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Small World Missions:
The Impact of Military Operations Other than War
on Combat Readiness

by

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
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Preface

In December 1990 I joined Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) Forty, which four months earlier had deployed to Jubail Ali, Saudi Arabia to participate in Operation Desert Shield. For the first time since Vietnam, the Seabees were executing their primary mission: combat service support engineering and construction for the United States Marine Corps, in this case the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Before and during the Gulf War, NMCB Forty and other Seabee battalions built base camps, maintained supply routes, constructed airfields and drilled wells for the Marines and other coalition forces.

After returning from Saudi Arabia in March 1991, we went through a typical homeport training cycle, followed by a routine European deployment. While the main body of the battalion deployed to Rota, Spain, I was the OIC of a 75-man detail at NAS Sigonella, Sicily. During that deployment, we did what Seabees had done on most deployments throughout the interim between Vietnam and the Gulf War. My Seabees lived in the barracks and worked on improving and expanding the facilities on the base. We built a concrete hardstand, erected a couple of small masonry structures, and constructed an addition to a Marine Rapid Reaction Force facility, among other projects. About half of the det also participated in a three-week exercise in Norway, Teamwork 92, where we again did base camp construction and other engineering tasks for the Marine Corps.



After another homeport training cycle, my final deployment with NMCB Forty was scheduled to be another routine rotation, this time to Guam. At the last moment, however, we were diverted to Somalia due to President Bush's decision to intercede in the humanitarian crisis in that failed state. For those of us who had been in Saudi, living and working in Somalia was familiar. Once again we lived in tents, and our primary mission was base camp construction for the Marines and other coalition forces. We also rehabilitated the Mogadishu airport, improved and maintained the relief supply routes, and drilled wells.

Since Somalia, the U.S. military has been involved in many more "military operations other than war"(MOOTW). One of the criticisms leveled against this trend has been that it detracts from the military's primary mission: to fight and win "traditional" wars.

A detrimental effect on readiness is often a presumption made by both proponents and opponents of MOOTW. Based on my experiences, that presumption demands a thorough examination.

Introduction - It's a Small World, After the Fall

"War is the continuation of political intercourse with the intermixing of other means."⁴

- Karl von Clausewitz

"War may be, among many other things, the perpetuation of a culture by its own means."²

- John Keegan

Clausewitz coined his oft-repeated maxim to make the case that political objectives should shape and govern the use of military force. Keegan's riposte argues that, rather than arising from a rational calculation of political ends and the force needed to achieve them, war instead is controlled by the inexorable and omnipresent pressure of cultural forces. Upon reflection, however, it is possible to reconcile the two concepts. The cultural zeitgeist invariably determines the ends of politics, and society's mores likewise shape and constrain the ways and means, including those of the military, used to achieve political objectives. Without contradicting Clausewitz, Keegan simply places war and politics within the cultural bounds that determine their character, conduct and purpose.

During the past decade, the end of the Cold War and the waxing information revolution appear to have set in motion a tectonic³ cultural movement, both imperceptible and vast, that is changing both the way in which the military is used and the ends it is called upon to pursue. The essence of that

cultural movement is a consensus among policymaking elites in the United States and like-minded nations that national power (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) should be used to promote international stability and reshape other nations and cultures as open, pluralistic, market-oriented democracies. This conviction, characterized by the current Democratic Administration as a strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" was first captured in U.S. National Security Strategy in 1993, and it is largely shared by our allies and the United Nations Secretariat. In turn, this strategy of engagement and enlargement has spawned increasing involvement by the U.S. and its allies in "military operations other than war." This trend is likely to continue, making it imperative that the U.S. military plan for these operations and understand their impact on combat readiness.

If there truly is a broad cultural movement underway, its sources are not difficult to identify. In a nutshell, growing economic interdependence and technological progress have changed the calculus of war. Popular attitudes towards warfare have become less romantic due to the devastation wrought by two world wars and the tremendous destructive potential of modern weapons. Simultaneously, economic interdependence and the apocalyptic power of nuclear weapons have eliminated the marginal utility of war between world or regional powers by ensuring that conquest will cost the victor as much, if not more, than the vanquished. Since the early Cold War, offensive war has been unthinkable to even the staunchest ideologues. Most important of all, since the fall of the

Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Union, the divided world of the Cold War has been replaced by the Small World of the information age.

In the Small World, everything is connected to everything else by a proliferating web of information and decision networks. It is increasingly difficult to quarantine a crisis because information and even action are no longer constrained by distance. Both a plea for help and a computer virus can be sent worldwide instantaneously. In such a world, geography no longer is the most pertinent aspect of a strategic defense. The effects of virtually any action can reverberate throughout the world almost instantaneously. Thus, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in such a world "The spread of our values makes us safer."⁴ To traditionalists, such a statement may seem nothing more than routine idealistic rhetoric. On the contrary, it is a realistic reaction to a world in which, given the impossibility of global physical control, only the nurturing of compatible values can forestall disruptive or hostile actions. Because of the cultural transformation engendered by international interdependence, protecting national security is increasingly defined in terms of respecting and expanding international norms and institutions, and preserving both intra-state and inter-state stability. Western⁵ nations, including the United States, use the military primarily to enforce and preserve the global status quo of relatively free markets and widespread democratic governance - in short, liberal values.

Although political leaders still speak in general of the national interest, the purpose and conduct of specific military operations are usually ideological and multilateral. While the world's industrialized democracies will still *defend* their national interests, as they did in the Gulf War, they now eschew the use of the military to *advance* national interests; to do so would be inconsistent with the culture. Rather, they seek to preserve the liberal values that have come to dominate the prosperous portion of the globe. National security strategy now focuses on the defense, and occasional expansion, of liberal values, which are increasingly synonymous with the national interest. The distinction between interests and ideals is blurring because western security and prosperity is founded on shared values and institutional norms, ranging from the Atlantic Charter to the World Trade Organization. The need to protect and enforce these norms has resulted in the use of the military in numerous operations other than war -- peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics and disaster relief missions.* These missions are the sine qua non of engagement and enlargement, and may be inescapable in the Small World. Along with the economic, diplomatic and informational tools of statecraft, it is likely that military capabilities will continue to be frequently employed in these non-combat missions.

This trend may accelerate as the world becomes more interconnected and interdependent, despite the fact that the limited objectives of these missions are

* The defense of liberal values can also result in war The stillborn Kosovo peace agreement led to Operation Allied Force

often politically problematic to decision-makers, and receive lukewarm public support. It is less a movement of popular ideals than a shift in cultural realities that requires the world's liberal nations to attempt to enforce international norms. In the Small World of the third millennium, western security cannot be vouchsafed solely by oceans, defended borders, or traditional military deterrence. Creating a benign hegemony of liberal democratic values, both at home and abroad, will be essential to national security.

