The Iran-Iraq War: Exceeding Means
Abstract
In September 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, which initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in contemporary Middle Eastern history. Saddam most likely chose to use military force because of threats to his regime from Iranian-sponsored subversion which he failed to counter with diplomacy, combined with the opportunity presented by Iran's increased vulnerability after the fall of the Shah. However, Saddam's military objective was too limited to force a negotiated settlement and he inflamed Iranian nationalism, thus sparking the eight year war that greatly exceeded Iraq's means. Key lessons of this war include the importance of selecting military centers of gravity, the critical impact of assumptions that prove false, and nationalism's unpredictability and impact on war. This paper will focus on Saddam's decision to go to war and his initial strategy. The Iran-Iraq war is worth studying to understand the relationship between ends, ways and means and why Saddam exceeded his means. We will examine, from a strategic and military perspective, Saddam Hussein's decision to go to war, what he hoped to gain, why his strategy failed to balance ends and means and the lessons learned that could facilitate successful strategy in the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 20, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA441679
Entities
People
- Karla Torrez
- Vincent Difronzo
Organizations
- National War College