

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

IRAQ: PREEMPTION OR PARALYSIS

Col JEFFREY S. JOHNSON, USAF

5601
FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC LOGIC
SEMINAR H

PROFESSOR
MR. THEODORE M. LAVEN

5602
THE NATURE OF WAR
SEMINAR N

PROFESSOR
DR. ILANA KASS

CAPT ROBERT BRANNON

ADVISOR
COL JOHN ZELINSKI

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2003	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2003 to 00-00-2003			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Iraq: Preemption or Paralysis		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified		32	

IRAQ: PREEMPTION OR PARALYSIS

The United States must preemptively strike the Iraqi regime before the regime obtains enough weapons of mass destruction to threaten U.S. security or to deter U.S. actions. Fundamental and vital U.S. national security interests, national safety and security and undeterred access and influence in the Middle East, demand a nuclear free Iraq. An irrational Iraqi dictator, armed with nuclear weapons, not only could but also likely would use these weapons against the U.S. to achieve his goals. The U.S. cannot live under the threat of massive destruction of its population by a madman. In addition, U.S. security is intimately tied to global economic security that is threatened by Iraqi expansionist desires. An Iraq armed with nuclear weapons would be difficult and extremely costly to stop from re-occupying Kuwait and seizing vast oil reserves. In fact, if Iraq obtained enough nuclear weapons, potentially all U.S. intervention in the Middle East could be prevented or deterred by the threat of massive destruction inside the United States. Therefore, the U.S. must take action to prevent Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons and pursue an end-state of a nuclear-free, moderate Iraqi regime. Since diplomatic actions and the use of limited force have not stopped Iraq from its quest for nuclear weapons, the U.S. must take more forceful action of a preemptive strike against the Iraqi regime before it's too late and too costly.

The case for this action is made in two main parts—Situation and Case for Preemption. Describing the situation begins by articulating U.S. national interests along with some assumptions about the Iraqi regime. Next, the Statecraft-Tools-Relationship (STR) model is described and applied to Iraq. This model argues for a balanced use of the appropriate tool of statecraft to match the given environment of the state with whom the U.S. is interacting. The Iraqi threat is then detailed, followed by a discussion of the heretofore failure to adequately

counter this threat. The STR model will show the failures are due to an inappropriate match of statecraft tool to the situation. The mismatch has resulted in Iraq continuing to pursue nuclear weapons and a growing threat to U.S. national security. Finally, the STR model argues that the appropriate tool--given the environment in Iraq--is large-scale use of military force to eliminate any nuclear weapons or weapons programs and produce a regime change. The first section shows the use of force is necessary. The Case for Preemption section discusses deterrence and preemption and when the U.S. use of force must occur.

In the second main part of this paper the case is made that the use of force must be preemptive before Iraq obtains a certain number of nuclear weapons that would be sufficient to deter U.S. action. A discussion on deterrence will show that if the U.S. does not act and allows Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons, then the U.S. will be placed in a position of being potentially deterred from acting in the Middle East. Given U.S. national interests, there is a threshold of acceptable cost or damage the U.S. would be willing to receive from Iraq in order to wage war with and eventually compel Iraq to follow U.S. demands. However, the acceptable cost is not unlimited. There is a cost beyond which the U.S. would not act. A credible threat of the use of sufficient force by Iraq against U.S. vulnerabilities not only could but would deter U.S. action—resulting in vital U.S. national interests being vulnerable to blackmail and manipulation by Iraqi leadership. This unacceptable cost could be measured in the number of operationally viable weapons of mass destruction owned by Iraq. For the sake of this paper, the argument of potential deterrence will be made with nuclear weapons. For example, ten Iraqi nuclear weapons placed inside U.S. cities with the real possibility to detonate would deter the U.S. Thus, in order to not be prevented from neutralizing a real, extant Iraqi nuclear threat, the U.S. must preemptively strike and destroy that threat—by either destroying Iraqi nuclear weapons manufacturing

capability, any existing nuclear weapons, or the Iraqi leadership currently preventing the removal of the nuclear weapons capability.

Finally, the paper will conclude with a brief discussion of how U.S. military action should take place. The Iraqi and U.S. Centers Of Gravity (COG), risks, and recommended courses of action, and conflict termination will be discussed.

I. SITUATION

National Interests, Assumptions, and Desired End-State. There are two vital U.S. national interests applicable to the situation with Iraq.

- 1) No nuclear threat from a rogue state and avowed enemy.¹ The Constitution of the United States established a government to provide an environment for the free exercise of basic inalienable rights. The threat of nuclear devastation to U.S. citizens runs directly counter to the fundamental values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” from our Declaration of Independence. The U.S. cannot tolerate a dictator possessing and having the potential to use nuclear weapons against the United States. The assumption associated with this national interest is that Saddam Hussein is an actor who would use nuclear weapons indiscriminately to serve his interests. The Iraqi dictator is a declared enemy of the U.S. whose goals include removing U.S. forces and influence from the Middle East, eliminating Israel, annexing Kuwait, and establishing pan-Arabic control of the vast oil reserves.
- 2) Undeterred access and influence in the Middle East. Middle Eastern oil reserves are critical to the global economy. The U.S. economy is intimately linked with the global economy and therefore the vitality of the U.S. economy is directly related to the vitality of the global economy. It is vital to U.S. national interests to be able to prevent the

dominance and control of vast quantities of oil resources by a single dictator that most likely would have a severe negative impact on the global economy.² In addition, the U.S. desires the promotion and growth of viable democracies around the globe. Thus, the survival of Israel as a free democracy is in the U.S. national interest. To help ensure Israel's security the U.S. must be able to act undeterred in the Middle East. The assumptions accompanying this statement of national interest are that should Iraq obtain nuclear weapons, it would attempt to re-occupy Kuwait and gain control of the Kuwaiti oil fields and would use nuclear weapons in the process if necessary. Furthermore, Iraq would seriously threaten to use nuclear weapons against Israel if Iraqi leadership was convinced their ability to inflict serious damage against the U.S. would deter the U.S. from responding.³

END STATE: The desired end-state, taking into consideration these national interests and assumptions, is a nuclear-free Iraq with a moderate regime not desirous of nuclear weapons.⁴

Statecraft-Tools-Relationship Model. In order to logically argue for a certain course of action vis-à-vis Iraq, a model of the tools of statecraft was built to show the logic and beauty of a symmetry or balance of actions to circumstances. States have a wide spectrum of tools to relate to other states. The tools of statecraft are on a continuum of benefice or aid going to a state desirous of help and willing to cooperate to the other extreme of a total war with a completely belligerent state. They range from positive means, such as diplomacy and aid, to compelling means, such as sanctions, to the use of force in increasingly greater degrees, until reaching the far end of the continuum of total war. The tools of statecraft can be mapped graphically to depict the relationship between two states. (Figure 1)




Figure 1.

On the horizontal axis is depicted the relations between states, ranging from enmity or hatred on the far left (negative end of the scale) toward total cooperation or unity on the far right (positive side of the scale). Above the horizontal plane are the sentiments and actions of the U.S. and below the horizontal axis are those of another state. In the U.S. section, on the right of the vertical axis, the scale represents increasing amounts of assistance and aid. On the left side of the vertical axis the scale represents an increasing amount of force used. In the other state's section, on the right side of vertical axis are the increasing requirements for aid. On the left side of the vertical axis the scale represents an increasing threat posed by the other state to the U.S.

