means to an end, it is not the end in itself. Strategy seeks to apply force in the form of combat (implied or actual) to influence what Clausewitz terms centers of gravity. These centers of gravity, if isolated and defeated, must of themselves cause the collapse of the enemy's opposition. In Vietnam, the center of gravity the North Vietnamese attacked was the popular support for the war against them. This is why American tactical victories were largely irrelevant in the end.²⁸ In other wars, the center of gravity may be the enemy army, the enemy government, the capital, or a piece of land. Note that once again, combat has as its object the center of gravity set out by strategy. Its means is the destruction of enemy forces. When combat is actually required, this destruction is

comprised of either the physical destruction of troops and equipment, or a breaking of their will to resist, or a combination of the two. When combat is not required, it is because the enemy's will to resist the move was broken before actual fighting occurred.

The object of combat is the center of gravity set out by strategy. Its means is destruction of enemy forces. No other means are available because tactics is about fighting. This distinction makes clear the need for strategy to give purpose to the killing done by tactics, just as policy gives purpose to strategy.

Killing for the sake of killing can become self defeating. In the coldest sense, killing uses ammunition and diffuses effort. In other cases, battles are fought against the wishes of the commander because troops are allowed to pursue an enemy in front of them when restraint may be more appropriate.²⁹ In such cases, the instrument--combat--breaks away from the control of strategy, and thus fails. At the same time, if strategy and policy offer poor guidance to tactics, tactics can assume the level of strategy, and killing enemy soldiers can become the end sought. Vietnam immediately comes to mind, where in the absence of a coherent policy and strategy, the number of Viet Cong and Vietnamese killed became the criterion of success. More recently, lacking a well thought out policy and strategy, the pursuit of Aideed in Somalia may have become the end rather than simply a means.

Combat must be bent to strategy or it loses its purpose and becomes wasteful. At the same time, troops should not be sent into situations where combat is possible without the wherewithal to prevail if their *implied* mission (to fight) turns into a real one. The extreme example of this practice brings us back to Vietnam where forces were initially sent in for signaling purposes. Their combat capability was seen as largely irrelevant because their purpose was to signal an American commitment to the people of South Vietnam. Repeated calls by General Westmoreland to provide stronger forces and, more importantly, the logistical units necessary to sustain operations were rejected on the grounds that the troops

were not there to fight, but to serve as a signal.³⁰ Combat must be the central idea whenever armed forces are deployed, even if for signaling. They must have the capability to fight or their presence becomes meaningless, or worse, a liability.

Approaching the use of military force from any perspective other than that dictated by the fundamental nature of war and the centrality of combat to that nature risks failure and needless loss of life. Avoidance of conflict does not always save lives in the long run. What it may do is surrender any initiative to the opponent, and force one to wait until he moves. Moreover, it is exactly when our motives are weak that our vigilance is most needed; for with weak motives, we get smaller commitment, and with smaller commitment comes the tendency to forget the importance of combat.³¹ With weak motives, we may not wish to expend the resources needed to provide truly combat capable forces, or we may choose to become only minimally engaged, not wanting to bring on a stronger commitment. Such decisions are rightfully within the purview of policy, but they must be based on informed judgment as to the hazards. For, as Clausewitz cautions, when a decision is made not to provide sufficient combat power, one

...must never forget that he is moving on devious paths where the god of war may catch him unawares. He must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier.³²

THE THEORY OF WAR AND PEACE OPERATIONS

NATURE OF WAR IN OUR ERA

A precondition to examining the impact of the theory of war on peace enforcement is to briefly explore how war is evolving in our era. Some argue that the era of state versus state wars is fading into the past.³³ We do not subscribe to that idea, but suggest that the popularity of this belief is based on a short-term view of history that sees only the largely intra-state wars of the recent past. It is all too likely, however, that the interests of nations will reassert themselves in as yet unknown ways--perhaps economically, perhaps as the result

of a discrediting of democracies as happened in the 1920s and 1930s. Whatever the mechanism, it is entirely possible that within a few years states may once again be fighting states.

Nevertheless, something has changed in warfare over the past fifty years, and especially within the last two or three years. It might be said that the first stage in the wars of decolonization has ended. In that stage, indigenous peoples successfully fought their colonial overlords for the right of independent rule. This was done during the global Cold War, and therefore was done within limits. The greatest single limit was the inviolability of national borders. Another limit was the interest of both superpowers to maintain a general status quo, which meant that wars would be acceptable within certain limits, but that if they went beyond the pale, the superpowers would quickly suppress them. Neither power wanted to risk the escalation implied in every little war that might threaten world order or their own lands.

The majority of indigenous peoples thus came to rule themselves. However, many of the borders in these regions (Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and to an extent even in Eastern Europe) are artificial, having been established by colonial masters. So much do these borders ignore cultural boundaries that the term nation state loses its meaning. Now, we are embarked upon the second stage in the wars of decolonization. In this stage, the peoples themselves are seeking to establish their own forms of government and their own boundaries based on their histories and cultures. This is generating the rash of intra-state conflicts from Africa to Bosnia.³⁴

It is likely that this state of affairs will get worse before getting better. Adding to the historical pressures from within, the United Nations, with strong U.S. support, is indirectly encouraging nationalities to seek independence by weakening the primacy of the state.³⁵ Qualified sovereignty of the type articulated by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali in *An*

Agenda for Peace puts every state at risk of international intervention if it does not accede to the wishes of its population, or even its vocal minorities, "...whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic."³⁶ While sound in theory, this concept has the potential of dealing a serious blow to any country where the stability of the society and government are not at the level to which the western powers are accustomed. If the human rights of individuals are to take increasing precedence over the sovereign rights of states, then what organizing mechanism is to replace the eroding nation state in providing for stability in the new world order? As of now, no viable alternative has been identified.³⁷ The effect has been to encourage ethnic and national aspirations for independence or at least greater recognition, without a mechanism to absorb these new tensions in the international community. The result is likely to be somewhat chaotic. The peace support business will be booming for the UN and for peace enforcement forces. Unfortunately, at the same time, the stability of the rest of the world, even of western Europe and potentially the United States may come under attack should global economic conditions deteriorate.³⁸

With that as background, how has the emergence of intra-state conflicts changed the nature of war in this age? Non-governmental actors have found it fitting and proper to use organized violence in pursuit of their goals. These actors include a wide range of groups from the Irish Republican Army, to Palestinian groups, Bosnian and Serbian militias, and Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka. While they do not represent all of the people in a given area, or even of a given nationality, they purport to (and seek to) garner wide popular support through various means. To the extent that they succeed (and existing governments can aid them greatly by their reactions to terrorist acts, etc.), the Clausewitzian trinity is still present, only in a slightly altered form.³⁹

In an insurgency, civil war, or even a state of anarchy, with the people rallied to different sides, passion and violence can become extreme, the use of armed force extensive,

but the political direction less assured. Given the passionate commitment of the people in ethnic wars, the will that binds the trinity together can be very strong. To the extent that the people, the "government," and the "military" are really the same people, this trinity is very compact and very strong. China under Mao serves as an excellent example of this. In fact it was part of his strategy that the army would be the people and vice versa.⁴⁰ In that way, the isolation of a center of gravity by the enemy would be much more difficult.

