To Derive Special Advantages: Clausewitz's Theory of Time and the Persian Gulf War
Abstract
As in many other areas of our lives, our ideas about warfare are generally formed unreflectively, resting largely on unquestioned assumptions. Sometimes these concepts are well-suited to the situation, but history is replete with examples of individuals "fighting the last war" because of an inability to understand how current circumstances differed from their past experiences. Insight into various theories on warfare will not solve this problem by providing easy answers, but in helping to formulate the right questions. As Sir Julian Corbett explains, theory should help an individual "acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation." A factor that is fundamental to developing an effective strategy is the impact that time will have in a particular conflict. According to the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, "both belligerents need time, the question is only which of the two can expect to derive special advantages from it in light of his own situation." The clarity and depth of Clausewitz's analysis on the impact of time in war is one reason his theory has remained so relevant. Developing a better appreciation of time as a factor in war can be done by examining Clausewitz's ideas on this subject and then comparing his ideas with the actions of the United States in the Persian Gulf war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA442061
Entities
People
- Thomas E. Griffith
Organizations
- National War College