


*Pursuing the National Interest:
A National Security Strategy
In A New World Order*

*Individual Research Project
National War College*



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***Pursuing the National Interest:
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Preface

The fact is that one moves through life like someone moving with a lantern in a dark woods.


George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950¹

In his memoirs, George Kennan describes his inability to recall his early years by using a lovely metaphor: a person passing through a dark woods. We are such different people toward the ends of our lives that we can hardly remember the beginnings of the journey. The same metaphor that Kennan applied to life applies in some measure in discussing national security and the foreign policy of the United States.

As Americans, we have approached the concept of a national security strategy in the same way one might walk through the dark woods with the uncertain aid of a flashlight. Shortsighted, nervous, unsure of our objectives, we have made our way through unfamiliar territory, congratulating ourselves for barely avoiding a tree one second, and tripping over a root the next. The light guiding our steps has swung from side to side, illuminating small portions of the pathway ahead while darkness swallows the mistakes and missteps of yesterday. With its aid, our focus has been on the next few steps, with little memory of the steps behind, and little thought of what lays beyond the arc of light a short distance ahead--except that the future is made more fearsome by our imagination and the memory of the last mistake.

As Kennan suggests, how wonderful it would be to retrace our steps in daylight, to see the fearsome specters which haunted the darkness banished. And to see that the path lit by the light of knowledge and perspective bears little resemblance to the one populated by our fears.

The purpose of this paper is provide illumination through the development of a national security strategy.



¹ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 4.

Chapter 1

Introduction

We face a time of transition. As outlined in the National Security Strategy of the United States,

The bitter struggle that divided the world for over two generations has come to an end. The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new era, one whose outline would have been unimaginable only three years ago. This new era offers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the even greater uncertainty we face. . . . Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an understanding of the extraordinary trends at work today--a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an accurate sense of the opportunities that history has put before us and a sober appreciation of the dangers that remain.²

On the world's stage, we are turning our focus from the familiar world of the Cold War: a world of bipolar conflict, with rights and wrongs and blacks and whites easy to separate through ideological lenses. Our gaze is now fixed on an uncertain world: a world in which regional, ethnic, and nationalistic conflicts are the most likely form of strife, and one in which the Soviet threat to our way of life--our polar star for two generations--has little place. The temptations of isolationism are strong. But, our international economic ties and the international range of today's military technology mean there is little chance we can return to the style of non-involvement with the world we maintained prior to World War II. In 1991, John Lewis Gaddis wrote in Foreign Affairs,

The passing of the Cold War world by no means implies an end to American involvement in whatever world is to follow; it only means that the nature and the extent of that involvement are not yet clear.³

Determining the "nature and extent of that involvement" will mean making choices among interests, threats, and resources. In the United States, the national security community faces a future of continually shrinking means which will limit the amount of national power we can bring to bear when we choose to become involved. While opportunities for involvement may be greater, the means are fewer. The key decisions American leaders will have to make will be what goals we pursue and on what ends we spend our declining resources.

During the years of the Cold War, we justified a large number of foreign interventions in the name of containment. In his inaugural address, John Kennedy told the world,

² National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1991), p. 1.

³ John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs Spring 1991: p. 102.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty. This much we pledge and more.⁴

In 1961, we pledged to defend our own liberty and everyone else's, too. Then, as now, there were no shortages of good causes on which to spend America's treasure. Perhaps the Soviet threat justified a profligate strategy. Today's threats, and even more, today's ability to pay will force us to make tough choices if we are to remain a superpower which can defend its own interests. And that is where our focus should be: on our own interests.

In their attempts to stabilize the world and spread democracy everywhere, many critics feel the current administration is still attempting to "pay any price, bear any burden" in pursuit of an endless series of "good causes."

As Ted Galen Carpenter said in a recent issue of Foreign Policy, two possible "good causes" have emerged to justify U.S. interventionism in a post-Cold War world: preserving international stability and leading a world-wide movement toward democracy. But as Carpenter suggests,

These two objectives would seem to be inconsistent if not fundamentally incompatible, but both have two features in common: Each would entangle the United States in a morass of regional, local, and even internecine conflicts throughout the world; and more often than not, each would involve the United States in conflicts that have little or no relevance to America's own vital security interests.⁵

We need a national security strategy that returns our focus to the basic definition of such a strategy: the nation's evolving plan for the coordinated use of all the instrument's of state power to *defend and advance the national interest*. By strategy, I refer to Gaddis' linkage of ends to means, intentions to capabilities, and objectives to resources.⁶

What are the goals of the national security strategy and foreign policy interests of the United States? The principal aim of any U.S. strategy has always been to achieve peace, security, and prosperity for the American people.⁷ George Kennan had this advice:

The fundamental objectives of our foreign policy must always be:

⁴ Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 246.

⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, "The New World Disorder," Foreign Policy Fall 1991: p. 24.

⁶ John L. Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," The National Interest Winter 1987/8: p. 29-30.

⁷ J. Michael Cleverley, "U.S. Strategy After the Cold War," Essays on Strategy, Volume VII, edited by Thomas C. Gill (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1990), p. 161.

1. to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers; and
2. to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities.⁸

Simple and eloquent words, but in statecraft, as Clausewitz suggests in war, even the simple things are difficult.

We are a young society, with the limited attention span of hyperactive children, made more so by the pace of the times and our steady diet of high-sugar television. Our national mood swings wildly from boundless optimism to barren pessimism. These are not the characteristics of which mature foreign policy is made. And, like children, in our foreign policy we have alternately engaged in exuberant overextension and then retreated into sulking isolationism, to borrow Kissinger's phrase from The White House Years. We have shown the capacity to alternate between believing we are too good for the rest of the world, and thinking we are not good enough to be involved. In our "good spells," we cheerfully spend national treasure on a variety of causes for the exclusive benefit of others. Once upon a time we could afford that. Now we can't and we need a guide star to help us make choices on how we spend our declining resources in the world today.

Why, Then, a National Security Strategy?

A national security strategy helps us to make choices and manage uncertainty. As Gaddis suggests, we are not likely to find "laws" of strategy that work with the same precision as those in physics and chemistry, and one would be foolish to try.

No one can anticipate the precise course of future events; hence rigid and arbitrary principles for dealing with them are absurd. But, alternatively, to deny the possibility of strategic "logic" altogether is to insist that we start from scratch each time, feeling our way as we go. It ignores the fact that general guidelines can be useful, even if they fail to prescribe specific courses of action in specific situations. It is the geopolitical equivalent of self-induced amnesia.⁹

⁸ George F. Kennan, draft paper, "Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy," as quoted in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, by John Lewis Gaddis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 27.

⁹ Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," p. 29.

A feeling for strategy, those "general guidelines," can provide the framework that allows one to avoid starting from scratch each time. As Clausewitz says,

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls. ... Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.¹⁰

In the day-to-day battles of national security formulation, there is little time for plowing afresh. The views of observers from outside and inside the policy process agree:

What we are seeing, therefore, are government policy makers unable to make high priority decisions (or making them very badly) while they chase frenziedly about making thousands of lesser, often trivial, ones.¹¹

High office teaches decision-making, not substance. Cabinet members are soon overwhelmed by the insistent demands of running their departments. On the whole, a period in high office consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it. Most high officials leave office with the perceptions and insights with which they entered; they learn how to make decisions but not what decisions to make.¹²

To borrow once again from my favorite source of metaphors, George Kennan, the policy process is like the life of a farmer. As Kennan told the students of National War College in 1947,

The reason you never see me around here on weekends (or rather, the reason you *would* never see me around if *you* were here weekends) is that I am up there [on Kennan's Pennsylvania farm] trying to look after that farm. The farm includes 235 acres, and a number of buildings. On everyone of those 235 acres and in every one of those buildings, I have discovered, things are constantly happening. Weeds are growing. Gullies are forming. Fences are falling down. Paint is fading. Wood is rotting. Insects are burrowing. Nothing seems to be

¹⁰ Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 141.

¹¹ Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam, 1980), p. 394.

¹² Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 27.

standing still. The days of the weekend, in theory days of rest, pass in rapid and never-ending succession of alarms and excursions.¹³

The policy-maker faces the same series of never-ending crises and emergencies. One can wander from crisis to emergency and back again but a scheme of prioritization can help. A national security strategy can provide the perspective in which the "alarms and excursions" of national security fit. A national security strategy can help decision makers turn crises to their own advantage, as well as guide the routine. An orderly approach to developing a national security strategy can aid in forming opinions and assigning priorities. That being said, how does one go about developing a national security strategy?

A model for national security strategy provides a means of illustrating the process of developing a strategy. One way to approach the steps one must take is to consider the intellectual process as similar to a Windows-like computer menu, as illustrated in Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1. The National Security Strategy Menu

The national security strategy development process as shown in Figure 1-1 has seven steps, shown as sub-menus. In this paper, I will first explain the first five steps of the intellectual process and then apply the approach to a specific case: the case of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European security.

Throughout the process, the unifying theme will be a need for the United States to focus on the national interest as we make choices on what goals and objectives to pursue and how to allocate our scarce resources.

But we need to begin at the beginning: the "International Context" sub-menu, where we will investigate our assumptions about the world and how it works.

¹³ George F. Kennan, *Measures Short of War: Lectures at the National War College 1946-47*, edited by Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 207.

Chapter 2

The International Context

Among the myriad of assumptions strategists carry about in their heads, perhaps none are more consequential than those relating to the shape and operation of the international system.¹⁴

A series of arguments have raged for years regarding the international context and the implications that has for the role of the United States on the world stage. Do men and nations pursue collective welfare or individual power? Is the natural state of the world one of warfare or peace? Can international agreements and organizations stem conflict? Central to the development of a national security strategy are the positions one takes in these arguments. Key to acting on the stage are our assumptions regarding the motivations of men and nations.

While America may be a melting pot, we are not homogeneous in our views of how the world operates, what (if any) role we should play, and what national objectives we should pursue. Central to answering these and other questions are our views concerning the working of the world. And central to most disagreements about where we should be heading are different starting points; starting points which are shaped by our assumptions about the international context.

Americans tend toward ethnocentricity and isolationism--by nature and by choice. Left to their own devices, most would ignore the rest of the world and single-mindedly pursue a three-car garage, or whatever else that lies at the end of their personal rainbows. But the United States can no longer afford ethnocentricity or isolationism. Despite the calls of "America First," that are making their recurrent appearances during this election year, we cannot ignore the rest of the world.

Our economy is too interdependent with others to withdraw from an active role. Markets that create jobs for American workers are increasingly overseas, as are many of products those workers want to buy. And if an appeal to economic self-interest is not convincing, then the threat posed by increasingly potent technology in the hands of more nations, many unfriendly, should convince those prone to withdrawal behind our borders that we cannot afford to adopt an ostrich mentality: burying our heads in the sand of isolationism is no longer a viable option. We *must* deal with the rest of the world, and to do that effectively we need to understand how the rest of the world works.

¹⁴ Terry L. Deibel, Course Notes for "Foundations of National Security Strategy," Vol I, p. 16.

Recalling the Windows-like menu screen of the Introduction, Figure 2-1 shows where the International Context falls in the overall development of a national security strategy.




Figure 2-1. The International Context Sub-Menu

This section will focus on the four major topics shown on the International Context sub-menu:

- The philosophical underpinnings that help shape understanding of the international context,
- A realist's (with a small "r") perspective of the world,
- Factors that are tending to stay the same in the post-Cold War World, and
- Factors which are changing.

The first step in gaining an understanding of the international context is to investigate those who had gone before.

Philosophical Underpinnings

Among the central assumptions regarding the international context, three of the more important are the views we hold regarding the nature of power, the number of actors, and the mechanisms that determine system interactions.¹⁵ Regarding the first of these--the nature of

¹⁵ Deibel, Course Notes, Vol I, p. 16.

power--it is appropriate to turn to the father of all American realists, Reinhold Niebuhr, who suggested that the study of the nature of foreign policy is the study of the nature of man.

Man has always been his most vexing problem. How shall he think of himself?

According to Michael Joseph Smith, in Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger, with this question Niebuhr opened his 1939 Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University.¹⁶ Anyone seeking to formulate a conception of the international context could do well to ask the same question, as philosophers have from the beginning of time. Living in the bloodiest century in the history of man inclines one to believe that peace is not man's natural state. Thucydides, the earliest "realist," shared that view.

Thucydides

In Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War, the historian-philosopher states, "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."¹⁷

Thus Thucydides, like all realists who followed him, emphasized the primary and inescapable importance of power. But this is only the most obvious way that Thucydides can be considered the first realist. In his conception of international order, his notion of state honor and interest, and his view of the radically circumscribed place of morality in foreign policy, he effectively defined a paradigm of realist thought. And underlying all of this is a dark vision of human nature which lends a tragic consistency to his account.¹⁸

Thucydides established the tone for realists on the question of human nature. He doubted that people can restrain their desire for power without external restrictions and had explicit views on human nature, views he gained through personally witnessing a civil war (types of wars which will be increasingly prevalent features of the post-Cold War world):

With the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly in its true colors, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy of anything superior to itself; for, if it had not been for the pernicious power of envy, men would not so have exalted vengeance above innocence and profit above justice. Indeed, it is true that in these acts of revenge on others men take it upon themselves to begin the process of repealing those general laws of humanity which are there to give a hope of salvation to all who are in distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence, re-

¹⁶ Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 100.

¹⁷ Smith, p. 4.

¹⁸ Smith, p. 4.

membering that there may come a time when they, too, will be in danger and will need their protection.¹⁹

The latter point--that the actions men take against other men may be applied to the first men, in turn--can be applied to states as well as to men. Thucydides was a product of his times, during which peace was the product of equilibrium in the balance of power--a major factor in the development of his perspective of the international context. Another major aspect of Thucydides' contribution to realist thought is his "consistent assertion of the radically limited role morality plays in the deliberations of states."²⁰

He reached the conclusion that justice and honor are irrelevant when the survival of the nation is in doubt and that the strong rely on their power; a view echoed by Napoleon, who reportedly said that God is on the side with the bigger battalions, and Stalin, who reportedly responded to criticism from the Vatican by asking how many divisions the Pope possessed.²¹ Nor is Thucydides irrelevant for an American decisionmaker.

Like Thucydides, we cannot be blinkered from the realities of the world--Saddam Hussein should remind us that the strong rely on their power. Thucydides would erase the notion that we make friends by doing good, and would advise us to appeal to the hard facts of fear and interest. He would tell us that the logic of fear and escalation always supersedes the logic of moderation and peaceful diplomacy. Thus, differences in domestic styles of government and national character may be interesting, but the fundamental nature of the international system is that states pursue their own interests.

But at the same time we listen to Thucydides' realistic advice, we have to keep in mind that upon entering the international fray, we can't drop the essential features, characteristics, and values that make us Americans as if they were eyeglasses we were afraid of breaking in a fist fight.

On the issue of morality and idealism in statecraft, we are dealing with the United States, a sum of its people. Our concept of the international system is the sum of all our views. Sometimes those views contradict each other. Sometimes we are inconsistent. Just as we have alternated between extroversion and introversion, the United States and its foreign policy have always contained elements of both idealism and realism. As Alexander DeConde suggests,

¹⁹ Smith, p. 9.

²⁰ Smith, p. 6.

²¹ Smith, p. 7.

... those who formulate foreign policy cannot do so solely in terms of power, as if they were playing a game. Domestic affairs and intangibles, such as national character and the passions of nationalism, sometimes carry greater weight in the making of foreign policy than does the strategy of power politics.²²

Thus, while Thucydides has intuitive appeal, his views on morality and its limited role have to be tempered by the fact that a "government of the people, by the people, for the people" cannot solely base its actions on unsentimental appraisals of interest. We stand for ideals as well and those must be entered into the calculus. With that in mind, let's turn to another realist philosopher, Machiavelli.

Machiavelli

Throughout Thucydides' philosophy is a "sense of brooding tragedy, a profound regret that this is the way of the world."²³ Machiavelli, on the other hand, presents an unfettered sense of the way in which state morality differs from individual morality. It is not a tragedy in Machiavelli's view; it is simply the way life is. As with Thucydides, from Machiavelli's perspective, the key to understanding state behavior is the calculus of power, interest, and consequences.

Just as with Thucydides, however, Machiavelli tells us more about how the rest of the world operates than providing rules to govern our actions. Only at the survival level will most Americans adopt the view that morality should not restrain state behavior. At that level--for example, the case of morality as it applies to nuclear deterrence--we adopted Machiavelli's advice.

Where the very safety of the country depends on the resolution to be taken, no consideration of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory nor of shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations aside, the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country?²⁴

Fortunately, we don't have to operate at the survival level very often. When we do, we suspend *habeus corpus*, as Abraham Lincoln did, or imprison Japanese-Americans, as Franklin Roosevelt did. In between those unhappy occasions, we do not separate morality from diplomacy; politics and morality do not normally operate in different spheres for the United States. Just as our Constitution shapes our government as an "invitation to struggle," we accept a

²² Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 2.

²³ Smith, p. 10.

²⁴ Smith, p. 11.

great deal less than perfect efficiency in the pursuit of national interests abroad because we allow morality to have a place in the council of advisers.

