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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

C-130B'S TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN POLICY,

DECISION MAKING & STRATEGY

COURSE 5603 ESSAY

LTC D J. SCHROER/CLASS OF 1997

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# Report Documentation Page

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## INTRODUCTION

This case study will examine decision making in U.S. Military Assistance Programs in the form of C-130B transfers to the Sub-Saharan countries of Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa from 1994 to present<sup>1</sup>. All three cases are linked with interdependent cause and effect relationships. Graham Allison's three models of decision making as outlined in *Essence of Decision*<sup>2</sup> (Rational Actor, Organizational & Political) will provide the frame of reference for analysis.

The original intent was to compare and contrast the decisions regarding the three countries using the Allison models. However, the Zimbabwe case is unusual and interesting on its own for two reasons. It summarily provides an interesting application of all three models of diverse decision making in a single case. In addition, the unique U.S. strategy in this case is worthy of examination and explanation. Hence, the Zimbabwe case will be the focus of the study, while Botswana and South Africa will be used for overall comparison and to illuminate valuable points outside the Zimbabwe example.

## BACKGROUND

In late 1993 and early 1994, the U.S. Air Force finished cascading C-130Hs into all of its Air National Guard units, replacing the existing C-130Bs. The B models which had undergone wing modifications were flown to Warner Robins and Hill Air Force Bases (AFB) to exchange the updated parts (compatible with current C-130Hs) with original components. Following this operation, the original C-130Bs contained almost no interchangeable parts with the newer C-130Hs and were of little value even as spare parts.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, the U.S. Air Force declared a block of operational C-130Bs as Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under the provisions of Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.<sup>4</sup> EDA is defined as:

The quantity of defense articles owned by the United States Government, and not procured in anticipation of military assistance or sales order, which is in excess of the Approved Force Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock of all Department of Defense

Components at the time such articles are dropped from inventory by the supplying agency for delivery to countries or international organizations under this Act.<sup>5</sup>

Of the many rules governing EDA, probably the most significant is the concept of providing equipment free of charge to other nations "as is, where is". This means equipment is offered in its present condition in its current location. Any repairs required to make the equipment operational and/or any costs of transportation are the responsibility of the accepting country. No Military Assistance financing, such as grants or loans are available, by law, for articles offered as EDA.<sup>6</sup>

In 1994, each of the three countries were in radically different positions to accept offers of EDA C-130Bs. A brief contextual summary is provided for the strategy and decisions which followed.

## **ZIMBABWE**

By 1994, Zimbabwe had a proven track record of a moderate position in Southern Africa and was a strong supporter of western policies. The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) had been a significant contributor to United Task Force (UNITAF) operations in Somalia, and the military was highly regarded as both credible and professional.<sup>7</sup>

Because of their involvement in international Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Zimbabwe had asked on several occasions, in both 1992 and 1993, for grants of military equipment from the U.S., especially C-130 aircraft. The Mugabe administration had supported U.S. interests for an extended period and there was a clear expectation that a reciprocal gesture in the form of Military Assistance was appropriate.<sup>8</sup>

The Zimbabwe Air Force was small but well trained. Its fleet consisted of one squadron of AG Bell 412 helicopters, one squadron of CASA 212 light turboprop transport airplanes, an aging (unflyable) group of Rhodesian vintage C-47s, one squadron of small jet fighters and a handful of trainers. All these aircraft are economical, reliable proven systems with minimal crew manning requirements and relatively

simple maintenance. Although flight hours and budgets were strictly limited, the small number of trained pilots balanced well with the meager operations tempo.<sup>9</sup>

President Mugabe had made great strides away from his initial direction toward socialist economy, but like many other African countries, internal economic growth was not keeping pace with social programs. National external debt was climbing and loan payments were overdue. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were placing pressure on Zimbabwe to accelerate reforms.<sup>10</sup> Two years of drought exacerbated these problems and during the spring and summer of 1994, the government undertook reforms with extensive cost saving measures, especially in the ZDF.

