Struggling for Change: Applying the Bureaucratic Model to U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Abstract
There are few hardy perennials in foreign policy, but over the last thirty years you could go to the bank on two First, every incoming president would make a secret vow not to be entrapped by his national security bureaucracies - State, CIA, and Defense Second, each administration would be blindsided by a Cuba event unforeseen by a narrow but enduring embargo policy which failed over three decades to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro Although the memoirs have yet to be written, one suspects that President Clinton, who borrowed so heavily from President Carter's national security staff, may also have borrowed the Georgian governor's skepticism of at least the State Department Nonetheless, like many of its predecessors, the Clinton Administration would default to a mechanism of foreign policy making that corresponds to the bureaucratic model described by Graham Allison. In short, a select group of key players determined by "where they sit," (State, NSC, at times Defense and Justice on Cuba matters) would make policy decisions but leave implementation to entrenched careerists with a long history of supporting the status quo.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA442445
Entities
People
- Leslie Bassett
Organizations
- National War College