While the public's visceral reaction is to reject the foreign entanglements this will inevitably require, self-interest demands aggressive and unapologetic U.S. engagement. Complex and interdependent systems, such as the human body, the world wide web, or the international political-economic system, are susceptible to the rapid spread of infection. For all three, viral protection is more effective than treatment. In the case of the international system, protection requires that the body politic not become infected with values and actions contrary to those which have permitted the western world to achieve levels of wealth and health unprecedented in human history. Therefore, all threats, whether springing from natural disaster, ethnic conflict or political strife, must be preempted with the appropriate prophylactics, which often will include military capabilities and sometimes military force.

In an economically and informationally interconnected world, no crisis is truly remote. The global village that Marshal McLuhan accurately predicted over 30 years ago continues to expand its boundaries, and cannot countenance

lawlessness within them. While the instantaneous access to information is the most obvious aspect of the global village, its true impact is due to the fact that each event in the world is now related to all others. Like it or not, this phenomenon has transformed our culture and created a "totally new psychic outlook"⁶ that makes it impossible to remain totally uninvolved in even the most remote crisis. As McLuhan understood, knowledge and visibility are already a form of involvement.

In this cultural environment, the U.S. military is often tasked with missions that have little or nothing to do with its traditional and primary skill, the management of violence, but rather employ subsidiary skills: engineering, medical, transportation, etc. Furthermore, the military's functional imperative, its role, may be changing: from protecting *national* security to preserving *international* stability and enforcing international norms. The former role has not disappeared; rather the latter has subsumed it. If this analysis is correct, a pressing question is posed to the military profession: as currently composed, can the military be effective at military operations other than war (MOOTW), as well as traditional combat operations?

An accurate and objective answer to this question may determine not only the effectiveness of the military, but also the ability of western culture to perpetuate itself. If western militaries cannot be effective at both traditional

combat missions and at MOOTW, then political leaders will be faced with a menu of unsavory choices:

- Restructure the military to one designed primarily for MOOTW, and therefore risk defeat on a military battlefield.
- Maintain a traditional military and largely abandon efforts to enforce international norms through military means, thus risking long-term cultural defeat.
- Attempt to create two distinct sets of forces, an option that is likely to be cost prohibitive.

Conversely, should we conclude that the military can perform MOOTW with only minor modifications and/or additions to its force structure, then the U.S. and its allies will have a potent means at their disposal to pursue the political objectives that will protect and expand liberal values.

Various commentators on military affairs have suggested that involvement in humanitarian and peace operations degrade the effectiveness of all military units. For instance, Charles Dunlap predicts: "Preoccupation with humanitarian missions (will leave) the military unfit to engage an authentic military opponent. Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spent performing a nontraditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military exercises."⁷ Military commentator Harry Summers has likewise criticized the

"operations other than war fad" as deleterious to military professionalism⁸, and is fond of former Secretary of Defense William Perry's November 1994 statement that "we field an Army, not a Salvation Army."⁹ On a more visceral level, there is the reaction of the Heritage Foundation's Andrew Cowin¹⁰: "When these guys sign up, they take an oath to defend and protect the Constitution, not to feed starving people in Somalia." Are military exercises the best and only way to train? Are the tasks associated with MOOTW more appropriate for the Salvation Army than the U.S. Army? Is defending the nation incompatible with saving the starving? To determine the veracity of these assumptions requires a detailed study of the specific military units involved in MOOTW and the tasks they are assigned.

Analysis of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia can shed light on whether the combat readiness of the individual units deployed to that operation suffered as a result and, if so, what steps could be taken to minimize such damage in the future. This analysis will be limited to Restore Hope (9 December 1992 through 4 May 1993), rather than the preceding and succeeding missions, Provide Relief and USFORSOM, respectively. The scope of Operation Provide Relief was limited largely to airlift and included few ground troops. USFORSOM, a component of UNOSOM II, became a peacemaking mission and thus took on the characteristics of a more "traditional" military operation, as the UN attempted to apprehend General Mohamed Farah Aideed, and his irregular forces responded by waging

war against the UN forces. The critical difference between Restore Hope and UNOSOM II was that the security and peacekeeping functions of the former (patrolling, mine clearance, heavy weapons confiscation), became indistinguishable from normal combat operations during the latter.¹¹

Operation Restore Hope was the prototypical MOOTW. It was primarily a peacekeeping and humanitarian operation, two of the most frequent types of non-combat missions for which the military is utilized. Even though there was no official peace treaty or cease-fire to enforce, Ambassador Robert Oakley's efforts to gain the acquiescence of the various Somali factions to UN intervention during Restore Hope limited the "peacemaking" (also known as peace enforcement) role of the military. Although the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking can be vague, peacemaking is war by another name, reminiscent of the low intensity conflicts of the Cold War, and should not be considered a species of MOOTW. While peacekeeping can transition to peacemaking, and vice-versa, it is important to maintain a distinction as we examine the impact of various military operations on combat readiness. The distinction could be summarized as follows. in MOOTW, of which peacekeeping is one manifestation, combat is the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, Restore Hope and IFOR in Bosnia were peacekeeping missions; UNOSOM II and Allied Force in Serbia peacemaking.¹²

Case Study - Operation Restore Hope

In April 1992 United Nations Security Council Resolution #751 created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to stem the growing humanitarian disaster in that failed state. The mission of UNOSOM I was to monitor a cease-fire in Mogadishu negotiated six weeks earlier and support a ninety-day action plan for providing humanitarian assistance. However, a token ground force of Pakistanis in Mogadishu combined with an airlift effort undertaken primarily by the United States (Operation Provide Relief) proved inadequate.

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali and President George Bush, flush with victory in the Gulf War, determined that the world community in general and the United States in particular possessed both the means and the responsibility to prevent further starvation and death¹³ After the security situation, and therefore the relief efforts, deteriorated throughout the fall of 1992, United Nations Security Resolution #794 was approved on 3 December 1992, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".¹⁴ Under the terms of the resolution the U.S. would lead a multinational coalition, the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF), to achieve that goal. The next day President Bush announced to the American people the initiation of Operation Restore Hope. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger justified U.S.

intervention on the grounds that Somalia constituted a tragedy of "massive proportions" and the U.S. "could do something" about it."¹⁵ Within the week U.S. military units were deploying to Somalia to participate in Restore Hope.

Eventually UNITAF included over 38,000 troops from 21 nations, including 28,000 U.S. personnel deployed to Somalia under the command of LTG Robert Johnson, reporting to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).¹⁶ All four services, as well as the supporting joint commands, made a significant contribution to Restore Hope. Therefore, it provides an excellent opportunity to analyze the readiness impact of MOOTW on a wide-range of units.