All this being said, however, most of the world is Machiavellian, and we have to realize that morality influences our actions, while other states may pay very little attention to it. Furthermore, the two most-recent U.S. administrations dealt openly with Hussein, even though he apparently had used chemical weapons against his own people, because it was judged to be in our interest, at the time. It was only when he endangered *our* interests that he "became Hitler." The danger in this Machiavellian world-view is that even when dealing with evil and unsentimental people, a government "of, by, and for" the people depends for its legitimacy on the American people who are mostly good and sentimental.

Many in the world, however, are operating at the survival level or have a sense of morality foreign to our European traditions. Their views are often shaped by the fact that they live in a Hobbesian world from which our national wealth insulates us.

Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes saw the nature of man as "the sum of passions, and of human reason as a calculating machine driven by the alternate pursuit and avoidance of appetites and aversions."²⁵ His notion of the international state of nature as a state of war is reflected in his more famous words reflecting on man's life in the state of nature which is, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." He draws an analogy between individuals in nature and states. In his view, states

... because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is their Forts, Garrisons and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War.²⁶

Most individuals in the world of the 20th Century live naked in a brutal world of power; that is why many are willing to alienate all their rights, save self-preservation, to a sovereign or a state who will at least protect them from themselves. How else can we understand the willingness of so many to live in the harsh, totalitarian regimes which seem to have been the norm for so long? Perhaps some willingness can be ascribed to a sense of futility, but there is a trade-off between the chaos of democracy and the order of authoritarian regimes. Lest one think this is only a theoretical argument, we will have an opportunity to watch as the people of the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union choose between

²⁵ Smith, p. 13.

²⁶ Smith, p. 13.

democracy and order. They have no long tradition of democracy to shape their views; only a memory of the availability of food under the Communist Tsars who ruled for seventy years.

Modern idealists would have us move away from a realist view of the world, but most of the planet's five billion persons still occupy a Hobbesian niche rather than a Park Avenue address. And in the modern world, many are not even safe from their own state. Perhaps the answer would be clearer if we could ask any of the million (or more) Cambodians who died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge whether self-preservation is worth the surrender of rights.

Idealism Versus Realism

What divides idealists and realists is differing views of man's basic nature and whether anarchy and the pursuit of power are central to understanding man, life, and the international context.

Idealists seem to believe that selfishness and a tendency to violence are not basic characteristics of man's nature, or at least they seem to believe that power and the use of force are not the *sine qua non* of relations between states. They believe that ideals and ideas are more important than power. One eloquent view of idealism was presented by Frank Tannenbaum in 1955:

This debate [over power politics] is of greater importance to the future of the United States than the old argument between the "interventionists" and the "isolationists." Both of them accepted the traditional American belief in international good will, in the doctrine of friendship among nations, in the right of the little nation to abide in security and without fear, in the hope of finding a way to peace among nations, in the sanctity of international treaties, in the belief in international law, and in the hope that the democratic way of life, by enhancing human dignity and widening human freedom, would ease the burden of conflict among men and nations.²⁷

Realists, on the other hand, are not convinced of man's basic goodness. Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau differ on this issue only in the metaphysics. While the former attributes man's tendency to seek power to original sin, the latter attributes it to two sources: the Hobbesian logic of competition and a universal *animus dominandi* rooted in human nature.²⁸ The metaphysical is not the issue, however. Tannenbaum and Morgenthau represent the diametrically opposing ends of the spectrum, but their views are not irreconcilable.

Man's basic nature was shaped by the competition for food and other necessities. In times of plenty, the tribe, city state, nation state, or whatever unit, survived and multiplied. In times

²⁷ Frank Tannenbaum, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), p. xii.

²⁸ Smith, p. 136.

of scarcity, they died. So far, that makes early man a realist. But as man grew and matured, he developed rules to govern behavior and minimize conflict within the family or tribe; for example, rules governing sexual behavior. Similarly, modern man has developed laws to control domestic behavior and has developed diplomatic conventions to regulate the relations between states. Unless we can guarantee full bellies for the world, however, there will be always be conflict, if only over the next meal. And full bellies won't prevent conflict over religion, national identity, or violations of the conventions governing inter-state behavior. When man is full, he has time to invent ideals and collective security arrangements; and can afford to allow morality and politics to co-exist. If he isn't well-fed, the most common state of affairs in a world of competition over resources, then men "conduct [their] affairs in the brooding shadow of violence."²⁹ So do states.

The point of this digression is that Tannenbaum and Morgenthau are not mutually exclusive. The United States sometimes operates at the edge of survival and, when it does, it is a "Realist." It imprisons Americans for sedition (forgetting free speech for a while) or suspends other basic rights of the Constitution. When our own survival is not threatened, we have a degree of "Idealist" in our nature and base decisions on sentiment and friendship rather than solely on self-interest, as was the case during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. These are the trade-offs decision makers must make between the various national interests: survival, economic well-being, value projection, et cetera.

Along with the difference between which we should pursue, ideals or self-interest, another aspect of the idealist-realist debate needs to be examined because of the argument that ensues on the selection of means to achieve ends. That aspect of the debate is the difference between the idealists and the realists that can be found in the eternal debate between ends and means. To illustrate this, consider two fictional "creeds" for the idealist and realist camps:

I. The Idealist's Creed: No ends, not even the idealist's own, can justify *power* and *power politics* as means.

Those who belong to the idealist camp focus on *ends*: on their lofty ideals and principles, such as enduring peace among nations and between peoples, the advancement of justice and welfare for all mankind, and cooperation in international organizations to regulate or suppress conflict. This preference for identification with objectives, rather than on the means of attainment, results in having to find an uneasy compromise between the use of power, which they abhor, and finding the means to pursue their exalted goals. Their chosen diplomatic instrument is most

²⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Anarchy--A Realist Perspective," in Theories of International Relations (ed. by James A. Hirsch (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. 168.

often pure persuasion: to persuade others based solely on logic rather than the use of force. The focus of idealists is more on the world as they would like it to be and less on how they plan to get there. This view can be contrasted with a fictional creed for the realists:

II. The Realist's Creed: The ends *are* the means, or alternatively, the means (the acquisition of power and its use) are the ends.

In contrast to the idealists, the realists focus on *means* to achieve their ends: mobilized and latent power. They accept power politics and some form of strife between nations as reflections of the basic nature of man. For realists, diplomacy serves nations with the same function as civil law authorities provide for individuals: controlling and limiting the struggle for power. The focus of realists is on the world as it is, and on the means to achieve their objectives, which for many realists *is* the acquisition of power.

America and most Americans fall between the two ends of the spectrum. Recognizing that a national security strategy has to deal with the world which is not American, a "realist" (with a small "r") perspective is useful and is the subject of the next section.

A "realist's" Perspective

The balance of power, geopolitics, and faith in international law and organizations devoted to the maintenance of peace have all been touted as the best solution at one time or another. The problem lies in the search for a *single* solution. The failure of a balance of power has been blamed for World War I (it's interesting to note that the same kind of failure led to the war between Athens and Sparta; perhaps we haven't evolved all that much politically in 2000 years). The perversion of geopolitics by the Nazis certainly erodes our faith in that system. And international law didn't prevent any number of conflicts in this century. But blaming each method or system individually is as mistaken as searching for a single solution. Each of the explanations, working together, can offer something to preserving international order.

That's why a "realist" (with a small "r") perspective is useful. It seems to have been characteristic of our most successful administrations in foreign affairs and contains the following key components:

- A clear and unsentimental appreciation and understanding of the nature of man; man who is capable of both great evil and great good.
- Nation-states and other organizations with roles on the world stage are composed of men and, thus, are also capable of good and bad as they pursue their own interests.

- The interests of those nation-states, being the sum of the aspirations of the resident population or of the leaders alone, may not be entirely clear to those inside or outside the states.
- The recognition that the U.S. government is "of, by, and for" the American people, with the result that the government and its policies are inescapably composed of both idealist and realist views.
- Our own interests will not always be clear, either because they result from a debate between competing camps or because the hierarchy of interests is unclear. We are a nation of contradictions.

The United States and other nations act in their own self-interest. In the course of foreign relations, a fundamental truth emerges: as a nation grows in size and strength, it attains the power and influence to achieve its foreign policy objectives, and power to influence the foreign policies of other nations. The United States has grown in power and ability to achieve our objectives and, like other nations, have made use of that power. The debate engendered by that use, or misuse, of power, shapes the discussion of what American foreign policy has been and should be.

Just as the world is more gray than black and white, the international context is a blend of realism and idealism. Seeing the world as it is does not blind us to seeing the way we would like the world to be.

Another dichotomy also exists: the factors that are remaining the same in the post-Cold War World and those that are changing. Let's look first at those that are tending to remain the same in a changing world.

Factors Remaining the Same in the Post-Cold War World

The first of the factors which will remain constant in the post-Cold War world is the root of conflict: the nature of man. Man does not evolve very quickly; certainly he evolves more slowly than events in world politics. That means that man and his basic nature will remain the same in the post-Cold War world. He has changed little since the time of Thucydides, having gained perhaps a patina of civilization, but Pol Pot and Idi Amin were not rulers in the last century or a millennium ago. They ruled in *this* century and their counterparts are waiting in

the wings if not actually in place. The implications of this are obvious. We can certainly expect more of the same competition for power and material well-being which has led to conflict in the past. As nations are the sum of their people, we can expect them to stay much the same as regards their motivations.

The national interests which drive state action will continue to be the same. Robert Osgood, along with many others, puts "national survival or self-preservation at the head of the list, because everything else would clearly depend on the achievement of this goal. He defined survival or self-preservation in terms of territorial integrity, political independence, and maintenance of fundamental governmental institutions."³⁰ Defending national survival against the myriad threats of the today's world means states will continue to employ force to ensure their own survival.

Conflict will also remain endemic for a variety of reasons which have not disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union. Borders are not set in people's minds, a far more important place than any map. In fact, most of the nation-states we know today are "jury-rigged contraptions that owe their existence to the 20th-century collapse of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, British, and French empires."³¹ Everybody has something someone else wants for nationalistic, economic, political, or religious reasons. Saddam Hussein reminded the West recently of that fact when he invaded Kuwait. The world is replete with other examples which will be sources of conflict. For example, consider the case of Africa where the "borders for most of [the] 50-odd states were drawn up by the great powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884 with maximum concern for the balance of power in Europe and little or none for the ethnic, linguistic, or cultural affiliations of Africans."³² Borders in East and Central Europe, largely the product of peace treaties ending the world wars of this century, will likely also be redressed. There will always be competition for resources, room, and land, which will be increasingly in demand as the world's population continues to expand.

Fortunately, another factor will also remain the same: "men of good will" will continue to pursue an end to violence through the United Nations and other international organizations. In this aspect of idealism, if few others, I agree with Stanley Kober, who wrote in Foreign Policy,

It is incorrect, therefore, to say that idealism rejects the balance of power. In fact, idealism recognizes that in the face of a military threat, there is no alterna-

³⁰ Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis (Spring 1977): p. 125.

³¹ Glenn Frankel, "Nation-State: An Idea Under Siege," The Washington Post, 11 November 1990: p. A28.

³² Frankel, p. A28.

tive to maintaining a balance, or even a preponderance, of power. What idealism rejects is the idea that international peace is solely the product of a balance of power. For the idealist, a country can have friends as well as interests. The ultimate objective of idealism is to broaden the circle of friendship by fostering the spread of democratic values and institutions.³³

Another factor remaining the same is that nation-states have never been, nor will they continue to be, the only actors on the world stage. Transnational and supranational actors exist and will continue to be important.

Some of these factors that will tend to remain the same in a changing world will contribute to stability; more will contribute to instability. The same is true of the factors that are changing.

Factors That Will Change

These factors constitute a much longer list. For structure, this section will rely on Samuel P. Huntington's three categories: *systemic changes*, *changes in the distribution of power*, and *changes in the relations among countries*.³⁴

Systemic Changes

The first change which Huntington categorizes as systemic is the emergence of a truly global economy and of powerful transnational economic organizations. This emergence will complicate the task of the strategist by increasing the complexity of interactions which must be considered and by increasing the number of actors. Some authors assume that an increasingly global economy, with the inevitable increase in interdependence between states, will result in less conflict. That may be true but economic competition can be competition between states, and states will seek an economic advantage as readily as they will seek a geopolitical edge. For example, one can make a case that Hussein's move into Kuwait was motivated by economics and the need to re-coup the losses stemming from the Iran-Iraq war. Certainly his justification for attempts to bully Kuwait into decreasing production and to cease "stealing oil from Iraqi fields" were economic. Access to raw materials, trade routes, and markets have been the cause of wars in the past and may be in the future. England and Germany were significant trading partners prior to the outbreak of World War I, for example, a circumstance which did not prevent the first world war.

A second systemic change is the electronic revolution in communications, the first since Gutenberg invented the printing press. The flood of available information and the speed with

³³ Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1990): p. 13.

³⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* (January/February 1991): p. 5-6.

which that information can be transmitted around the world have increased the desire for democracy (witness the communication via facsimile machine with the students in Tiananmen Square) and complicated the task of the decision maker (more information is not always better).

Related to the communications revolution is a global movement toward democratic political systems and market economies. The spread of information brought the images of the lifestyle of the West, with all its allure, behind the Iron Curtain (which was apparently permeable to communications) and infected an entire nation with the desire for change.

All of these factors affect the next systemic change: the declining importance of the nation-state (which Morgenthau, the ultimate realist, predicted as early as 1948³⁵). This is exacerbated by the intensification of national and ethnic identities, which will result in the rise in the number and types of states, and the rise of international organizations to deal with almost every conceivable issue.

Huntington summarizes the consequence of these systemic shifts by suggesting they represent the seeming shift in the relevance and usefulness of different power resources, with military power declining and economic power increasing in importance.³⁶

Changes in the Distribution of Power

This category includes the rise of economic tripolarity (C. Fred Bergsten's term³⁷) with the United States, Germany, and Japan atop the pile; the rise of the Weapon State (Charles Krauthammer's term, which he defines as small aggressive states, often hostile to the West, which are armed with weapons of mass destruction and which possess the means to deliver those weapons)³⁸; the demise of the Soviet Union, with the continuing evolution of the republics; and the slow decline of the United States in relative power and influence while others rise (a situation which Richard Rose calls, "Learning to live with other elephants"³⁹).

Changes in the Relations Among Countries

During the Cold War, relations between countries were relatively stable and the highest priority issue was security. In the post-Cold War world, we can expect a decline in the importance

³⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Third Edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), second (un-numbered) page of preface to third edition.

³⁶ Huntington, p. 5.

³⁷ C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1990): p. 96.

³⁸ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91 (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 23.

³⁹ Richard Rose, The Postmodern President, Second Edition (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), p. 27.

of security issues for the United States while global issues such as the environment, drugs, debt, hunger, population, and development all rise in importance. Overall, the world will be without an overriding cleavage such as the one that characterized the Cold War world, but will have a welter of ethnic, national, religious, economic, and cultural antagonisms.⁴⁰ Huntington suggests that the relations between countries may be more volatile and possibly more duplicitous than they were in the Cold War years and more ambivalent, with no Cold War alliances to help in the categorization as ally, antagonist, or neutral.

Conclusions For the International Context

The study of the international context is the study of man. If you think man is motivated by the pursuit of power and material well-being, then the realists offer a compelling, if less than cheerful, view of the world and the international context. If, however, you believe that man has acquired more than a surface polish of civilized behavior and can pursue ideals as well as power, then the idealist camp has a place for you.

The world is not black and white and neither are the views of most Americans. Most have picked and chosen from both camps for their views. A combination of the balance of power, geopolitics, and faith in international law and organizations devoted to the maintenance of peace offers the best hope for the future.

⁴⁰ Huntington, p. 6.

Chapter 3

The Domestic Context

Indeed, one of the real challenges of the national security strategist is to understand public opinion and its expression in Congress so thoroughly that he reflects it in his strategic designs, leads it in his preferred directions, and uses it for his own purposes. At a minimum, he must determine what can be sold to the people and on the Hill if he hopes to create a successful and sustainable national security strategy.⁴¹

In discussing the place of the domestic context in the development of national security strategy, it's important to keep in mind what Paul Kennedy describes as an altogether broader conception of national security than the military terms in which we normally think.⁴² It is, in a curious way, very American. National security is about the implementation of policies designed to secure (in the words of the Founding Fathers) life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for the polity in question. In the United States, there is often a difference between the polity--the American public--and the views held by the developers and implementers of strategy. And there is a striking difference between the beliefs of the American public and those of its "opinion leadership"⁴³ on many of the goals of American national security strategy and on America's role in the world.

Most of the American public doesn't particularly care much about *foreign* policy and doesn't pay much attention to its implementation as long as the government doesn't give away too much money to ungrateful foreigners. Americans don't pay much attention to foreign affairs in the absence of a crisis. After a year in office and at a time when he was enjoying record approval levels for his conduct of foreign affairs, a Gallup poll found that 40 percent of the people surveyed could not name anything in response to a question regarding President Bush's greatest achievement in office.⁴⁴ The response seemed to be, "Well, whatever it is he's doing, he should keep doing it," This may be a reflection on the character of his "achievements" or a sense that foreign policy doesn't matter much to the average American.

⁴¹ Terry L. Deibel, Course Notes for "Foundations of National Security Strategy," Vol I, p. 24.

⁴² Paul Kennedy, "American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience," Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 168.

