Inchon and Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach
Abstract
Long range bombardment, carrier battle groups, stealth technology, submarines, nuclear deterrence (embodied in ICBMs and SLBMs), tanks, air cavalry...and the list goes on. These machines, tactics and doctrines serve as the defining elements of how we think about war in the Twentieth century. They are the instruments of our strategic ethos and the fundamental threat of commonality among them is their ability to approach the problem of war in an indirect manner. Whether a system uses mobility and maneuver, or tactical invisibility, or the psychological menace of overwhelming destruction, each avoids direct engagement B. H. Liddell Hart's book, Strategy, is the clearest baseline for understanding the indirect approach to warfare. Douglas MacArthur's Inchon landing during September 1950 is an excellent description of Liddell Hart's concept applied. This paper will examine the Inchon landings in light of the premises outlined by Liddell Hart. We begin with a brief review the situation on the ground in Korea, transition into an examination of Liddell Hart's strategy and axioms against MacArthur's strategy, and finally, draw conclusions about the applicability of Liddell Hart's theory as an approach to warfighting.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA442205
Entities
People
- Allen Branco
Organizations
- National War College