Cyber Power Theory First, Then Information Operations
Abstract
The words we use to express ideas and concepts matter. To be present at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the midst of an information age, with no theory of information operations (IO) seems disconcerting, at least on the surface. Think tanks, government research organizations, and learned individuals have all pointed to the need for a viable theory of IO, yet no such theory has emerged. Despite the lack of a theory or national strategy for IO, the U.S. military does have IO organizations, doctrine, and training. The Department of Defense has the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), which provides full-spectrum IO support to CINCs and CJTFs. Each military Department has its own Information Warfare Center (IWC), which provide IO support to their respective services AFIWC for the Air Force, Fleet IWC (FIWC) for the Navy, and Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) for the Army. The U.S. military now has IO units, with some services redesignating intelligence units as IO units. One example is the mass Air Force redesignation of its Intelligence Wing and subordinate squadrons. The U.S. military has both joint and service IO doctrine in some areas it is consistent, in other areas it is not. And there are many highly technological tools for IO, so of course there must be training. But there is no theory of IO from a national perspective. Carl von Clausewitz said that the primary purpose of theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled. A plethora of questions emerges from the apparent entropy surrounding the development of a theory of IO.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA441637
Entities
People
- Antoinette G. Smart
Organizations
- National War College