⁴³ "Opinion leadership" is defined here as representative of those surveyed by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which "included Americans in senior positions with knowledge of international affairs. [The Council's survey] included roughly equal proportions from the national political and governmental world." Reilly, John E., ed. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 5.

⁴⁴ George C. Edwards III, "George Bush and the Public Presidency: The Politics of Inclusion," The Bush Presidency, edited by Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), p. 129.

While they may not have been paying much attention to the details, they know what they want. And, while Richard Rose is correct in saying the case of national security in the United States is one of "one country, many voices,"⁴⁵ the public is remarkably consistent in what they consider to be the key to *good* national security strategy and foreign policy: they believe the United States should pursue national economic self-interest as the highest priority. As William Schneider wrote recently in Eagle In A New World,

The public has always [at least from 1974 to 1990] put goals that are in our own *economic self-interest* at the top of the list. They still do. Americans feel our top foreign policy goals should be protecting the jobs of American workers, protecting the interests of American business abroad, and securing adequate supplies of energy (all considered very important by more than 60 percent [of the respondents in polls of the public conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations from 1974 to 1990]).⁴⁶ [Emphasis in original.]

For opinion leaders, however, "the goals at the top of the list were all *globalist*--preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, worldwide arms control, and improving the global environment. The public is less internationalist than its leaders."⁴⁷ Understanding this dichotomy--a key attribute of the domestic context--is central to the development of an effective national security strategy. This section will investigate three aspects of the domestic context as shown below.




Figure 3-1. The Domestic Context

In discussing the domestic context, this section will cover three basic subjects:

⁴⁵ Richard Rose, The Postmodern President, second edition (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), p. 215.

⁴⁶ William Schneider, "The Old Politics and the New World Order," Eagle In A New World (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 41-44.

⁴⁷ Schneider, p. 44.

- First, the American people (the polity in search of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"): What are we like? In what do we believe?
- Second, some prevailing themes in American foreign policy and how those will affect the development of national security strategies.
- Third, what the first two sections mean for the role and objectives of America in a new world order.

Let's turn first to the American people, keeping in mind Allen Bloom's attribution to Tocqueville, "The great democratic danger is enslavement to public opinion."⁴⁸

The American People: What Are We Like?

*Do I contradict myself?
Very well I contradict myself.
(I am large, I contain multitudes).*
Walt Whitman

America is a series of contradictions: between freedom and order, between charity and self-interest, between idealism and realism, between Puritanism and hedonism, between extroversion and introversion, between religion and secularism, between preserving and exploiting the environment, between the rights of the individual and the tyranny of the majority. We are a society defined by our contradictions. It's no wonder we have such a hard time expressing our wants and desires, or that our leaders don't seem to hear or understand us. In The Postmodern Presidency, V. O. Key is quoted as saying, "The voice of the people consists mainly of the words 'yes' or 'no,' and at times one cannot be certain which word is being uttered."⁴⁹

At times we personify Pericles' paean to the Athenians,

... the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbor, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own. ... We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality ... wealth we employ

⁴⁸ Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 246.

⁴⁹ Rose, p. 116.

more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it.⁵⁰

At other times we can avoid making crucial decisions and ignore the most pressing problems facing our society. We want to eat and stay thin; we want to balance the budget and continue the "free lunch program" of entitlements; we want to lead the world but we don't want to pay much for the privilege.

Alexis de Tocqueville is not the only Frenchman to have struggled with the American character. One hundred and twenty-one years after Tocqueville walked down the gangplank of the steamer *President* to the shores of Manhattan, another Frenchman, Sanche de Gramont, soon to be renamed Ted Morgan and become a permanent American, landed in New Haven and began the process of becoming an American. Part of Morgan's quest involved searching for the national character. But he found that in no other country is national character so resistant to definition. In On Becoming American, Morgan lists a number of American traits, each with its opposite characteristic which is necessary to complete the portrait, that are useful in describing the contradictions inherent in the domestic context.⁵¹ The first of these--Puritanism--we inherited from our forefathers.

Puritanism

We are, or would like to think we are, pure in heart; we are God's few, chosen to inhabit what once was the richest nation on Earth. We are Americans not by an accident of birth but as a birthright. In the religion of Puritanism, every man is a priest. This concept provided the well spring for our form of democracy, with its distrust of authority and belief in the sanctity of the individual. This was, of course, reinforced by our abiding detestation for the class system in Europe, from which our earliest forefathers fled. They also sought religious freedom--that is, religious freedom for themselves, not for others. The abiding sin of Puritanism is hypocrisy, which results because we cannot live up to our extravagant self-estimation.

We have also rebelled against the Puritan streak in our society. Puritanism's opposite trait provides endless source material for televangelists, their Biblical wrath focused on the permissive nature of the Seventies, with sexual revolution, and the Eighties, characterized by the pursuit of Goods, instead of Good.

⁵⁰ Pericles, "The Glory That Was Athens," A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches (edited by Houston Phillips) (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 11-12.

⁵¹ Ted Morgan, On Becoming American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 257-292.

Altruism

We are an altruistic people. Americans give away more to charities each year than many nations earn. When you have space and abundance, as Americans do, you have the potential for altruism and idealism. Americans willingly contribute time and money to efforts such as Habitat For Humanity, which builds homes for poor Americans, and the Peace Corps, which builds them for poor non-Americans. We have open hearts and checkbooks for the small child who needs an operation or the family down on its luck.

Our altruism knows limits, however. We oppose foreign aid as a "give away" program even though almost all of that money returns to purchase American goods and services. And, at the same time we are contributing to local charities, we can ignore the plight of those in sub-Saharan Africa--or our own inner cities--and exchange gunfire over a parking space.

Anti-Intellectualism

For most of their history, Americans have had a bias against intellectualism. For example, the 1828 presidential election was seen as a contest between ...

John Quincy Adams who can write
And Andrew Jackson who can fight.⁵²

In 1952, President Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson, a true intellectual who had difficulty in communicating to less-intellectual Americans. In 1954, the president defined an intellectual as "a man who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows." American heroes are occasionally-illiterate athletes and entertainers, not writers and thinkers. That changed briefly, at least in parts of America, with the meteoric rise to fame of Henry Kissinger.

For the first time we had the intellectual as superstar, in constant orbit, dating starlets, trading quips with chiefs of state, leaking tidbits to favored reporters. He was not merely a powerful man, he was well-liked, he shot up in the personality polls, in spite of the fact that he looked like an itinerant peddler and sounded like somebody trying to tell an ethnic joke.⁵³

The tendency toward anti-intellectualism does not mean the average American does not think. It just means the average intellectual can't communicate with the average American. It also has implications for the maker of strategy who must depend on public support to carry out the strategist's program. Many Americans are anti-intellectual by temperament, a trait which

⁵² Morgan, p. 263.

⁵³ Morgan, p. 265.

finds its sources in our pragmatism (education is useful as a means, not an end) and in the common assumption that self-appointed and educated elites often lack common sense.

Provincialism

We like being Americans and most of us never leave the United States. In the mid-Seventies, only 14 million Americans held passports.⁵⁴ And those who do travel have an almost unlimited ability to be shocked by the natives they see on their travels.

Another form of provincialism is an indifference to the outside world. During the Vietnam War, a *Redbook* poll found that four out of ten women with sons in Vietnam didn't know where it was.⁵⁵ During the height of the furor over aid to the Nicaraguan *Contras*, most Americans couldn't find Nicaragua on a map. The same was almost certainly true in the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Good Sportsmanship

This is one of the credos we demand our leaders live by. They are not allowed to display anger or any other emotion in public except on rare occasions. A candidate can be erased from the scene by appearing overly emotional, as the case of Senator Muskie in New Hampshire in 1972 demonstrated.

That same sense of sportsmanship carries over to the conduct of American foreign policy with the constant debate over covert action and other "dirty tricks." We claim to dislike negative campaign advertising, but will wallow in the salacious details of a candidate's extramarital sexual life. We are a sum of our contradictions while at the same time we respect individualism.

Individualism

Americans prize their individualism. As Stanley Kober wrote in *Foreign Policy* in 1990,

The American principle of government is *individual* self-determination, not national self-determination. Americans believe in *e pluribus unum*: one out of many. So long as rights are guaranteed on an individual basis, the concept of a nation is irrelevant.⁵⁶

In American minds, government exists to serve the individual. It belongs to us; not we to it. The nationalist concept so prevalent in Europe or Japan that can be summarized as, "Sacrifices for the Motherland/Fatherland," is foreign to us. Our focus is on ourselves. The appeal of John Kennedy's inaugural speech,

⁵⁴ Morgan, p. 267.

⁵⁵ Morgan, p. 268.

⁵⁶ Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1990): p. 19.

And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.⁵⁷

was the freshness, the innovation of the concept of doing something for society instead of for one's self.

The point is *not* that Americans are selfish. They can be astonishingly generous. The point is that their focus on individualism has impacts beyond an instinctive distrust of government. Americans make decisions based on the impact on the individual rather than on the impact on society as a whole. They will stop a dam in Tennessee that would benefit millions because it might harm small fish, which contribute little to society. They will protect a spotted owl at the cost of thousands of jobs. And they will continue to focus on their own lives--the individual search for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness--rather than on the challenges facing the nation until, and unless, those challenges becoming extremely serious or life-threatening. As John Spanier wrote in American Foreign Policy Since World War II,

The effect of this attitude is clear: Americans turn their attention toward the outside world only with the greatest reluctance and only when they feel provoked--that is, when the foreign menace has become so clear that it can no longer be ignored. Or to state it somewhat differently, the United States rarely initiates policy; the stimuli that are responsible for the formulation of American foreign policy come from beyond America's frontiers.⁵⁸

The focus on individualism not only makes U.S. foreign policy reactive, it makes it harder to conduct a coherent foreign policy. As James Madison said in Federalist Number 42, "If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."⁵⁹ Too frequently, we aren't. While the government rarely prosecutes those who violate the Logan Act, which proscribes individual negotiating with other nations, it happens frequently; for example, the stream of politicians, entertainers, and ordinary Americans who went to Hanoi, or Jesse Jackson's efforts in the Middle East.⁶⁰

The opposing trait to individualism is a passion for association. After finding mutual interests, Americans band together. "Whenever two or more Americans have a common problem, they

⁵⁷ Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 241.

⁵⁸ John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (6th Edition) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 16.

⁵⁹ James Madison, "Federalist No. 42," The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 211.

⁶⁰ Robert L. Beisner, "Pawns in the Game," rev. of October Surprise, by Gary Sick, *Book World*, The Washington Post 26 January 1992: p. 4.

form a Committee of Concerned Citizens."⁶¹ As with individualism, the passion for association can make it harder to govern. When individuals band together, it often results from passions stemming from a single issue. Single-issue interest groups distort democracy by forcing decisions based on individual positions rather than on the good of society as a whole.

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must begin."⁶² But how do we define the will of the people? According to George Kennan, Anton Chekhov, who was a doctor in addition to being a writer, once observed that when a large variety of remedies were recommended for the same disease, it was a pretty good sign that none of them was any good and that the disease was incurable. Kennan used that observation as a metaphor for the various explanations put forth by the expansionists for the territorial acquisitions by the United States in 1898.⁶³ The metaphor can be extended, however. In the case of the American public, the various explanations can all be right, because our policy sometimes reflects the contradictions inherent in the American public.

These individual traits of Americans have resulted in prevailing themes in American foreign policy, the subject of the next section.

Prevailing Themes in American Foreign Policy

... I was surprised to discover how much of our stock equipment, in the way of rationale and rhetoric of foreign policy ... was utopian in its expectations, legalistic in its concept of methodology, moralistic in the demands it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to ourselves.

George Kennan ⁶⁴

Most new administrations come to office with a flood of enthusiasm and a desire to demonstrate their difference from their predecessors by pursuing new goals and treading new paths. In the preface to the 1955 edition of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Russell Kirk argues that the danger to foreign policy in a democracy is,

⁶¹ Morgan, p. 291.

⁶² Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America (edited by Phillips Bradley) (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), Volume I, p. 57.

⁶³ George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: New American Library, 1952), p. 22.

⁶⁴ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 71.

... that custom and tradition and prescription will be overthrown utterly by neoterism, the lust after novelty, and that men will be no better than the flies of a summer, oblivious to the wisdom of their ancestors, and forming every opinion solely under the influence of the passion of the hour.⁶⁵

It's not quite that bad. We do occasionally change directions (for example, the strategy of containment after World War II and President Nixon's opening to China), but the history of American foreign policy is a history of pursuing the status quo for the most part. President Bush has elevated this tradition to the level of dogma. Part of the reason for this pattern stems from our lack of interest about the outside world and part stems from "political culture," which may be thought of as those values, beliefs, and traditions that affect the political behavior of a state in recognizable patterns over a period of time.⁶⁶ This section will cover some of those recognizable patterns.

Isolationism

The sum of America's provincialism and individualism at the national level is isolationism. During most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States adhered to the doctrine of isolationism. Whether the policy stemmed from the advice of the founding fathers or the demands of subduing a continent is a matter for historians to argue, but the fact remains that the United States remained splendidly isolated until we began to involve ourselves in the Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After our Pacific adventures, we returned to internal matters for a few years.

The United States hoped to stay out of the European conflict that erupted in Sarajevo in 1914 and, in fact, remained out of that great global cataclysm until 1917, the year before its end. Wilson's successful campaign in 1916 was based on the slogan, "He kept us out of war."⁶⁷ And, after the war, the Senate denied President Wilson's internationalist outlook and refused to ratify his call for U.S. participation in the League of Nations. American isolationism lasted until we entered World War II.

After World War II, most Americans would have cheerfully returned to their preoccupation with improving their lifestyle. However, one of those key historical roadblocks diverted us from returning to isolationism. The menace posed Soviet aggression and a monolithic communist bloc was such that we adopted one of those significant deviations in our preferred and isolationist mode of operation--the strategy of containment. Lest we believe that aberration--

⁶⁵ Russell Kirk, preface to On Liberty, by John Stuart Mill (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. xiv.

⁶⁶ Martin E. Goldstein, America's Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), p. 110.

⁶⁷ Goldstein, p. 115.

deviating from isolationism--is permanent, however, Congressman Gephardt, the House Majority Leader, and his calls for protectionist barriers serve as a reminder of the isolationist tendencies of the 1930s which saw the enactment of the Hawley-Smoot tariffs. Pat Buchanan and his platform of, "America First--and Second, and Third," should remind us that isolationism is one of those continuing trends in American foreign policy. We *may*, according to President Bush, have kicked the Vietnam syndrome but the American people and their elected representatives in Congress are still leery of American involvement overseas.

What William Schneider calls "populist isolationism" has not disappeared from the American psyche:

... the sentiment among the poor and the poorly educated that, however noble our purposes, most of the things we do for the rest of the world are wasteful, pointless, unappreciated, and tragic. Sometimes, as in the case of Vietnam, they are right.⁶⁸

The American public believes in internationalist principles. But, when it comes to policy and putting those principles into operation, the isolationist tendency rises, especially if the policy is neither cheap nor easy.

Legalism-Moralism

A second tradition in American foreign policy is what George Kennan called the legalistic-moralistic approach, which he felt had run like a "red skein through our foreign policy" of the first fifty years of this century.⁶⁹ It's still a part of our foreign policy. Those who believe in this tradition hold the conviction that conflicts over power between states can be avoided by the acceptance of rules and restraints. They also express a faith that once the rules have been agreed to and written down, states will abide by them. Legalism-moralism also assumes that states will subordinate their pursuit of selfish goals to that of a peaceful and orderly world, if only the path to such a world is shown to them. As a result of their beliefs, those with faith in legalism-moralism also place great importance on international law, world opinion, sanctions, arbitration, and mediation.⁷⁰ The American public also shares this faith to a degree. One of the key findings of a public opinion survey published in a 1991 issue of Americans Talk Issues was that Americans believe with some consistency that,

The United Nations should play a bigger peace keeping role and take the lead in addressing international problems. Its structure and organizational viability should be enhanced and democratized. Where necessary for it to perform its

⁶⁸ Schneider, p. 63.

⁶⁹ Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, p. 93.

⁷⁰ Goldstein, p. 118.

functions, its resolutions should have the force of law and precedence over U.S. law and the laws of other nations.⁷¹

American foreign policy can also be characterized by the sense of mission: to spread democracy and free-market ideals to the rest of the world, whether they appear to be interested or not. As with fanaticism and zealotry in any guise, we have met resistance from those whom we had hoped to convert.

We've had another thread throughout our experiences with others: we have often based our actions on moral grounds, as we perceive them, rather on narrow self-interest. This has both affected our actions and biased our judgments of other nations, which are sometimes not inclined to adopt a moral stand or which possess a morality different from our own.

Moralism, which has occasionally reached the level of a religious crusade, combined with zealotry, are not the most notable characteristics of a successful foreign policy.

Discounting the use of force is another facet of American legalism-moralism. We place a great deal of faith in nonviolent means of pursuing national objectives and consistently underestimate the significance of force in the international political process.

Pragmatism and Liberalism

We are pragmatists and problem-solvers, not theorists. Based on the frontier tradition, we tend to look at the closest problem as something to be solved immediately, with no thought for what lies over the next hill. While pragmatism should be a hallmark of strategy, our tendency to immediately focus on the most visible or urgent problem limits our perspective. It can limit vision and a sense of the interdependency of issues. One author has examined President Bush's predilection for this type of behavior and characterized it as, "tactical mastery ... strategic indirection."⁷² We like to see results quickly--in our quarterly balance sheets and from our foreign policy--and are impatient. We are more comfortable with crisis management than long-range planning.