A parabolic curve on both sides of the horizontal axis forming a mirror image marks the instruments of statecraft matched proportionately to the requirements of the environmental relationship with another state. This illustrates the ideal or perfect use of statecraft. As the good will or sentiments of the U.S. toward another state increase (moving to the right on the horizontal axis), then the corresponding amount of effort of positive aid and assistance increases

exponentially toward the point of 'Total Aid-Giving' or complete nation building. In the same manner, as bad will or fear of a growing threat from another state increases (moving negatively to the left on the horizontal axis), then so too does the amount of coercive force increase exponentially toward the point of 'Total War' on the far upper left quadrant. There is a corresponding negative passion of the state matched to the use of force against another state. Thus, the continuum of U.S. instruments of statecraft from 'Total War' toward 'Total Aid' is captured along the parabolic curve above the horizontal axis.

Below the horizontal axis is the nature of the state with which the U.S. has a relationship. Starting from (0,0), the position of lukewarm neutrality, and moving horizontally (positively) toward the right, the goodwill and cooperation increase toward unity with the U.S. Moving horizontally toward the left (negatively) is an increasing amount of discord and animosity, toward enmity with the U.S. On the right side of the vertical axis going downward is an increasing amount of need for U.S. assistance. On the left side of the vertical axis is an increasing amount of threat toward the U.S. Putting these factors together the ideal mirror image against U.S. tools of statecraft is a parabolic curve. On the positive side, a state demonstrates increasing amounts of unity toward the U.S. and increasing requirements for aid toward the point of 'Total Aid-Receiving'. This would be idealized by a failed state requiring complete governmental infrastructure rebuilding while fully embracing the dream to become a democracy. On the negative side, the curve moves from neutrality and no threatening capability toward the end point of 'Total Threat', that is, unlimited operational weapons of mass destruction combined with total hatred of the U.S.

Combining the upper graph of the U.S. tools of statecraft with the lower graph of the nature of the state with whom the U.S. is interacting, the two parabolic curves form a mirror

image. The infinite points of ‘Total War’ mirrored by ‘Total Threat’ and ‘Total Aid-Giving’ mirrored by ‘Total Aid-Receiving’. This mirror image portrays the ideal use of the tools of statecraft proportionately matched to the appropriate corresponding value in the nature of the state with whom the U.S. is interacting. As Socrates said in Plato’s *Philebus*, there is an eternal and intrinsic beauty in symmetry.⁵ Thus, the idea of a symmetrical association of matching rising goodwill sentiment and correspondingly increasing aid on our side with a unity of goodwill and progressively greater needs on the recipient’s side is both naturally appealing and a logical use of resources. Likewise, it makes sense to use a balanced effort of force and passion against the threatening state. The greater the threat, the greater the need for increasing the amount of force used and combining it with a corresponding rise in passionate will against the enemy.

If the use of tools of statecraft moves away from a mirror image, then it is moving away from the sense of symmetry and balance. While a full justification of this assertion is beyond the purview of this paper, following is a short example of how deviation from the ideal can be disastrous for a nation. Figure 2 is a quick look at the case of Vietnam.




Figure 2

The threat from the North Vietnamese was arguably low toward the U.S. and its interests. This threat level was combined with high enmity toward the U.S. (point NV for North Vietnamese). However, as the U.S. applied increasing amounts of limited force, the will and passion of some Americans moved from negative to positive (point U1 to U2). Disproportionate or unbalanced match of force without negative sentiment resulted in the nation being torn apart. The SRT model would argue that point U3 would have been the more appropriate U.S. response to match the threat and resolve the conflict with proportionate force.

Applying this model to Iraq, the situation could be graphically portrayed as in figure 3.




Figure 3

The U.S. has attempted to use diplomacy, coercion from international pressures, and limited use of force to compel the Iraqi regime to comply with UN resolutions demanding full dismantlement and destruction of weapons of mass destruction programs (point U1). However, diplomatic means have failed to stop the movement of the Iraqi leadership toward the left, i.e. increasing hostility toward the U.S. Also, international pressures and the limited use of force have failed to compel Iraq away from pursuing a downward path, increasing the threat against the U.S. by building or obtaining nuclear weapons. Iraq is plotted at point I1. This model argues that the appropriate response from the U.S. is to move upward toward the left, increasing the amount of force used with a corresponding amount of negative sentiment (toward U2) to match the Iraqi move downward toward the left with an emerging or realized nuclear threat and increasingly hostile leadership (toward I2).

Having described in general the current situation between the U.S. and Iraq, the next section will detail the increasing nature of the threat from Iraq and the heretofore failure to achieve the desired ends of the UN resolution and U.S. national interests.

The Threat. This paper uses Dr. Ilana Kass' model to clarify the threat facing the United States. The Kass model is $\text{Threat} = \text{Vulnerability} * \text{Capability} * \text{Intent}$.

Vulnerability. The events of 9/11 proved the United States is vulnerable to attack. Despite the numerous changes implemented since the terrorist attacks of last year, the U.S. government continues to declare America vulnerable to attack. Indeed, another attack is likely to occur.⁶ Also, an independent commission reported, "only a minuscule fraction of the containers, trains, trucks and ships entering the country are searched, which means the chances of detecting a weapon of mass destruction are almost nil."⁷ Thus, porous borders, known penetrations by terrorist operatives across the borders using shipping containers, terrorist cells operating inside the United States, etc. combine to place the vulnerability of the U.S. well above the seventy five percent mark. For the purposes of this paper, the vulnerability rating is judged to be ninety percent or .9 in the above equation.

Iraqi Capability. This paper focused primarily on the Iraqi nuclear capability for ease of discussion of deterrence effectiveness. Iraq had a very well-funded nuclear weapons program aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapons-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon.⁸ Destruction of some of the nuclear weapons program took place under the auspices of the UN resolutions. However, Dr. Khidhir Hamza, previous director of the nuclear weapons program, stated the UN inspection/destruction programs fell well short of destroying all chemical and biological capability and did not come close to eliminating

the nuclear weapons development program.⁹ Dr. Hamza revealed Iraq built a crude nuclear bomb and only lacked sufficient enriched uranium to be able to detonate it. The bomb was larger than could be carried on a SCUD missile, so engineers were working on reducing the size for weaponization.¹⁰ Just how much of this capability was destroyed by DESERT STORM is a mystery due to Iraqi deception and interference in the UN inspection program.

Iraq suspended cooperation with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 5 August 1998. At that time Iraq declared it would “not cooperate in any activity involving investigation of its clandestine nuclear programme.”¹¹ The Iraqi public statement admitted the presence of a secret nuclear program. Iraqi stonewalling and UN inaction resulted in the unchecked continuation of this secret program to build nuclear weapons. Sources such as the CIA say nearly 7,000 scientists continue to work on a nuclear weapons program.¹² President Bush confirmed this in his speech to the American people on 8 October, 2002, when he stated the “evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program.”¹³

While there is disagreement as to whether Iraq will have an operational nuclear weapon in six months or six years,¹⁴ the bottom line is that, left unchecked, Iraq *will* become a nuclear power. This paper rates current Iraqi capability as .75. The rating approaches 1.0 once a bomb is made and operationalized.

