An Uncertain Deterrence: Bernard Brodie, Indian Nuclear Strategy, and the Problems of Stability
Abstract
The above statement was excerpted from Bernard Brodie's 1959 study Strategy in the Missile Age. As originally drafted, it was meant to describe US policy-makers in the early years of the US and Soviet nuclear competition. The phenomenon reflected in this statement is currently manifested in India's nuclear strategy The dawn of the nuclear weapons age in 1945 gave birth to not only a new form of more powerful explosive, but also to a new focus in military strategies. In particular, it gave new emphasis and meaning to the age-old concept of deterrence. In the US, among the most influential early thinkers on the strategic and political significance of nuclear weapons and deterrence was Bernard Brodie. Fifty years after the first nuclear explosion, nuclear weapons programs have taken on strategic and political significance on the Asian sub-comment This paper analyzes Indian nuclear strategy in the context of Brodie's theories on nuclear strategy. It focusing on three critical areas. First, we look at the importance of the Indian concept of recessed deterrence and its absence in Brodie's writings. Then, we discuss the Indian object of deterrence. Finally, we analyze India's retaliatory capability in the context of Brodie's recommendations for effective deterrence. In analyzing these areas it becomes clear that India's nuclear strategy does not fully accord with Brodie's strategic recommendation for stability in the nuclear age. As presaged in the opening quote, this, may be due to a deeper rejection of the concept of nuclear retaliation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA442215
Entities
People
- Warren M. Stern
Organizations
- National War College