Hussein and the Iran-Iraq War: Miscalculation, Escalation, and Megalomania
Abstract
Saddam Hussein miscalculated when he invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. Expecting a rapid victory that would consolidate his power and position, Hussein instead found himself drawn into a costly war of attrition with a fanatical if not overly competent enemy. As the conflict progressed over eight years, Hussein escalated from his planned limited strike to seize territory, to a war of attrition, then to a war of terror directed against the will of the Iranian people. Because Hussein did not accurately assess his adversary, and due to diplomatic, strategic, and tactical blunders, Hussein allowed his war to out-strip his initial objectives. His changes in political and military strategy, though rational by his calculus, allowed the war to become something alien to his original intention. As a result, a nearly decade long war arose from a poorly conceived land-grab with the Iraqi and Iranian people paying a heavy price.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 17, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA441777
Entities
People
- Debra Taylor
- Merrick Krause
Organizations
- National War College