The following analysis proceeds by service, followed by conclusions that relate to both the services individually and to the various functions performed by one or more services.

Air Force - the best exercise anyone ever didn't plan

For the Air Force, Somalia was an exercise; a particularly challenging and educational exercise. General Fogleman, then commander of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) stated that Restore Hope was "the first time our air mobility forces (were) engaged in a major *exercise* in their post-Cold War configuration" (italics added). He went on to call it "the most significant airlift/air mobility operation the command has executed", proving the Air Mobility Command's "global reach "¹⁷

Airlift was the USAF's contribution to Restore Hope (later, during UNOSOM II, AC-130 gunships were deployed). While supporting this humanitarian mission, AMC learned many valuable lessons that improved its ability to support U.S. forces in a traditional conflict. It is unlikely that the "orthodox exercises" preferred by Colonel Dunlap would provide the unexpected surprises and daunting challenges of Restore Hope. For instance, the 50th Airlift Squadron out of Little Rock Arkansas sortied eight C-130s to Kenya on 36 hours notice; nine hours after the planes landed in Kenya their first aid flights to Somalia were underway.¹⁸ "Fog and friction" predominated throughout Restore Hope, just as in war or other human activities that require extemporaneous decisions and actions. Recreating the random challenges of this environment in a training exercise is almost impossible, due to the need to both plan the exercise in advance and control its performance.

AMC was faced with the requirement to surge over 75,000 short tons of cargo and equipment into an extremely austere theater of operations, with few staging bases available in the immediate vicinity. The airlifters responded superbly. AMC introduced an entirely new concept of operations that ensured that both aircrews and air refueling aircraft were utilized to their full potential.¹⁹ A tanker bridge across the Atlantic and North Africa eliminated the need for refueling stops and crew rest layovers en route, and also reduced maintenance requirements on the Air Force's limited supply of C-5 and C-141 airframes.²⁰ Faced with the severely constrained capacity of Mogadishu International Airport

(MIA), ground controllers met the challenge by precisely scheduling the arrival and departure of each aircraft, not only at MIA but at the staging bases near Cairo and Addis Ababa.²¹

Restore Hope also provided AMC an opportunity to prove the feasibility of a concept first used during Desert Shield - the use of KC-10 tankers as airlifters. This innovation could prove important during the surge phase of a traditional military operation. In addition, Restore Hope allowed AMC to test the effectiveness of its integration of reserve units and its interoperability with numerous coalition partners. Perhaps most importantly, the operation highlighted the need for the Air Force to possess better infrastructure intelligence on all the world's airfields, many of which are ill suited for a large military operation. This realization has led to the development of lay-down packages for most of the world's key airfields.²²

In summary, Restore Hope was better than any exercise AMC could have devised, and it served a purpose. Nevertheless, Restore Hope also had adverse consequences for AMC and the USAF, although they are harder to quantify than the benefits. Contrary to most conventional wisdom, it is relatively easy to find training and readiness benefits to MOOTW. The negative consequences tend to relate to wear and tear on personnel and equipment. For instance, Restore Hope increased operational tempo for the Air Force and AMC significantly. The cumulative impact of Restore Hope and other missions required AMC to defer depot maintenance of the strategic airlift fleet²³, and reduced airlift availability for

planned training exercises.²⁴ In order to perform the mission, safety regulations were relaxed. Crew duty days were increased and the number of hours an aircrew could fly in a 30-day period was raised from 125 to 150, and eventually to 165 hours. During Restore Hope the reliability rate for scheduled departures fell well below standards, to around 80%, and the availability of spare parts declined. Should the U.S. have been suddenly confronted with a crisis elsewhere in the world that required a large airlift, it would have found its men, women and machines exhausted. Although that did not occur, the increased optempo during Restore Hope and subsequent operations may be contributing to the services' retention and recruiting problems.

Nevertheless, the readiness and expertise of the military's airlift forces was actually improved by Restore Hope. The concepts that were tested under strenuous conditions and the lessons learned improved the capability of the Air Force and AMC to support a traditional military operation with surge and sustainment airlift.

Army – Triggerpullers versus “Beans and Blankets”

More so than for the other services, the consequences of Restore Hope for the Army are complicated and ambiguous, and perhaps instructive in the debate over whether the U.S. needs peacekeeping troops that are distinct from its combat troops.

The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) bore the brunt of the American commitment to humanitarian relief in Somalia. Most of the Division's personnel deployed to Somalia at one time or another during 1993. At first blush, committing a top-flight combat infantry division to such an undertaking is a dubious and potentially dangerous enterprise. A comparison of the brigade mission statements with the missions actually assigned to the task forces from those brigades seems to prove the critics' point that the military's combat readiness could be frittered away in such operations. The mission of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, 10 MD (LI) is:

"To maintain a light infantry brigade manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea or land anywhere in the world, *prepared to fight upon arrival and win.*"²⁵ (Italics added)

Conversely, in Somalia, the mission of Task Force 3-14, drawn from the 2nd Brigade, was:

"To conduct tactical security operations to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian relief assistance within the area of operations; establish coalition force presence; and establish secure lines of communications."²⁶

While the rules of engagement allowed Task Force 3-14 to fight if threatened, doing so was inconsistent with "winning" in terms of the objectives of Restore Hope. Task Force 3-14 was in Somalia to save starving Somalis, not to fight or kill them. Whenever that became necessary, there could be no sense of triumph or accomplishment. Psychologically, this puts combat troops in a no-win position. No matter how brilliantly they perform tactically, the act of "fighting" has become inconsistent with "winning".

Further complicating the mission of the combat troops in Operation Restore Hope was the lack of a military opponent, even an unconventional one. Outside Mogadishu, most of the warlords had accepted the U.S. led intervention, and even within Mogadishu General Aideed was generally quiescent during Restore Hope. With some exceptions, the opposition confronting U.S. combat troops consisted of ragtag brigands and common criminals. For the first time in a generation, front-line U.S. Army troops performed constabulary duties overseas.

For the most part, they performed that mission extraordinarily well. Nevertheless, the infantrymen of the 10th Mountain Division were not honing their combat skills in Somalia. For them, Restore Hope was not an "exercise" that prepared them to do their duty during a traditional war. Likewise, other combat elements of the 10th MD (LI) sacrificed combat proficiency due to Restore Hope. For instance, collective training for the 3-62 Air Defense Artillery was cut short, and its external evaluation canceled. The 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry had

to leave 60% of its equipment in Somalia when it re-deployed to the U S., resulting in a degraded Unit Reporting Status. There were some benefits for combat units, such as the execution of an unscheduled and rapid deployment and improvements in some tactical areas, such as the increased night vision goggle proficiency noted by the Falcon Aviation Brigade.²⁷ Nevertheless, the 10th Mountain Division's scheduled combat training routine was interrupted and Restore Hope did not provide the opportunity to practice many of the mission essential tasks of its combat units.