Thus, war in our era will still be defined in traditional terms, but it has taken on a new shape. Military force will remain an instrument of limited utility--that is it can only return a situation to the point where other options are available. That, however, is a limit under which it has always operated. War today will be fought with a heretofore unusual ferocity and violence because of the fuel of nationalism, ethnicity and religious fervor. The ability of governments or political leaders to control passions and military force will be tenuous at best. Military force itself will be of a lower order than that possessed by the great powers, the technology less sophisticated, the unit structure far more fluid, and the doctrine and strategy less elaborate and well developed. Yet, the convergence of people and military will mean that special efforts will have to be made to not only defeat military forces but to cut them off from popular support.⁴¹ This is a different, and very complex form of war from what we have traditionally encountered. It will take a great deal of thinking and study for the American military to understand it, and even more of an effort to accommodate our doctrine to its nature.⁴² Nevertheless, it is still war, and there is much to be learned from history if only we take the time to look.

PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACE ENFORCEMENT

The theory of war is laid out before us. Before discussing the specific implications of theory for peace enforcement operations, it is necessary to further clarify the distinction

between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The former, as traditionally conducted by the United Nations, involves the presence of lightly armed, or unarmed troops between antagonists. The peacekeepers are there to *preserve* a peace that already exists, albeit possibly of a tenuous sort. They are there at the behest of all parties in the conflict as a means of ensuring that the peace has a chance of growing through a continuing political dialogue. Although peacekeeping employs armed forces, it is not treated as war. The international community has in effect decided to take the risk at not being prepared for combat in order to preserve its apparent neutrality and in the hope of providing a *symbol* of global support for a peace process. It is gamble, but one that has generally met with success. Peacekeepers generally are viewed as neutral, and are not there to conduct combat operations. Their combat role is non-existent, and their weapons serve only for self defense should the situation deteriorate.⁴³

Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves the injection of armed forces into a situation where peace does not exist, and where at least one of the parties does not want an international presence.⁴⁴ Peace enforcers are sent in to *create* a peace, and then to maintain (enforce) it. As such, they are being asked to go into a combat situation with at least the implication that they are there to fight if the will of the international community is not respected.⁴⁵ Under such conditions, the perception of neutrality is impossible to maintain, though, as I will argue below, it may still be possible to appear even handed. This is clearly within the pale of war as defined by Clausewitz. Consequently, deciding to deploy peace enforcement forces is markedly different from deployment of peace keeping forces.

While it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the modalities of peace enforcement operations in detail, some comments regarding the conduct of such operations will be helpful in addressing theory's impact on them. In general, *peace enforcement* operations, as defined in this essay, entail the insertion of armed forces into a country or

region where conflict continues. Their mission is to separate any fighting forces, through combat if necessary, and to establish security zones between them.⁴⁶ Once this relatively easier (from a military perspective) phase is completed, then the peace enforcers must sustain the fragile peace they have created. As discussed above, the use of peace enforcement forces need not actually involve combat; but their presence and heavier (than peacekeeping) armament imply the possibility of combat if international sanctions are not followed.

The danger, of course, is that none of the sides necessarily want them there, and that they may quickly become the common enemy. It is uncertain whether this fact can be avoided; it is more predictable that both sides will try to use foreign intervention to build public support for their cause. Suffice it to say that success in this phase can only have a chance if the forces involved treat both sides even handedly to the greatest extent possible. This will not mean that they will be perceived as neutral, but may help create a perception of fairness.

In this sense, the peace enforcers may end up filling a role similar to that filled by police officers in a community. The key is to avoid pushing the mass of the local population into the camp of one of the antagonists. The goal should be to create order: to get the masses to accept and expect a peaceful environment and to keep them from believing their only defense rests with the warring opponents.⁴⁷ While justice drives many of our motives in acting against war, it is not the primary function of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is mainly concerned with establishing peace, not with ensuring justice. Justice must await the political solution that peace enforcement makes possible but does not itself achieve.⁴⁸

For Americans, fighting for peace and not justice might be a hard pill to swallow, for we like to choose between good and evil.⁴⁹ This necessarily entails choosing sides. To pick one side over another in a peace enforcement operation, however, is tantamount to deciding on an alliance with one against the rest. If that is what we want to do, then we must

approach it as such. That mission is different, however, from peace enforcement, with a different set of concerns and objectives, and a different level of commitment. As Clausewitz cautions,

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.⁵⁰

The above discussion emphasizes the difficulty of successfully conducting military operations *inside* another sovereign nation. We are talking about war; a phenomenon that is exceedingly complex and unpredictable. Layered on top of that in intra-state conflict we find the intractability of extreme passions and poor, if any, governmental (or rational) control. Approaching the effort from an a-historic perspective, however, further exacerbates the problem by cutting us off from a framework for rational analysis of the situation. We are set adrift in uncharted seas, with neither light nor compass. Difficult as peace enforcement operations will be, it would be wise to view them through the perspective of theory. At least in that case, we would be honest with ourselves and our people as to the nature and extent of the commitment we seek to make, and as to the likelihood of success.

INFLUENCE OF THEORY ON PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

As the discussion thus far has indicated, peace enforcement is war, and is therefore shaped and influenced by war's fundamental nature and characteristics. While theory and history cannot provide the cookbook solutions one is tempted to seek, it can illuminate our judgment in deciding on a course of action. Theory gives structure to our use of the past--and that structure is essential if we are to be able to select what in the past is valid to our purposes today, and what is not. From this discussion of theory and the historical examples provided, some general implications can be derived. These are representative thoughts, and do not pretend to be exhaustive. Their purpose is to illustrate how theory can apply, and to

encourage further thought and analysis in this area.

