Sadat & The Yom Kippur War: Luck or Brilliance?
Abstract
In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Anwar Sadat masterfully employed a national security and national military strategy to achieve his immediate goal of breaking the political stalemate and increasing Egypt's leverage at the bargaining table. On the whole, he carefully matched ends and means and employed the tools of statecraft in a synergistic manner. By limiting his military objective and using strategic deception, Sadat overcame Egypt's vulnerabilities and Israel's strengths. However, he incorrectly assessed the interests and capabilities of Syria and the United States (US) and failed to follow through on the opportunity presented by superpower conflict. These omissions increased the risk of Sadat's strategy and prolonged the achievement of his ultimate goal-regaining the territory lost in the 1967 War. Examining the international and domestic environment, means and ends, and the plans developed from both a national security and national military strategy standpoint will illuminate the conclusions drawn above.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA442409
Entities
People
- Michael Linnington
- Robert C. Green
Organizations
- National War College