Despite these substantial external economic pressures, in a seemingly irrational move, President Mugabe concluded a purchase for two new Presidential Model Super Puma helicopters. This sale was reportedly worth \$50 million. The IMF, World Bank and most donor country embassies (who had strenuously objected to the sale as it was in progress) were both enraged and dejected.<sup>11</sup>

## **BOTSWANA**

Democratic institutions and U.S. interests had also been long supported by Botswana. Another significant contributor to several peacekeeping operations, Botswana was rapidly professionalizing their small army and air force under the structure of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF). Although improving steadily, and of considerably better quality than most other African nations, the BDF trailed the ZDF in training and overall capability.<sup>12</sup>

During the early 1990s, the BDF was undergoing a modernization and expansion program to make the armed forces more capable and comparable with its neighbors in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Overall, the BDF size was and is about 1/5th of the ZDF with a total force of approximately 10,000. The Air Force is built around AG Bell 412 helicopters and a handful of light transport aircraft. Like the

ZAF, they are relatively small, non-complex, well tested systems which require only normal maintenance and moderate levels of crew training and manning<sup>13</sup>

However, as part of a major commitment to the BDF, a new airfield complex outside the capital of Gabarone was completed in 1993. It is a first class facility including C-5 capable runways, modern maintenance hangars and excellent support structures.

Unlike Zimbabwe, Botswana has the diamond industry infrastructure which provides consistent employment and solid financial backing for the government. The economy in general is second only to the regional powerhouse of South Africa. As a result, military modernization and even expansion are not significant problems if conducted responsibly.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

Clearly in a class by itself, South Africa is the regional power with a military currently in excess of 100,000. Although only recently admitted back into normal relations with most western countries, the military was on a professional level with most European countries in terms of training, professionalism and equipment.

Since 1992, major efforts have been underway to integrate the previous South African Defense Force (SADF), African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas and the homeland armies. Some degradation of capability and professionalism over the short term has been displayed, but the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF) appears to be leading the way in national integration.

The South African Air Force (SAAF) received seven C-130Bs in 1963 from the United States and has maintained them in excellent condition. All are flying with well trained, proficient crews. In addition, partly as a by-product of the extended sanctions, South Africa has an internal maintenance structure which is capable of performing all major functions including depot level rebuild.<sup>14</sup>

Although not booming, the economy in South Africa is by and large capable of supporting its military, especially after current downsizing initiatives are implemented following the integration process. As sanctions have been lifted and relations with neighboring countries normalized, several IMF/World Bank initiatives have also been undertaken to improve regional economic conditions by improving infrastructure in South Africa

The United States has been eager to reinforce the reforms undertaken following the implementation of majority rule and show visible support for the Mandela government, albeit with limited means. Specific emphasis has been to improve military capabilities in order to move toward a regional peacekeeping force with South Africa as the core, capitalizing on its organizational and logistical strengths <sup>15</sup>

An interesting aspect of the South Africa case is that South African Armaments Corporation (Armcor), the South African parastatal defense contractor, still remains under sanction. Two legal suits are pending in U.S. Federal Court regarding violations of previous sanctions. This maintains a state of denial regarding the company, despite all other sanctions on South Africa having been lifted. It is expected that once these two cases are adjudicated, the mandatory denial period which usually follows will be waived by the U.S. Government <sup>16</sup>

This is a particularly acute problem for South Africa because the Ministry of Defense and the parastatal apparatus are deeply intertwined. Armcor is not only a corporate defense contractor but has evolved into the research agency, procurement branch and purchasing agent for all services of the military. This makes any transfer of major systems to South Africa without Armcor involvement almost impossible.<sup>17</sup>

## **THE REGION**

Understanding the regional dynamics in Southern Africa is essential to appreciating the strategy and decisions which followed as part of the C-130B EDA Program. The relations and manifestations of these dynamics are not often rational and seldom even clearly understood by the participants

While South Africa had remained under sanction, Botswana and Zimbabwe had an unspoken competition for local dominance and prestige in the region<sup>18</sup> The neighboring countries of Namibia, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique were all suffering stunted growth as a result of a combination of internal conflict and South African fallout.