Iraqi Intent and Will. Iraqi intent to acquire nuclear weapons can be measured by their decision to invest billions of dollars in uranium enrichment and ballistic missile delivery platforms.¹⁵ The Iraqi intent to own nuclear weapons is clear. Whether Saddam Hussein intends to use nuclear weapons is less than one hundred percent certain. But his previous behavior, “unremitting hostility to the West and a record of using unconventional weapons in previous conflicts”¹⁶ lead

strongly to the conclusion that he would indeed use nuclear weapons as a deterrence, and in an attack on Israel or the United States. President Clinton was convinced by all the information available to him while in office that Saddam Hussein would in fact use weapons of mass destruction. He said, "Mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them."¹⁷ Saddam's aims, goals and intentions have not changed since 1998. If anything, his resolve has stiffened. This paper rates Iraqi intent to acquire and potentially use nuclear weapons as .95.

The threat equation vulnerability*capability*intent when filled-in with this paper's ratings becomes $\text{Threat} = .9 \times .75 \times .9$. This brings the overall threat rating as .6. The threat is real and will get worse with time if not stopped.¹⁸ The best way to eliminate the threat is to reduce any one of the factors to zero. This would be virtually impossible in the case of vulnerability. But, eliminating nuclear weapons or ill-will intent against the U.S. is a real possibility. Unfortunately, to date, diplomatic means and the limited use of force have failed on both counts.

Failure of Diplomatic Means. The ultimate multilateral diplomatic tool for attempting to bring about change in another state is the UN resolution. These resolutions focus world attention on a problem state and can call for direct, compelling changes within a given state. The UN resolution can bring about condemnation, sanctions and ultimately military action. Since 1990, the UN has passed 54 resolutions concerning Iraq--13 before DESERT STORM and 41 since. Fourteen resolutions called for Iraq to become nuclear free and directed inspections and destruction of Iraq's WMD programs. Clearly the diplomatic tool has been given a chance. However, the defection of Hussein Kamel in 1995 revealed the stark reality of Iraqi non-compliance with UN resolutions and continuation of covert WMD development programs. The 1999 UNSCOM report to the Security Council detailed a long litany of Iraqi actions designed to

obstruct disarmament. Iraqis concealed programs, moved equipment, documents, destroyed evidence, retained weapons after “supervised destruction”, etc. across the years from 1991 to 1998. The report concluded, “by the end of 1998, there remained significant uncertainties in the disposition of Iraq’s prohibited programmes.”¹⁹ Not only did the UN inspections fail to fully uncover and destroy the Iraqi nuclear program, but also the number of nations respecting the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq radically declined over the 11-year period. Jordan, Syria, and Turkey (among others) completely defy the oil embargo and smuggle oil from Iraq. Other nations to include our allies Germany and France bring Iraq prohibited technologies.²⁰ In short, diplomatic containment and compellence by UN resolutions have completely failed.

Failure of Limited Use of Force. The failure of diplomatic means to cause a change in the behavior of Iraqi leadership directly resulted in the use of force by the U.S. against Iraq in 1998.²¹ The U.S. attacked over 300 targets and spent over half-a-billion dollars conducting the DESERT FOX campaign in December 1998.²²

DESERT FOX was aimed at destroying Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The effectiveness of the damage is completely unknown. But what is known is that the attacks did not stop Iraq from continuing to pursue WMD. Prime Minister Tony Blair released a U.K. government dossier on 24 September 2002 that stated, “there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa” since 1998.²³ The only reason Iraq would need this type of uranium is for a nuclear weapon. The use of limited force against Iraq failed to stop Iraq’s programs or come close to achieving a certainty of a nuclear-free Iraq.

II. DETERRENCE AND THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION

Vital national interests and the failure of diplomatic means and limited use of force to change the Iraqi regime compel the U.S. to take stronger action. This action can be legally

justified by the same legal justification used for DESERT FOX and for the case of national survival and self-defense.²⁴ Legal justification says an attack *can* be undertaken and vital interests say it *must* be undertaken. The question is when. This paper argues the possibility of all future U.S. military actions in the Middle East being deterred by a threat of Iraqi nuclear weapons compels the U.S. into taking action before such deterrence can take hold.

Deterrence involves at least one rational actor—the state being deterred. Should one state (A) want to deter another state (B) from taking action, i.e. maintain the status quo of non-intervention, then A must find the threshold of unacceptable cost beyond which the second state will not act. The threshold could be in political, economic, or military pain—or a combination thereof. An example of military pain is in the case of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In this case of deterrence, since it is “mutual”, then both actors must be rational. That is, they must recognize that the opposing state has the capability and intent to use nuclear weapons should nuclear weapons be used against them. However, in the case of single-sided deterrence, the only actor that need be rational is the one upon whom deterrence is being worked.

Therefore, in the case of Iraq attempting to deter the U.S. from taking action in the Middle East, only the U.S. need be a rational actor for deterrence to work. If Iraq obtains nuclear weapons and that fact is made known to the U.S., and if the U.S. believes that Iraq could and would in fact use the weapons and inflict damage upon the U.S. or her interests, then the U.S. is potentially subject to being deterred by Iraq.

The question of where deterrence would take hold against the U.S. is a question of how much damage the U.S. would be willing to absorb from a nuclear attack and still take action in the Middle East--to counter Iraqi expansion, for example. Would the U.S. be willing to absorb 1,

2, even 5, or perhaps 10 nuclear detonations on its soil in order to preserve the sovereignty of Kuwait and access to Kuwait's oil?


One could argue that the U.S. values the stability of the Middle East, access to oil, and preservation of Israel as a viable nation to the point of being willing to take action, despite the certainty of a nuclear weapon exploding on U.S. soil. The Iraqi threat of using one nuclear weapon might not completely deter U.S. action. The threat of using two nuclear devices against America might raise the hesitancy of U.S. decision makers in acting. This would raise the level of deterrence, but not completely dissuade the U.S.

But, what if Iraq was allowed to manufacture nuclear weapons unchecked and, in fact, had five or more weapons? Would a declaration to the world that these weapons would be used in major U.S. cities should anyone attempt to thwart the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait stop the U.S. from acting? At what point would the U.S. be willing to trade American lives—innocent men, women and children—for Kuwait's or Saudi Arabia's sovereignty? At some point U.S. leadership would be compelled to not act. The cost would rise above the level of acceptability. The U.S. would be deterred.

The potential effectiveness of Iraqi deterrence against the U.S. is supported by America's previous acceptance of deterrence. It seems clear that, given the U.S. leadership's demonstrated rationality and vulnerability to deterrence by the threat of nuclear weapons—as demonstrated by the development and acceptance of MAD and flexible response doctrine--the U.S. can be deterred by Iraqi ownership of nuclear weapons. While there may be a question as to how many nuclear weapons such deterrence would require, it seems very clear that there is, indeed, a threshold of unacceptable damage beyond which the U.S. would not act.

Even though the U.S. might threaten total annihilation of Iraq in response to Iraqi use of nuclear weapons, the deterrence effect upon Iraq is mute if its leadership is willing to accept such annihilation. And this certainly seems to be the case with Saddam Hussein, given his previous use of chemical weapons on his own people. As Kenneth Pollack says, “Saddam has a number of pathologies that make deterring him unusually difficult.”²⁵ Thus, the argument that our nuclear arsenal would deter any and all use of nuclear weapons by Iraq falls short of being reliable, particularly in the enormously important issue of our national survival.

Taken together, the fact that the U.S. can be deterred by Iraq owning sufficient number of nuclear weapons and the fact that Iraq cannot necessarily be deterred by the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an Iraqi first use, the conclusion is the U.S. must act preemptively to remove the possibility of Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons. The case for preemption increases in value the closer Iraq comes to obtaining nuclear weapons. This can be graphically portrayed in figure 4.



