Saddam Hussein's Grand Strategy During the Iran-Iraq War
Abstract
Upon selection of the topic of the Iran-Iraq War, we initially prepared to support the position that Saddam Hussein had carefully utilized all the principles of statecraft and chose war only as his last resort. However, after careful analysis of the history of the relationship between the two countries, the events that led to the conflict, and the utilization of military strategy, the evidence led us to a different conclusion. Saddam Hussein's fear of Iran and its Shiite Revolution drove him to engage the Iranian Government in a miscalculated limited war designed to stop further Shiite ambitions against his regime. By not fully utilizing all the options of statecraft, he was forced to rely solely on military instruments of power, which proved to be incompatible with a limited style campaign against a revolutionary adversary. Use of military force appears a natural choice for this leader, based on his background, experience and past successes. From the age of 18, he was involved in Baathist opposition activities in Iraq. In 1959, he was involved with the attempted assassination of Qasim. In 1963, he participated in an attempted Baathist coup, was put in prison but escaped. He was an underground Baathist activist constantly dodging the authorities. The Baathist Party itself was formed from the lower classes of the minority Sunni population. Historically, lower class parties that attain power tend to rule by force and intimidation. So it seems natural that the Baathist regime, headed by Saddam Hussein, gravitated to the military instrument of power to solve national security issues.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA441658
Entities
People
- Kurtis Jensen
- Matthew Klunder
Organizations
- National War College