Zimbabwe had been given a clear initial advantage by inheriting the structure of the Rhodesian Armed Forces and the assistance from Britain following independence. However, President Mugabe's economic programs combined with the crumbling threat from Mozambique resulted in a gradual erosion of military funding and capability

Almost exactly opposite forces were at work in Botswana as the military slowly professionalized itself and increasing revenues provided better training and equipment. Credibility and recognition were slow in coming, but inclusion in several peacekeeping operations signaled a new appreciation of the BDF by most western observers

Politically, Presidents Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Masire (Botswana) competed for opportunities to display the regional and African significance of their countries Both had offered their services in mediating different African disputes and providing peacekeeping forces During the summer of 1995, Harare, Zimbabwe was the host site for the All African Games As South Africa changed regimes both sought to position themselves, using a variety of tactics, for advantage in the evolving new order.

## **THE OFFER**

Following demodification, a group of 11 C-130Bs were flown to Davis-Monthan AFB and placed

in Flyable Short Term Hold/Storage The official notification process for EDA proceeded through Secretary of the Air Force-International Affairs (SAF-IA) to Department of Defense-International Security Affairs (DOD-ISA) and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).<sup>19</sup>

Sitting on the ramp at Davis-Montham AFB, the aircraft were completely flyable except for overdue inspections and maintenance. As these C-130Bs were scheduled for withdrawal from units, most were granted waivers for periodic maintenance until they were turned in, while all had been sitting for several months The U.S Air Force, and subsequently the DSAA, position was that all overdue inspections and maintenance must be performed prior to releasing the aircraft from the U.S This was primarily for safety and legal responsibility reasons.<sup>20</sup>

As part of the “as is, where is” policy, the U.S. Air Force could be paid to perform these services or a private certified contractor could be secured For two aircraft, the initial maintenance costs to release the aircraft from Davis-Montham AFB amounted to several million dollars<sup>21</sup>

Because only 11 were available and the requests totaled many more airframes, an interagency EDA Coordinating Committee was convened All major U S agencies with an interest in the program were represented and although there were some minor disagreements between regions, a consensus was reached and a recommendation for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs formed In the Southern Africa region, the committee recommended two aircraft each to Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa.<sup>22</sup> This recommendation was adopted and in August 1994 official notification of the countries was made through the local U.S. Embassies and the offer forward

In the Zimbabwe and Botswana cases, the overdue maintenance services, a spare parts package, maintenance and pilot training with two years of contractor maintenance was recommended as a

package. Given the internal Air Force capabilities of each country this appeared to be a logical recommendation. This initial package represented approximately \$12 million.<sup>23</sup>

South Africa had already stated it would completely rebuild each aircraft and was interested only in the minimum maintenance required for release. Even this limited arrangement represented several hundred thousand dollars.

All these actions seem to make sense, except in the case of Zimbabwe. Why would the U.S. Government, which is encouraging financial responsibility for African countries and downsizing unnecessary military institutions offer two large, complex aircraft systems to a country incapable of even paying for the maintenance services required for their immediate release? In larger terms, the questions of follow-on maintenance, normal operating costs, aircrew manning and training were all almost impossible. For example, the \$1 million annual operating and maintenance costs for the two aircraft was more than the entire ZAF budget.<sup>24</sup>

### **THE STRATEGY**

Several factors combined to predetermine an irrational answer to a very important question. Most important were the specific requests made by the Zimbabwe Minister of Defense one year earlier for C-130s which was denied on the basis of none being available. Coincidentally, the request had been officially renewed in early 1994. Also significant were the perceived obligations of the U.S. to treat Zimbabwe fairly and include them in an offer, if one was to be made to Botswana and South Africa. Failure to make the offer to Zimbabwe would have been ungrateful, a tremendous insult and would have fueled regional tensions.

All the diverse agencies understood the general guidance from the administration and their own agency position. At the same time each had a realistic picture of the problematic nature of the

Zimbabwe offer while all agreed on the political necessity of making it. The recommendation and subsequent offer was made with the hope that Zimbabwe would be realistic and turn it down

The significant exception was the American Embassy, Harare. Between 1993 and 1994 all major personnel, including the ambassador, deputy chief of mission (DCM), attache and assistant attache had rotated. The new people were not aware of the previous specific requests and were surprised and shocked at the U S offer. Some, to this day, do not know the full background, and were not capable of addressing the question of which was worse:<sup>25</sup>

- Hoping Zimbabwe would decline the obviously ridiculous (viewed as counterproductive, ill advised, and potentially disastrous) offer, or
- Trying to repair the political fallout from their exclusion while Botswana and South Africa received their aircraft.