However, we must examine all of the units below the Brigade level before concluding that the operation impaired the overall combat readiness of the 10th Mountain Division. The lessons become more complicated upon consideration of the numerous combat support and combat service support Battalions in the 10th Mountain Division. For them, Restore Hope was a perfect opportunity to practice their missions in a real-world, real-time scenario.

Table 1 summarizes the applicability of Restore Hope to the missions of those units, and highlights both positive and negative impacts. In general, Restore Hope was an excellent training experience with negative consequences for equipment readiness. Like the airlifters, the combat support units that comprised half of the 10th Mountain troops in Somalia benefited from Restore Hope. The training value of actually doing the job is the same for combat support and logistics units whether delivering "beans and bullets" or "beans and *blankets*".

To take just one example from Table 1, the 710th Maintenance Support Battalion had the opportunity to practice its Mission Essential Task List (METL) under challenging circumstances. The Battalion performed every task from outload and port staging to logistical support to establishing a defensive perimeter. The training benefits were similar for most of the units listed on Table 1. Somewhat ironically, an exception is the military police. Although peacekeeping missions seem a natural fit for these units, the methods they employ to maintain order on a military installation are ill suited for a violent and volatile locale such as Mogadishu. While training can overcome this shortcoming, a more serious concern is the optempo that numerous MOOTW deployments have created for these units. Rather than attempt to train military police to be civilian police, a preferable solution would be to create a pool of civilian police that could be called upon to support military operations other than war.²⁸

As MOOTW and other deployments have become more commonplace, the cumulative impact on personnel tempo for some non-combat units, such as psychological operations and military police, have been severe. However, where negative consequences for non-combat units exist, they do not necessarily indicate a mismatch between wartime missions and MOOTW, but rather a need to resource the services adequately for MOOTW, at the expense of warfighting should the national security strategy and its objectives so demand.

Table 1 - Impact of Restore Hope on Selected Units of the 10th MD (LI) *

Unit	Mission	Participation in Operation Restore Hope	Negative Consequences	Positive Consequences
210 th Forward Support Battalion	Provide the combat service support a brigade Task Force from 10 th MD requires to fight and win	Established logistics bases in six locations to support the 2 nd Brigade Task Force, the Aviation Brigade and UN coalition forces	Transferred inventory to relieving battalion	Executed its mission in a challenging environment. Gained experience working with and supporting coalition forces
710 th Maintenance Support Battalion	Maintain a MSB manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea and land anywhere in the world and prepared upon arrival to provide the supply, maintenance, health services, and transportation support the Division requires to fight and win	Conducted port staging area mission for Division Provided logistics support for Army units in theater. Marshaled Division for rearward movement	Material and personnel shortages (the latter problem existed prior to the operation)	An opportunity to perform <i>every</i> aspect of the battalion's mission statement
E Company-25 th Aviation Regiment	Maintain a Light Infantry Division Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Company trained and ready to deploy by land, sea and air anywhere in the world on short notice. Upon arrival, provide aviation intermediate maintenance support to the Division	Provided aviation intermediate maintenance support to the aviation task force in Somalia	Required to leave behind key pieces of equipment for incoming units	Performed mission in an austere environment similar to what might be expected in a war zone Created "a realistic and aggressive high operating tempo training program"

* Excerpted from Fiscal Year 1993 10th Mountain Division (LI) Annual Historical Review

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 10 th Mountain Division Artillery	Provide command, control and administrative supervision of organic and attached field artillery units. Provide unit administrative and logistical support for the Division Artillery staff section and elements.	Served as the Joint Task Force headquarters, providing command and control to subordinate UN forces.	None noted.	Experience operating with in both a joint and coalition environment.
10 th Military Police Battalion	Liaison with all law enforcement agencies within the area of jurisdiction and maintain order and military discipline in the installation by controlling traffic, conducting investigations and directing active physical security and crime prevention programs.	Deployed. Attempted to train indigenous Somali police force.	Contributed to extremely high optempo, especially following earlier deployment to Florida for Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations.	
41 st Engineer Battalion	Deploy rapidly by air, sea and land anywhere in the world, and, upon arrival, provide mobility, survivability and countermobility support the division requires to fight and win.	The Headquarters element and two companies deployed to Somalia and were tasked with opening supply routes.	Unable to conduct battalion-wide training due to split between Somalia and Fort Drum.	Practiced wartime mission: built two Bailey bridges that were the longest constructed outside the U.S. since Vietnam. Also conducted minesweeping and clearing, reconnaissance, field fortification construction and base support.
110 th Military Intelligence Battalion	To deploy rapidly by air, sea or land to anywhere in the world, and, upon arrival, provide the intelligence and electronic warfare support the Division needs to fight and win.	Selected personnel (analysts, linguists, technicians, counterintelligence teams and ground surveillance teams) deployed and provided intelligence, surveillance and security support through the Long-Range Surveillance Detachment.	Due to Restore Hope and other factors, the number of personnel in the Technical Control and Analysis Element fell short.	Restore Hope was "instrumental in enabling the battalion to hone technical intelligence operations planning and deployment skills and provided battalion personnel with invaluable experience in conducting intelligence and support operations."

As noted earlier, a positive aspect of Restore Hope for the 10th Mountain Division was the experience of deploying. Many of the mission statements included in Table 1 begin with the requirement to deploy by air, sea and land anywhere in the world. Missions like Restore Hope give units the opportunity to do just that. In the words of one battalion Commanding Officer: "A unit's ability to rapidly react to deployment instructions is a true measurement of the unit's readiness. MOOTW deployments have provided and will continue to provide units with real world training opportunities thus increasing unit readiness."²⁹ Restore Hope and other humanitarian operations have vastly increased the Army's experience with unexpected, large-scale deployments. This has undoubtedly improved its readiness to respond anytime, anywhere to "fight and win".

Table 1 also indicates many of the negative consequences of MOOTW, aside from making it difficult for infantrymen to practice their combat skills. Restore Hope split the Division and its units between the U.S. and Somalia, and then throughout southern Somalia, making it impossible for Brigades or even Battalions to train and operate together. Equipment tables of allowance were also divided, and equipment condition and readiness degraded.

Upon close examination, the impact of a military operation other than war on the combat readiness of an Army infantry division is somewhat ambiguous. As a whole, the 10th Mountain Division's readiness was to some extent degraded

by Restore Hope, yet significant portions of its support elements benefited from the experience. This is particularly significant because in many operations other than war logistical support is the mission assigned the military.

The Marines – America's warriors, America's 911 force, or both?