We also have embedded in our political culture the "Locke-ian" idea of the sanctity of the individual. While it is one of our bedrocks, the problems in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and elsewhere illustrate the potential for the use of violence by minorities in the cause of self-determination. Individualism has its price, both in government inefficiency and in blood.

⁷¹ "The Emerging World Order," Americans Talk Issues Survey #16 (Washington, D.C.: The Americans Talk Issues Foundation, 1991), p. 1.

⁷² Terry L. Deibel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," Foreign Policy, Fall 1991: p. 3.

We Americans are the sum of our contradictions, as is our foreign policy. Alexis de Tocqueville observed aristocratically that, "Almost all of the defects inherent in democratic institutions are brought to light in the conduct of foreign affairs; their advantages are less perceptible."⁷³ Our contradictions will have an impact on our views of America's role and objectives in a New World Order.

What These Mean For America's Role and Objectives in a New World Order

First, we should eliminate those hypotheses that suggest either that foreign-policy goals and diplomatic behavior are merely a response to domestic opinions or that public attitudes are virtually ignored as important components of a definition of a situation.⁷⁴

There are two major themes in this section. Both are tied to the presumption that American policy and national security strategy, in order to be legitimate, must reflect to some degree the will of the American people. The first theme is that America is turning inward: the American public feels there are too many challenges we need to face at home for the United States to be very internationalist in outlook. The second theme deals with the views of the American public on the shape of the New World Order and the role the United States should play.

America is Turning Inward

A fundamental shift has taken place in the way Americans think about national security. Sometime during the late 1980s, people started to consider nonmilitary issues a more serious threat to our national security than military issues. In 1990, the Americans Talk Security Project asked people to name what they considered to be the "one or two greatest threats to our country's national security." Ninety percent cited nonmilitary threats, such as violent crime, pollution, health-care costs, the federal budget deficit, nuclear waste, and economic competition from other countries. Only 51 percent named military threats, such as nuclear weapons, terrorism, conflicts in the Third World, and Communist aggression [in addition to the nonmilitary threats also cited].

William Schneider⁷⁵

Americans are beginning to turn inward again, as they have in the aftermath of most of our wars. The end of the Cold War is not different in this regard. They are still internationalist in *principle*, but are concerned about our ability to pay for "good causes" outside our borders when they are plenty of challenges within our country. In 1991, the Americans Talk Issues

⁷³ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy In America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 240.

⁷⁴ K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Fifth Edition) (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 342.

⁷⁵ Schneider, p. 55.

Foundation found that what America learned from the Gulf War is the value of multilateralism, a need for a larger role for the United Nations, and the need to address shared threats. Americans are quite prepared to use American military power overseas but they believe the financial costs should be shared.⁷⁶

Many Americans support a strong U.S. role in the world. "The public remains strongly committed to an on-going leading role for the United States in the world, even developing new NATO-like treaty and military commitments in the Middle East" for example.⁷⁷ Still they resist "foreign" spending and strongly support addressing problems at home.⁷⁸ More than two-thirds of the public said, "the U.S. faces problems at home that require greater attention to domestic, rather than foreign and military needs."⁷⁹ The majority of the public is decidedly insular: strongly committed to addressing problems at home rather than spending money overseas. Strategists will have difficulty in convincing the American public that programs overseas are more pressing than at home. That bodes ill for large amounts of aid to the struggling republics of the former Soviet Union, for example.

The Shape of the New World Order

Through the experience of the [Gulf] war, the American people have settled on some relatively clear and consistent principles that might help guide reactions to future events--the appropriateness of military force where sanctions fail, burden sharing among allies and affected countries, a lead role for the United Nations, the aspiration to broader cooperation in dealing with foreign threats, though a willingness to act alone if necessary, and support for international agreements to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons.⁸⁰

In turning inward, Americans are not ignoring the rest of the world. The inclination stems from a perceived lack of means. We only have so much money and need to spend it on problems we face in this country. When questioned on their views of the shape of the New World Order, the public has definite ideas. According to the authors of "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," the American public is "now enthusiastic about a number of principles for governing behavior among nations in this new era."⁸¹

⁷⁶ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," Americans Talk Issues Survey #15 (Washington, D.C.: The Americans Talk Issues Foundation, 1991), p. 16.

⁷⁷ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 13.

⁷⁸ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 9.

⁷⁹ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 12.

⁸⁰ "The Emerging World Order," p. 9.

⁸¹ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 16.

People believe there should be a "general understanding among nations," backed up by the "military force" of "the United States and other nations," to stop any country "threatening to use chemical or nuclear weapons" (92 percent agree, 74 percent strongly) or any country invading another. That broad consensus on multilateralism and common threats carries over to other realms where there is near universal support for the U.S. using "its position to get other countries to join together to take action against world environmental problems (93 percent, 69 percent strongly).⁸²

There is also a sizable majority of Americans who support a pragmatic and less idealistic U.S. role in the world, where the United States uses "its aid, weapons and alliances to maintain a balance of power between hostile countries" in certain parts of the world.⁸³

Conclusions

The next few years will be tough for the advocates of foreign aid. The mood of the American public is fairly clear: purely altruistic objectives outside this country are at the bottom of the list of priorities. These include helping to improve the standard of living of less-developed countries or helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations. As William Schneider says, the public's attitude seems to be, "Who cares?" when it comes to these goals.

Do-good internationalism is not very popular, whether it is of the liberal variety (improving the standard of living of poorer countries) or the approach favored by President Reagan (exporting democracy to other countries).⁸⁴

This is a sign of the times. In the aftermath of winning the Cold War, the American public's perception of relative security has not improved. While we feel more secure militarily, we feel less secure economically. The aims of our national security strategy need to change from security in the traditional sense to security in the economic sense. We need to pursue the national self-interest in this regard. This is more than the "erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions" that George Kennan and others have found dangerous.⁸⁵ As the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls have shown, the American people have long put the economic self-interest at the top of the priority list.

We are Americans and, as such, have had continuous threads throughout our foreign policy. Some are complementary. Some are mutually exclusive. But, taken together, they result in a

⁸² "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 16.

⁸³ "The New World Order--What the Peace Should Be," p. 17.

⁸⁴ Schneider, p. 46.

⁸⁵ Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, p. 92.

caveat to Thucydides' advice to be realistic in the pursuit of self-interest: Americans have essential features, characteristics, values, and contradictions that make us Americans. Among those are a strong sense of individualism and a political system that make defining the national interest difficult and can make the state less efficient in the pursuit of a defined national interest.

On the issues of morality, idealism, and the pursuit of the national interest in statecraft, we are dealing with the United States, a sum of its people. Just as we have alternated between extroversion and introversion, the United States and its foreign policy have always contained elements of both idealism and realism. As Alexander DeConde suggests,

... those who formulate foreign policy cannot do so solely in terms of power, as if they were playing a game. Domestic affairs and intangibles, such as national character and the passions of nationalism, sometimes carry greater weight in the making of foreign policy than does the strategy of power politics.⁸⁶

Thus, while Thucydides has intuitive appeal, his views on morality and its limited role have to be tempered by the fact that a "government of the people, by the people, for the people" cannot solely base its actions on unsentimental appraisals of interest. We stand for ideals as well and those must be entered into the calculus.

⁸⁶ Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, second edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 2.

Chapter 4

Interests

*If some governments operate to fulfill a series of logically consistent goals, many more do not seem to be working toward the achievement of any specific objective or, at best, seem to improvise policies to meet specific domestic or external crises or commitments. ... As one British diplomat has claimed, "most important decisions are often made, not as part of a concerted and far-sighted policy, but under the urgent pressure of some immediate crisis."*⁸⁷

Introduction

Why are interests so important? Because they help to define the problem and the situation. As a nation of pragmatists, we tend to leap immediately into the fray without pausing to define the problem or determine the actual national interests involved. The process of defining national interests provides the focus for decision makers. National interests help leaders separate the wheat from the chaff, to distill the national purpose from the cacophony of cries that make the United States "one nation, many voices." Put in a more philosophical vein, the pursuit of interests--national and self--is the common characteristic that nations and men share. Interests are the key to discerning national and individual purpose. National interests *justify* policy. They determine what is desirable.

But if the answer to "Why?" is clear, the answer to "What?" is less so. The answer to the question, "What are the national interests of the United States?" depends upon whom you ask. Ask a farmer in North Dakota and the answer will likely be to find new markets for agricultural products. Ask a member of the military and the answer will likely be to have strong armed forces. Ask a member of the Center for Democratic Institutions and the answer will likely be to aid the struggles of fledging democracies around the world. But these individual answers are the undistilled "many voices." They do not represent the true national interest. These answers may indeed be the objectives our national security policy will pursue, but they are not the national interests which must shape that policy. The voices must be distilled into truly national interests, not merely regional or personal interests. Distillation is a political process. As Donald Nuechterlein said in 1985,

U.S. national interests are the product of a political process in which the country's elected national leadership arrives at decisions about the importance of specific external events that affect the nation's political and economic well-be-

⁸⁷ K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis Fifth Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 119.

ing. Clearly, the determination of national interests is influenced, especially in a representative democracy, by the needs and aspirations of interest groups, bureaucratic structures, and various political factions; but ultimately the President has to make a judgment about the extent to which the national interest is involved in a specific issue or crisis.⁸⁸

The President gets plenty of advice in this process from the Congress, the media, special interests, and the public. The result is that there are many definitions of national interest, most of which do not lend themselves to precision in policy-making. In finding a set of answers to "What are the national interests?" we need to understand why the answers are so hard to find. Surely we can agree on our national interests, can't we?

Well, we can't, or, at least, we do not agree often and not for very long. Since the days of Washington and Hamilton, American foreign policy has been, for the most part, rooted in the pursuit of national self-interest, not sentiment. But the concept of self-interest has changed. In the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of national self-interest became so broad that the problems of people everywhere in the world became the concerns of Americans. In 1990, Pat Buchanan said,

"National purpose" has become a vessel, emptied of original content, into which ideologues of all shades and hues are invited to pour their own causes, their own visions.⁸⁹

Mr. Buchanan's tense and word choice are wrong. The "national purpose" has not *become* a vessel, it has always *been* a vessel, or, perhaps, a melting pot. Into that pot we throw the hot-button issues of interest groups, the media, Congress, the administration, and the body politic. The views of the last component have always been the most difficult to discern as a specific foreign-policy issue is never placed on a ballot.

All of these inputs must be distilled to their most basic elements: interests at a national level.

What answers does this chapter offer? The national interest can be distilled into four basic interests, as shown in Figure 4-1.

⁸⁸ Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 7.

⁸⁹ Patrick J. Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," The National Interest (Spring 1990): p. 77.




Figure 4-1. The Interests Sub-Menu

The chorus of many voices can be distilled into four basic interests:

- **National security:** This interest is defined as the protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers. It includes American citizens, property, and investments overseas.
- **Economic well-being:** This interest is defined as the economic prosperity of the citizens of the United States through the promotion of U.S. trade and investment.
- **Value projection:** This interest is defined as the promulgation overseas of a set of values that we as Americans believe are worthy of emulation.
- **Accumulation of Power and Influence:** This aspect of the national interest is different from the three above, as it is a *means*, rather than an end. It defines the pursuit of the national interest in terms of power. Since we cannot predict the future with any accuracy, a basic interest of the United States should be the accumulation of power and influence against the day when it will be needed to pursue other national interests.

National Security

There are many different definitions of self-preservation and national security. But most would agree that the highest priority for any national security strategy is to "ensure the sovereignty and independence of the *home* territory and to perpetuate a particular political, social,

and economic system" based on the beliefs of those who live in that territory.⁹⁰ The 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States describes this most fundamental of objectives this way,

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.⁹¹

A central part of this interest is the inclusion under its protective wing of Americans and their interests overseas. Nuechterlein terms this as extending the *public interest*, which may be viewed as the well-being of the American people within the territorial boundaries of the United States, to the *national interest*, which includes the well-being of Americans and American enterprises operating *outside* the boundaries of the United States.⁹² This extension also applies to the economic well-being of the United States which depends on external trade and investments.

It's important to note the integral features of national security interest as defined in the National Security Strategy of the United States. The first, and a pre-condition for the second, is, "The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation," which can be summarized as the physical security of the nation. This means secure borders, freedom from blackmail or other forms of coercive behavior, and independence of action.

The second feature is embodied in the phrase, "with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure." Americans have enjoyed a benefit few others in this world have enjoyed. Since our inception as a nation, we have enjoyed a democratic form of government with its guarantee of the rights of the individual. Few Americans would choose to live in this country if it was governed in an autocratic or dictatorial manner. Thus, the "national security" interest includes the physical security of the country *and* its democratic form of government. They are indivisible as defined by the *national security* interest. This does not preclude extra-democratic actions taken in response to perceived danger; for example, President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, or the restriction of other rights by presidents during later wars.

In a 1977 article in Orbis, Fred Sondermann refers to the efforts of Alexander George and Robert Keohane to "imbue the term [national interest] with specific meaning."⁹³ According to Sondermann, they wrote about three "irreducible" national interests:

⁹⁰ Holsti, p. 124.

⁹¹ National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 3.

⁹² Nuechterlein, p. 6.

⁹³ Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis (Spring 1977): p. 125.

... physical survival--by which they meant the survival of people, not necessarily the preservation of territory or sovereignty; liberty--by which they meant the ability of inhabitants of a country to choose their form of government and to exercise a set of individual rights defined by law and protected by the state; and economic subsistence--the maximization of economic welfare.⁹⁴

The third of George and Keohane's "irreducible" interests, economic welfare, is the subject of the next section.

Economic Well-Being

The National Security Strategy of the United States defines this goal as the pursuit of a "healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad." This goal was not invented by the present administration. As Alexander DeConde stated in A History of American Foreign Policy,

Throughout its history the United States has been one of the world's major trading nations. From the beginning, therefore, notable principles in American foreign policy have been the promotion and protection of trade, and later, of investment and industry abroad. Many of the memorable phrases that stud the vocabulary of our diplomatic history, such as freedom of the seas, the Open Door, and Dollar Diplomacy, reflect the pervasive impact of those economic concerns.⁹⁵

In discussing the component parts of the "national interest," it's important to note that, unlike the assumption of the traditional realist, the United States is not an impermeable nation-state with a rigid set of hierarchical interests in priority order. There has been competition from the first among the various components and the economic interest has historically done well in the competition. An early example is the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in 1816 to defy the U.S. Supreme Court and uphold,

... the validity of a contract to buy a British license--a kind of safe-conduct pass on the high-seas--for an American freighter during the War of 1812. The ostensible rationale was a legal one. But the political factor can hardly be ignored. Uninterrupted trade for New England ranked among the local establishment far ahead of the national interest, especially during the War of 1812.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Sonderrmann, p. 125. Sonderrmann provided this citation: "Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interest: Uses and Limitations," in Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, *Appendices*, vol. 2, pp. 67-68."

⁹⁵ DeConde, p. 11.

⁹⁶ Liva Baker, The Justice From Beacon Hill--The Life and Times of Oliver Wendell Holmes (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 281.

Nuechterlein states that the national economic interest "was historically the most important interest of this country because geography made it possible for the nation to concentrate its energies on trade and commerce rather than [on] defense of its territory."⁹⁷ That historical priority may be true again in the 1990s and it is important to remember that we have gone to war at least three times since 1776 over economic issues: 1812, 1917, and 1991.

Value Projection

Nuechterlein defines this interest as, "Promulgation of a set of values that U.S. leaders believe to be universally good and worthy of emulation by other countries."⁹⁸ This component of the national interest has long been a central feature of our national security strategy but is coming under increasing scrutiny. Pat Buchanan advises us that,

... we should look, too, with a cold eye on the internationalist set, never at a loss for new ideas to divert U.S. wealth and power into crusades and causes having little or nothing to do with the true national interest of the United States. High among these is the democraticist temptation, the worship of democracy as a form of governance and the concomitant ambition to see all mankind embrace it, or explain why not.⁹⁹

Where Buchanan's analysis fails is that he has skipped a step. He suggests that because we can not afford to project our values overseas, based on our limited means, that value projection is not in our interest. But *means* do not limit interests; they limit the *objectives* that we can pursue actively. The internationalist goals Buchanan denigrates have commanded the loyalty of figures as different as Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan because of the hard lessons learned during this century.

The first lesson was that the United States would never know genuine security, lasting peace, and sustained prosperity unless the world also knew security, peace, and prosperity. The second lesson was that international security is indivisible--that the discontent that produced extremism and aggression was highly contagious and bound to spread. The third lesson was that the only way to achieve our fundamental interests was to eliminate the conditions that breed extremism.¹⁰⁰ The sum of all these lessons is that our security is tied to the rest of the world. Democratic systems and other values of the United States, when projected overseas, can help to offer solutions to eliminating the conditions that breed extremism and ultimately threaten the security of the United States. Alas, this situation is also not black or white, as demonstrated

⁹⁷ Nuechterlein, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Nuechterlein, p. 8.

⁹⁹ Patrick J. Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," The National Interest (Spring 1990): p. 81.