The Embassy immediately began an intensive lobbying effort to discourage all sectors of the Government of Zimbabwe from accepting the aircraft. Much to everyone's dismay, President Mugabe and the Minister of Defense indicated they planned to accept

From the Zimbabwe point of view, the details of funding and follow-on support could be negotiated or waived if the U S genuinely wanted to help their friends. Costs were relative while regional perceptions and outward manifestations of power were clearly the predominant question

The ZAF leadership was horrified. Even two aircraft would require a restructuring of the entire Air Force, saying little of the long-term costs of maintaining and operating these complex systems. Massive infrastructure upgrades and extensive pilot retraining would be required. There were no navigator positions in the ZAF and the flight engineers flew in most cases as the copilots of all the aircraft. Air Vice Marshall Harvey protested as diplomatically as possible, but he was definitively told to prepare to accept and operate the two C-130Bs.<sup>26</sup>

## THE OUTCOME

The Botswana and South African programs have continued toward completion. One aircraft bound for Botswana is in the Lockheed facility in Greenville, S C undergoing maintenance with the second projected to arrive in February 1997 <sup>27</sup>

The South African initiative was so well received by all agencies that in 1995 when three Navy C-130Fs were being scrapped, they were offered as an afterthought. Because the aircraft were so uniquely configured and outfitted, they were of no value to anyone else. South Africa's unusual maintenance/rebuild capabilities and their long term plans to completely reconstruct all the C-130s, made this a valuable offer which they promptly accepted <sup>28</sup>

Zimbabwe's case, as outlined earlier is not as simple. For almost two years, the bureaucratic wheels turned as preparations to transfer the aircraft continued. Letters of Intent (LOI) and Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) were continually drafted, rejected and redrafted. Site surveys by both USAF personnel to Zimbabwe and ZAF personnel to Davis-Monthan AFB were conducted <sup>29</sup>

The Government of Zimbabwe waged a strong campaign with the U.S. Embassy in Harare to provide funding assistance, loans, grants or alternative programs to transfer the C-130s. Under the provisions of the EDA Program all of these options were illegal. <sup>30</sup>

Internal resources could not produce adequate funding for even the down payment on the initial maintenance services. ZAF senior leaders continued to point out the financial disaster these two airframes represented while the senior leadership of the government became more entrenched.

Substantial external condemnation over the Super Puma sales and subsequent pressure was exerted by the IMF and World Bank as word of the acceptance of the C-130Bs began to leak out. Internal economic unrest and drought aggravated the situation in the summer of 1995 and the military was placed under severe financial restrictions. The U.S. Government, through the Embassy, emphatically

stated there could be no financial support in any way for the EDA Transfer Program. Senior ZDF officers became increasingly more vocal in their objections to the proposed acceptance of the aircraft.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, in December 1995, after attempting every reason not to say no, the Government of Zimbabwe reluctantly declined the offer of the two C-130B EDA aircraft.<sup>32</sup>

### **MARGINAL PLAYERS**

Traditionally, Congress and defense contractors play significant roles in major systems transfers to foreign militaries. For several reasons this proved not to be true in the C-130B EDA program.<sup>33</sup>

DOD-ISA forwarded the Congressionally mandated authorization packages in accordance with Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The procedure allowed that if no intervening action by Congress took place in 15 days, the action was released and by default, procedural approval was granted.<sup>34</sup>

In all three cases, the intent of future peacekeeping self-sustainability was well understood in Congress. In addition, no one wanted to object to incentives to South Africa in light of their recent reforms while the contributions of Zimbabwe and Botswana were well known. DOD-ISA was fully prepared to lobby, if concern over South Africa came up. The significant contribution of the Congress was not to slow down or needlessly complicate the process.<sup>35</sup>

Lockheed initially suffered from their own internal confusion over the transfers. They objected to the offers on the grounds that they competed with new aircraft sales to the countries (Lockheed had been saddled with a number of new C-130s which were sitting on their ramp built under contracts which later collapsed.) When DOD explained that none of the countries involved were in any stretch capable of purchasing new C-130s for \$39 million each, Lockheed's position immediately reversed.<sup>36</sup>

They immediately began an intensive marketing program to sell both the initially required services and a long-term maintenance, spares and training package. The focus of this effort was directed to the countries involved, as the conditions of the EDA program were purely commercial in nature.