The dichotomous nature of the Marine's participation in Restore Hope was evident from the operation's first comical moments, as a Marine Expeditionary Unit executed a nighttime amphibious landing, and was illuminated on the beach by media floodlights and bombarded by flashbulbs. That first night, and much of what followed, often seemed inappropriate for America's leanest, meanest warriors. Yet, the strategic concept of the Marine Corps envisions a force that maintains a high state of combat readiness, while simultaneously being prepared to execute operations other than war: "America's 911 force", as the slogan says.

Furthermore, MOOTW is not a mission that the Marines have assumed only since the Soviet threat disappeared. The Marine Corps Strategic Concept of 1952³⁰ envisioned:

"A versatile, expeditionary force in readiness . . ." and "A balanced Force for a Naval Campaign and a Ground and Air Striking Force . . . Always at a high state of combat readiness . . ." but also "Ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of war . . ."

Throughout the Cold war the Marine Corps was called upon to keep the peace through the restrained use of force – from Beirut in 1958 to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to Los Angeles in 1992. Since long before the term “MOOTW” was coined, the Marines have been a lethal combat force that is often called upon to “suppress or contain international disturbances” without resorting to combat. In many ways the history of the Marines Corps belies the argument that combat troops cannot maintain their edge while being used as an instrument of coercive diplomacy or temporarily acting as a constabulary force. The Marine Corps grunt has always been expected to exhibit both fierceness and restraint in varying proportion, depending upon the mission. In many respects, Restore Hope was a prototypical mission, as one Marine concluded when he wrote, “The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit experienced the unique opportunity to implement many of the missions it had trained for in the real world.”³¹

Nevertheless, the duality embraced by the Marines Corps Strategic Concept can be arduous and often frustrating. A description of a Marine 81mm mortar platoon’s experiences in Mogadishu concluded that, “In ‘Operations Other Than War’ units are often assigned tasks that bear little resemblance to their normal duties”³² Despite the Marine Corps’ long experience with peacekeeping, these operations can still burden some units with missions for which they have little training, and make it impossible to maintain proficiency in their primary mission. For instance, the mortar platoon of Battalion Landing Team 2/9 spent

the last weeks of 1991 patrolling, along with a reconnaissance platoon, the "Green Line" in Mogadishu and providing security for the port area, an environment inappropriate for the use of indirect fire weapons.

Yet most aspects of Restore Hope were not unfamiliar to Marine combat units nor detrimental to their readiness. Though unopposed except by the media, the amphibious landing and the subsequent seizure of key objectives in Mogadishu was training more realistic than an "urban warrior" exercise. Subsequent to the landing, the 24th MEU carried out many of the missions it must accomplish during training to become special operations capable, such as security, reinforcement, show of force, tactical deception, military operations in urban terrain, and reconnaissance and surveillance operations.³³

Tasked with the seizure of weapons caches, the Marines employed cordon and search operations similar to those used in Vietnam.³⁴ These complex operations, which require precise coordination of air and ground units, were conducted in an austere environment where the unexpected was routine. The cordon and search operations that the 24th MEU (SOC) and other units conducted in Somalia were identical, except for the rules of engagement, to combat operations and undoubtedly improved unit readiness.

As with the Army and Air Force, Restore Hope provided Marine Corps logistical units the opportunity to practice their mission in a real-world environment, including all of the unexpected and additional demands that often entails. For instance, Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 not only supported the

Marine Air Combat Element (ACE) at four widely-dispersed locations, but provided essential logistical support to all U.S. Army forces at Baledogle, and established an airfield fuel dispensing system for coalition forces at Kismayu.³⁵ MWSS 372 was taxed to the limit with combat service support missions beyond its charter to support the Marine ACE at one primary location - excellent preparation for the unexpected demands that the friction of warfare often imposes.

As the *Marine Corps Gazette* noted in November 1993, "much of what the United Task Force (sic) accomplished was the result of hard work by the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) . An FSSG's organization and logistics support capabilities are well-suited to form the foundation upon which humanitarian interventions like Somalia can be built." In other words, the 1st FSSG did its mission and did it well. For combat service support units, MOOTW is less dangerous than war but more realistic and demanding than training. As Restore Hope transitioned to UNITAF II, Brigadier General Hopgood, commander of the 1st Force Service Support Group in Somalia, called for lessons learned from his officers. The result was over 50 articles³⁶ containing lessons applicable to both humanitarian and combat missions. While MOOTW may increase optempo for support units, it improves, rather than degrades their expertise and readiness

For the Marine Corps itself, MOOTW is another opportunity to demonstrate the flexibility that is its trademark. In the words of Lance Corporal

Billy Shaver of Waxhaw, N.C., quoted³⁷ while on patrol in Hoddur, Somalia: "If this is what the Marine Corps will be doing in the future, I still want to be a part of it. The Marine Corps will do whatever it is asked to do the world changes day to day. Tomorrow, something may happen in the Middle East and we'll have to go there."

Navy – The Seabees "Can Do", so why don't they?

There are also units and personnel that sacrifice neither optempo nor training when called upon to participate in MOOTW. Resistance to utilizing some forces centers on neither concerns over strategy nor readiness, but the arcana of budgetary policy. The Naval Mobile Construction Battalions are an example.

The U.S. Navy was not only present off the coast of Somalia, but on the ground as well. Two NMCBs and a regimental staff, over 1000 Seabees, participated in Restore Hope. As alluded to in the preface, assigned tasks were almost identical to those performed in Saudi Arabia before and during the Gulf War: base camp construction, airfield improvements, well drilling and road maintenance. Somalia was a more challenging construction environment, due to the lack of materials or native industry.

In both cases, the Seabees had to apply their doctrine of self-defense while accomplishing the task at hand, i.e. practice the slogan "we build, we fight". The threat differed between the two deployments. In Saudi Arabia work

was often slowed by the need to don MOPP gear and/or take cover in air raid shelters, while in Somalia the construction crews had to be vigilant against attacks by bandits and militia forces. The experiences gained from both deployments made the battalions and the Seabees in them more capable and better prepared.

In neither case was optempo affected, because all of the battalions that went to both Saudi and Somalia maintained the routine cycle of seven months in homeport, and seven months deployed. Those seven-month deployments are intended to train Seabees for their combat service support mission. However, the contrast between the Somalia deployment and a routine Seabee deployment provides an example of how a MOOTW can actually enhance training and readiness.

A routine Seabee deployment possesses the shortcomings often attributed to military participation in humanitarian missions – it does not permit Seabees to practice the skills that will be expected of them in wartime. Seabees are not skilled at “finished” construction, the attractive, climate controlled facilities to which the developed world is accustomed. However, during a routine deployment, the Seabees are tasked with these types of projects because base commanders do not have to pay for military labor, as they must when work is performed by contract. This is a false economy to the nation. First, it is not the type of construction that trains Seabees to do their mission. Second, it is an inefficient use of resources, since Seabees are not particularly good at masonry,

or ductwork, or fire suppression systems, or the myriad other specialties required in modern facilities. Third and foremost, the opportunity cost is tremendous.