¹⁰⁰ Alan Tonelson, "What is the National Interest?" The Atlantic Monthly (July 1991): p. 35-6.

be the recent near-accession to power of an Islamic fundamentalist group in Algeria through democratic means.

Value projection is a national interest shared by most idealists and some realists. The concept of the national interest defined in terms of power is a realist notion and the subject of the next section.

Accumulation of Power and Influence

The final "national interest"--the accumulation of power and influence--has its basis in Hans Morgenthau's contention that, "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."¹⁰¹ Like other nations, the United States must pursue its interests in an uncertain world. We cannot predict the exact nature of the circumstances in which we will have to operate or the nature of the situations and problems we will face. That uncertainty makes accumulating power and influence, for the time when they will be needed, in our national interest.

The pursuit of other national interests all ultimately rest on the latent and mobilized instruments of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, political, and moral. Like a boxer, the United States needs to stay in shape for the next fight by training and building up strength and endurance. We may struggle for freedom and physical security, we may pursue economic well-being for American citizens at home and abroad, or we may strive to project our democratic values to struggling republics overseas. But the accomplishment of all these national interests depends on the exercise of power and influence. Accumulating power and influence for the time it is needed is in the national interest.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the distilled spirits--the national interests--which result from the "many voices" of Americans, each purporting to be the true national interest. Maintaining a focus on the national interests can provide the stars by which statesmen can navigate while they are tossed by the waves and tempests of international discord.

¹⁰¹ Morgenthau, p. 27.

Chapter 5

Threats

For the first time in over half a century, no single great power, or coalition of powers, poses a "clear and present danger" to the national security of the United States.

John Lewis Gaddis, Spring 1991 ¹⁰²

During the Cold War, the strategist had an easier time of it in some respects. If the interests of the United States could not be clearly defined in a certain situation, and thus a plan developed to directly pursue those interests, then the strategist could at least counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In many instances, frustrating *Soviet* interests or advocating a course of action that responded directly to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union were seen as the next best course of action for U.S. planners. In many cases, such as in Afghanistan beginning in 1979, that course appeared to be successful.

While the United States had little intrinsic interest in Afghanistan, with the possible exception of its role as a potential route to oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, frustrating Soviet efforts to subdue the Afghan rebels furthered American interests in at least two ways. First, the Soviets lost influence with other Muslim countries while America gained influence both as a reaction to the Soviet action and in response to United States' support of the mujihadeen. In what was seen as a zero-sum game, that was important, especially in light of the traditional U.S. tilt toward Israel. Second, the Soviets were distracted by the war from other adventures which might have attacked American interests directly, and the reaction to the quagmire in the Soviet Union helped to speed Gorbachev's internal reforms later in the 1980s. But on other occasions, responding to the Soviet threat did not automatically further American interests. In Vietnam, that course of action actually harmed rather than advanced American interests.

Rather than defining actual U.S. interests in Vietnam, the locale was seen as the next ideological battleground between the West and East. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations perceived a threat to U.S. interests because of the tenor of the times, familiar to students of the era: a loss anywhere was thought to be a loss everywhere. Thus, American leaders thought the loss of an American ally such as South Vietnam would have a significant impact on the perceptions of other U.S. allies. It followed to the "best and brightest" that we had to counter the Soviet threat in the nation of North Vietnam. They assumed it was automatically in our interest.

¹⁰² John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991): p. 102.

The end of the Cold War offers an opportunity to shift from threat-based thinking. Threats will not be as focused as they were during the Cold War and the United States would be better advised to pursue directly the national interests.

While no single great power may threaten the security of the United States, that does not mean threats to the United States have disappeared with the end of the Cold War. They have changed. They are multidimensional and multipolar.

In keeping with the thought that strategy should be interest-based rather than threat-based, the threats will be organized according to the four national interests posited in Chapter 3, as shown in Figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1. National Interests Sub-Menu

In this chapter, the threats to the United States will be addressed as they threaten the four interests, which were defined in the previous chapter.

Threats to National Security

For the purposes of this paper, the "national security" interest is defined as the protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers. It includes American citizens, property, and investments overseas. It is interesting to note that the 1991 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States does not even have a "Threats" section, unlike earlier versions in which it was of premier importance. But whether dangers to our national security are called "opportunities" or "threats," they still exist and the first threat to this interest did not die with the end of the Cold War.

Nuclear Threat from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The CIS nuclear force is still the world's largest and potentially the most devastating threat to the national security of the United States. While the end of the ideological conflict reduces the "intention" component of the threat, the "capability" component cannot be overlooked, especially when one considers the ethnic, religious, and nationalistic violence in the republics where nuclear weapons are stationed. Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are home to both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and some of the worst violence. As Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said in Military Forces in Transition,

The former USSR remains a nuclear superpower in the midst of a revolution--a situation without parallel in history. The continuing existence of enormous military capabilities in a state which is in the throes of a revolution--and the accompanying potential for violence and chaos--presents a new kind of security challenge for the United States and its allies.¹⁰³

Rise of Weapon States

The rise of weapon states, to use Charles Krauthammer's term for the emergence of small aggressive states armed with the weapons of mass destruction and possessing the means to deliver them, makes the coming decades a time of heightened, not diminished, threat of war.¹⁰⁴ The post-Cold War world is marked shifting threats to U.S. national security. The demise of the Soviet Union may have reduced the threat from its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. But that world will also see a dramatic increase in the number of other states with the capability to deliver those weapons anywhere on earth. According to Secretary Cheney,

By the year 2000, more than two dozen developing nations will have ballistic missiles, fifteen of those countries will have the scientific skills to make their own, and half of them either have or are near to getting nuclear capability, as well. Thirty countries will have chemical weapons and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons.¹⁰⁵

The Weapon State is marked by several characteristics that increase the threat to the national security of the United States:

- It is not much of a nation state. The lack of national identity raises the potential for internal strife and national insecurity, both sources of a desire for the leadership to turn

¹⁰³ Military Forces in Transition (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91 (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1991): p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Krauthammer, p. 30.

to outside aggression. Weapons of mass destruction offer international legitimacy their other national attributes do not justify.

- The national leadership structure has an extraordinary degree of social control exercised by a powerful, often repressive and authoritarian state apparatus. National leaders frequently answer to no one but themselves.
- Current Weapon States (such as Iraq, North Korea, and possibly Libya) are deeply antagonistic against the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. For ideological and/or historic reasons, they are deeply resentful of what they see as a Western-imposed status quo.

The CIS nuclear capability and the threat from Weapon states endanger our physical survival. But, as defined in this essay, our "national security" interest includes the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions. One of the most dangerous and persistent threats to those values and institutions is posed by narcotics trafficking and the consumption of illicit drugs in the United States.

Narcotics Trafficking

In 1989, Michael Dziedzic said in Survival,

Drug addiction is a scourge that transcends the wreckage it has made of countless individual lives. Measured on a societal scale, the destructive consequences can include a soaring violent crime rate, an enormous waste of human potential, and the squandering of vast financial resources to feed a nation's collective drug habit or to repair its effects.¹⁰⁶

Drug consumption in the United States presents a "clear and present danger" to the cherished values, fundamental institutions, and vitality of the nation. Increased violent crime, the breakdown of the family unit in many cases, lost productivity, the spread of AIDS, and the tremendous societal and financial costs stemming from the lifetime care that will be required for "crack babies" are among the many deleterious results of narcotics trafficking and consumption in the United States. According to the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States,

No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the trade in drugs as all too familiar. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with a vast, debilitating black market and large

¹⁰⁶ Michael Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security," Survival (November-December 1989): p. 533.

funding requirements for enforcement, criminal justice, prevention and treatment systems.¹⁰⁷

Narcotics trafficking endangers our national security through threatening the fundamental values and institutions we hold dear: the American family, liberal democratic traditions, and law and order. It also affects our economic well-being through the diversion of billions of dollars into an illegal economy and through deleterious impacts on American productivity. But it doesn't stop there. As will be discussed later, it also poses a threat to value projection overseas and the accumulation of power and influence. Narcotics trafficking threatens all national interests.

Threats to American Economic Well-Being

The "economic well-being" interest is defined as the promotion of U.S. trade and investment, both internally and externally. If the ideological threat from the Soviet Union has ended with the end of the Cold War, threats to American economic well-being show no sign of abating. If anything, they are multiplying. As C. Fred Bergsten said in Foreign Affairs,

Moreover the United States is in relative economic decline, caught in scissors movement between increasing dependence on external economic forces and a shrinking capacity to influence those factors. The share of international trade in the American economy has tripled over the last four decades, and is about as great as in the economies of Japan or of the European Community as a group. The United States has become the world's largest debtor country and will continue to rely on capital inflows of over \$100 billion per year to finance its external deficits for the foreseeable future.¹⁰⁸

For purposes of this paper, threats to American economic well-being will be grouped under two headings: external threats and internal threats.

External Threats to American Economic Well-Being

The United States may, in the word's of one observer, indeed be the "only superpower in both military and economic terms,"¹⁰⁹ but the economic source of that power is being eroded and America's position is likely to continue to decline relative to its competitors.

Economic and Commercial Threats From Western Europe and Asia. Economic growth is now much more rapid in Western Europe and Asia than in the United States. Bergsten feels economic growth is likely to continue there at four percent a year or so through most of the

¹⁰⁷ National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 17.

¹⁰⁸ C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1990): p. 97.

¹⁰⁹ Bergsten, p. 96.

1990s, compared to an annual growth rate of between two and two-and-a-half percent in the United States over the same period.¹¹⁰ America's share of world trade is less than the European Community's, and the global role of the dollar has fallen while the Deutsche mark and the yen have become more widely used. The recent decision by the European Community (EC) to move to a common European monetary unit will only accelerate this process. Productivity is also rising faster in the Asia than in the United States.

American frustration with Japan remains high and the trade deficit combined with Japanese market restrictions continue to provide a source of friction. Japan and the other Asian tigers are aiming toward technological superiority to match their high quality.

After Canada, the EC is the United States' largest trading partner but the economic future is not bright. The EC's study of the unification of the European market predicts that imports from outside the community will decline in almost every sector as a result of the removal of remaining internal trade barriers.¹¹¹

Bergsten also offers a disturbing future alternative: a European-Japan nexus stemming from widespread doubts about America's economic future. Europe and Japan are,

... likely to enjoy higher growth rates than America during the coming critical transitional period--perhaps by a substantial margin. Their economic policies, especially toward international issues, have tended to be more stable and predictable. They will thus offer attractive markets and business partners for interpenetration, via both trade and investment, as reflected in the recent linkup between Mitsubishi and Daimler-Benz to conduct joint aerospace research and possibly cooperate in automobile production.¹¹²

Instability in the Middle East. As the world's economy grows, so does its thirst for oil. The economic well-being of the United States is dependent on secure sources of relatively cheap oil and that makes instability in the Middle East a direct threat to American economic well-being. About two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves are located in the Middle East. This largest source of the essential lubricant of the American economy is also racked by ethnic, religious, tribal, and nationalist strife. In 1990, Saddam Hussein achieved control over 20 percent of the world's reserves when he invaded Kuwait and was within reach of another 25 percent in Saudi Arabia. Other sources of conflict will stem from demographic pressures, uneven economic development, religious fundamentalism and radicalism, and other destabilizing factors.

¹¹⁰ Bergsten, p. 97.

¹¹¹ Bergsten, p. 99-100.

¹¹² Bergsten, p. 103.

Internal Threats to American Economic Well-Being

In a 1991 article in Foreign Affairs,¹¹³ Robert Hormats describes three internal factors that threaten the long-term future of American economic well-being:

- America appears unable to educate and productively mobilize to the fullest extent possible its vast human resources. In particular, it has failed to assimilate and gainfully employ a substantial portion of its large racial minorities. America stands out among the large industrialized democracies for its racial and ethnic diversity. The diversity has historically been a source of economic strength and dynamism. It could become a source of political friction, social fragmentation, and economic disarray unless the country can better educate, motivate, and employ its growing population of minorities.
- America is undergoing a collapse of the intergenerational social contract, which is exemplified by a national preoccupation with short-term parochial interests at the expense of long-term national interests. The national commitment to the well-being of future generations, which led to an implicit but long-standing contract to save for the future, support a sound educational system, and maintain the physical infrastructure, is giving way to a national short-sightedness. Instead of the "ant ethic" of the past, always saving for the future, we are becoming a nation of grasshoppers, addicted to funding more programs than we are willing to pay for. The legacy for the nation's children is massive debt rather than a better life.
- We are avoiding individual and collective responsibility for making controversial decisions needed to change course. Individual responsibility seems to be a thing of the past. Many segments of society have come to blame their problems on others, to employ the rhetoric of victimization rather than enterprise and self-discipline, and to look to the government for solutions, rather than depending on individual initiative.

Threats to Value Projection

The value-projection interest is defined as the promulgation overseas of a set of values that we as Americans believe are worthy of emulation. The first threat to this interest is posed by narcotics trafficking which, through corruption, crime, and intimidation, erodes or weakens democratic structures in producing and consuming countries. The second threat to value projection is posed by competing ideologies, such as Muslim fundamentalism. The third threat to

¹¹³ Robert Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1991): p. 135-6.

the projection of American values is posed by environmental threats which cross the boundaries between nations.

Environmental Threats

American values are threatened by demographic, resource, and climatic issues which will be grouped under environmental threats. In some cases, these environmental threats endanger values both at home and abroad, which means that environmental dangers can threaten the national security interest and the value projection interest.

Demographic Issues. Population growth lies at the core of most environmental trends. It took 130 years for world population to grow from one to two billion. It will take only a decade to climb from today's five billion to 2000's six billion.¹¹⁴ Even though the United States is only growing at just under one percent annually, and is only a minor contributor to the growing global population, the growth in the total population will increase the demand for resources and, thus, the competition. The increasing population will accelerate the use of non-renewable resources such as oil, upon which our economy depends. It will also accelerate the loss of our planet's genetic diversity.

In the competition between more people and non-human species, the latter will lose. With the loss of the forests, in order to provide arable land, we will lose the genetic diversity of the planet. The loss will be felt aesthetically, scientifically, and economically.

Resource Issues. Society has not reached the limit of growth on this planet, but the pace of growth is accelerating, as are the deleterious impacts of the sheer numbers of people. Global economic output has quadrupled since 1950 and it must continue to grow to provide just the basics for the world's expanding population. But that economic growth will require more energy use, more emissions, more waste, more land converted from forest (which will contribute its own problems), more raw materials, more pollution. As Jessica Tuchman Mathews said in a 1989 Foreign Affairs article,

Moreover, for the first time in its history, mankind is rapidly--if inadvertently--altering the basic physiology of the planet. Global changes currently taking place in the chemical composition of the atmosphere, in the genetic diversity of the species inhabiting the planet, and in the cycling of vital chemicals through the oceans, atmosphere, biosphere and geosphere, are unprecedented in both their pace and scale. If left unchecked, the consequences will be profound and, unlike familiar types of local damage, irreversible.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Mathews, p. 163.

¹¹⁵ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989): p. 163.

The voracious demand for resources is already having an impact on the government and individuals. The costs of fertilizers to replenish once productive soil, the damage those fertilizers do when they run off into bays and estuaries, soil erosion, and the damaging impacts of the improper use of pesticides are among the many impacts of the demand for food to feed the growing multitudes.

Climatic Issues. We are altering the environment on a planetary scale. Global warming, the most damaging result of our conducting an experiment in the only laboratory we have to live in, will drastically alter the climate. Higher temperatures caused by the absorption of sunlight in the higher concentrations of carbon dioxide and other gases will reduce our capability to feed the larger population we will have in the century. The result will be conflict over the available food and arable land.

In future years, these environmental threats may be threats to our national survival. Today, they are threats to the quality of life. Thus, I have lumped them under threats to value projection. Part of today's debate over responses is shaped by the prioritization of these threats. Critics who charge the Bush Administration is not doing enough to combat global warming and other environmental threats base their arguments on the threat to national and global survival.

Threats to American Power and Influence

The threats discussed previously present tangible dangers to three American national interests: national security, economic well-being, and value projection. There is a fourth interest, however, which was first defined by Hans Morgenthau: the accumulation of American power and influence. In Morgenthau's view, all nations seek power and influence as the most fundamental national interest. While this essay does not take this extreme position, there are situations in which statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.¹¹⁶

Power and influence provides the *means* to achieve national interests, the *ends* of a national security strategy. But, national power and influence can be considered as both a means *and* an end. As a means, it has extrinsic value in that it allows a country to pursue goals and objectives. As an end, it has intrinsic value in that national power is the guard which makes countries less likely to threaten the national interests of a country seen to be powerful.

National power and influence stems from the attractiveness of a country's ideology, the *skill* of a country's diplomats, the strength of a country's economy, and the military forces at a coun-

¹¹⁶ Morgenthau, p. 5.

try's disposal. Threats to America's ability to accumulate power and influence are both external and internal.

External Threats

The primary external threats to American power and influence, as well as to the projection of American values, are competing ideologies such as radical Muslim fanaticism and Communism. The internal values of these ideologies are fundamentally opposed to American values and make it unlikely that there can be shared long-term interests. These ideologies are also "export oriented;" the leaders of countries who believe in these ideologies seek to export their values and convert others, who are likely to share their distrust of the West. It is in the national interest of the United States to seek to contain these fundamentally incompatible ideologies because they will limit the ability of the United States to accomplish other national interests.