- *A clear policy objective and sufficient level of effort is essential.* The need for a clear objective has been repeatedly stressed by American decision makers from President Clinton on down.⁵¹ What theory tells us that is unique is *why* such an objective is needed. Since war is the embodiment of violence and passion in a realm of chance and uncertainty, any hope for success comes from the rational and well thought out policies that give it purpose. Without a rational policy, the forces of chaos take over, and our goals fall to the wayside. Without a clear articulation of an objective, popular support is harder to generate, and "mission creep" harder to avoid.⁵²

Not only must policy provide a clear objective, but it must also determine the level of effort to be employed--how important is this policy objective to the country. Desert Storm was a classic in this sense. Colin Powell's criterion of overwhelming decisive force was met, and our clear objectives were achieved--with remarkably few losses. Desert Storm was relatively easier to figure out, however, because it was a "traditional" war *between* states where one side was clearly the evil aggressor. On the other side of the coin is our operation in Somalia. In part because it was not treated as war, but as something other than war, the traditional alarms were not in place. Instead we, as part of a UN operation (UNOSOM II) sought to accomplish a broad policy objective with insufficient force. One might argue that if Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, or those under him, had perceived the operation as war, then either the armor would have been forthcoming when requested, or the mission statement changed to coincide with the reality of the situation. That neither was done suggests an absence of consideration of the *interaction* between policy, strategy, and tactics.

In a broader sense, there was a policy-strategy mismatch throughout our entire involvement in Somalia. When it was a purely American operation, our policy provided strategy with a clear objective and sufficient level of effort. However, it ignored a

fundamental tenet of customary international law: when a nation takes over for a sovereign, or acts in place of a sovereign no longer capable of acting, then that nation assumes the responsibilities of that sovereign. We ignored this and believed we could simply feed the people and leave without addressing the underlying social and political causes of the starvation. The result was UNOSOM II wherein the UN, with U.S. support, sought to expand the policy objective to one of nation building--a rational, if not risk free, objective. Unfortunately, the level of effort needed was not provided, and the result was a defeat of the policy goal and, perhaps more significant, a loss of credibility of both the UN and of American power.

*- Because peace enforcement operations are conducted in an environment of chance, policy cannot be a tyrant over strategy, but must react to the reality created by the execution of that strategy.*⁵³ Plans seldom survive first contact with the enemy. This, as Clausewitz argues, is inherent in the nature of war as an interaction of opposed wills. The operation of a strategy in a conflict sets up unanticipated consequences and reactions from other players in that conflict. Just as strategy cannot accomplish something for which it has either insufficient forces or for which its tool--tactics--is unsuited, policy cannot expect strategy to accomplish an objective alien to it. This fact is compounded by the realization that as a war progresses, policy makers may find it increasingly difficult to control both the emotions and the uncertainties inherent in the war. Great force of will and constancy of purpose is required to continue to focus on the objective and not let it change based on the exigencies of the moment. Policy must react to the reality created by strategy, but it remains the master of that strategy. When it becomes subordinate to strategy, then frustration, confusion, and often failure follow close behind.⁵⁴ Another aspect of the policy-strategy interaction is where policy too quickly changes to reflect recent strategic successes, such as UNOSOM II in Somalia. Policy must respond to the reality created by war, but must also

consider changes in goals with great care for the full ramifications of that change.⁵⁵

Peace enforcement operations carry with them these same seeds of disaster. In the first instance, the policy objective must be clearly articulated. Beyond that, however, sufficient flexibility must be present to allow policy to adapt as circumstances change. This requires a careful balancing of the need to respond to reality while at the same time maintaining focus on the original purpose for entering into the conflict. Too much rigidity is bad; but, so too is excessive flexibility. Thus, as the theory of war suggests, there must be a constant interaction between policy and strategy; between the statesman and the commander.

- It is the role of policy to determine whether to act unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This seems obvious, and at one level it is. However, it also implies a choice of risks, with which strategy should not have to contend. Acting unilaterally may ensure the greatest control over the objective, and promise the greatest flexibility to the commander in terms of organization, doctrine, structure and rules of engagement. Unilateral action provides the greatest protection to our forces in allowing them to act cohesively with speed, flexibility and decisiveness. All of these are important ingredients of success in an environment of uncertainty such as war.

Acting multilaterally, on the other hand, may promise greater international, and possibly domestic support. It may in some ways reduce the costs to the United States in supporting the operation, and it may make isolating the theater from outside assistance easier. However, these political gains must be weighed against their impact on the strategic level--for in coalitions we surrender a portion of our latitude, and our forces may yield up some cohesion, speed, flexibility and consistency. Furthermore, in a peace enforcement operation, the fairness of the intervening forces is often a key factor.⁵⁶ This becomes much more difficult to ensure with diverse multi-national forces, each having differing ideas regarding the definition of fairness.⁵⁷

- *Popular support is essential.* This is such a simple statement, yet one so often overlooked. If peace enforcement operations are considered something other than war, then the need for popular support becomes less apparent. Once we consider peace enforcement as a form of war, then the need for popular support becomes obvious. First, popular support must be generated in order to commit resources to the operation, and to sustain it to successful conclusion. The process of articulating a clear and well defined policy objective as well as an honest portrayal of the level of effort required and the duration anticipated go far in building popular support. If the truth be told, and the people do not support the plan, then the plan must be rewritten. To go to war without mobilizing popular support risks failure. Our experience in Vietnam serves as a clear indicator of the extent and duration such a failure can entail.

Second, in that peace enforcement operations are essentially limited war, both the goals and means may be limited as well. One of the great difficulties in limited war as it has been practiced in the past fifty years is that while popular support may be hard to generate in the beginning, it may be equally hard to *contain* once war starts. The population may become inflamed over casualties or atrocities; it may demand action for humanitarian reasons that, in the short term, may negatively impact on operations; or it may demand a change in the policy objective to make it a more total, vice limited war. In peace enforcement operations, however, the desirability of evenhandedness suggests avoiding the choosing of sides. Thus, the government may be faced with the difficulty of generating popular support (normally through demonizing one of the opponents), while at the same time not choosing sides. Not choosing sides becomes even more difficult when media coverage slants issues to portray one side as the evil aggressor with the other as the innocent victim. This dilemma points back to the difficulty of generating popular support and then controlling that "passion" as the conflict progresses. It seems to be a common problem in limited wars, and one for

which the principal solution lies in the education of the public as to the nature of what is being undertaken. Short of that effort, it will be difficult to successfully carry out a peace enforcement strategy.

- *Peace enforcement is a military operation, and as such, cannot resolve the underlying causes of a conflict.* As Clausewitz counseled, the result of military action is never final. Military force serves one purpose: to create an environment where options are available.⁵⁸ In other words, military force can only serve to give time to the political process. While peace enforcers may be required to perform policing duties, their primary focus must be on combat capability. As peace enforcers, they are not suited for resolving political, social, and economic problems that may underlie the conflict. Once a situation is stabilized sufficiently to allow the work of peacekeepers and nation builders to resume, the peace enforcers could be reduced or pulled out, depending on the situation, with a readiness to return if conditions deteriorate. As Clausewitz wrote, the idea of combat must be present when military forces are used, and this includes peace enforcers.