Seabees exist to do rough construction in austere environments – a combat service support mission at which they have excelled in Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. A mission perfectly suited to the humanitarian needs of the underdeveloped world. Yet Seabees are seldom used to "engage and enlarge" because their value to the *Navy*, which resources them, is as free labor to accomplish minor construction on its installations. Only during exercises, such as Teamwork, that are occasionally included in a routine deployment do Seabees practice their wartime construction skills. The value to *the nation* would be greater if the Seabees were used to support the national security strategy in military operations other than war. Not only would this further our national objectives, but it would better prepare Seabees for their wartime mission.

It is unlikely that the Seabees are unique. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units gained invaluable experience in Somalia that cannot be replicated in a training environment. Most complicated but most intriguing of all are the medical personnel of the Navy, Air Force and Army. Experience in an austere, low-intensity conflict such as Somalia provided the best possible training to uniformed medical personnel. In a country with no indigenous medical facilities, U.S. medical personnel had to deal with deadly and exotic diseases.³⁸ Yet, in this case valuable training can create a tidal wave of negative repercussions, since military hospitals and clinics rely upon their uniformed staff to provide routine

medical care. The lesson is that the military has become accustomed to using many of its logistical and support personnel to maintain itself, rather than emphasizing their combat service support mission. Due to personnel and budgetary policy, these forces and personnel not only cannot be spared for MOOTW, but are less ready than they could or should be for operations that are war.

Conversely, the seagoing portion of the Navy, the warfighters, are largely unaffected by MOOTW. That is because the Navy engages in MOOTW constantly, and has for over 50 years, ever since the decision was made after World War II to forward deploy U.S. naval forces. Forward presence is itself a military operation other than war that, by its nature, enhances combat readiness while simultaneously serving the National Security Strategy. And just as with specific operations other than war, such as Restore Hope, the down side of forward presence is high optempo and high cost.

At various times during Restore Hope, the Navy contributed an Amphibious Ready Group, a Carrier Battle Group and a destroyer squadron. However, neither training nor operating tempo was significantly nor adversely affected because those forces would have been deployed and operating in remote corners of the world in any case. Restore Hope did provide the opportunity to test the U.S. Navy's interoperability with a wide variety of coalition partners. While optempo remains a concern for the Navy, it is primarily due to

the strategy of maintaining forward presence despite a reduced force structure, and is only slightly exacerbated by MOOTWs.

The only seagoing portion of the Navy that was affected by Restore Hope was the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). As with other logistical units, Restore Hope provided an excellent training opportunity for the MPF. Restore Hope was "a classic MPF operation."³⁹ The day after a special purpose Marine air-ground task force secured the port, the first MPF ship arrived from Diego Garcia. The following day MPF equipment and supplies were issued to fly-in echelon forces.⁴⁰ This is another case in which Restore Hope was a superb exercise.

The movement of the MPF, Seabees and ships to the Horn of Africa obviously eliminated the availability of these forces for other, potentially more vital missions. However, President Bush correctly anticipated that none would occur. Those Navy forces that did participate in Restore Hope became more capable from the experience.

Joint Operations - The proof is in the doing

MOOTW has been a crucible for forging effective joint and coalition operations. Even more than field units, the staff responsible for a MOOTW benefits from the unscripted fog and friction that are difficult to build into a fictitious exercise scenario. As noted in the lessons learned from Somalia,

"planning for peace operations is much the same as planning for combat operations"⁴¹. CENTCOM learned in Somalia that it lacked critical information regarding infrastructure capabilities within its area of responsibility. CENTCOM also discovered the flaws in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), such as the late arrival of "transportation through-putters", soldiers trained to unscramble delays at staging areas and terminals. Perhaps most importantly, Restore Hope gave CENTCOM planners an opportunity to utilize the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and discover its capabilities and limitations.

As with planning, "Intelligence is as vital to the success of a peace operation as it is to any other military activity."⁴² In Somalia, a wide range of intelligence systems, including ground surveillance radars and unmanned aerial vehicles, were employed, some for the first time. Issues regarding hardware compatibility and information access arose, and were often resolved so that future operations will benefit from the coalition experience in Somalia.

Finally, Restore Hope provided CENTCOM the opportunity to test the concept of foreign projection, vice foreign basing, by putting a large U.S.- based force on the ground in a matter of weeks. The lessons from that experience will be applicable to all future military operations.

Conclusion – Adapting to the Small World

*"Peacekeeping isn't a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."
- Dag Hammarskjold*

Is the military trapped by the conundrum succinctly summarized by the former Secretary-General? The goal of the foregoing analysis was to determine whether the combat readiness of the individual units deployed to Operation Restore Hope suffered as a result. Although many metrics have been developed that attempt to objectively measure readiness, conceptually readiness can be defined as the nation's ability to have the right forces in the right place at the right time to fight the right war.⁴³ This ability consists of six elements:

1. Qualified people.
2. Combat capable hardware and technology.
3. Appropriate maintenance and spare parts for the hardware.
4. Tactics that realize the full potential of the people and hardware.
5. Training to ensure forces can conduct operations.
6. The ability to move hardware and people to the fight.⁴⁴

Judged against these criteria, the negative impact of Restore Hope was limited to wear and tear on equipment. With the exception of front-line combat units, Restore Hope actually enhanced the fourth, fifth and sixth elements of readiness for the units that participated. In the case of combat support and combat service support units, Restore Hope was an opportunity to hone tactics and practice mission essential tasks that could not be replicated in a planned exercise. For all the units deployed, it provided an invaluable opportunity to

move hardware and people to a remote and austere location, and learn how to do it better next time.

Mr. Hammaraskjold undoubtedly had the "pointy end of the spear" in mind, as do most commentators who fret over what they consider the inappropriate use of military forces for operations other than war. By reviewing the wide range of units that participated in Restore Hope, we are reminded that the military is not a single blunt instrument capable only of managing the application of violence, but is composed of a multitude of instruments. The units that possess capabilities appropriate to MOOTW more often than not benefit from exercising those capabilities in a MOOTW mission; peacekeeping, it turns out, actually is a job for *some* soldiers. The readiness of combat support units is not sacrificed by participation in a *specific* MOOTW, but it can be degraded by the *cumulative* impact of MOOTW deployments imposed on a force structure designed for combat operations. A 1995 GAO report⁴⁵ confirmed what is common knowledge when it concluded that many units have "experienced increasing operating tempo and decreased time between deployments" because of peacekeeping and reduced force structure.

