Clausewitz on the Rappahannock. Fog and Friction at the Battle of Fredericksburg
Abstract
Carl von Clausewitz completed his initial, unrevised draft of On War more than thirty years before the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter. His writings, unlike those of his Swiss contemporary, Antoine-Henri Jomini, had not become a part of American military curriculum by the middle of the 19th century, and most Civil War commanders probably were unfamiliar with his work. Moreover, the conflict in which those commanders were engaged proved to be qualitatively and quantitatively different -- in scale, in violence, in technology, in resultant changes in tactics -- from the Napoleonic wars on which Clausewitz based many of his observations. Nevertheless, the Civil War is replete with examples of Clausewitzian principles applied or ignored. The writings of the Prussian military philosopher provide a useful framework for analyzing how the two sides pursued that conflict and for identifying factors affecting victories and defeats. To examine the entire war through that lens would require volumes. Instead, this paper will attempt to consider several questions on the scale of a single engagement, the battle of Fredericksburg. Which of Clausewitz's theses were most relevant to that campaign? Which commanders reflected, understood, applied those principles more? What role did this play in the outcome? Could a different application of Clausewitz's lessons have affected the results of the battle? Do aspects of Fredericksburg contradict the Prussian's teachings? Examination of these questions demonstrates that, while the Fredericksburg campaign illustrates many of Clausewitz's theses, fog, friction and military genius best explain how a promising Union initiative ended in disaster.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 02, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA442709
Entities
People
- John J. Boris
Organizations
- National War College