Averting a Rush to Failure: The Interagency Process and United States-North Korea Policy
Abstract
In the fall of 2000, with only months left in office, the Clinton administration rushed to complete a missile agreement with North Korea. Such an agreement, aimed at limiting both indigenous use and missile exports, would clearly have been one of the administration's most important foreign policy achievements, and could have had far-reaching effects on stability in a region of great economic and security importance to the United States. Yet the negotiations and the potential end game--a Presidential visit to Pyongyang--were fraught with political and diplomatic danger. In the end, the administration came very close to handing North Korea a diplomatic coup without an assured return, but it pulled back at the last moment. The process that brought about this chain of events was unique, combining aspects of the regular interagency process with the overarching power of a special policy coordinator, who both ran the process and, at times, almost ran away with it. In fact, this case presents an excellent example of both the usefulness and the danger of working outside the confines of the normal interagency process in determining national security policy and demonstrates the importance of having an interagency process that ensures all views are considered in significant policy decisions. As a senior participant observed, "to the extent that the interagency process was followed, it succeeded in getting some serious issues on the table with North Korea and in preventing the administration from overreaching as the issue reached the end game; however, it was often a struggle to keep the issue within the interagency process."
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA442345
Entities
People
- Elise M. Vander Vennet
Organizations
- National War College