Skipping the Interagency Process Can Mean Courting Disaster: The Case of Desert One

Abstract

The April 1980 attempted rescue of Americans held hostage in Iran suffered from many shortcomings. The focus of this paper is not the actual April 11th decision to go ahead with the mission, but rather the earlier decision to maximize security by "keeping to an absolute minimum the number of people who knew about the mission," thus fatefully minimizing interagency and intra-agency coordination. While it is impossible to say that better coordination and consultation would have overcome all the shortcomings and problems the mission encountered, it is possible to posit that such coordination would have helped, and with only minimal added risk to the much-sought secrecy. This case demonstrates that however contentious, clumsy, and sometimes time-consuming, the interagency process (one more example of America's affinity for checks and balances) produces more well-rounded decisions than do maverick, off-the-cuff, ad-hoc arrangements

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1999
Accession Number
ADA443843

Entities

People

  • Jane M. Floyd

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Arms Control
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Covert Operations
  • Disasters
  • Information Operations
  • National Security
  • New York
  • Rules Of Engagement
  • Security
  • Students
  • Task Forces
  • Universities
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Strategic Security Studies