The red line shows the requirement to attack rapidly rises the closer Iraq comes to owning operational weapons. The case for preemption remains at 100% after Iraq has one nuclear weapon and until the point at which increasing numbers of nuclear weapons owned by Iraq begin to reduce the likelihood of U.S. military action against Iraq. The downward turn of preemption drops rapidly at the point at which the U.S. is deterred by sufficient Iraqi nuclear weapons.

Once the deterrence value of Iraqi nuclear weapons is accepted, then prevention of this deterrence effect before its being realized is a clear imperative. Given the failure of both diplomacy and limited force—as outlined above—and given the STR model, the best course of action for the U.S. to pursue is overwhelming force, backed by the appropriate national will against the Iraqi regime.

Military Course of Action. The U.S. military course of action should be a massive military strike aimed at invading Iraq, destroying all WMD capabilities, removing Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party from power. The military campaign should be conducted by a coalition of forces and supplemented by covert action. Optimally, the attack would take place during the winter.²⁶

A large-scale military action against Iraq, with the goal of defeating and replacing Saddam Hussein should focus on selective Iraqi Centers of Gravity (COG)—leadership/C3, military, and WMD infrastructure. Since “Baghdad regards the issue as a matter of survival,”²⁷ heavy preparatory air strikes should concentrate on Iraqi leadership and command, control, and communications capabilities. Iraqi leadership should be isolated and destroyed. Second, massive air strikes should annihilate Iraqi military capability to the greatest extent possible. Ideally, the military should practically cease to exist before any ground invasion. Finally, the civilian population and all civilian related targets, such as factories, power plants, water supplies, etc. should be avoided. One mistake of DESERT STORM was unnecessary destruction of Iraqi

civilian-related targets, such as power plants. The Iraqi people are not the enemy, the Iraqi leadership is. Therefore, propaganda to the Iraqi populace about their impending liberation, combined with massive airdrops of food and medical aid to population centers should be conducted to demonstrate U.S. goodwill toward the Iraqi people. Fourth, a ground invasion using indigenous insurgent groups previously prepared by covert action seizes complete control of Iraq. Covert Action should be a significant part of the strategy to defeat the Iraqi regime. Prior to the conflict, the CIA should establish a strong network among the internal opposition parties.²⁸ During the military campaign, these groups should be incorporated into the overall strategy of defeating the Iraqi military. These dissident forces can be quite large. For example, in the North there are as many as fifty thousand armed Kurds who could fight with U.S. forces to help topple the regime.²⁹ Iran, too, recognizes the need for allowing these dissident groups to join the fight. “Iran is prepared to allow thousands of exiled Iraqi fighters to cross the border and fight alongside an American-led campaign against Saddam Hussein”, according to Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister.”³⁰ Finally, hostilities are terminated after an unconditional surrender of any remaining Iraqi military forces and the removal of the Ba’ath party--along with Saddam Hussein and his sons and cronies--from power.

Establishing a post-Saddam Hussein regime will require consulting other nations and an enormous diplomatic effort to take into account key Middle East nations in the area, such as Iran, which insists on being part of deciding how the post-Hussein government will look.³¹ Iranian concerns for protecting the Shia Muslims in the South will be matched by Turkish concerns of an independent Kurdish state in the northern parts of Iraq.³² With wide consultation, a new, moderate Iraqi regime should be set in place with the goal of moving toward a democracy. As

the Rumsfeld doctrine points out, “To those who would change what is, falls the responsibility of helping provide something better.”³³

U.S. Centers of Gravity. Prior to the campaign against Iraq, U.S. COGs and possible consequences of war with Iraq need to be examined to develop counters to U.S. vulnerabilities. Some of these COGs include allied support, U.S. public support, oil, technically oriented military, and logistic requirements for long-distance war.

Allied Support. In the past, Iraq did an excellent job identifying the U.S. Coalition effort as a COG and working against it. Since 1991, the Iraqi regime has masterfully manipulated support of key players in the UN Security Council Permanent five (P5). In particular, France and Russia—two of Iraq’s top four trading partners—have been the strongest opposition to strong intervention by the UN in Iraq.³⁴ For example, in July 1998, Russia proposed to the Security Council to have Iraq’s nuclear file closed. This was in the face of a scathing report from the UN inspectors demonstrating just the opposite.³⁵ Also, Iraq successfully isolated the U.S. in 1998. Turkey refused to support DESERT FOX, as did Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Three of the P5 abstained from voting to approve the military action. As a result, “almost without its being aware, America had lost its access to the Gulf.”³⁶ This same kind of action by Iraq against this COG can be expected with any new military campaign.

U.S. Public Support. Iraq will most likely view U.S. public support for war as a COG. Current U.S. public opinion continues to favor ousting the Iraqi regime, though the support drops if the action requires large numbers of American troops deploying to Iraq (200K).³⁷ Saddam Hussein could read this sentiment as a weakness and aversion to loss of life. He could try to exploit this perceived weakness by conducting terrorist attacks within the U.S. to divert attention and cause general panic among Americans. Also, Saddam could use chemical weapons against

U.S. forces to cause large-scale casualties to undermine continued U.S. support for military action.

Oil. Since the world economy still runs on oil, Iraq could attempt to contaminate Kuwaiti, Saudi, Iranian and Iraqi oil fields with chemical weapons. Furthermore, Saddam may attempt to organize an embargo by OPEC against selling oil to the U.S.³⁸

Technically Oriented Military. The U.S. high-tech military demands long, complicated training for its enlisted force. This means suffering high casualties could lead to long timelines to replace the losses. In addition, high tech warfare requires integrated communications and a working Global Positioning Satellite system. Disrupting communications or disabling the GPS system would severely hamper U.S. war fighting and use of precision-guided munitions.

Logistics. Fighting a war halfway around the globe requires huge amounts of sealift. Disabling seaports of departure or arrival could severely hamstring operations and possibly forestall a ground invasion. Iraq could attempt to disrupt all major port facilities in the Mid-East and Europe by terrorist operations.

Threats to each of these COG need to be thoroughly analyzed and countermoves developed. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all of this analysis, one example of a possible counter to Iraqi attacks against a U.S. COG, allied support, is intensive and continuous diplomatic consultation and information sharing. The coalition must be maintained by sharing convincing intelligence supporting the U.S. case of Iraq's nuclear weapon program and intentions to use nuclear weapons. A primary factor for the desertion of allied support has been the perceived absence of a threat from Iraq.³⁹ These countries have been on the right side of the SRT model, wanting to give aid and rebuild economic ties, while the U.S. has been on the left side, attempting to use force to compel Iraq to disarm. This discord leads to turmoil and

break down in coalition efforts. Furthermore, coalition partners must be convinced they have an input in the decision-making process of how to deal with Iraq prior to, during, and after military confrontation.

Risks. Finally, U.S. leadership needs to be cognizant of the many risks involved in conducting a military campaign against Iraq. For example, war could precipitate an even broader Islamic holy war against the U.S. and her allies. “Jordan’s King Abdullah recently warned that attacking Iraq in the absence of progress to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ‘would really open Pandora’s box’ and further harm U.S. strategic interests in the region.”⁴⁰ Also, Iran directly opposes a U.S. military government following the toppling of Saddam Hussein.⁴¹ A lower risk than holy war is the potential loss of general support of other moderate Middle East nations. For example, Morocco, strategically located at the opening of the Mediterranean, is finding support for U.S. actions against Iraq an increasingly costly stance to take.⁴² Another potential risk in toppling the Iraqi regime could be Kurds calling for an independent nation. This could cause some severe problems as Turkey warns they will go to war to prevent an independent Kurdish state from rising out of the ashes of a war with Iraq.⁴³

Conversely, there are risks if the U.S. does not act. The bulk of this paper has demonstrated the unacceptable risks to U.S. safety and security, as well as, the perils inherent in being blackmailed by Iraqi nuclear weapons, loss of influence in the Middle East, and vulnerability to Iraqi domination of Middle Eastern oil. In the estimation of this writer, the risks of not acting far outweigh those of taking the necessary decisive action against Iraq.