Internal Threats

Internal threats to American power and influence are those factors which make the United States appear ineffectual or otherwise incapable of accomplishing its goals. Examples include perceived American weakness in dealing with pressing problems such as declining productivity, ineffective education, the growing "underclass," and the federal deficit. The perception of weakness created by our inability to address pressing problems detracts from overall American power and influence. Figure 5-2 provides a summary of national interests and threats to those interests.

<i>National Interests and Threats</i>	
<u>National Interests</u>	<u>Threats</u>
National Security	CIS Nuclear Capability Weapon States Narcotics Trafficking
Economic Well-Being	Economic and Commercial threats from Europe/Asia Middle East Instability
Value Projection	Environmental threats (Resource, Demographic, Climatic)
Power and Influence	Competing Ideologies

Figure 5-2. National Interests and Threats

In presenting these national interests with opposing threats, it's important to note that some threats can be considered to endanger more than one national interest. Narcotics trafficking--which threatens national security, economic well-being, and the projection of American values--is the best example of this type of threat.

Chapter 6

Resources and Power

A generation ago the President [of the United States] had a trump card in dealing with foreign nations: to act as if they were not there. Europeans characterized this with the saying: Having America as an ally is like being in bed with an elephant. Mammoth military and economic force gave the United States a unique displacement in the international system. ¹¹⁷

As the words from Richard Rose's The Postmodern President indicate, a decade or two ago the United States was preeminent in the sum of power. While it was a bipolar world in some forms of competition, in the sum of all power--moral, economic, military, political--it was a unipolar world. Today it's hard to know what to think about the state of American power and influence. Which of the two "Ks,"--Krauthammer or Kennedy--should we believe?

In "The Unipolar Moment," Charles Krauthammer says that the conventional assumption regarding the demise of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world is wrong: there will *not* be "a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or) "Europe", China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia."¹¹⁸ On the contrary, Krauthammer sees the immediate post-Cold War world not as multipolar, but as unipolar:

The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies. ... The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment.¹¹⁹

On the other hand, we have Paul Kennedy, who likens the position of the United States to other "empires in decline," for example, pre-Revolutionary France of the 1780s and Great Britain of the 20th Century. In an article-length version of his book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Kennedy said,

In 1945 the United States commanded a 40 percent share of the world economy; today its share is half that, and yet our military commitments have grown dra-

¹¹⁷ Richard Rose, The Postmodern President, Second Edition (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), p. 27-8.

¹¹⁸ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91 (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 23.

¹¹⁹ Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," p. 23-4.

matically. This imbalance, which conforms to a classic historical pattern, threatens our security, both military and economic.¹²⁰

As is normally the case when we are presented with two answers--one black, the other white--the answer is gray. The United States is the only country with the military, economic, diplomatic, and political assets to be an important player any place in the world in which we choose to become involved. But we must also face what Kennedy calls "the two great tests that challenge the longevity of every major power that occupies the number-one position in world affairs:"

First, in the military-strategic realm, can it preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense commitments and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments? And second, as an intimately related question, can it preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of global production?¹²¹

If we are uncertain about the relative state of American power, we are equally uncertain as to what to do with the power we have. Americans are of two minds about our national power: we accept extravagant power as a national birthright, but we don't like to use or deal in power. Perhaps a nation-state psychoanalyst could find the roots of the dichotomy in our childhood: fleeing the old world for the new; shunning the balance-of-power politics of our European forebears; blessed with geographical separation so we did not have to learn to use power effectively or subtly. Be that as it may, a dichotomy exists between the possession of power and its uses.

Most Americans accept without question that the United States is the preeminent nation in the world. After all, we've been told since 1941 that this is the "American Century," and, to confirm our beliefs, we've seen great national prosperity and equally compelling political and military victories. In 1987, Professor Kennedy's book set off a firestorm of indignant response to his thesis that the United States might be in relative decline. For example, one of Kennedy's most distinguished critics, Samuel P. Huntington, said,

In contrast to other countries, the United States ranks extraordinarily high in almost all the major sources of national power: population size and education, natural resources, economic development, social cohesion, political stability, military strength, ideological appeal, diplomatic alliances, technological achievement.¹²²

¹²⁰ Paul Kennedy, "The (Relative) Decline of America," The Atlantic Monthly (August 1987): p. 29-30.

¹²¹ Kennedy, "The (Relative) Decline of America," p. 36.

¹²² Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.--Decline or Renewal," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988/89): p. 91.

Huntington's bone of contention with Kennedy was that *relative* American power is still "extraordinarily high." That may be true today, especially in light of the demise of our major competitor in the military and political sweepstakes: the Soviet Union. But if we fail to question our status and the state of American power; if we continue to accept that this "has been, is, and always will be" the American Century (forever and ever, amen), we will delude ourselves and will be in danger.

Is this the unipolar moment? Is the United States the most powerful nation on earth? If so, how long will that status last? Central to the discussion should be a reasoned investigation of four major categories of American power. Turning to the national security development menu, this chapter will cover four major categories of American power, or resources, as shown in Figure 6-1.




Figure 6-1. The Resources Sub-Menu

American resources and power are the sum of the individual sources of power: moral, military, economic, and political. Let's turn to the first of these: the moral power of the United States.

Moral Power

In Bound To Lead, Joseph Nye observes that nations are moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest which have marked earlier eras: "In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more impor-

tant, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important."¹²³ One can dismiss this as an attempt to explain the success or failure of the Japanese--who lack natural resources, large armed forces, and other accouterments--to fit the traditional model of a powerful nation-state. Or one can recognize that power, like so much else in international and personal life, can stem from intangible sources. Such is the case with moral power. As Nye says,

A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power--that is, getting others to want what you want--might be called indirect or co-optive power behavior.¹²⁴

Or it might be called *moral* power, which stems from the attractiveness of a nation's culture, ideology, and perceived role in international relations. The German teenagers who hammered the Berlin Wall in 1989 wore American bluejeans. The Soviet teenagers who defended the Russian parliament during the August 1991 coup listened to American music. The Chinese students who demonstrated for liberty in Tiananmen Square fashioned a replica of the Statue of Liberty as the symbol of their goals and aspirations. American movies, television, and music--American culture--are sought around the world.

The successful revolutions which have overthrown communist and other authoritarian regimes around the world have been fought by peoples in search of individual freedoms, rights, and "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." If the United States is sometimes seen as a heavy-handed giant--the elephant the Europeans have been sleeping with--it is also seen as a beacon for oppressed peoples around the world. The twin impacts of the American elephant were addressed in an editorial in The Washington Post by Michael Getler,

In Germany, in particular, it is an anti-Americanism that goes beyond what one encounters in Japan. "Anti-Americanism is very strong and not only on the left. It's very stylish because the U.S. is everything we hate to be and know we are," says Michael Stuermer, director of the Research Institute for International Affairs in Munich. "There is also a strong tendency to underestimate America," he says, "and that worries me very much." ... While the U.S.-led war in the Persian Gulf brought out hundreds of thousands of German protesters, Stuermer asks, "Where were the [Germans] when the people of Kuwait were being butchered?" "There is no mass peace movement in Germany against what is happening in Yugoslavia," adds German novelist Peter Schneider, "because the

¹²³ Joseph S. Nye, Bound To Lead (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 29.

¹²⁴ Nye, Bound To Lead, p. 31.

United States is not involved." And, he adds, there is no solution to the fighting there because America is not involved.¹²⁵

To Germans and to many others around the world, the attractiveness of our culture, the ethnic openness of our society, and the pluralistic appeal of the American political system are sources of American moral power. Haitians and others risk their lives to get to the United States. And others around the world who cannot or do not wish to leave their homelands, risk their lives to make their own countries like ours. But at a time when the ideology and culture of the United States are shining brightly, there are problems in our moral resources which will cause the light to dim; problems which have their roots in the very heart of American society and domestic politics.

As Robert Hormats said in 1991, in Foreign Affairs, these problems lie in a confluence of three factors:

America's apparent inability to educate and productively mobilize to the fullest extent possible its vast human resources and, in particular, its failure to assimilate and gainfully employ a substantial portion of its large racial minorities; collapse of the intergenerational social contract, exemplified by a national preoccupation with short-term parochial interests at the expense of long-term national interests; and avoidance of individual and collective responsibility for making the controversial decisions needed to change course.¹²⁶

These problems have their most detrimental impacts in the economic and political sources of power, but they are applicable to the moral source of power as well. As Hormats asks, can an America whose cities are in some parts indistinguishable from Third World slums, and whose already large underclass continues to fall behind the rest of society, maintain the moral authority required for world leadership when so many nations and peoples see a better quality of life as their overriding goal? Can an America in which large numbers of blacks and other minorities fall outside the productive economy and become alienated from mainstream society avoid the kind of social conflict that forces a country to turn inward and be a beacon to people of color who crave socio-economic equality? Can such an America provide an example to other nations trying to cope with their own racial heterogeneity, ethnic diversity, and increased immigration?¹²⁷ How long can those of the outside world, who gained their desire to be American by watching television and reading newspapers, be exposed to stories of America's prob-

¹²⁵ Michael Getler, "Decline and Resurgence: In Japan and Germany, Taking Leave of the American Century," The Washington Post 15 December 1991: C4.

¹²⁶ Robert Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1991): p. 135.

¹²⁷ Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," p. 138.

lems in making its society work before the American example becomes one to avoid rather than one to pursue?

America gains moral power because others want to be like us. Continuing to maintain moral power means we have to make life in America attractive. That means we have to solve our problems, rather than ignore them or bequeath them to the next generation.

Military Power

Regardless of the political outcome of the Gulf War, it's clear that the United States is the only country with the combination of moral, economic, political, and, most of all, *military* power necessary to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. What is equally clear, if less well known, is that in a few years an operation of that size will be beyond our capability.

By 1997, U.S. forces will be 25 percent smaller than today--1.6 million personnel in uniform compared to the present 2.1 million--if Bush Administration plans are adopted. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Les Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin), is advocating cuts in defense spending of at least \$110 billion and perhaps as high as \$150 billion over the next six years, more than twice the reductions proposed by the administration.¹²⁸ His plan, which has been endorsed by the Speaker of the House, Congressman Tom Foley (Democrat, Washington), would reduce overall troop strength to 1.4 million.¹²⁹ The president's Democratic opponents are calling for a peace dividend of \$180 to \$200 billion by 1997, compared to his approximately \$66 billion.¹³⁰

The U.S. military will be appreciably smaller by 1997. The only questions are how much smaller and how much capability will remain? If we use the money saved wisely, perhaps we will indeed be stronger, as the proponents of the cuts maintain. Regardless, both the military and the economic sources of power look to diminish over the next few years.

Economic Power

"When I was a kid, it was such a marvelous place," Junji Izumi said, poking disconsolately with his chopsticks at a dark red slice of raw tuna steak. "We

¹²⁸ "Representative Aspin Is Seeking To Cut \$110 Billion Of Defense Outlays," The Wall Street Journal 21 February 1992: p. 16-17.

¹²⁹ John Lancaster, "Aspin Seeks to Double Bush's Defense Cuts," The Washington Post 27 February 1992: A16.

¹³⁰ Leslie H. Gelb, "What Peace Dividend?" New York Times 21 February 1992: p. 31.

would see it on TV, and it was like the shining light of the world. So rich, so free--it used to be a place where dreams come true." The "marvelous place" that Izumi, a 39-year-old retailer, was lamenting in nostalgic tones at a teeming bar in this busy Tokyo suburb on a recent night is none other than the United States of America, a country that was once the stuff of dreams for nearly everyone in Japan--but evidently is no more.¹³¹

America's success in the Persian Gulf war was based on a variety of factors: the strength of the American-led coalition; the superbly fit, trained, equipped, and led forces; and the mistakes of the opponent are among the factors most commonly cited. But another factor served as the foundation for our success, as it has for all our wars in this century: the strength of the American economy. Without the enormous investment in education, industry, science, technology, and infrastructure of the past twenty years, the U.S. economy would not have been able to support the enormous effort required to transport 500,000-plus troops half-way around the world to successfully fight in the backyard of the world's fourth largest army. It bodes ill for the future, however, that at the same time that many in Congress and on the campaign trail are competing to see who can cut America's military the most, U.S. domestic savings are at a historic low and that investment in research and development, infrastructure, and education is inadequate. American relative economic strength is declining.

The reasons are many; the explanations varied. Paul Kennedy's best seller, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, argues that the cause of our failing economy and the major threat to America's status as a great power is "imperial overstretch." But as Robert Hormats writes,

The critical problem for the United States is not the roughly five percent of GNP that it spends on defense, a figure that in any case is destined to decline. It is the failure of the United States to use the other 95 percent of its GNP with maximum efficiency. The danger for the United States at the end of this century is not imperial overstretch but domestic underperformance--a failure to effectively mobilize America's considerable advantages and resources to meet the multiplicity of internal social, political[,] and economic challenges of the 1990s and the attendant consequences of such a failure for America's global role.¹³²

In today's world, in the absence of a ideological or military opponent, America's capability to act on the world stage is in large measure a reflection of our economic strength. The fact that our capability is weakening stems from domestic, not foreign, causes.

¹³¹ T.R. Reid and Paul Blustein, "Japanese View U.S. With New Negativity," The Washington Post 1 March 1992: A1.

¹³² Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," p. 137.

These causes include a low savings rate, deficient educational system at the secondary level, stagnant productivity stemming from poor work habits and lack of investment, and rising demand for welfare-state entitlements without and corresponding willingness to pay for them. The United States is both the richest nation in the world and the least taxed.¹³³ Over the last thirty years, taxes have remained almost fixed (rising from 18.3 percent to 19.6 percent of GNP) and defense spending has declined from 25 percent to about five percent of GNP.¹³⁴ At the same time, spending for domestic entitlements has nearly doubled. At the same time that the Reagan Administration and Congress cut taxes during the 1980s, spending on social programs and income entitlements grew from \$313 billion to \$533 billion per year, twice the increase of the Carter Administration.¹³⁵ The combination of increased spending with no comparable revenue increases has resulted in massive deficits.

Budget deficits are the chief cause of trade deficits, which in turn require the United States to borrow huge sums, much of it from abroad in the past, which has added to both our external independence and restricted our flexibility.¹³⁶ Elimination of budget deficits is as necessary as it is unlikely.

As a result, in the short to medium term, America's international economic position is likely to continue to decline. Today, America's share of world trade is less than the European Community's and our exports are not much more than Germany's alone. Economic growth in Asia and Europe, currently projected to continue at four percent through the rest of the decade, exceeds that of the United States: about two to two-and-a-half percent. Productivity increases in Japan and other Asian countries are also higher than in the United States.¹³⁷

Why aren't we addressing these pressing problems? Because we don't quite have to yet. Despite the alleged panic over the 1991 deficit in the neighborhood of \$275 billion, the government produced a record \$400 billion deficit for 1992. This translates to about 15 percent of GNP, a figure which may not be too bad compared with the average deficit of 22.8 percent of GNP during World War II. And our total national debt now stands at about 58 percent of GNP, not too far different from the 53 percent of GNP our national debt represented at the end of the Great Depression.¹³⁸ The problem is we aren't in a war or a great depression, and

¹³³ C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1990): p. 106.

¹³⁴ Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," p. 26.

¹³⁵ P.J. O'Rourke, *Parliament of Whores* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), p. 96.

¹³⁶ Bergsten, p. 105.

¹³⁷ Bergsten, p. 97.

¹³⁸ O'Rourke, p. 104.

the trends show no signs of getting any better. It's easy to blame the politicians for the deficit. But they are the symptom, not the disease.

The problem is an American public with a bottomless appetite for federal money, a public which has elected politicians determined to feed that hunger. Our government spent \$4,900 on every person in America in 1991. The average American household received almost \$13,000 worth of federal benefits and services during that year. That family would need an income of \$53,700 to pay as much in taxes as they got in services. Less than 20 percent of the population has that kind of money. And only 5 percent of the population filed income tax returns showing adjusted income levels above \$53,700.¹³⁹ That means that 95 percent of the American public has a stake in continuing business just the way we are. Until that attitude changes, there is little hope for improving the American economy. At its heart, solutions to economic problems have to be political and there is little reason to hope for political solutions in the near future. The problems with American politics are the subject of the next section.

Political Power

In Bound To Lead, Joseph Nye discusses an aspect of power, power conversion capability, which takes on increased significance in today's political situation. Based on their political mechanisms, some countries are more efficient at power conversion than others. The United States is not one of these. The U.S. political system promotes freedom at the expense of efficiency. We cannot and should not change this. But the problems that result need to be addressed. The United States will need to increase its involvement in international institutions and in domestic reforms that will enhance the openness and attractiveness of American political culture. In Why Americans Hate Politics, E.J. Dionne describes the problem this way,

Over the last three decades, the faith of the American people in their democratic institutions has declined, and Americans have begun to doubt their ability to improve the world through politics. At a time when the people of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are experiencing the excitement of self-government, Americans view politics with boredom and detachment. For most of us, politics is increasingly abstract, a spectator sport barely worth watching. Election campaigns generate less excitement than ever and are dominated by television commercials, direct mail, polling, and other approaches that treat individual voters not as citizens deciding their nation's fate, but as mere collections of impulses to be stroked and soothed.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ O'Rourke, p. 105.

