The Reluctant Peacemaker, Rwanda April 1994
Abstract
No more genocide - the nations of the world reacted to the shock of the systematic mass extermination of European Jews and other ethnic groups during World War II by agreeing to act pre-emptively against future threats of genocide. The '90s began with President Bush declaring a "new world order where brutality will go un-rewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance." Yet, in 1998, President Clinton apologized to the Rwandan people for failure to act against the most efficient genocide of the century. Why, in 1994, did the United States of America, as the world's leader in human rights, decide not to act while up to a million Rwandans were murdered? The purpose of the paper is to examine the personal, organizational and interagency issues that led to the decision not to intervene militarily in Rwanda during the 90 days of the genocide. The analysis will show that a lack of executive level (political) leadership allowed personal and organizational factors within the bureaucracy to determine national policy. Initially, this paper discusses the previous experiences of the principals, the organizations and possible pre-conceptions. Secondly, the paper analyzes how they viewed the Rwandan crisis and formed their positions. It then addresses the interactions that resulted in the final decision. Finally, comment is made on the enduring effects of that decision on US policy making. The paper is limited to US decisions and is not concerned with the actions of international players except where there is a direct effect on US decisions. While covering much of the same material as the references, this paper is not concerned with apportioning blame, and deliberately does not assess the rights or wrongs of the decisions made during the genocide in Rwanda.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA442071
Entities
People
- Lee C. Roberts
Organizations
- National War College