The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends
Abstract
If intelligence constitutes the missing dimension of studies on international relations, then, as Martin Alexander noted, the study of intelligence work directed against one's friends and allies could be considered "the missing dimension to the missing dimension." In this essay I will examine one facet of one case of espionage directed at allies and friends Eisenhower's use of intelligence collected against the French and British in the weeks leading up to the Suez crisis of 1956. After a brief overview of the Suez crisis, I will address the different modes of collecting intelligence used by Eisenhower, including imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human source intelligence (HUMINT). I will then make a few observations about Eisenhower's use of intelligence and offer some hypotheses on targeting one's allies for intelligence collection. Finally, I will illustrate the continuing relevance of an important lesson from the Suez crisis the suddenness with which a state might find itself needing intelligence on its allies and friends.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA441684
Entities
People
- Mark A. Bucknam
Organizations
- National War College