Using the Information Instrument to Leverage Military Force: A Need for Deliberate Interagency Coordination

Abstract

No modern military strategist discounts the contribution that effective communication with allies, neutral nations, and the enemy populace and forces can make to victory. Despite this acknowledgement of the importance of information, the United States has entered its last several conflicts with an ad hoc approach to information in all categories: the strategic, the operational, and the tactical. This paper analyzes the institutional culture and practices of the two actors most often involved in the application of the information instrument abroad: the U.S. Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group and the United States Information Agency (USIA). It surveys how these two agencies planned and coordinated their activities during two recent conflicts, the Gulf War and the UNITAF intervention in Somalia, pointing out problems that plagued the operations that could have been avoided. Finally, it proposes solutions to ensure better interagency planning before deployment and better coordinated exercise of the information instrument during operations. Before presenting these case studies, the author reviews the history of the USIA and the 4th Psychological Operation Group; the use of psychological operations by the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations; the use of psychological operations in the Vietnam War; the curtailment of USIA activities after the Vietnam War and their resurgence during the Reagan administration; and the USIA mandate during the Bush and Clinton administrations. These case studies suggest that cooperation between USIA and the U.S. military is neither institutionalized, prescribed, nor officially established. When cooperation happens, it happens because the military and USIA officers in the planning sessions or on the ground recognize its importance and set up ad-hoc ways of working together. The paper concludes with recommendations for improving interagency coordination with regard to psychological operations.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1994
Accession Number
ADA444455

Entities

People

  • Carl T. Sahlin Jr.
  • Cynthia G. Efird

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of Defense
  • Department Of State
  • Governments
  • Interagency Coordination
  • International Organizations
  • Law
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Psychological Operations
  • Psychological Warfare
  • United States
  • Vietnam War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Life Cycle Cost Analysis
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.