Therefore, MOOTW creates two core problems for the military:

- How to maintain the combat readiness of the nation's warriors, in particular the Army's Infantry and Armored Divisions, amid occasional MOOTW deployments.*
- How to reduce the high optempo that MOOTW requirements are imposing on certain combat support and combat service support units, such as military police.

Both can be resolved if the military reconciles itself to the likelihood that MOOTW will predominate in the future. If John Keegan is correct that culture determines the ways and means that a nation or group uses to pursue its political objectives, as well as influencing the selection of those objectives, then our national military strategy is unlikely to change with Administrations. The world may have become too interconnected, too small, and our culture too sensitive to outside stimuli, not to be engaged. While it would certainly be Pollyannaish to suggest that the U.S. and its allies no longer require forces that can engage in combat across the spectrum of potential armed conflict, it may be equally unrealistic to believe that the Small World tendency to use the military to help impose or maintain international norms is a fad that will soon pass.

Preventing MOOTW deployments from affecting the readiness of combat troops to "fight and win" can be achieved in one of two ways. The first would be to limit our participation to those units, like the Seabees, that will either benefit

* However, it must be noted that MOOTW can provide intangible benefits to combat troops, such as the camaraderie that comes from facing shared adversity and the leadership and responsibility improvements that

from the experience, or those such as airlift squadrons that, if operational and personnel tempo are properly considered, will gain more than they will lose. The second would be to train and equip some combat units, on either a continuous or rotational basis, for MOOTW.

The first option would require policymakers to limit U.S. involvement in MOOTW to logistical support. Restore Hope and other humanitarian and peacekeeping missions have demonstrated that the logistical capability of the U.S. is unmatched⁴⁶, but that many nations are capable of providing combat troops to perform constabulary or peacekeeping functions. This option would not preclude the presence of U.S. forces "on the ground." In addition to airlift and intelligence, the U.S. could provide engineering, medical, EOD and other assets at the scene. However, this option would require that the U.S. rely upon allied or coalition force protection and, perhaps, accept foreign command of U.S. logistical units. More problematic from a strategic perspective, it relegates the "indispensable nation" to a supporting role. In those cases where the stakes and U.S. interests are low, this approach will suffice. However, when western cultural values are on the line the U.S. will be expected to lead, as was the case in Bosnia.

Leadership of the Small World requires the U.S. to adopt the second option: to train and equip U.S. combat forces for MOOTW. This option would permit U.S. leadership of MOOTW missions, but would reduce the number of

General Zinni saw in the soldiers participating in Restore Hope

combat troops available to fight a traditional war. It also has the disadvantage of being controversial within the military. General Anthony Zinni is emphatic:

"I've heard people say maybe we ought to create some units specially trained to deal with OOTW. Units whose troops are kinder, gentler. That's Bull! The better disciplined the troops, the better they perform. You are going to have Sergeants making big decisions at roadblocks and checkpoints. Good discipline, good troops, good small unit leadership is absolutely necessary."⁴⁷

And Major General Paul Blackwell has stated:

"I think there is great danger if you deviate your training from the established METL tasks during the final preparation phase of a short notice alert and deployment. It is my strong opinion that we have the capability to adapt the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with our METL to accomplish the mission during MOOTW. We can do this because of the intelligence and flexibility of our soldiers and commanders."⁴⁸

Such arguments deprecate the importance of training by suggesting that troops prepared for combat can, due to good judgment, character, and discipline,

adequately perform constabulary duties. It is unlikely that either officer would make the reverse argument, i.e. sheriff deputies could be called upon to fight a war. Furthermore, troops trained for MOOTW should not necessarily be "kinder and gentler". In fact, they can continue to be the same tough troops that fight the nation's wars.

For years the British army has rotated its best combat units between peace operations in Northern Ireland and armored or assault infantry assignments in Europe. Peacekeeping training schools precede the Northern Ireland deployments while traditional combat arms training prepares the units for their NATO assignments.⁴⁹ While the application of this rotational process to the U.S. Army would reduce the number of combat forces available at any one time, it would recognize the inevitability of peacekeeping missions and the unique requirements that peacekeeping, as opposed to combat, places on an infantry or armored unit. Combat troops can be proficient at peacekeeping or maneuver warfare, but not both *simultaneously*⁵⁰ Nevertheless, judgment, character and discipline do provide the foundation that make soldiers ideal for both missions *in sequence*.

Despite dozens of MOOTW deployments over the past decade, the military continues to focus on "fighting and winning" major conflicts when sizing, training and equipping its forces. Yet MOOTW deployments serve important national interests, and in some cases may even prevent major conflict. It is incumbent on the military to be fully trained and capable for these assignments, while

acknowledging that rotational training for MOOTW will decrement the nation's ability to fight one or more major conflicts.

As for the unsustainable optempo that some units have experienced due to MOOTW, there are a myriad of solutions available. Some of the specialties that have been most taxed are military police, airlift crews, engineers, civil affairs and port opening units. The optimal solution may differ for each.⁵¹ As discussed earlier, it may be best to integrate civilian police into peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Often contractors can be used in place of military airlift during MOOTW missions. In the case of engineers and other combat service support units such as EOD, it is likely that the burden could be spread more evenly; Army peacekeepers may have to receive their combat service support from Marine logisticians and Navy Seabees in order to provide relief to overburdened Army units. Finally, for the units that reside mostly in the Guard and Reserve, such as civil affairs and port operations, a migration of combat units to those specialties is required. This is already occurring as the Army National Guard Redesign reorganizes 11 combat brigades as combat support and combat service support units.

Many of these solutions require a modest transfer of funds from warfighting requirements to MOOTW requirements, assuming a stable military budget. This is proper. The Small World demands that we place added emphasis on shaping events so that we are not forced to respond later to a emergency. In the Small World, events run their course too quickly to avoid

engagement until a crisis occurs; infections can spread quickly. All of the tools of statecraft, including the military, therefore must be utilized to preempt threats to liberal values and the international status quo.

In addition to highlighting the need to address the impact of MOOTW on warfighter readiness and the optempo of supporting forces, the preceding analysis of Operation Restore Hope also reveals the tendency of the budget process to emphasize self-perpetuation of the military establishment over the objectives of the national security strategy. The tasks assigned to Seabees during routine deployment are a case in point. Reform of the budget process is beyond the scope of this analysis, and perhaps beyond the scope of human imagination. However, determined leadership can correct some of the counter-productive results created by the budget process. The theater CINCs must ensure the forces available to them are utilized to further national strategy – to engage and enlarge – rather than as a free labor force for the bases where they are stationed.

