21st Century Air Power Theorists: Who Has It Right John Warden or Robert Pape?
Abstract
The use of air power has dramatically shaped the modern battlefield since its inception. Because there are no boundaries restricting where air power can go, it has the unique ability to employ and influence the outcome of a conflict at all levels of warfare from strategic to tactical. Whichever theory senior military leaders follow heavily influences the military strategy they pursue. Theory then becomes the foundation for military strategy. The impact of theory on military strategy therefore, logically influences the Services to invest in forces in order to accomplish and support that strategy. For example, the theory of strategic bombardment dominated military strategy during and after World War II. The U.S. Air Force, in support of that strategy, built an enormous bomber fleet. The two prominent theorists in today's air power debate are John Warden III, a retired Air Force Colonel and Robert Pape, a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Warden's theory contends that air power can be used to influence the adversary's leadership or decisionmaking entity. In contrast, Pape proclaims that air power should coerce an adversary through denial of the adversary's ability to use its military to achieve its objective. This paper will summarize the theories of John Warden III and Robert Pape and then point out their strengths and weaknesses. Then describe the linkage between theory, military strategy, and the budget; thereby showing how air power theory in turn affects the budget. Finally, this paper will argue that Warden and Pape's theories are complementary and that senior leadership should consider both when developing military strategy and the budget.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA442423
Entities
People
- Jeffrey G. Lofgren
Organizations
- National War College