- *Peace enforcement must target enemy centers of gravity.* While this sounds harsh, it is a reality of any military operation. The objective of strategy is determined by policy, the means of strategy is combat, and the objective of combat, as determined by strategy, is the destruction of the enemy's will to continue. This is best accomplished through the paralysis, elimination, or destruction of a center of gravity. In peace enforcement operations, the problem becomes identification of that center of gravity. Each case must be considered on its own merits, with its own peculiar characteristics in mind. Nevertheless, some general observations are warranted.

While it might be easy to remove the political head, or to destroy the military capacity of one or both sides to a conflict, it is unlikely that these steps would be sufficient (even if they were permitted by policy). More likely as a center of gravity would be popular support.

If the mass of the population can be dissuaded from supporting the armed conflict, or, more importantly, if they can be persuaded that their interests can be met better through peaceful settlement of the dispute, then their support for continued struggle is eroded.⁵⁹ This requires a two-part approach. On the one hand, military operations must make it plain that violent methods will not be tolerated, regardless of which side partakes of them. On the other hand, both sides must be convinced that negotiated settlement can ultimately resolve their differences.

Does this mean that every circumstance where peace enforcement may be needed will yield success? No. In some, the problems may be so intractable, that even peace enforcement cannot work. What the concept of "center of gravity" leads to is a means of assessing the level of effort likely to be needed, and the chances of success in using the peace enforcement tool of policy.

One final thought on this issue. Even in peace enforcement operations, combat by the enforcers must be the theme around which forces are selected and organized. However, that combat can be implied as well as actual. Therefore, while it may not be desirable to turn a nation into a wasteland to save it, the appearance of a capability to do so on the ground in country may be crucial to convincing the warring parties that a peaceful settlement is the preferred alternative.

- Peace enforcement is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. Maximum flexibility must be granted to the on-scene commander. One of the keys to success in peace enforcement operations is the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances and to respond rapidly and decisively. This is true of any operation in war because the constant interaction of opposed forces makes any situation subject to time. Opportunities for action are fleeting, and must be exploited quickly before they evaporate. For example, in Bosnia, NATO jets have detected violators of the no-fly zone who are actively engaged in bombing

missions. However, their ability to respond is hampered by political controls. By the time permission is received to respond, the opportunity has passed.⁶⁰ This undercuts the credibility of the no-fly zone, and of the international community's commitment to the policy.

This is not to say that commanders should have free reign of military action once a peace enforcement operation is begun. What is being argued here is that the commander and the statesman must decide on a policy and strategy at the outset, and then allow the commander to carry that out. If a no-fly zone is to be created then the decision should be made up front as to the degree that the zone is to be enforced. If it is not to be enforced when challenged, then that could be worse than not having one at all. Because of the constantly shifting nature of war, moreover, an ongoing dialogue between the statesman and commander (between policy and strategy) is necessary to ensure that the requisite flexibility is retained by the commander, but that that flexibility remains within the confines dictated by policy.

- The United States must conduct its peace enforcement operations within the framework of our societal values. The relation of the various forces in Clausewitz' trinity within a given country in many ways outline that country's strategic culture. In the United States, the relationship between the people, the military, and the government imposes certain restrictions on how we conduct operations. There is always a high moral content to what we do; a sense that we act, not for cold political reasons, but for humanitarian or legal or moral reasons. Likewise, because of the large influence of public support on our military operations, they must generally be swift, offensive, decisive, and with relatively light casualties. Above all, our wars must seem to be just and humane.⁶¹

The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches serves to guarantee that our wars will be fought with the ideals of our people considered. Unfortunately, that very separation of powers has in the past given incentive for the executive

branch to call wars other than that which they are. Vietnam is the classic case where successive administrations refused to go to the Congress for a declaration of war. The consequent mood in Congress resulted in the War Powers Resolution, which has driven the administration to call even fewer "involvements" war. A reluctance to invoke Congress' role in war making may have contributed to the poor situation our forces were in in Somalia, since once again the administration considered the action something other than war. While the process can be risky from the administration point of view, the procedure and debate of getting a declaration of war, or at least a vote of support, from Congress can serve a triple purpose: it forces the administration to explicitly articulate its intentions, it educates the American people as to what they are getting into, and it confirms the public's support for the operation. All of this comes into play when America contemplates war (or non-war). It may not be according to theory, but it is how we go to war. Therefore, any plans for employment of our forces must consider our strategic culture against military theory, addressing the concerns of both, or we quickly will be on the road to failure.

- Part of the calculus of a peace enforcement operation must be the likely impact on other great powers in the world. In an uncertain and changing environment such as war, the interests of other nations and actors must be taken into account. Originally limited objectives, once expanded based on success in combat, may change the calculus of power by encouraging the entry of another power into the fray. China's entry into the Korean War in 1950 and Russia's recent dispatch of troops to Sarajevo serve as examples. While our planning cannot always account for the reactions of other states, it must be cognizant of their concerns, and flexible enough to adapt to the changing circumstances brought on by war.⁶²

CONCLUSIONS

Peace enforcement operations are one form of war, different in degree, but not

different in type from what has occurred throughout history. As a form of war, they place certain demands on policymakers and the objectives they set. Peace enforcement operations are hard--they will involve a substantial investment of national (and international) treasure, may involve significant casualties, and may last years or decades. Even then, it has yet to be proven that peace enforcement and nation building can work. Some have suggested that the very concept is flawed.⁶³

Yet, in the past a form of peace enforcement and nation-building *has* been conducted: the occupation of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II serve as a examples of how much effort this process may take. There, nations whose military forces had been defeated and whose governments had fallen were forced to reorder their societies to conform to the wishes of the victors. The experiment was a success, but, and this is the key issue, the investment in terms of money and forces was staggering. Nothing short of the financed rebuilding of these two countries and the continued occupation of their territory for generations would likely have succeeded. While this example is admittedly an extreme case, it serves to illustrate the *potential* costs of peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement can work, but it will likely take uncommonly inspired and gifted leaders, a substantial portion of the global community's resources, and potentially upwards of a generation to accomplish. The trustee territories of the early years of the U.N. come close to what we might expect. The difference is that peace enforcement--the intervention by armed forces to compel peace--will be required, and like a fire, a lack of sufficient cooling time encourages reflashes. The investment promises to be staggering.

How, then, does the global community stop these destabilizing and murderous internal wars? First of all, the U.N. as currently structured is incapable of dealing with the type of military action that will be required in a peace enforcement operation. It lacks the command and control capabilities, the cohesive forces, the organization, the equipment, and the finances

for sustained combat operations.⁶⁴ In the past, the U.N. has turned to a coalition leader, usually the United States, to operate under its authority. This is the model used in the Korean War and in Desert Storm. Thus, in peace support operations and nation building, the U.N. might rightly concentrate on a neutral peacekeeping function, its role in facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes (peace making), and the advice and resources it can apply to nation building. When peace enforcement is required, it would be better if the U.N. continued to rely on coalitions or regional organizations to do the job.⁶⁵

Secondly, to remedy many of the deep seated and emotional internal conflicts that are either ongoing or threatened, a much closer cooperation between agencies within governments, especially in the United States, and between governments, non-governmental organizations and the U.N. is required. In the limited war scenarios most likely to occur in the near future, the use of military force will solve nothing by itself. It will serve only to return a situation to the point where more lasting steps can be taken to diffuse the situation and build peace.

