The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Inevitability of Surprise
Abstract
The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 was a significant benchmark in the development of modern warfare. In its three weeks of intense combat the world witnessed the devastating effects of small guided weapons on the large, swift, manned machines that had dominated the air and land for decades. While tanks and aircraft were not rendered obsolete the war confirmed the need for major changes in weapons procurement, air and land tactics, and force structures. The microchip had transformed the armory. The 1973 War was not merely a demonstration of the impact of new technology. The circumstances of its inception, conduct, and termination also provided an unusual opportunity to test more fundamental and enduring concepts of the nature of war. This paper will focus on the issue that in one form or another dominated all phases of the conflict--the repeated errors of all parties involved, combatants as well as their allies, in evaluating and properly responding to the capabilities, intentions, and actions of their opponents. It was this aspect of the war, most frequently spoken of in terms of "surprise," that is fact brings one to the more basic question of how one can hope to understand the system of complex interactions that war embodies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA442632
Entities
People
- Leonard Belgard
Organizations
- National War College