III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, if the United States does not take action to prevent Iraq from owning nuclear weapons, the future threat will grow into a roaring storm that could kill tens of thousands

of Americans and/or deter the United States from having an effective role in preventing Saddam Hussein from controlling the lifeblood of the world economy. Vital U.S. national interests compel the nation to take action preemptively. The cost of waiting is just too great.

The statecraft-tools-relationship model demonstrated that the appropriate action to take against Iraq is large-scale military action, combined with a national passion to remove the evil dictator Saddam Hussein. Diplomacy and limited use of force have already proven themselves ineffective. They will continue to be ineffective until there is a fundamental change in the nature of the Iraqi regime. Iraqi enmity and moves toward an ominous threat of total war must be matched in-kind in order to eradicate them.

U.S. military action should be a large-scale coalition effort, combined with covert actions. Hostilities should cease with the unconditional surrender of the Iraqi military, and the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party from power. In cooperation with allies and other Middle East nations, a new moderate Iraqi government should be established with the goal of moving toward a future democracy.

The United States will face many risks to its own Centers of Gravity when undertaking military action against Iraq. And, there are many other possible risks and consequences to a future Mid-East war. However, the risks of not taking action against Iraq far outweigh the risks of a preemptive attack. President George W. Bush said it well during his State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, "I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer."⁴⁴ The U.S. must act now, preemptively and decisively or face paralysis.

¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy states the “United States will...prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction...”, National Security Strategy, p. 1.

² Bard E. O’Neill and Ilana Kass, “The Persian Gulf War: A Political-Military Assessment”, *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 11, p. 214. “Of the various types of interests the United States has in the Middle East, two have been consistently deemed major or vital since at least 1973: security and economic. Remarkably, these interests have remained paramount despite the dramatic changes throughout the global arena.”

³ Kenneth M. Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad?”, *Foreign Affairs*; New York, Mar/Apr 2002. Pollack says that Saddam, “once in possession (of nuclear weapons would) dare the United States to evict him and risk a nuclear exchange.”

⁴ This end state already has broad international support as it is articulated in UN Resolution 687 (1991), “Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” S/RES/687 (1991), 8 April 1991.

⁵ Plato, *Philebus*, 360 BC, translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 32 and 32-42. Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth are the three main ingredients in Socrates’ description of a virtuous life. In defining symmetry and beauty Socrates said, “straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures...are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures...”

⁶ John Mintz, “Report: U.S. Still Vulnerable”, Washington Post, 25 October 2002, p. 1, “A prestigious task force led by two former U.S. senators has concluded that the American transportation, water, food, power, communications and banking systems remain easy targets for terrorists despite the government’s efforts at tightening the nation’s domestic security in the past year.”

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ International Atomic Energy Agency report no. 779. [[S/1997/779](#)]

⁹ Dr. Khidhir Hamza, *Saddam’s Bombmaker, The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda*, Scirbner, NY, 2000. p 326. Dr. Hamza revealed that after he began to be debriefed by the CIA he discovered, “Iraq apparently persuaded U.N. inspectors that: Our nuclear effort had never progressed beyond basic research; The bomb-design center I’d built at Al-Atheer was merely a materials research facility; The equipment to make explosives for the bomb had been destroyed.” The CIA missed the mark at understanding the true scope and nature of the clandestine nuclear weapons program. Iraq was much further along and much of the program survived destruction of the war and inspections.

¹⁰ In addition to Dr. Hamza, the UN inspection report also stated the Iraqis had achieved significant weaponization prior to 1991. See Interim status report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in response to the Presidential statement on Iraq of 14 May 1998. [[S/1998/694](#)]

¹¹ S/1998/927, Letter dated 7 Oct 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, Letter dated 7 Oct 98 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General, Appendix, Sixth Consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)

¹² Ken Fireman, “Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade Or Inspect; Concern over Weapons Cache”, Long Island Newsday, August 14, 2002.

¹³ President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, 8 October 2002, as recorded by the New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/national/08BTEX.html

¹⁴ The intelligence assessments for Iraq to have enough enriched uranium vary from a matter of months to the year 2010. But all assessments show the Iraqi drive to obtain operational nuclear weapons. See Andrew Krepp’s, “Iraq’s WMD Programs: A Comparison of Assessments, 11 October 2002, Carnegie endowment. <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=3809>

¹⁵ See the IAEA report, GC(40)/13, 12 August 1996, “The Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq, report by the Director General”. [[GC 40-13](#)] Iraq was implementing a program to become self-sufficient in producing enriched uranium through electro-magnetic isotope separation, the so-called calutron program. In addition, Iraq was building missiles which only have an offensive purpose of flying nuclear weapons within the Middle East. The Iraqi nuclear weapon in the mid-1988 conceptual design was deemed to be far too heavy to be delivered by missile. Consequently the PC-3 Fourth Group (Weapon development) had been advised to modify the design “with a view to reducing the total weight of the projectile (payload) to about one ton or less”.

¹⁶ Ken Fireman, “Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade or Inspect; Concern over Weapons Cache”, Long Island Newsday, August 14, 2002.

¹⁷ Francis X. Clines and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and British Forces Attack Iraq; Clinton cites military need to act.” New York Times, 17 December 1998.

¹⁸ The point of this model is not mere mathematics, but to show that the threat is influenced by all three elements in the model--capability, vulnerability, and intent. If any one factor is zero, then the threat is zero. Similarly, if any one factor is extremely low, then the threat is correspondingly minimized. In this paper, given the significant rating of each element, the ending threat rating is high. Although the threat rating of .6 may at first glance seem like a low number, it is exponentially higher than a threat rating of .5 or less. That is because in this model, each of the three factors will most likely be less than 1.0, since one equates to perfect capability, absolute certainty of intent, or total vulnerability. And, when using an equation with three factors, each of which has a value of less than one, then the final product of the equation is pulled away from 1.0 by each factor. For example, on the low end of the scale, if all three factors in the equation were 0.1, then the resulting product is .001. That is one tenth of one percent. If all the factors are .5, then the result is .125. This is a seemingly small number, but 125 times greater than the previous example. It is not until all three factors are at the level of .8 that the threat equates to greater than fifty percent, that is .512. Keep in mind, this result is more than five hundred times greater than the result of the low end of the scale. Even if all three factors were rated at .95, the resulting product is only .857. Thus, the .6 rating described in this paper is much higher rating than the moderate number might suggest at first glance.

¹⁹ UNSCOM-Report to the Security Council-25 January 1999, Annex D, Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament.

²⁰ Pollock, Kenneth M. "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Mar/Apr 2002.

²¹ Remarkably, Kofi Annan sent a letter to the President of the Security Council just days prior to the U.S. attack on Iraq saying Iraq was in full compliance with the inspection program. See S/1998/1172, 15 December 1998. The political intrigues of the UN, its ineffectiveness and blatant misread of the facts would make an interesting story in itself.

²² According to Col Daniel Scott, USA (ret) working at the Center for Defense Information, DESERT FOX cost \$502,525,616, not including F-117 cost figures.