Finally, there has to be a perception in the world that the international community will not tolerate recourse to force and violence in the resolution of disputes. Such a perception can never stop all of the wars that will occur, but it can make the U.N.'s recourse to peace enforcement much less frequent and less costly. Creating such a perception will require that the U.N. conduct at least one successful peace enforcement mission where heavy troops are inserted into a conflict, the conflict stopped, and a successful, fair and lasting peace created. The deterrent effect of such an operation will serve notice to other antagonists that peaceful solutions can work and that turning to war and violence may bring down the might of the international community.⁶⁶ Given the current policies of the U.N. and the United States in support of qualified state sovereignty, the incentive for ethnic groupings to rebel against their governments will remain. The price for world stability will have to be paid eventually.

Paying it now will be cheaper in terms of blood and treasure than if we have to pay it bit by bit over the next ten to twenty years.

The problem, then, comes down to what we hope to see the world look like in the next twenty years, and whether we are willing to pay the price now for that world. It is largely up to the United States to set the vision and to lead the world to it.⁶⁷ Through a two-pronged program of, on the one hand, strong support for increasing economic interdependence and collective security, and on the other, a abject intolerance of war and instability, the United States can hold out the promise of a truly new world order. Nations and peoples that can see benefit in an open world and at the same time know the penalty for stepping beyond the pale of international dialogue will support our efforts.

To do this, to move out with a sense of purpose in the world, will require the support of the American people. To date our political leaders, on both sides of the aisle, have failed to mobilize the public to support what must be our role in the emerging world. The people, for all their love of comfort and material wealth, for all their concern over the conditions inside the United States, are now, by virtue of a fifty year Cold War, sophisticated enough to see the need for U.S. involvement in the world. What has been lacking so far is the leadership needed to take them there.

While a good portion of that lack of vision, has been the preoccupation with domestic affairs, no small part of it has come from the belief that we are living through a historically unique time. Such a view holds that what history has taught us in the past no longer bears on the present or the future. We are on our own, with no real charts or stars to guide us. History does have lessons for us; the theories, particularly military ones, that have been developed with the blood of our ancestors hold wisdom that we ignore at our peril. Theory cannot lead us step by step through the maze in which we now find ourselves, but it can help illuminate our judgment and highlight what otherwise might be missed. By looking to the

past for guidance, we can thereby face the future squarely, confident that, as has so often happened before, our wisdom and resources combined will solve the problems we face. Turning our back on the past will only guarantee that we repeat it to the great detriment of the world.

NOTES

- ¹Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1994), pp. 64-65.
- ²See Bill Clinton, "Reforming the United Nations." Speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 September, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LX, No. 1 (15 October, 1993), pp. 9-13. See also the series of speeches delivered by key administration officials over the past few months: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement." Delivered 21 September, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LX, No. 1 (15 October, 1993), pp. 13-19; Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World." Delivered at the National War College, 23 September, 1993. Reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39 (Sept 27, 1993), pp. 665-668; and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "American Foreign Policy." Delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 4 November, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LX, No. 6 (1 January, 1994), pp. 162-167.
- ³"National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce..." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992, (SC DOC S/24111, June 17, 1992), para. 11. Hereafter cited as "An Agenda for Peace."
- ⁴Although "An Agenda for Peace" states that the sovereign state is the "...fundamental entity..." of the international system, the document's actual effect may be exactly the opposite through its support of minority rights within states and the expressed right of the international community to intervene to support those rights. Such a position seems tailor made to act as an incentive for separatism and ethnic nationalism, while at the same time undercutting the legitimacy of existing state governments. Boutros-Ghali, paras. 17-18. The concept of qualified sovereignty is elaborated upon and updated in his "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 98-99. The argument that the erosion of sovereignty is undercutting global stability is supported by Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army War College Press, February, 1993), pp. 2-6. See page 18 below.
- ⁵Lt. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, "U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 5. Part of the problem in discussing peace enforcement is the lack of definitional rigor in the literature. Boutros-Ghali adds to the problem by failing to clearly delineate between peacekeeping, peace making, and peace enforcement forces. He does however, acknowledge that peace enforcement troops need to be much more heavily armed than peacekeepers, the implication being that peace enforcers would possibly have to use military force to attain their objectives. While not every case would involve actual fighting, he maintains, the capability of doing so "...is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security." "An Agenda for Peace," paras. 42-45. Sara Sewall defines peace enforcement as "...any operation authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce a UN Security Council mandate which may, or may not, have the consent of the parties, and which may require the use of military force." "Peace Enforcement and the United Nations," Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 102. General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.), includes the essence of peace enforcement under the rubric of peace making: "Peacemaking is imposing coalition military forces between combatants and persuading them to withdraw or face direct military confrontation with a clearly superior force." "The Use of Military Force in Bosnia," in NATO: The Challenge of Change, ed. Jeffrey Simon, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 163. For the purposes of this essay, and for the sake of permitting some rigor in analysis, peace enforcement will be defined as set out in the text. It presumes the use of forces in combat, or the possibility of their use to separate warring parties.
- ⁶Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75. Emphasis in the original.

