Interactive War in Vietnam. Pulverizing the Core Versus Nibbling at the Edges
Abstract
This essay uses Carl von Clausewitz's theories on war to critique US national and military strategy in the Vietnam War. It argues that US policy makers failed to apply two key Clausewitzian concepts. First is the idea that war is a complex, non-linear interaction between states. Resulting from this failure, US leaders failed to recognize the true nature of the war- that is the political context which shaped it, the motives which prompted its energy to engage in it, and the form it would take. Furthermore, they conducted the war based upon a linear construct which envisioned the carefully "calibrated," controlled and gradual escalated use of power would produce a predictable and desirable response from the enemy. The second key Clausewitzian concept not applied by US leaders is that although war is non-linear in its nature, linearity must exist in the proportional relationship between military means (and costs) and the political ends they are designed to attain. The US mistake is this regard was that it embarked on the war with a disproportionate relationship between its political aim and its military means. In effect, the means it was willing to apply (and the costs it was willing to pay) were insufficient to achieve the desired aim vis a vis the means and ends of its opponent. The essay is divided into four parts. The first two will examine Clausewitz's concepts of the non-linearity and linearity of war. The second two will use these concepts to critique the US strategy in Vietnam.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA442224
Entities
People
- Ron Chilcote
Organizations
- National War College