²³ Steven Dolley, "There They Go Again: IAEA Misstates Its Record on Dismantling Saddam's Nuclear-Bomb Program", 30 September 2002, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. <http://www.nci.org/02NCI/09/iraq-pr9302002.htm>

²⁴ According to Paul Schott Stevens, former legal advisor to the National Security Council during the Regan administration, "In 1998, in Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton authorized military operations against Iraq in an effort to destroy Iraq's WMD capability, to enforce the terms of the cease-fire, and enforce the U.N. inspections process. The Security Council did not object to these actions. Nor, as a legal matter, could it do so, in the face of what Richard Butler, former head of the U.N. inspections program, has termed "Iraq's unremitting policy of concealment and resistance." The most recent formal assessment, conducted under the Security Council's auspices in 1999, only confirmed Iraq's defiance of its disarmament obligations. As Mr. Butler points out, no one has been watching Saddam Hussein in the interim and "[Y]ou can be sure that he is . . . building weapons." Taken from Paul Stevens' editorial, "Why Bother?", Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2002.

Furthermore, Article 12 of the International Law Commission Declaration of Rights and Duties of States, approved by 6th General Assembly 1951, "Every State has the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack." This legal foundation for self-preservation is also supported by the UN Charter Articles. Article 1 *To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace*, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. Article 51 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Although these articles talk about responding to aggression, a strong legal case can be made for preemptive attacks against a state known to be an aggressor. The idea of justifiable preemptive attacks is not a new nor illegal. "The president's preemption doctrine-and its first application in Iraq- is firmly rooted in centuries of tradition." Max Boot, "Who Says We Never Strike First?", 4 October 2002, New York Times.

²⁵ Kenneth M. Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Mar/Apr 2002.

²⁶ Michael Jordan, "Frustrated, US Shifts Its UN Course," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 October 2002, p. 1. "Some US military planners say any military attack must be made during the Iraqi winter, before the onset of rain, floods, and oppressive heat."

²⁷ Alkadiri, p.71.

²⁸ This in fact appears to be the case already. According to Eli J. Lake, UPI, "CIA Puts Two Sites in Kurdish Areas", *Washington Times*, 25 October 2002, p. 17. "The CIA this week beefed up its presence in northern Iraq, establishing two formal field offices in the Kurdish-controlled territory protected by U.S. and British fighter jets, according to Iraqi opposition officials."

²⁹ Jeffrey Fleishman, "Kurdish Dream of Nation Is A Nightmare for Turkey", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 2002. "More than 50,000 Iraqi Kurd fighters could help defeat the Iraqi president. But Washington's relationship with the Kurds is angering Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization partner with airbases and staging grounds for U.S. forces. Turkey is pressuring the U.S. to make participation in the war more palatable by reining in the Iraqi Kurds and by providing economic aid to offset costs Turkey cannot afford."

³⁰ Patrick Bishop, "Iran 'Will Allow Exiled Iraqis To Fight With US'", *London Daily Telegraph*, 25 October 2002.

³¹ Stephen Ferral and Roger Mathews in Tehran, "Iran Rejects Scheme for U.S. Military Rule in Iraq", *London Times*, 25 October 2002. "Iran insists that it must be involved in the formation of any post-Saddam administration but the prospect of seeing one enemy topple another has left its fragmented regime divided. Among its priorities are ensuring a role in government for Iraq's majority Shia population, who have been ruled by a despotic Sunni regime for decades, and to see the elimination of thousands of Iranian Mujahidin Khalq fighters based in Iraq, which Britain has designated a terrorist organisation."

³² Turkey has long feared an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey has spent billions of dollars fighting the notion of their 13 million Kurds forming their own state. Their primary concern is control of the rich northern oil fields. See Jeffrey Fleishman's article, "Kurdish Dream of Nation Is A Nightmare for Turkey", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 2002.

³³ Pamela Hess, "Rumsfeld Sets New Rules To Enter Conflict", UPI.com, October 17, 2002.

³⁴ According to the CIA Factbook, Iraq's top import/export trading partners include Russia, France, Egypt and China.

³⁵ Raad Alkadiri, "Iraq: The Dilemma of Sanctions and Confrontation", Managing Developments in the Gulf, Rosemary Hollis editor, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 74.

³⁶ Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Regional State Competitors: The Case of Iraq", Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?, Edited by Col Lloyd J. Matthews, USA (ret), U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, July 1998. p. 292.

³⁷ Jackie Calmes, "Washington Wire", *Wall Street Journal*, 25 October 2002, p.1. "By 2-to-1, respondents to a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll support military action to oust Hussein. But the margin closes to 47% to 40% if war means sending as many as 200,000 U.S. troops to Iraq, as is widely estimated. Overall support for ground action is down from July and September polls; foes include most senior citizens, professionals, Democrats, independents and Northeasterners."

³⁸ Michael Evans, "Saudi Arabia Gives US The Cold Shoulder", *London Times*, August 15, 2002. "Saudi Arabia still provides 17 percent of America's oil."

³⁹ Ibid. p. 299.

⁴⁰ Ken Fireman, "Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade or Inspect; Concern Over Weapons Cache", *Long Island Newsday*, August 14, 2002.

⁴¹ Stephen Ferral and Roger Mathews in Tehran, "Iran Rejects Scheme for U.S. Military Rule in Iraq", *London Times*, 25 October 2002. "Iran told Washington yesterday that it would never accept an American attempt to impose military rule on Iraq if Saddam Hussein were toppled from power. In stark, unambiguous language, Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, condemned leaked proposals to install a US general at the head of an interim post-Saddam administration as unwarranted neocolonialism. Citing Iraq's bloody experience of British-backed regimes, he issued a warning that such an administration could lead to future bloodshed and instability."

⁴² Doris H. Gray, "Iraq-Ivasion Talk Roils Morocco", *Washington Times*, August 15, 2002.

⁴³ Patrick Taylor, "Anti-Baghdad Talks Shunned by top Kurd", *New York Times*, August 15, 2002.

⁴⁴ Quotation taken from "Prospects for U.S. Military Action in Iraq", February 27, 2002, Center for Defense Information.