- ⁷Clausewitz, p. 75.
- ⁸Most notably by the British historian and strategist Sir B.H. Liddell Hart. See especially his Strategy, 2nd edition, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).
- ⁹The American experience in Vietnam is clear proof of this fact. Harry Summers develops this line of reasoning in On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1982).
- ¹⁰Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter, 1992/93), p. 67.
- ¹¹This quote is from Beyerchen, p. 67. Clausewitz uses the analogy in Book 1, Chapter 1 of *On War*, p. 75. It applies regardless of the number of opponents involved.
- ¹²"Mission creep" can be defined as a situation that occurs when a nation embarks on a military endeavor for limited objectives, but that those objectives expand during the course of the endeavor, often in response to success in achieving the initial goals.
- ¹³Many works have appeared over the past years on the uncertainty of war at the grand strategy level. The most thorough study of the horizontal and vertical interaction in crises may be found in Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). An excellent review of nuclear strategy and its concern over escalation may be found in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981). For a discussion of the loss of control of events by Hitler in 1939, and to an even greater extent by the Japanese between 1931 and 1941, see H. P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War, (New York: The Free Press, 1989). For a cogent review of our involvement in Somalia see Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 45-55.
- ¹⁴Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 32-45. See also The National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1992), p. 10.
- ¹⁵Clausewitz, p. 89. Emphasis added.
- ¹⁶Beyerchen, pp. 70-71. Emphasis added. Clausewitz introduces this idea at the end of Book I, Chapter 1, p. 89.
- ¹⁷Harry Summers argues convincingly that in Vietnam the failure to mobilize public support for the war in effect attempted to discount the popular leg of the trinity. The result was a collapse of support for the war. See On Strategy, pp. 16-19.
- ¹⁸See John T. Hanley, "Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine Force," U.S. Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 17-19; and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 192.
- ¹⁹On the peaceful tendencies of democracies, see for example, Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy," Foreign Policy, 91 (Summer 1993), p.105, Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy, 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 30-31, and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Avon Books, 1992), pp. 262-264. The traditional staples of wealth over which nations have fought in the past include territory, resources, and people. On the impact of globalization and the information revolution on these factors, see Walter Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p. xii. For an alternative interpretation of why these factors no longer reign absolute, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-23, and Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (February, 1994), pp. 72-74.
- ²⁰Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 192.
- ²¹Political reasons might include the risks to an incumbent for supporting a potentially losing or costly endeavor, or the financial costs that come with war benefits for veterans. Bureaucratic reasons range from the insecurity of young White House aides in military matters (e.g. in the case of Vietnam), or in our present case, the need for one part of the DOD organization to fight for limited resources. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict--ASD SO/LIC--has done much to foster the concept of "Environment Short of War," and with some success. To the extent that near-term future conflicts can be characterized as non-war, ASD SO/LIC will have legitimate claims on a larger portion of the shrinking pie.
- ²²Clausewitz, p. 87.
- ²³Clausewitz, p. 80.
- ²⁴Clausewitz, p. 594.
- ²⁵Clausewitz, p. 141. Emphasis in original.

²⁶ Clausewitz, p. 95. Emphasis in original.

²⁷ Clausewitz, p. 95.

²⁸ Notice that the center of gravity need not be *in* the theater of operation. American tactical victories dealt heavy blows to the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies. However, they were tied to a strategy and policy that were confused and separate from each other. Policy never provided the level of effort needed to isolate and defeat the North Vietnamese centers of gravity—their government, military, and alliances. Therefore, while the Americans expended treasure and life in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese felt confident in their ability to prevail, and to influence American policy via the streets and campuses in American cities. It is through this disconnect between policy and strategy that American tactics assumed not only an indecisive, but in reality an irrelevant role in the final outcome of the war. See Summers, On Strategy, p. 1.

²⁹ A well known example of this is the way Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was pulled into a general engagement at Gettysburg against his desires. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee, an abridgment in one volume by Richard Harwell, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), pp. 321-323.

³⁰ Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 92-93. See also General William C. Westmoreland, USA, A Soldier Reports, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 120.

³¹ Clausewitz, p. 99 and pp. 601-604.

³² Clausewitz, p. 99.

³³ See for example van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 193; Kenichi Ohmae, Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, (New York: Harper Business, 1990), especially pp. 213-217; and Mark N. Katz, "The Legacy of Empire in International Relations," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12 (1993), p. 365. Boutros-Ghali implies that state-versus-state wars are no longer the primary security threat in the post-Cold War era; "An Agenda for Peace," para. 12. This idea is echoed in Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (summer, 1993), pp. 8-11.

³⁴ It is not just artificial borders that remain, but also colonial elites in many cases. See Katz, "The Legacy of Empire in International Relations," pp. 366-367.

³⁵ Donald Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement, pp. 5-6.

³⁶ Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," paras. 17-18.

³⁷ Thomas G. Weiss argues that the present trend is toward a growing perception that the international community, in supporting its "...right to intervene for humanitarian purposes," will replace the sovereign state as the guarantor of security in the world. "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter, 1994), p. 110, (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the willingness of the international community to shoulder that responsibility is in doubt (in terms of commitment of resources, troops, and time).

³⁸ The waves of instability and unrest emanate out from Eastern Europe as ethnic groups demand recognition (and in some cases independence), economic conditions worsen, and tensions mount. Besides the danger of mass migrations into the already strained western democracies, there is also a danger that protectionism will actually grow in the West in response to stagnating economies and domestic politics. This combination could well mean a gradual decline in economies and the growth of unrest there. For a particularly chilling commentary on these possibilities, see Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), especially Chapter 21, "The Zone of Illusion," pp. 204-212.

³⁹ The case of the Irish Republican Army serves as an excellent example, especially of the waxing and waning of popular support in response to two stimuli: terrorist actions and government responses. See Don Mansfield, "The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland," Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. Bard O'Neill, William R. Heaton, & Donald J. Alberts, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 45-82.

⁴⁰ John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 840-841. See also, for example, Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War, May 1938." In Selected Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 197-198.

⁴¹ Bard O'Neill underscores the challenges faced by these factors in his analysis of insurgencies. "Analyzing Insurgency: An Overview." Unpublished essay. (Washington, D.C.: National War College, February, 1991), pp. 30-32.