Little lobbying effort was directed at the Congress because of the widely held view this transfer had no opposition and that it was substantially a "win-win" program. Costly efforts were expended elsewhere. Generally, the only serious competition in Congress for EDA Programs was the reserve components. They often argue that active force drawdown equipment should all be directed toward them. In this case, since the equipment was obsolete even by Air Guard standards, the prevailing view was that it would be approved without reservation. In fact, this proved to be the case.

Botswana contracted with Lockheed for a package including the overdue maintenance, some limited upgrades and a two year Contractor Logistical Support (CLS) package. In the long run, Lockheed now views this cascade EDA Program as a significant element in future business.<sup>37</sup> It remains to be seen, whether after two years, South Africa will begin to market its capabilities regionally and compete in this type of maintenance contractor support.

In South Africa's case, the denial sanction against Armscor eliminated Lockheed from effectively competing for even a portion of the requirements. As an interesting side note, Lockheed, in conjunction with several other major defense contractors, did mount a successful effort to waive the sanctions if it could be demonstrated Armscor was serving as only an administrative agent and not a contractor. Unfortunately, in the C-130B case, the exception was not approved in time for a bid to be rendered and Lockheed officials were clear that trying to skirt this issue in advance was out of the question.<sup>38</sup>

### **POLICY, DECISION MAKING & STRATEGY**

During deliberations and events leading to the initial offer, elements of all three Allison models had roles to play in the decisions. The 'Rational Actor' position of the administration to support potential

self-sufficiency for PKOs and reward previous participation was well understood and incorporated by all the interagency action officers. At the opposite end of the scale, the 'Politics' of the regional dynamics were well understood and the potential ramifications of a mistake well calculated. At the center, the 'Bureaucratic Procedures' of the process were an integral part of the strategy designed to "hope for a realistic decline" of the offer.

Most of the action officers felt that given the time necessary to process the transfers, sufficient power from all quarters and reason could be brought to bear to reap the political face saving of the offer and secure the long term objective of a rejection. The risk-benefit calculations assessed that even a worst case acceptance would lead to fewer long term problems than excluding the Government of Zimbabwe from the offer. All senior policy makers concurred with the single exception of the Embassy.<sup>39</sup>

Notable is the lack of continuity and surprise which the initial offer provoked with the entire Embassy staff.<sup>40</sup> Although the Embassy quickly recovered and pursued an aggressive campaign in concert with the overall strategy of working toward a rejection, this is one potential area for increased emphasis in the future.

It is also interesting to note that in pursuit of the acceptance on the Zimbabwe side, all three elements can be observed as playing major roles in the final decision. The 'Rational Actors' of the ZAF and their allies in the government campaigned to decline the offer and achieve more realistic goals. President Mugabe and Minister of Defense Mahatche clearly represented the 'Politics' of personality, regional power brokering and prestige. Once again, central to the outcome were the 'Bureaucratic Process' of denial of further IMF loans for financing the transaction, U.S. insistence on the necessity of initial safety maintenance (and its attendant immediate cost) and the legal limits of EDA Programs.

which permitted no financing or other package type support. Finally, the time required for processing the activity allowed pressure and reason to wear down over time the immediate attractiveness of prestige and perceived power.

Senior policy maker interaction was not required for this transfer to take place. Decisions were made based on broad policy guidance which was supervised and checked periodically as the different formal documents were circulated among the required agencies. Interagency meetings and briefings produced consensus on how to best handle the entire operation. Although the process could have been stopped and elevated for discussion/decision by any number of action officers or supervisors (even by the U.S. Ambassador), it never was.

### CONCLUSIONS

Allison's three models can be unique in dominating or they can appear and interact in different fashions during decision making. In many cases, one aspect or model predominates a particular decision or phase of decision making. In the Zimbabwe case study the three models can be observed as being different aspects leading to two different decisions. In both the decision to offer and the decision to decline all three models had important roles.

The 'Rational Actor' prevailed over 'Bureaucratic Process' and 'Political Concerns' in decisions regarding the initial offer and the final rejection in the Zimbabwe case study. It is clear, however, that aspects of the other two models contributed to shape and modify the decisions that were reached and the strategy that implemented them. Although several traditional dynamics in the form of Congressional action and contractor/lobby efforts were not significant in this specific case, it is easy to understand their importance in light of some of the footnotes to the South Africa example.