With the requisite wisdom and leadership, the U.S. military can be used effectively for peacekeeping and other MOOTW missions without significantly reducing combat readiness. Required are the wisdom to discern the cultural imperatives of the Small World, and the leadership to adapt to this new reality. U.S. participation in MOOTW must be considered in force composition, sizing and training; deployment schedules; and operating accounts. More importantly,

military culture must change, from an attitude that eschews operations other than war to one that recognizes them as essential to national security.

¹ This is a more accurate translation of the German than that used in the standard English version of Clausewitz' On War

² John Keegan, A History of Warfare, pg 46

³ Coincidentally, John Lewis Gaddis detects a new "tectonic" geopolitics, which he describes in his April 1999 *Atlantic Monthly* article "Living in Candlestick Park" However, he uses the metaphor toward a different purpose

⁴ As quoted in the Washington Post from a 22 April 1999 speech in which PM Blair proposed an intervention doctrine that makes human rights equal or greater consideration than national sovereignty

⁵ Throughout this essay, "western" is used in its broadest sense, meaning not only Western Europe and its progeny, but countries such as those along the Pacific rim that have assimilated western attitudes and mores Likewise references to liberal or "our" culture are not necessarily limited to peoples or nations with a Judeo-Christian or Enlightenment background Rather, it refers to the post-Westphalian culture that balances state sovereignty with adherence to minimal norms regarding human rights Contrary to Samuel Huntington's thesis in *Clash of Civilizations*, my presumption is that those liberal norms will be violated by members of western society, such as the IRA or the Serbian Army, as well as by the Idi Amins and ayatollahs of the planet

⁶ McLuhan's words

⁷ This is contained amidst the hyperbole explaining the genesis of *The American Military Coup of 2012*

⁸ Colonel Harry G Summers Jr (Ret) The New World Strategy A Military Policy for America's Future, New York Simon and Schuster, 1995 pg 202

⁹ In a 1997 Chester W Nimitz Memorial Lecture in National Security Affairs entitled "The Making of Military Strategy for the Twenty-First Century", Colonel Summers approvingly quotes this sentiment before contrasting it with the subsequent intervention in Bosnia

¹⁰ As quoted by David J Lynch in "When the Mission is Aid", *Air Force Magazine*, February 1993

¹¹ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations Lessons Learned National Defense University Press, Ft McNair Washington, D C 1995 Page 63

¹² Professor Adam Roberts (in "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping") of Oxford University as well as other commentators, has drawn the line between enforcing peace agreements that have the consent of all parties and coercing the acceptance of such agreements However, I find this a bit legalistic As with Restore Hope, sometimes a military force and coordinated diplomatic efforts can create a temporary de facto peace

¹³ A thorough description of the thought process leading to intervention is contained in "Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention", a Pew Case Study in International Affairs by Ken Menkhaus Of primary importance was the Bush Administration's desire to increase UN credibility in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era

¹⁴ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I Samatur also offer a number of insights as to how this tragedy could have been avoided in *Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, The Brookings Institute, 1995

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 33

¹⁶ Kenneth Allard *Somalia Operations Lessons Learned* National Defense University Press, 1995

¹⁷ Air Mobility Command 1993 Command History

¹⁸ David Lynch, 'When the Mission is Aid' *Air Force Magazine*, February 1993

¹⁹ Robert S Dudley, 'Operational Realities' *Air Force Magazine*, February 1993

²⁰ David A Fulghum, 'Restrictions Shape Somalia Airlift' *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 14-21 December 1992

²¹ Air Mobility Command 1993 Command History

²² Ibid

²³ Dudley, pg 138

²⁴ GAO NSIAD 94-128

²⁵ Annual Historical Review 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Fiscal Year 1993

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Ibid

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- ²⁸ The participation of civilian police (Civ-Pol) and or International Police Monitors (IPM) in peace operations is thoroughly discussed in "Policing the New World Order" by Ambassador Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. The success of such operations is highly dependent upon close cooperation between military forces and Civ-Pol within the same command structure, and a transition plan from military patrols to civilian police activities.
- ²⁹ Colonel David Knapp, "Humanitarian Assistance and Readiness" (unpublished ICAF course paper)
- ³⁰ According to the MarineLink webpage
- ³¹ SSgt N H North, "Training Pays Off, the MEU Did It All" *Leatherneck*, August, 1993
- ³² "Patrolling the Green Line" by 1st Lt Andrew R. Milburn appeared in the September 1994 *Marine Corps Gazette*
- ³³ North, pg 34
- ³⁴ Described by Maj. Stephen J. LeBlanc in "Cordon and Search in Somalia" *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1993
- ³⁵ LtCol William D. Johnson, "The Marine Wing Support Squadron: A Success Story in Somalia" *Marine Corps Gazette*, February, 1994
- ³⁶ Many of which were published in the November 1993 edition of *Marine Corps Gazette* in the article "Combat Service Support in Somalia". All of the articles were turned over to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System and the Marine Corps Historical Center.
- ³⁷ In the 31 January 1993 edition of *The State*
- ³⁸ One of the many valuable lessons learned contained in Kenneth Allard's book is the need for medical intelligence, including prevalent diseases, their treatment, and the capabilities of medical facilities throughout a theatre.
- ³⁹ "Combat Service Support in Somalia" *Marine Corps Gazette*, November, 1993
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, pg 79
- ⁴¹ Allard, pg 41
- ⁴² Ibid, pg 74
- ⁴³ This definition is drawn from the CINCPAC staff paper 'Understanding Readiness'
- ⁴⁴ Ibid
- ⁴⁵ GAO/NSIAD-95-51
- ⁴⁶ Key examples are cited in 'Coalition Logistics: A Case Study in Operation Restore Hope', a thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College by Major Lamont Woody, USA. Major Woody notes the superiority of U.S. quality control of sanitation, food, water, fuel and medicine, U.S. lift and cargo handling capability, and U.S. expertise at common item purchase, shipment, storage and issue.
- ⁴⁷ Excerpted from interviews with General Officers Zinni and Blackwell that were conducted early Spring 1994 at Quantico, VA and Ft. Stewart, Ga. for the TRADOC pamphlet series 525-100-XX, Leaders Guide to Operations Other Than War (draft unpublished). The interviewer, COL Gary Knapp, was assigned to Battle Command Battle Laboratory, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid
- ⁴⁹ According to Denis McLean in the article 'Peace Operations and Common Sense', which is contained in Managing Global Chaos, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Hampson, ed. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. 1996.
- ⁵⁰ Frederick W. Kagan and David T. Fautua contend in 'Could We Fight a War If We Had To?', published in the May 1997 edition of *Commentary*, that the divisions on duty in Bosnia could not respond "immediately to any contingency in which maneuver warfare is being conducted."
- ⁵¹ GAO/NSIAD-95-51 entitled *Peace Operations - Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Effect Response to Regional Conflicts* contains a wide range of options for easing the strain of peace operations.