- ⁴²There is also a difficulty within the U.S. military in accepting peace enforcement as a form of war. Accustomed to preparing for the more "conventional" (and hence predictable) war of the European front--a re-run of World War II--the military as a whole is having a tough time coming to grips with the evolving nature of war in our era. Concepts such as the "Environment Short of War" and "Operations Other Than War" suggest that operations such as peace enforcement are considered to be outside the pale of what our military is designed and prepared to do. I would argue that we must be prepared to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict, and to do so at several points in that spectrum simultaneously. This is fundamentally different than what our military has been brought up with in the Cold War, and will require considerable effort and time to change. Shunting many of these operations off into a special group within the military relieves the bulk of our officer corps of responsibility to understand and prepare for what may be the most likely forms of conflict in the next ten to twenty years. Further development of this idea and its impact on our training, doctrine, and organization unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this essay.
- ⁴³Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," para. 50. See also Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement, p. 19.
- ⁴⁴Boutros-Ghali, paras. 44-45; Snow, pp. 21-26.
- ⁴⁵This theme is clear in Clinton, "Reforming the United Nations," p. 12.
- ⁴⁶James P. McCarthy, Gen., USAF (Ret.), "The Use of Military Force in Bosnia," in NATO: The Challenge of Change, ed. Jeffrey Simon, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 163-166.
- ⁴⁷Again, with the IRA example, popular support for the insurgency grows in periods when the Catholic people of Northern Ireland *perceive* that the British Army is not being even handed, and is in fact taking the side of the Protestants. In such a situation, they have only the IRA to defend them, and this results in increased popularity for the IRA movement. Mansfield, pp. 65-66.
- ⁴⁸Military operations, just like police operations, can and do contribute to justice. The distinction here is that their *primary* focus is on peace vice justice. Justice in this sense is what will underly the final solution to the crisis, and which is attained only through political and diplomatic processes, not through the barrel of a gun.
- ⁴⁹"...the United States sees war as a conflict of good versus evil, in which good should always triumph." Anita M. Arms, LtCol., USAF, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," Essays on Strategy, IX, ed. Thomas C. Gill, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 24. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "American Military Strategy," Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lecture, Policy Papers in International Affairs, Number 28, (Berkeley, Ca: Institute of International Studies, 1986), pp. 3-17; and Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, (Fall, 1981), pp. 21-47. While a debate continues as to whether a strategic culture as such can even exist, let alone how it can be defined, as these sources suggest, there are certain *preferences* among a people which at least in a general sense describe their approach to international relations and war.
- ⁵⁰Clausewitz, p. 88. Emphasis added.
- ⁵¹Clinton, "Reforming the United Nations," p. 12. See also Sarah Sewall, "Peace Enforcement and the United Nations," p. 105.
- ⁵²Somalia is the most recent example of "mission creep," where policy objectives changed in the face of operational success. See T. Frank Crigler, "The Peace Enforcement Dilemma," Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), p. 66. The most significant example of where policy surrenders guidance of a war to strategy is World War I. In that case, the conflict continued for several years largely because leaders could not figure out how to end it. There starting objectives were soon forgotten, and only the concept of not being humiliated could attempt to substitute for what should have been policy. Otherwise, direction of the war was left to generals until 1917. Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 105.
- ⁵³"That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. it must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them." Clausewitz, p. 87.
- ⁵⁴The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 provides a wealth of examples in this area. First of all, Hitler, in deciding to invade Russia, essentially decided on a policy for which the tool of strategy was insufficient. Given the size of Russia, the poor logistics infrastructure there, and the difficulty Germany would face in keeping its forces supplied with equipment and material, a "rational" calculation would indicate that the political objective (to the extent that it was ever defined) was unattainable with the forces at hand.

- That being said, however, the errors were compounded when Hitler refused to consolidate his front after the offensive failed. Refusing to allow policy to bend to the reality that had been created, he rigidly insisted on contesting every inch of ground. As a result, his forces were increasingly wasted in useless defenses, further weakening his overall position. The ultimate refusal to adapt policy to strategy was Hitler's refusal to consider surrender as the Russian, and later the allied armies converged on Berlin. See Willmott, The Great Crusade, especially chapters 2, 3, and 6. See also Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Army Historical Series, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 1968).
- ⁵⁵ UNOSOM II serves as an example of a failure to fully consider all of the ramifications of a change in policy objective when success in a limited objective (feeding the people) generates pressures for an expanded commitment (nation building). See Crigler, p. 66. A recent example of the failure of policy to adapt to the reality created by strategy may be found in the American experience in Beirut Lebanon on 23 October, 1983. Here, the presence of the U.S. Marines shifted the conflict onto a new trajectory. Policy failed to adapt to this by either providing sufficient level of effort, or of changing the mission (objective) of the forces. The result was the death of 241 U.S. Marines and an embarrassment of U.S. policy. See "DOD Commission Reports On Beirut Terrorist Attack," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 68, No. 2 (February, 1984), pp. 10-13.
- ⁵⁶ "Fairness" in this sense implies the impartiality that is associated with domestic police forces. The example of the police in East Los Angeles has been used often: They walk their beat to prevent violence and crime--to maintain the domestic peace--and in doing so are perceived as supporting primarily the peace, not one side over the other. While the appearance of impartiality may not be easy to maintain, it is considered important by several experts in the subject, including both Col. Gary W. Anderson, USMC and MGen M. A. Willcocks, British Army, who stressed evenhandedness during the National Defense University Symposium entitled "Military Coalitions and the United Nations: Implications for the U.S. Military," held at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 2-3 November, 1993. General Willcocks argued that impartiality was one of the key concepts in the British "philosophic approach" to peace support operations. On the same subject, see also Donald Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement, p. 33.
- ⁵⁷ Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," p. 22.
- ⁵⁸ Not only Clausewitz has stressed this. Donald Snow writes: *"In this circumstance, military force is relevant as a condition to facilitate political processes, not as a substitute for them. Military force can act as a precondition for enduring peace...; it cannot create such a peace..."* Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement, p. 20.
- ⁵⁹ This applies to any form of government, though democratic forms are obviously much more susceptible to popular pressures.
- ⁶⁰ In an editorial to The Washington Post, Jeane Kirkpatrick cites a case where it took over four hours to get authorization to retaliate for shelling of UN Peacekeepers--and even then, NATO commanders were unsure as to whether permission had been granted. "Peacekeepers' Lives in Danger," The Washington Post, (March 21, 1994), p. A19.
- ⁶¹ Huntington, "American Military Strategy," pp. 14-17; and Arms, "Strategic Culture," pp. 22-23. This concept is open to different interpretations, however. For example, how humane was the fire bombing of Tokyo which began in February, 1945 in which hundreds of thousands of civilians died? Unable to hit targets using precision bombing techniques, American B-29s intentionally attacked industrial centers by incendiary bombing surrounding civilian neighborhoods. I am not passing judgment on decisions made fifty years ago, and times and beliefs have changed. However, I am suggesting that the terms "just" and "humane" may not be as absolute as we Americans would prefer to think. See Dan van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945, (New York: Touchstone, 1991), pp. 372-373.
- ⁶² This applies to not only our objectives, but also our methods. As Col. Steven Rader, USA, points out, our preference for overwhelming force runs counter to the practices of other powers, and may generate friction, or even confrontations between great powers. "The U.S. Military Role in a Multilateral Framework," Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 55.
- ⁶³ *"A much more serious weakness...lies in the very concept of peace-enforcement, the notion that peace can be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of outsiders."* Crigler, p. 67.
- ⁶⁴ McCaffrey, "U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," p. 7. Reforms currently under consideration do not go far enough to correct these flaws.

⁶⁵Roberts, pp. 15-19.

⁶⁶I have drawn my idea from the Masada example of the Roman Empire. In that instance, an empire that maintained at most twenty-nine legions, sent one against the rebellious Jews of Masada for three years. The signal was clear to all the barbarians surrounding the borders of the Empire: Mess with Rome and you will get hurt and hurt bad. Such was the effect of Masada that a great economy of force was realized for centuries. It was only after the deterrent nature of the Roman legions had been compromised by internal wars and a poor, linear defensive strategy that the army Rome could muster would never meet the demands placed on it. As Edward Luttwak writes: "*...the Romans clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but psychological--the product of others' perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this strength.*" The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 3-5.