¹⁴⁰ E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 10.

The twin dangers of this style of politics are apparent. First, the fact that campaigns seem empty of meaning runs the risk of diminishing the attractiveness of our political system to others. This reduces one of the primary sources of America's political and moral power: the appeal of the democratic system. Second, because we have run down the worth of public service for so many years, there is a flight from candidacy for office. We elect those whom we deserve. The abandonment of public life has created a political void that is filled increasingly by the politics of the attack commercial and by issues that appear unimportant or contrived. The lack of comity continues after the election.

One voice among many decrying the state of politics today belongs to the National Academy of Public Administration, who said recently that Congress and the executive branch spend too much time bickering, don't communicate well on important issues, try to undercut each other's authority, and often seem hopelessly deadlocked.¹⁴¹ The academy's findings warn of dangers beyond the decade-long feud between Congress and the Reagan/Bush administrations.

"Major issues now facing this country are not being addressed because of the distrust and deadlock that exist between Congress and the executive branch," said James R. Jones, chairman of the American Stock Exchange and a former House member, who headed the two-year study. "New attitudes and new devices are urgently needed in this critical relationship."¹⁴²

Both Congress and the executive branch are to blame, as they struggle over the reins of power. But the increased competition between the branches comes at a high price: mismanagement, inefficiency, and waste. And, ultimately, less political power can be mobilized in pursuit of our national interests.

Conclusions

Today, the United States is the most powerful nation of Earth--both absolutely (mobilized power) and potentially (latent power). That statement is true but has little practical meaning because the problem comes in bringing power to bear in situations. In today's environment, power isn't very useful if we can't mobilize our tremendous latent power. The key to mobilizing power is found in the political process and ours isn't working well.

For many years the unspoken theme of our political system has been sub-optimization. Instead of pursuing the *national* interest, we have pursued goals lower in the hierarchical structure. Instead of advocating what's best for the country, the political parties have pursued what's best

¹⁴¹ Eric Pianin, "Study Decries Government 'Deadlock'," The Washington Post 2 March 1992: A15.

¹⁴² Pianin, p. A15.

for the Democrats or Republicans, labor or management, liberals or conservatives, internationalist or isolationist, or whatever labels you wish to apply to the choices we faced in the past. Instead of making sacrifices to ensure the long-term health of the country, we've sacrificed our long-term health in order to feed a national and unhealthy appetite for short-term pleasures. This is self-destructive. It damages the sources of national power we need, be they moral, military, economic, or political.

We live in a democracy and must vote to change the national direction, if indeed we are to change it. In the past, only wars and other national crises such as the Great Depression have been sufficient to force us to act as a nation instead of 280 million individuals, each involved in an individual quest for "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This is the source of our greatest strength--the appeal the American way of life has for others--and our greatest weakness.

Chapter 7
Case Study
An Interest-Based Strategy for the United States in Europe

Introduction

At the Rome summit in November 1991, NATO officially abandoned the strategies of forward defense, flexible response, and nuclear deterrence--victims of the success of the alliance and the fall of the USSR and Warsaw Pact. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, has not signaled the need for an equally dramatic reduction in U.S. forces according to General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (and commander of the United States European Command), who told the U.S. Congress,

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has not brought assurance of peace and stability to Europe. Other disturbing forces have moved to the forefront. ... Threats to U.S. interests remain, but they are less clear and more diversified. ... After the first World War, we developed an isolationist attitude and turned our backs on Europe. In doing so, we left behind an unstable and potentially explosive situation. ... History clearly shows that our military presence has a stabilizing effect on Europe while benefiting our own security.¹⁴³

In simpler times, before the end of the Cold War erased the clear ideological opponent we faced, the Department of Defense could point to the vast Warsaw Pact armies as justification for the 300,000-plus U.S. troops which have been stationed in Western Europe since 1952. But in the absence of the Warsaw Pact threat, we are now in the challenging position of identifying new threats, most of them vague, without being able to say how U.S. forces might be able to deter or engage them. But, we need to step back from the forest a few steps and re-survey the terrain. The Soviet threat we countered for so many years was only a threat because we perceived that we had a vital interest in a free and independent Europe. The end of the Cold War serves not only as an opportunity to address the threats we face, but also to analyze U.S. interests. With the demise of the threat, is Europe still as vital?

The purpose of this case study is use the subject of U.S. involvement in European security to demonstrate the employment of the national security strategy model developed in the first five chapters of this research paper. In order to understand the situation in 1992, however, it's necessary to look at the beginnings of U.S. involvement.

¹⁴³ John Lancaster, "Top General Supports 150,000 U.S. Troops in Europe as Hedge," The Washington Post 4 March 1992: A20.

Background

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States faced a fundamental decision concerning the future of Western Europe and the relations--economic, politico-military--we wished to establish with the exhausted democracies. Rather than retreat to North America as we had after World War I, the U.S. government recognized the need to participate in the affairs of Europe and in its recovery. Surprisingly, the U.S. government came to two different conclusions about the shape of U.S. participation. In the economic sphere, the United States government decided the Europeans must bear the responsibility for their actions. In the military sphere, we did not demand the same responsibility; rather than hold the Europeans responsible for their own security, the United States assumed the lion's share of the security burden. As will be explained in greater detail later, the U.S. assumed the burden because the Europeans would not field the forces deemed necessary and because the threat was so formidable and endangered a region deemed vital to U.S. interests. The Soviets, of course, also threatened the United States directly.

The two different forms of relations--which resulted in European *economic independence* and *security dependence*--continue to shape the relations of the U.S. and Europe. The decisions made forty years ago have had an abiding effect on the relative political maturity of Europe.

To analyze the case in Europe, let's turn to the model of national security strategy development process developed earlier in this paper. Figure 7-1 shows the process.




Figure 7-1. The National Security Strategy Development Process

Figure 1 shows the seven-step process with the "Interests" sub-menu displayed for purposes of illustration. For this case study, three of the seven steps are of most importance: interests, threats, and strategies/plans: a "triad." In this case study, we'll investigate the "triads" of interests, threats, and strategies/plans during two key years in our relations with Europe since World War II--1947 and 1952--and see if there are implications for a third triad: 1992's interests, threats, and strategies/plans for U.S. involvement in European security arrangements.

Before turning to the three triads, let's discuss the choice of dates: "Why 1947, 1952, and 1992?"

First, why 1947? In 1947, the Marshall Plan was a reversal of nearly two centuries of American foreign-policy tradition: we got involved in the affairs of Europe during peacetime. Obviously, something significant happened to the triad which caused such a dramatic departure from diplomatic tradition. In this case study, we'll show how a significant intersection of interests and threats occurred during 1947 which resulted in a dramatically different strategy/plan.

Second, why 1952? First of all, this is not a precise date. The year 1952 is used as shorthand for the decisions made and the actions taken during 1950 through 1953: from the first decision by President Truman on 9 September 1950 to send a substantial number of U.S. troops to Europe; to the Senate approval of the decision on 9 April 1951; to the 27 May 1952 signing of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community; to its unraveling over the next two years.¹⁴⁴ To the main point, however: in "1952," an equally significant departure in our foreign policy tradition occurred when the United States decided to station large numbers of American troops in Europe as part of a forward-based military strategy. This was not simply a continuation of the occupation forces; this was an open-ended commitment to the defense of Europe. In 1952, the second major element of the triad--the threat--changed, or at least our perception of it. The result was an equally dramatic departure from past patterns of behavior.

Finally, why 1992? With major changes in the first two components of the triad in 1947 and 1952, we changed our response. The dramatic dissolution of the threat to Europe's peace and freedom--resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union--signals a need to look again at our strategy/plan. In 1947, U.S. leaders decided we needed to help in the re-building of Europe because an independent Europe was vital to the national interest of the United States. In 1952, U.S. leaders decided a changed threat--the rise of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military--meant

¹⁴⁴ Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 10-19.

we needed to station 300,000-plus U.S. troops in Europe. In 1992, it's obvious that the threat component of the triad has changed. But the interest component has changed as well. Significant changes to two of the three components forces a need to look at the third component: in this case, U.S. participation in European security.

With those thoughts in mind, let's turn to the first key date, 1947.

The Triad in 1947

Let's look at the first step in the triad: how did the national interest apply with regards to Europe in 1947? George Kennan, the Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, said a free, vital, democratic, and *independent* Europe was one of the cornerstones of protecting the U.S. national interest through the strategy of containment. He saw containment as the means of keeping the four remaining critical areas of the world (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine Valley with its associated industrial areas, and Japan) out of the hands of malevolent opponents.¹⁴⁵ He and the rest of the U.S. government decided that the security of Western Europe was indivisible from the security, economic well-being, and other national interests of the United States. In 1947, we had won a war, but we were losing the peace. Communist-inspired strikes in Italy and France, a communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade were visible examples of the breakdown in democratic institutions in Europe and the successful advance of Communism: the threat, the second element in the triad.

How did the U.S. government view the threat in 1947? Returning to Kennan's words,

On April 28, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall returned from Moscow, where he had been attending the latest meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He returned shaken by the realization of the seriousness and urgency of the plight of Western Europe, where economic recovery had failed to proceed as expected and where something approaching total economic disintegration seemed now to be imminent. ... It was plain that the Soviet leaders had a political interest in seeing the economies of the Western European peoples fail under anything other than Communist leadership. The general realized that for us to delay action to shore up these economies ... was simply to play into Communist hands.¹⁴⁶

The intersection of interest (a free and independent Europe was of vital interest to the United States) and threat (a peaceful, subversive Communist takeover of Western Europe as a result of economic devastation and political malaise) resulted in the third element of the triad: the Mar-

¹⁴⁵ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 359.

¹⁴⁶ Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 325.

shall Plan. For the first time *in peacetime*, a combination of interests and threat to Western Europe required the United States to respond. The shape of the U.S. response had a significant impact of the shape of Western Europe.

The Marshall Plan, which led to European economic recovery, called upon the Europeans to draw up their own program and to take responsibility for implementing it. By insisting on a joint approach, the U.S. government hoped to force the Europeans to begin to think like Europeans, not like independent states, in their economic recovery. As Kennan, one of the principal architects, put it,

It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally and to promulgate formally on its own initiative a program designed to place Western Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of Europeans. The formal initiative must come from Europe; and Europeans must bear the basic responsibility for it. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of the later support of such a program, by financial and other means, at European request.¹⁴⁷

The key to the success of the Marshall Plan was the demand that the Europeans accept responsibility for their own economic future. Forty-five years later, the result is a vibrant, economically-independent and economically-integrated European Community 1992 (EC 1992).

In 1947, an intersection of threats and interests caused the United States to reverse two centuries of diplomatic tradition. Another change occurred in 1952. What made the situation different from 1947?

The Triad in 1952

The first element in the triad--U.S. national interests--had not changed from 1947 to 1952. We still saw a free and independent Europe as inextricably linked to the U.S. national interest: our own physical security, economic well-being, value-projection, and power and influence depended on the maintenance of an independent and democratic Western Europe. What *had* changed from 1947 to 1952 was our perception of the threat.

As Aaron Friedberg said in a 1988 article in The National Interest,

... NSC 68 [first circulated in 1950 but shelved until the outbreak of the Korean War] warned that, if existing spending and procurement policies were continued, the United States would decline sharply in power relative to the Soviet

¹⁴⁷ Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 336.

Union. It argued that only a major effort to mobilize the potential resources of the free world (and, in particular, and increase in U.S. defense expenditures of large but unspecified proportions) would be sufficient to avert catastrophe.¹⁴⁸

The threat to Europe from the East was no longer seen as economic or political subversion; it was military: Western Europe faced invasion from a Soviet Union armed with large conventional forces and nuclear weapons. The Korean War awakened U.S. decision makers to the idea that existing U.S. strategies and plans were no longer sufficient to defend against this threat. The United States would have to play a larger role, especially in light of the failure of the Europeans to meet the force goals called for in the February 1952 NATO meeting in Lisbon.

The politico-military relations of the "transatlantic bargain" were shaped under the Brussels Treaty (1948), the Vandenberg Resolution (1948), and the North Atlantic Treaty (1949). Opposite to the economic independence engendered by the Marshall Plan, the European dependence upon the United States caused by the North Atlantic Treaty causes disagreement to this day. As President Bush commented at the NATO meeting in Rome in late 1991,

Our premise is that the American role in the defense and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European unity. If our premise is wrong, if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today [7 Nov 91].¹⁴⁹

Forty-plus years after formulating the transatlantic bargain, the collapse of the USSR allows us to speak of reshaping the military relationship and to debate the relative merits of European security independence. The threat posed by the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of World War II and throughout the Cold War was enough to meld the fractious and independently-minded members of NATO into an alliance. With a few hiccups, such as France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure under De Gaulle, member nations managed to agree well enough to outlast their opponent. Faced with a formidable threat to national security, other interests took lower priority.

The dramatic dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has largely removed the military threat to Europe which resulted in the 1952 decision to station large numbers of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in Europe. With that thought in mind, let's look at the final year under consideration: 1992.

¹⁴⁸ Aaron Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," The National Interest (Spring 1988): p. 69-70.

¹⁴⁹ "Bush Hits the Wrong Note in Rome," Chicago Tribune 10 Nov 91: p. IV-2.

The Triad in 1992

Central to this case study and the discussion of a national security strategy for 1992 is the model of the process shown a few pages ago. It is reproduced on ~~the next~~^{this} page for ease of reference.




Figure 7-2. The National Security Strategy Development Process

In 1992, it's become a cliché to suggest that Europe has undergone dramatic change. The demise of the Soviet threat and the advent of EC 1992 offer a convenient opportunity to appraise the situation; to ensure that the objectives and assumptions that led to NATO in the early 1950s, and the large U.S. presence today, are still valid. We will have to address some tough questions, for example: Do new assumptions, arrangements, interests, and threats exist which will drive changes in fabric of NATO? Can NATO be restructured so that we retain a position of influence while reducing our commitment? Or is it time to prepare for the end of NATO? And, if so, what will take its place: the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or perhaps some new organization?

The first step in developing a national security strategy for the United States is to turn to our understanding of the international context.

The International Context

During the Cold War, the threat to national survival dropped other national interests to lower priority. With the reduction of the threat, those other interests rise in priority and the Europeans can be expected to pursue them. One example of the changing perceptions of national in-

terest in the French suggestion that it is time for the EC to "develop a common foreign and security policy to include over time a common defense."¹⁵⁰ While EC 1992 offers economic integration as a first step, political integration may not be far behind; political integration that will require a reduced U.S. role in Europe as a first step.

Other national interests will continue to enjoy priority now that national survival is ensured. The focus of European diplomacy and policy for the next few years will clearly be on Europe. What little appetite they have for out-of-area diversions will be completely removed by the full plate of issues they face in-theater. Among those issues are completing economic integration, the possibility of mass immigration once borders are opened, and the "German question" (can they [Europe] afford a united Germany as the strongest member of Europe?). With their unfortunate experiences twice in this century and four times in the last 125 years, we can expect the Europeans to address this last question.

Other nation-states in Europe are also pursuing their national interests. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has undergone devastating change and former WTO members are now clamoring for succor from their former opponents. Ethnic and nationalistic rivalries once checked by the USSR's iron control now make the countries of Eastern Europe the primary source of instability in Europe today.

It's interesting to draw a parallel between today and the late-1940s, when the Europeans asked the U.S. to guarantee their security in the political vacuum resulting from World War II. A similar security vacuum exists in Eastern Europe today following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have sought NATO security guarantees, either through membership or by special defense pacts. Rather than asking NATO, an organization with an uncertain future, the long-term answer is to ask *Europe*. This is an example of the deleterious effects of NATO in its current form.

NATO continues to reinforce the boundary in Europe which Kennan foresaw as one of its primary dangers:

No one was more conscious than I was of the dangers of a permanent division of the European continent. The purpose ... was not to perpetuate the status quo ...; it was to tide us over a difficult time and bring us to a point where we could discuss effectively with the Russians the drawbacks and dangers this status quo

¹⁵⁰ Howard LaFranchi. "Paris, Bonn Propose Europe Army," The Christian Science Monitor, 18 Oct 91, page 6.

involved, and to arrange with them for its peaceful replacement by a better and sounder one.¹⁵¹

From the U.S. perspective of the international context, diversity is "good," independence is "good," democracy is "good." But just as the threat has changed since 1952, the situation is changing at home.

The Domestic Context

Times are changing. Both Congress and the American public are exerting strong domestic pressure to retrench from overseas commitments and to face problems in-house (some of the most vocal would make sending U.S. forces to Europe an "out-of-area" response for us in the future). But the 1992 members of the "America First" crowd are not alone. According to The Washington Post,

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one of the nation's leading internationalists, is among those who contend that the United States should be less engaged abroad than it was during the Cold War. "We've gotten into the habit of thinking that anything that is broken in the world, we've got to fix," Kissinger said, in advocating increasing attention to domestic travails.¹⁵²

In Chapter Two, "The Domestic Context," we discussed the tendency of the American people toward isolationism in the absence of threat to our survival. The domestic willingness to "pay any cost, bear any burden," has ended. Base closures and force structure reductions required by decreased budgets are occurring today and will be even more drastic tomorrow as we reduce forces by as additional 25 percent (at least) by 1997. The direct payoff for stationing U.S. forces in Europe since 1952 has been a free and independent Europe; one in which the U.S. had a degree of political influence. But the threat that justified large numbers of U.S. forces no longer exists. And a significant and growing number of influential people feel we don't need to protect Europe from today's threat. Americans in greater and greater numbers are suggesting that the Europeans can use the economic benefits of EC 1992 to pay for their own defense while we use reductions in the U.S. defense budget for other uses.

