Saddam Hussein and the Iran-Iraq War
Abstract
Although Saddam Hussein survived the Iran-Iraq War, he did so in spite of his rudimentary, incoherent national security strategy and his lack of any real military strategy. In the first part of this paper, the authors analyze Saddam's national security strategy, examining Iraq's national interests, threats to and opportunities for furthering those interests, Saddam's political objectives, and his use of the instruments of statecraft. The second part of the paper explores Saddam's strategy for war with Iran, including Iraq's military objectives, its capabilities and vulnerabilities, and Saddam's strategic concepts for employing military means to achieve military and political ends. The final section of the paper evaluates Saddam's national security strategy and the degree to which his military strategy fit that strategy. The authors conclude that Saddam's gravest mistake was to misjudge the kind of war he was initiating in September 1980.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA441842
Entities
People
- Frank Esquivel
- Mark Bucknam
Organizations
- National War College