Bibliography

1. Alkadiri, Raad, "Iraq: The Dilemma of Sanctions and Confrontation", Managing Developments in the Gulf, Rosemary Hollis editor, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000.
2. Annan, Kofi Letter to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1172, 15 December 1998.
3. Bishop, Patrick, "Iran 'Will Allow Exiled Iraqis To Fight With US'", London Daily Telegraph, 25 October 2002.
4. Boot, Max, "Who Says We Never Strike First?", New York Times, 4 October 2002.
5. Bowden, Mark, "Tales of the Tyrant", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 289, No. 5, p. 35, May 2002. On the web at Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/howden-saddam.htm>
6. Bush, President George W., "President Bush's Speech on the Use of Force", 7 October 2002, transcript in the New York Times, 8 October 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/national/08BTEX.html>
7. Calmes, Jackie, "Washington Wire", Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2002, p.1.
8. Center for Defense Information, "Prospects for U.S. Military Action in Iraq", 27 February 2002.
9. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East", <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm>
10. Clines, Francis X. and Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. and British Forces Attack Iraq; Clinton cites military need to act." New York Times, 17 December 1998.
11. Danner, Mark, "The Struggles of Democracy and Empire", New York Times, 9 October 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/opinion/09DANN.html>.
12. Dolley, Steven, "New Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: Key Issues", Nuclear Control Institute, Washington D.C., 26 September 2002. On the web at <http://www.nci.org/02NCI/09/iraq-fs-925-draft.htm>
13. Dolley, Steven, "There They Go Again: IAEA Misstates Its Record on Dismantling Saddam's Nuclear-Bomb Program", 30 September 2002, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. On the web at <http://www.nci.org/02NCI/09/iraq-pr9302002.htm>
14. Evans, Michael, "Saudi Arabia Gives US The Cold Shoulder", London Times, August 15, 2002.
15. Ferral, Stephen and Roger Mathews in Tehran, "Iran Rejects Scheme for U.S. Military Rule in Iraq", London Times, 25 October 2002
16. Fireman, Ken "Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade Or Inspect; Concern over Weapons Cache", Long Island Newsday, August 14, 2002
17. Fleishman, Jeffrey, "Kurdish Dream of Nation Is A Nightmare for Turkey", Los Angeles Times, 25 October 2002.
18. Gray, Doris H., "Iraq-Invasion Talk Roils Morocco", Washington Times, 15 August 2002.
19. Hamza, Khidhir, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1998, Vol. 54, No. 5. On the web at <http://www.bullantomsci.org/issues/1998/so98hamza.html>.
20. Hamza, Dr. Khidhir, Saddam's Bombmaker, The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, Scirbner, NY, 2000.

21. Hess, Pamela “Rusmsfeld Sets New Rules To Enter Conflict”, UPI.com, October 17, 2002
22. IAEA report, GC(40)/13, 12 August 1996, “The Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq, report by the Director General”. [[GC 40-13](#)]
23. Jordan, Michael, “Frustrated, US Shifts Its UN Course,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 October 2002, p. 1.
24. Krepp, Andrew, “Iraq’s WMD Programs: A Comparison of Assessments, 11 October 2002, Carnegie Endowment. On the web at <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=3809>.
25. Lake, Eli J. UPI report, “CIA Puts Two Sites in Kurdish Areas”, Washington Times, 25 October 2002, p. 17.
26. Mintz, John, “Report: U.S. Still Vulnerable”, Washington Post, 25 October 2002, p.1.
27. Mitchell, Alison and Carl Hulse, “C.I.A. Warns That a U.S. Attack May Ignite Terror”, New York Times, 8 October 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/international/middleeast/09IRAQ.html>
28. O’Neill, Bard E. and Ilana Kass, “The Persian Gulf War: A Political-Military Assessment”, *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 11.
29. Orlov, Vladimir and William C. Potter, “The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 1998, Vol. 54, No. 6. On the web at <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/nd98orlovpotter.html>.
30. Pelletiere, Stephen C., “Regional State Competitors: The Case of Iraq”, Challenging the Untied States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?, Edited by Col Lloyd J. Matthews, USA (ret), U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, July 1998.
31. Polluck, Kenneth M. “Next Stop Baghdad?”, *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Mar/Apr 2002
32. Plato, *Philebus*, 360 BC, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
33. Stevens, Paul Schott, “Why Bother?”, Editorial in the Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2002.
34. Taylor, Patrick, “Anti-Baghdad Talks Shunned by top Kurd”, New York Times, August 15, 2002
35. UNSCOM-Report to the Security Council-25 January 1999, Annex D, Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament.

¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy states the “United States will...prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction...”, National Security Strategy, p. 1.

² Bard E. O’Neill and Ilana Kass, “The Persian Gulf War: A Political-Military Assessment”, *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 11, p. 214. “Of the various types of interests the United States has in the Middle East, two have been consistently deemed major or vital since at least 1973: security and economic. Remarkably, these interests have remained paramount despite the dramatic changes throughout the global arena.”

³ Kenneth M. Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad?”, *Foreign Affairs*; New York, Mar/Apr 2002. Pollack says that Saddam, “once in possession (of nuclear weapons would) dare the United States to evict him and risk a nuclear exchange.”

⁴ This end state already has broad international support as it is articulated in UN Resolution 687 (1991), “Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” S/RES/687 (1991), 8 April 1991.

⁵ Plato, *Philebus*, 360 BC, translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 32 and 32-42. Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth are the three main ingredients in Socrates’ description of a virtuous life. In defining symmetry and beauty Socrates said, “straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures...are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures...”

⁶ John Mintz, “Report: U.S. Still Vulnerable”, Washington Post, 25 October 2002, p. 1, “A prestigious task force led by two former U.S. senators has concluded that the American transportation, water, food, power, communications and banking systems remain easy targets for terrorists despite the government’s efforts at tightening the nation’s domestic security in the past year.”

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ International Atomic Energy Agency report no. 779. [[S/1997/779](#)]

⁹ Dr. Khidhir Hamza, Saddam’s Bombmaker, The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, Scirbner, NY, 2000. p 326. Dr. Hamza revealed that after he began to be debriefed by the CIA he discovered, “Iraq apparently persuaded U.N. inspectors that: Our nuclear effort had never progressed beyond basic research; The bomb-design center I’d built at Al-Atheer was merely a materials research facility; The equipment to make explosives for the bomb had been destroyed.” The CIA missed the mark at understanding the true scope and nature of the clandestine nuclear weapons program. Iraq was much further along and much of the program survived destruction of the war and inspections.

¹⁰ In addition to Dr. Hamza, the UN inspection report also stated the Iraqis had achieved significant weaponization prior to 1991. See Interim status report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in response to the Presidential statement on Iraq of 14 May 1998. [[S/1998/694](#)]

¹¹ S/1998/927, Letter dated 7 Oct 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, Letter dated 7 Oct 98 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General, Appendix, Sixth Consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)

¹² Ken Fireman, “Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade Or Inspect; Concern over Weapons Cache”, Long Island Newsday, August 14, 2002.

¹³ President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, 8 October 2002, as recorded by the New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/national/08BTEX.html

¹⁴ The intelligence assessments for Iraq to have enough enriched uranium vary from a matter of months to the year 2010. But all assessments show the Iraqi drive to obtain operational nuclear weapons. See Andrew Krepp’s, “Iraq’s WMD Programs: A Comparison of Assessments, 11 October 2002, Carnegie endowment. <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=3809>

¹⁵ See the IAEA report, GC(40)/13, 12 August 1996, “The Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq, report by the Director General”. [[GC 40-13](#)] Iraq was implementing a program to become self-sufficient in producing enriched uranium through electro-magnetic isotope separation, the so-called calutron program. In addition, Iraq was building missiles which only have an offensive purpose of flying nuclear weapons within the Middle East. The Iraqi nuclear weapon in the mid-1988 conceptual design was deemed to be far

too heavy to be delivered by missile. Consequently the PC-3 Fourth Group (Weapon development) had been advised to modify the design "with a view to reducing the total weight of the projectile (payload) to about one ton or less".

¹⁶ Ken Fireman, "Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade or Inspect; Concern over Weapons Cache", Long Island Newsday, August 14, 2002.

¹⁷ Francis X. Clines and Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. and British Forces Attack Iraq; Clinton cites military need to act." New York Times, 17 December 1998.