It is also significant to note that the initial thesis of this study was that the Zimbabwe case study clearly represented an irrational policy and a bureaucratic process out of control. At very best, it appeared on the surface that the U S policy suffered from a one size fits all approach.

It is encouraging to report that upon investigation the facts did not support this thesis and by sharp contrast, outlined an enlightened policy followed by a shrewdly crafted strategy that tried to make the best of a "damned if you do - damned if don't" scenario. In the final analysis, (although Zimbabwe won, only by not losing) this Sub-Saharan case study appears to be one of the few that exemplifies a supportable policy, a working interagency process and produces a win-win product that is so often sought by policy makers and implementers

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<sup>1</sup> NOTE Valuable background and detailed information for this case study was provided by interviews conducted with several individuals. They include

- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (DOD-ISA)  
Teresa Whelen, Chief Africa Desk. Interviewed by author. Notes 10 Dec 1996
- Defense Security Assistance Agency, Middle East/Africa/Americas Division  
Ann Smoot, Africa Branch. Interviewed by author. Notes 11 Dec 1996
- Secretary of the Air Force, Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs (SAF-IA), Mideast/Africa Division  
Major Rob Wilson, Project Officer, C-130 EDA Transfers. Interviewed by author. Notes 9 Dec 1996
- American Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe  
Lieutenant Colonel Grant Hayes, Defense Attache. Interviewed by author. Notes July 1995  
Major Andy George, Assistant Defense Attache. Interviewed by author. Notes 2 Dec 1996
- U S Congressional Staff  
Mr. Phil Christensen, Deputy Staff Director African Affairs Subcommittee. Interviewed by author. Notes 12 Dec 1996
- Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, International Marketing Division  
Mr. Dick Stearns. Interviewed by author. Notes 9 Dec 1996
- Zimbabwe Air Force  
Air Vice Marshall (AVM) Harvey, Director of Operations. Interviewed by author. Notes July, 1995

While not everyone agreed on the fine points, it is notable that all major facts were corroborated in the different interviews. Where minor conflicts arose, they are outlined in the study or were satisfactorily resolved in subsequent follow-up questions. All participants were extremely knowledgeable and helpful. It was also clear that the interagency process had worked well in this case both by the consistency of the information from different agencies and also the consensus/interaction between them.

<sup>2</sup> Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis. Harper-Collins 1971

<sup>3</sup> Wilson interview

<sup>4</sup> Wilson interview

<sup>5</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. The Management of Security Assistance. 3rd Edition. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. 1982. p. 2-18 thru 2-19

<sup>6</sup> Whelen interview

<sup>7</sup> George interview

<sup>8</sup> Whelen & Smoot interviews

<sup>9</sup> George, Harvey & Hayes interviews. Authors personal observations

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- 10 George & Whelen interviews
  - 11 George & Whelen interviews
  - 12 Whelen interview
  - 13 Whelen interview.
  - 14 George, Smoot & Whelen interviews
  - 15 Christensen & Whelen interviews
  - 16 Whelen interview
  - 17 Smoot & Whelen interview
  - 18 George, Smoot & Whelen interviews
  - 19 Wilson interview
  - 20 Wilson interview
  - 21 Wilson interview
  - 22 Smoot & Whelen interviews
  - 23 George, Smoot, Whelen & Wilson interviews
  - 24 George & Whelen interviews
  - 25 George interview
  - 26 George, Harvey & Hayes interviews
  - 27 Stearns interview.
  - 28 Smoot & Whelen interviews
  - 29 George, Smoot, Whelen & Wilson interviews
  - 30 George interview
  - 31 George interview
  - 32 George & Whelen interview
  - 33 Christensen, Smoot, Whelen & Wilson interviews
  - 34 Christensen & Whelen interviews
  - 35 Christensen & Whelen interviews
  - 36 Stearns, Whelen & Wilson interviews.
  - 37 Stearns interview
  - 38 Smoot, Stearns & Whelen interviews
  - 39 George, Smoot, Whelen & Wilson interviews
  - 40 George interview