Leninism with a Human Face: National Strategy in Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore
Abstract
Few observers of the newly independent city-state of Singapore in 1965 would have guessed that it was to become one of the greatest economic success stories of the latter half of the 20th century. Though blessed with a key position astride a major world trading route, it appeared to be increasingly isolated within the region, both politically and economically. Indeed, with serious social problems of its own on the horizon, the country was as much a candidate for domestic disintegration as economic take-off. That Lee Kuan Yew avoided the former and succeeded beyond anyone's dreams in the latter is the ultimate tribute to his political acumen and strategic vision. Like Lenin, who a half century earlier took control of a state with serious internal and external vulnerabilities, Lee's priority was internal stability and economic modernization. Like Lenin as well, Lee sought rapid modernization through an ambitious program of economic and social transformation. One final similarity between these two men was that they were possessed of extraordinary confidence in their own policy prescriptions, and were prepared to exhort, cajole, and if need be coerce their populace into going along. In a sense, both leaders saw themselves as the vanguard of their revolutions. Why then did Lee succeed where Lenin failed? Although Lenin certainly faced the more taunting task, this paper argues that a crucial element of Lee's success lay in his more skillful use of scarce resources. In particular, Lee was strikingly successful in convincing others to direct their resources towards achieving his objectives. Although Lee was not above applying pressure against those who balked (in domestic politics), generally his strategies relied more on cooperation than coercion.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 13, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA442067
Entities
People
- Larry Wohlers
Organizations
- National War College