⁶⁷No other country has the power to lead, and, arguably (though certainly not universally accepted), no other country commands the reputation of benign and idealistic power than the United States. While it is highly likely that power centers will eventually rise up to oppose American "hegemony," there is a window wherein the United States can attempt to convince the world that economic interdependence and collective security are in both the world's and America's interests. Failing this, the rise of opposition power centers is likely to be accelerated, and conflict and instability greatly increased. See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), pp. 23-33; and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-51.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- . "DOD Commission Reports On Beirut Terrorist Attack." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 68, No. 2 (February, 1984), pp.10-13.
- Albright, Madeleine K. "Building a Consensus on International Peace-keeping." Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. October 20, 1993. Reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 4, No. 46 (Nov. 15, 1993), pp. 789-792.
- . "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World." Speech delivered at the National War College, 23 September, 1993. Reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 4, No. 39 (Sept 27, 1993), pp. 665-668.
- Arms, Anita M., LtCol., USAF. "Strategic Culture: The American Mind." Essays on Strategy, IX. Ed. Thomas C. Gill. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 3-32.
- Arnold, Edwin J. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests." Parameters. Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 4-12.
- Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. U.S. Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1994.
- Baker, James H., LCOL, USA. "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations." Parameters. Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 13-26.
- Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War." International Security. Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter, 1992/1993), pp. 59-90.
- Blodgett, John Q. "The Future of UN Peacekeeping." The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 207-220.
- Bond, Brian. War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Bouchard, Joseph F. Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "Empowering the United Nations." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 98-99.
- . An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992, (SC DOC S/24111, June 17, 1992).

- Browne, Marjorie Ann. "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress." CRS Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. (Jan. 27, 1994).
- Christopher, Warren. "American Foreign Policy." Speech delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 4 November, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. LX, No. 6 (1 January, 1994), pp. 162-167.
- Clinton, Bill. "Reforming the United Nations." Speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 September, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. LX, No. 1 (15 October, 1993), pp. 9-13.
- Collier, Ellen C. "War Powers and U.N. Military Actions: A Brief Background of the Legislative Framework." CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. (Dec. 21, 1993).
- Crigler, T. Frank. "The Peace Enforcement Dilemma." Joint Force Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 64-70.
- Diamond, Larry. "Promoting Democracy." Foreign Policy. Vol. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46.
- Diehl, Paul F. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options." Armed Forces & Society. Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter, 1993), pp. 209-230.
- Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- . "United Nations Forces and Regional Conflicts." From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on U.S. Foreign and Defense Policies. Ed. Patrick M. Cronin. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 181-197.
- Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee. An abridgment in one volume by Richard Harwell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961.
- Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books, 1992.
- Gray, Colin. "National Style in Strategy: The American Example." International Security. (Fall, 1981), pp. 21-47.
- Halperin, Morton H. "Guaranteeing Democracy." Foreign Policy. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 105-123.

- Hanley, John T. "Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine Force." U.S. Naval War College Review. Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 9-28.
- Hart, Sir B.H. Liddell. Strategy, 2nd edition. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Huddleston, Louis D. "Policing the New World Order: An Alternative Strategy." Comparative Strategy. Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan-Mar, 1992), pp. 1-13.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "New Contingencies, Old Roles." Joint Force Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 38-43.
- . "The Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49.
- . "American Military Strategy." Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lecture. Policy Papers in International Affairs, Number 28. Berkeley, Ca: Institute of International Studies, 1986, pp. 3-17.
- Katz, Mark N. "The Legacy of Empire in International Relations." Comparative Strategy. Vol. 12 (1993), pp. 365-383.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "The Coming Anarchy." The Atlantic Monthly, (February, 1994), pp. 44-76.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "Peacekeepers' Lives in Danger." The Washington Post, (March 21, 1994), p. A19.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), pp. 23-33.
- Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement." Speech delivered 21 September, 1993. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. LX, No. 1 (15 October, 1993), pp. 13-19.
- Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise." International Security. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-51.
- Lefever, Ernest W. "Reining in the U.N.: Mistaking the Instrument for the Actor." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 17-20.
- Lewis, William H., ed. Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? McNair Paper 25. Report of a Special Conference. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (November, 1993).
- , ed. Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. McNair Paper 17. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (June, 1993).

- , and Sewall, John O. B. "United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends Versus Means." Joint Forces Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer, 1993), pp. 48-57.
- Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Mansfield, Don. "The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland." Insurgency in the Modern World. Ed. Bard O'Neill, William R. Heaton, & Donald J. Alberts. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980.
- McCaffrey, Barry R., Lt. Gen., USA. "U.S. Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations." In Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military. Ed. Dennis J. Quinn. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.
- McCarthy, James P., Gen., USAF (Ret.). "The Use of Military Force in Bosnia." NATO: The Challenge of Change. Ed. Jeffrey Simon. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 157-168.
- Metz, Steven. "The Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations." Report of a Roundtable Sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (October 5, 1993).
- O'Neill, Bard. "Analyzing Insurgency: An Overview." Unpublished essay. Washington, D.C.: National War College, February, 1991.
- Oakley, Robert B. "An Envoy's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 45-55.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. New York: Harper Business, 1990.
- Parsons, Sir Anthony. "The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era." International Relations. Vol. XI, No. 3 (December, 1992), pp. 189-200.
- Powell, Colin. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 32-45.
- . The National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1992.
- Rader, Steven, Col., USA. "The U.S. Military Role in a Multilateral Framework." Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military. Ed. Dennis J. Quinn. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 51-60.
- Roberts, Adam. "The United Nations and International Security." Survival. Vol. 35, No. 2

(summer, 1993), p. 3-30.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War." International Security. Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113.

Rutler, James L., Col., USAF. "Peace Enforcement: A War By Any Other Name..." Unpublished paper. Washington, D.C.: National War College, November, 1993.

Seth, Sanjay. "Political Theory in the Age of Nationalism." Ethics and International Affairs. Vol. 7 (1993), pp. 75-96.

Sewall, Sarah. "Peace Enforcement and the United Nations." Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military. Ed. Dennis J. Quinn. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 101-111.

Shy, John, and Collier, Thomas W. "Revolutionary War." Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Ed. Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 815-862.

Snow, Donald M. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order. Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army War College Press, February, 1993.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1982.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993.

U.S. Senate. Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change. A staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (August, 1993).

van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Weiss, Thomas G. "Intervention: Whither the United Nations." The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter, 1994), pp. 109-128.

Westmoreland, William C., Gen., USA. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976.

Williams, Daniel. "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of U.S. Troops." The Washington Post. February 6, 1994, p. 24.

Willmott, H. P. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. New York: The Free Press, 1989.

Wisner, Frank G. "U.S. Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long." Statement to the Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, July 14, 1993. Defense Issues. Vol. 8, No. 46 (July 30, 1993).

Wriston, Walter. The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992.

Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Army Historical Series. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 1968.