Waging War for Peace: Anwar Sadat's October 1973 Offensive
Abstract
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's decision to go to war against Israel in 1973 was based on a coherent, consistent, and well-crafted strategy that effectively employed limited war to achieve clearly defined political goals. Sadat's strategy took into account the threats and risks that he faced, along with the opportunities that could be exploited within the international and domestic context. Before embarking on war, Sadat exhausted virtually every available instrument of statecraft in his effort to create a new political-military dynamic that would facilitate negotiations with Israel and thus regain the territory that Egypt lost in the 1967 Six-Day War. In retrospect, some analysts might criticize Sadat for pursuing a risky military strategy to achieve his political goals. However, it seems clear that the other instruments of statecraft, including his skillful use of diplomacy, were insufficient without the application of credible military force. For his part, Sadat firmly believed that only shock therapy, applied through the trauma of war, would shake Israeli leaders from their confidence that continued control of the occupied territories was their best guarantee of security. In addition to Israeli intransigence (and superpower indifference), growing domestic unrest in Egypt made the option of war even more compelling for Sadat, especially in light of internal challenges to his legitimacy. Once he had decided on the use of force, Sadat's strategic dilemma centered on balancing means and ends. He was able to maximize his limited means by bringing to bear other instruments of statecraft to buttress his military strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA441682
Entities
People
- Christopher J. Mcmullen
- Mohammed F. Al-allaf
- Patrick M. Shaw