¹⁸ The point of this model is not mere mathematics, but to show that the threat is influenced by all three elements in the model--capability, vulnerability, and intent. If any one factor is zero, then the threat is zero. Similarly, if any one factor is extremely low, then the threat is correspondingly minimized. In this paper, given the significant rating of each element, the ending threat rating is high. Although the threat rating of .6 may at first glance seem like a low number, it is exponentially higher than a threat rating of .5 or less. That is because in this model, each of the three factors will most likely be less than 1.0, since one equates to perfect capability, absolute certainty of intent, or total vulnerability. And, when using an equation with three factors, each of which has a value of less than one, then the final product of the equation is pulled away from 1.0 by each factor. For example, on the low end of the scale, if all three factors in the equation were 0.1, then the resulting product is .001. That is one tenth of one percent. If all the factors are .5, then the result is .125. This is a seemingly small number, but 125 times greater than the previous example. It is not until all three factors are at the level of .8 that the threat equates to greater than fifty percent, that is .512. Keep in mind, this result is more than five hundred times greater than the result of the low end of the scale. Even if all three factors were rated at .95, the resulting product is only .857. Thus, the .6 rating described in this paper is much higher rating than the moderate number might suggest at first glance.

¹⁹ UNSCOM-Report to the Security Council-25 January 1999, Annex D, Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament.

²⁰ Pollock, Kenneth M. "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Mar/Apr 2002.

²¹ Remarkably, Kofi Annan sent a letter to the President of the Security Council just days prior to the U.S. attack on Iraq saying Iraq was in full compliance with the inspection program. See S/1998/1172, 15 December 1998. The political intrigues of the UN, its ineffectiveness and blatant misread of the facts would make an interesting story in itself.

²² According to Col Daniel Scott, USA (ret) working at the Center for Defense Information, DESERT FOX cost \$502,525,616, not including F-117 cost figures.

²³ Steven Dolley, "There They Go Again: IAEA Misstates Its Record on Dismantling Saddam's Nuclear-Bomb Program", 30 September 2002, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. <http://www.nci.org/02NCI/09/iraq-pr9302002.htm>

²⁴ According to Paul Schott Stevens, former legal advisor to the National Security Council during the Regan administration, "In 1998, in Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton authorized military operations against Iraq in an effort to destroy Iraq's WMD capability, to enforce the terms of the cease-fire, and enforce the U.N. inspections process. The Security Council did not object to these actions. Nor, as a legal matter, could it do so, in the face of what Richard Butler, former head of the U.N. inspections program, has termed "Iraq's unremitting policy of concealment and resistance." The most recent formal assessment, conducted under the Security Council's auspices in 1999, only confirmed Iraq's defiance of its disarmament obligations. As Mr. Butler points out, no one has been watching Saddam Hussein in the interim and "[Y]ou can be sure that he is . . . building weapons." Taken from Paul Stevens' editorial, "Why Bother?", Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2002.

Furthermore, Article 12 of the International Law Commission Declaration of Rights and Duties of States, approved by 6th General Assembly 1951, "Every State has the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack." This legal foundation for self-preservation is also supported by the UN Charter Articles. Article 1 *To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.* Article 51 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Although these articles talk about responding to aggression, a strong legal case can be made for preemptive attacks against a state known to be an aggressor. The idea of justifiable preemptive attacks is not a new nor illegal. "The president's preemption doctrine-and its first application in Iraq- is firmly rooted in centuries of tradition." Max Boot, "Who Says We Never Strike First?", 4 October 2002, New York Times.

²⁵ Kenneth M. Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Mar/Apr 2002.

²⁶ Michael Jordan, "Frustrated, US Shifts Its UN Course," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 October 2002, p. 1. "Some US military planners say any military attack must be made during the Iraqi winter, before the onset of rain, floods, and oppressive heat."

²⁷ Alkadiri, p.71.

²⁸ This in fact appears to be the case already. According to Eli J. Lake, UPI, "CIA Puts Two Sites in Kurdish Areas", *Washington Times*, 25 October 2002, p. 17. "The CIA this week beefed up its presence in northern Iraq, establishing two formal field offices in the Kurdish-controlled territory protected by U.S. and British fighter jets, according to Iraqi opposition officials."

²⁹ Jeffrey Fleishman, "Kurdish Dream of Nation Is A Nightmare for Turkey", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 2002. "More than 50,000 Iraqi Kurd fighters could help defeat the Iraqi president. But Washington's relationship with the Kurds is angering Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization partner with airbases and staging grounds for U.S. forces. Turkey is pressuring the U.S. to make participation in the war more palatable by reining in the Iraqi Kurds and by providing economic aid to offset costs Turkey cannot afford."

³⁰ Patrick Bishop, "Iran 'Will Allow Exiled Iraqis To Fight With US'", *London Daily Telegraph*, 25 October 2002.

³¹ Stephen Ferral and Roger Mathews in Tehran, "Iran Rejects Scheme for U.S. Military Rule in Iraq", *London Times*, 25 October 2002. "Iran insists that it must be involved in the formation of any post-Saddam administration but the prospect of seeing one enemy topple another has left its fragmented regime divided. Among its priorities are ensuring a role in government for Iraq's majority Shia population, who have been ruled by a despotic Sunni regime for decades, and to see the elimination of thousands of Iranian Mujahidin Khalq fighters based in Iraq, which Britain has designated a terrorist organisation."

³² Turkey has long feared an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey has spent billions of dollars fighting the notion of their 13 million Kurds forming their own state. Their primary concern is control of the rich northern oil fields. See Jeffrey Fleishman's article, "Kurdish Dream of Nation Is A Nightmare for Turkey", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 2002.

³³ Pamela Hess, "Rumsfeld Sets New Rules To Enter Conflict", UPI.com, October 17, 2002.

³⁴ According to the CIA Factbook, Iraq's top import/export trading partners include Russia, France, Egypt and China.

³⁵ Raad Alkadiri, "Iraq: The Dilemma of Sanctions and Confrontation", *Managing Developments in the Gulf*, Rosemary Hollis editor, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 74.

³⁶ Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Regional State Competitors: The Case of Iraq", *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?*, Edited by Col Lloyd J. Matthews, USA (ret), U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, July 1998. p. 292.

³⁷ Jackie Calmes, "Washington Wire", *Wall Street Journal*, 25 October 2002, p.1. "By 2-to-1, respondents to a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll support military action to oust Hussein. But the margin closes to 47% to 40% if war means sending as many as 200,000 U.S. troops to Iraq, as is widely estimated. Overall support for ground action is down from July and September polls; foes include most senior citizens, professionals, Democrats, independents and Northeasterners."

³⁸ Michael Evans, "Saudi Arabia Gives US The Cold Shoulder", *London Times*, August 15, 2002. "Saudi Arabia still provides 17 percent of America's oil."

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 299.

⁴⁰ Ken Fireman, "Dilemma Over Iraq, Invade or Inspect; Concern Over Weapons Cache", *Long Island Newsday*, August 14, 2002.

⁴¹ Stephen Ferral and Roger Mathews in Tehran, "Iran Rejects Scheme for U.S. Military Rule in Iraq", *London Times*, 25 October 2002. "Iran told Washington yesterday that it would never accept an American attempt to impose military rule on Iraq if Saddam Hussein were toppled from power. In stark, unambiguous language, Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, condemned leaked proposals to install a US general at the head of an interim post-Saddam administration as unwarranted neocolonialism. Citing Iraq's bloody experience of British-backed regimes, he issued a warning that such an administration could lead to future bloodshed and instability."

⁴² Doris H. Gray, "Iraq-Ivasion Talk Roils Morocco", *Washington Times*, August 15, 2002.

⁴³ Patrick Taylor, "Anti-Baghdad Talks Shunned by top Kurd", *New York Times*, August 15, 2002.

⁴⁴ Quotation taken from “Prospects for U.S. Military Action in Iraq”, February 27, 2002, Center for Defense Information.