The cases are similar in both continents: national survival is not as threatened and other interests are resuming higher priority. The Europeans no longer feel threatened, so the American presence in Europe is no longer as necessary, and the influence gained by the American contribution to European security is reduced. Similarly, because the Soviet threat to Europe (and, thus, to the United States) is reduced, Americans are less willing to spend a lot of money

¹⁵¹ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, 365.

¹⁵² Don Oberdorfer, "Opinion Builds for Smaller U.S. Role Abroad," The Washington Post, 27 Oct 91, page A20.

pursuing national survival. They feel our economic well-being and values are threatened and we should divert money and energy to protecting those national interests.

Our assumptions about the international and domestic contexts have changed. Have our interests?

Interests

What are the foreign policy interests of the United States? George Kennan had this to say: "The fundamental objectives of our foreign policy must always be:

1. to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers; and
2. to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities."¹⁵³

How do these apply with regards to Europe? What is the U.S. national interest in 1992? Is it still the same as in 1947 and 1952? In the absence of a virulently-opposed ideological threat, a free and independent Europe is still desirable but it is no longer as *vital* as it was in 1947 or 1952. Europe is important to our economic well-being, but no longer to our physical survival, the most important national interest and the one that led to stationing U.S. troops there in 1952. The United States has another national interest, however, which relates to Morgenthau's concept of the national interest defined in terms of power and influence. This is also an advantage our leaders are unwilling to surrender. As a result of the preeminent role the United States plays in defense matters, the U.S. also enjoys a measure of political influence in Europe. In the view of U.S. leaders, continuing the current shape of NATO, as well as continuing to base a large number of American forces in Europe, will translate into American influence in other arenas. As General Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said recently,

The most important coalition in which we are involved is NATO. Why be involved in NATO anyway? The first half of this century was bloody. Both world wars were wars in which we in the United States were initially not involved, but we were dragged into them. So, it looks as if it's almost inevitable that if something happens in Europe we'd be dragged into it and, after all,

¹⁵³ George Kennan, draft paper, "Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy," as quoted in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, by John Lewis Gaddes, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 27.

Europe is vitally important to us. **Better that we commit ourselves to Europe early, forward deploy some forces there, so that we have a hand in shaping the future of Europe as far as security is concerned.** Not American hegemony, not American control, but American influence. An American seat at the table. How do we get that seat? We get it through our commitment. How is that commitment symbolized? It is symbolized by the forward deployment of an adequate force ...¹⁵⁴ [emphasis in original]

General Galvin's conclusions need to be questioned on at least three issues--the first two related to the end of the Cold War. First, Europe is no longer as important to our national survival as it was during the Cold War. It's no longer an ally in our fight against an ideological enemy. Second, what threat do we see that requires U.S. forces actually stationed on European soil? During the Cold War, they were there as a trip wire or because we would have had little time to mobilize forces in response to a Warsaw Pact invasion. Today there are buffer states between the Russian Republic and the West. Warning times are now measured in months if not years. What use do we have for a trip wire? What justifies the presence of U.S. forces in Europe in 1992? The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states have undergone devastating change and the countries of Eastern Europe are looking to the West for economic aid and security. The threat has changed since 1952. Ethnic and nationalistic rivalries have flourished as a result of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and now represent the greatest threat to the peace in Europe today. But do U.S. troops need to be stationed in *Western* Europe to respond to that threat? Or should that be the responsibility of the Europeans?

General Galvin's conclusions need to be questioned in a third area: keeping an American seat at the table. It's not clear how well the U.S. contribution in one arena--European security--has translated to influence in others. With the exception of Great Britain (and that exception is limited), European countries have agreed with us only when it has been in their interest to do so (should we really expect anything else?). The list of disagreements is long and includes:

- 1956: Britain and France and the seizure of the Suez Canal.
- 1964-1973: The U.S. enjoyed little support from NATO allies for its policy with regard to the war in Vietnam.
- 1973: Only Portugal of NATO's continental countries allowed the United States a staging area in 1973's resupply of Israel (Portugal, after some arm-twisting, allowed

¹⁵⁴ General John R. Galvin, "Why We Should Be In NATO," Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Policy Letter (Kelly AFB, TX: AFNEWS/IIA, 1992), p. 3.

the use of the Azores).¹⁵⁵ At the same time, other NATO allies allowed the Soviets to overfly their territory to resupply Arabs opponents engaged in combat with the Israelis. After the 1973 war, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger complained to the British Foreign Minister that the Soviet Union had been freer to use NATO airspace than the United States.¹⁵⁶

- 1982: France denied overflight rights during the Eldorado Canyon strike on Libya. It's true that most, if not all, of the cases where NATO allies refused to support the United States dealt with the Middle East. But that is also the region where the potential for conflict remains high.
- 1982-1983: The Europeans, over the vehement objections of the Reagan Administration, decided to subsidize--financially and technologically--the trans-Siberian natural-gas pipeline to supply gas to Europe.

Retaining U.S. influence in Europe will be based on the continuation of both sides seeing mutual interests. When interests are parallel, the United States and Europe will work together (U.S. forces or no U.S. forces). During the period when the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat, U.S. forces did not translate into political influence. Why should the future, with no Soviet threat to bind the alliance, be any different?

Threats

While the primary threat, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, is receding, threats still exist:

- First, the future of the Russian-led Confederation of Independent States (CIS) is unclear. At some time, the CIS could pose a threat to Western Europe, if only as a source of ethnic and nationalistic conflict, possibly involving nuclear weapons. In addition, the CIS still has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, a potential threat to Europe and the United States.
- Second, the potential for a resumption of the traditional German-French conflict exists at some level. Both are now democracies, which according to conventional wisdom should limit the potential for conflict, but there have been four wars between them in the last 125 years and human nature doesn't change that rapidly.

¹⁵⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 520.

¹⁵⁶ Kissinger, p. 709.

- Third, there is the possibility of a resurgent and militaristic Germany. Germany is the most powerful nation in Europe economically, politically, and in conventional military forces. That combination has proved dangerous in the past, when it was *not* democratic.
- Fourth, unchecked immigration of "undesirables" from Eastern Europe and the Middle East/North Africa will pose a threat for the members of the European Community.
- Fifth, regional disputes and ethnic rivalries such as the current situation in Yugoslavia will provide a source of conflict for the future.
- Sixth, we will have to watch the political survival of the new "republics" of Eastern Europe. They have no long heritage of democracy to sustain them and the pressures of economic development and regional conflict may cause them to revert to authoritarian structures.

The economic security of the United States is clearly linked to Europe, one of the largest markets for U.S. exports. But in the absence of an ideological threat such as the Soviet Union, Europe is no more critical to the United States than the other critical geographic areas delineated by George Kennan. It's interesting to note that one of the five regions of the world that Kennan saw as critical, "where the sinews of modern military strength could be produced in quantity," is the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁷ A strong case can be made that today the area in greatest danger of the five Kennan regions is the Russian Republic. Perhaps that is where we should be placing our focus rather than on protecting Europe from last year's threat or paying a great deal of money for influence which is illusory. The physical actions we take to protect national security should be a function of the threat (which is decreasing) and our available power (which, unfortunately, is also decreasing, both in our willingness to use power outside our borders and in absolute terms).

Power

Sources of U.S. power are limited. It's interesting to contrast our position today with that of the British government in 1949. According to Sloan in NATO's Future:

... the British absolutely opposed any suggestion that they maintain a substantial presence on the continent to help balance potential German power. The reluctance of the British to play a major role in the Central European balancing act reflected London's own priorities. The British Labor Government of the time

¹⁵⁷ Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 359.

viewed a major political and military commitment on the continent as less important to British interests than its Commonwealth ties and global responsibilities.¹⁵⁸

Their decision was unfortunate. For two decades, they would be locked out of participation in Europe's economic and security concerns. But their decision to refrain from participation was possible because of our commitment to NATO. Kennan's fear about the focus of the alliance--on military rather than political solutions to their problems--were real. And we can afford the commitment much less today than in the early days of the bargain.

Forty-seven percent of the DoD budget goes in one form or another to the defense of Europe against a dramatically changing threat. Another way to view the problem is in terms of force structure. It takes three soldiers based in the continental U.S. (CONUS) to support one active duty person stationed in Europe in order to limit the percentage of time spent overseas. Because only active duty people serve long-tours overseas, this 3-to-1 ratio depends on active forces, which are being reduced dramatically. Congress is also complicating the problem by freezing reserve force levels, while drawing down active forces disproportionately. We'll have a harder time in the future maintaining the CONUS-to-overseas ratio regardless of the threat.

U.S. forces are planned to be reduced to 150,000 by 1995; still significant levels. General Galvin feels we need to keep them at that level in order to ensure we have a degree of influence in European affairs. But, the real source of U.S. power in the future will be economic and political strength (not the illusory influence of U.S. forces in Europe). And with a sizable on-the-ground commitment in Europe, complicated by Congressional obstinance in reserve matters, we will not be able to structure U.S. forces to meet the new threat--regional contingencies.

And we are in economic trouble. Real wages in the U.S. are receding to the levels of the 1960s.¹⁵⁹ And the future does not look any better. Since 1980, the share of the nation's economy being reinvested in education and training, infrastructure, and civilian research and development--the assets that offer payoff in future competitiveness--has dropped 40 percent from an already anemic level.¹⁶⁰ While it appears we may actually make a small "profit" on the Gulf War, passing the hat does not provide a suitable impression of national strength. And the ones paying the bills in the future for U.S. troops stationed in Europe (that is, Europeans)

¹⁵⁸ Sloan, p. 8.

¹⁵⁹ Jodie T. Allen, "Why Our Economic Alarm is Sounding," The Washington Post 27 Oct 91: C1.

¹⁶⁰ Jeff Faux, "A Tax Cut Could Really Wreck Things," The Washington Post 21 Oct 91: C2.

will certainly have a say in how we use the troops (thus, U.S. troops in Europe might be of use only in Europe).

The real source of future influence will be political and economic strength, not military. Committing substantial forces to Europe degrades our military strength by tying a large number of forces to a single mission and deflects our attention from the real source of influence in Europe--U.S. political and economic strength.

Objectives

Our objective is a free, vital, and independent Europe. EC 1992 will provide that in an economic sense. But how do we guarantee its political independence? We can do that only by allowing them to accept responsibility for their own security. They can protect themselves from the future threat: ethnic and nationalistic rivalries. Their fear that a resurgent Germany will dominate the continent is something they should prevent, not the United States, through such efforts as the Franco-German corps recently surfaced by the governments of France and Germany. That being said, however, a politically unstable Germany would be very dangerous, and possibly a matter requiring U.S. involvement.

Strategy

Our strategy to achieve American interests should be asymmetrical, and based on our limited means and a reasonably stable future. We should structure U.S. forces, based on limited means, to meet the future threat: regional contingencies. As we reduce U.S. force levels in Europe, we should attempt to retain prepositioning and basing rights, in order to respond to future threats. We will also need to retain military-to-military contacts with whatever defense forces the Europeans develop. European Community 1992 is clearly a less attractive alternative than the position of *primus inter pares* we enjoy today. But it is not opposite to our objective--a free, independent Europe. It is going to happen. We need to manage the transition, not attempt to delay or impede implementation.

Secretary of State James Baker presented the administration's view of the future of NATO in an address to the Berlin Press Club on 12 December, 1989. In part, he said, that NATO should have four new missions¹⁶¹:

- First, "NATO will become the forum where Western nations cooperate to negotiate, implement, verify, and extend [arms control, confidence-building, and other political consultative] agreements between East and West."

¹⁶¹ James Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism, Architecture for a New Era," U.S. Department of State Current Policy No. 1233, p. 3.

- Second, "Intensified NATO consultation on these issues [regional conflicts, along with the proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons] can play an important role in forming common Western approaches to these various threats."
- Third, "NATO should also begin considering further initiatives the West might take, through the CSCE process in particular, to build economic and political ties with the East, to promote respect for human rights, to help build democratic institutions, and to fashion, consistent with Western security interests, a more open environment for East-West trade and investment."
- Fourth, "NATO may have its greatest and most lasting effect on the pattern of change by demonstrating to the nations of the East a fundamentally different approach to security. NATO's four decades offer a vision of cooperation, not coercion; of open borders, not iron curtains. The reconciliation of ancient enemies, which has taken place under the umbrella of NATO's collective security, offers the nations of Eastern Europe an appealing model of international relations."

But just as Clausewitz said the most far-reaching act of judgment a commander can make is to refrain from trying to turn war into something that is alien to its nature, we need to be careful of how we try to use NATO.¹⁶² The primary objective for the U.S. administration, once our own security has been enhanced, is clearly to retain some degree of influence in Europe. They have posited future roles and missions for NATO in order to protect the one organization in which the U.S. is first among equals. In postulating future missions, however, I submit they are trying to turn NATO, a military alliance, into something alien to its nature. The four worthwhile objectives Secretary Baker postulated above should be undertaken by other agencies.

CSCE can be used to pursue arms control, political development, and other issues between East and West. The WEU can be the basis for new security arrangements to respond to regional and ethnic conflicts. And the EC can be the forum to foster political integration. A united Europe--politically as well as economically--provides the best example to the nations of Eastern Europe. While we await the events in the Soviet Union, and the development of a new security arrangement under the WEU (or other framework), NATO can continue to provide security. U.S. force levels can be reduced to levels below 150,000.

¹⁶² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 88.

Conclusions

NATO has served the Europeans and the United States well. It has achieved the primary interests of both partners. Europe is free, independent, and economically vital. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are no longer a threat. We won.

Rather than attempt to find new missions for NATO in order to retain our "first among equals" position, we should recognize the influence we gain from basing large numbers of U.S. forces in Europe is illusory. When our interests merge, Europeans will support us. When they do not, as has been the case a number of times in the past, the Europeans will not support us regardless of how many troops we station in Europe. They know today, as they have known for the last 50 years, their survival is in our interest and we will continue to ensure it when and if it is threatened. They have felt no special need to cater to our demands. The same will be true in the future. Real U.S. influence will continue to be based on political and economic strength. Thinking that basing U.S. forces in Europe will translate into influence is mistaken and diverts us from solving internal problems. It's time for the United States to face the end of NATO and cooperate in the political unification of Europe.

In the late-1940s, the United States decided to force the Europeans to accept responsibility for their economic affairs. The result is a healthy and unified European Community, which is today a key trading partner of the United States. But in the sense of providing for European security, we did not demand the same independence. The result is a great deal of U.S. money being spent to defend Europe from a disappearing threat and relatively little political integration in Europe.

It's now time to look for a "better and sounder" replacement, to use Kennan's phrase, for the large number of U.S. troops in Europe. The age of unlimited resources that allowed us to "pay any cost, bear any burden" has ended. We are closing bases and reducing forces today and will do that even more dramatically in the coming years. The direct payoff for stationing U.S. forces in Europe since 1952 has been a free and independent Europe, one in which the U.S. had a degree of political influence. But the threat that justified large numbers of U.S. forces, and the means to pay for them, no longer exists.

We've fought for an independent and democratic Europe since 1917, in both military and economic terms. Marshall Plan aid for Europe was \$12 billion dollars in late-1940s dollars. In 1990 dollars, that translated to \$125 billion.¹⁶³ We've also had 300,000-plus troops on the

¹⁶³ Terry L. Deibel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1991): p. 13.

ground since 1952. By one account, \$135 billion of the \$290 billion Fiscal Year 1992 budget for the Department of Defense will be spent to defend Europe.¹⁶⁴ A free, independent Europe is clearly in our interest, if only because democracies don't fight each other. But that goal has been achieved. The democracies of Western Europe are strong, both economically and politically.

We need to keep the lessons of the Marshall Plan and NATO in mind. In the late-1940s, the United States decided to force the Europeans to accept responsibility for their economic affairs. The result is a healthy and unified European Community, which is today a key trading partner of the United States. But in the sense of providing for European security, we did not demand the same independence. The result is a great deal of U.S. money being spent to defend Europe from a disappearing threat and relatively little political integration in Europe. The Europeans need to accept responsibility for their own security as a basis for future political integration. The likely result will be a stronger *political* partner.

A metaphor suggests itself to summarize the thesis of this case study regarding the U.S. participation in European security arrangements: the maturation of the family. When children are young, parents care for them. Parents contribute to their children's welfare and protect them from all dangers. They teach them values. They hope to create good citizens.

But when the children reach adulthood, wise parents stop making decisions for their children. While parents don't stop caring about their children's welfare, they realize that children become adults and have to make their own way. That means the children have to accept responsibility for their own actions, have to protect themselves, and have to make their own way in the world. It's all part of becoming an adult.

The same is true in Europe. In 1947 and 1952, the United States had to get involved to protect the fledgling democracies and economies of Western Europe. The European Community grew under our protection to share our values and to become a responsible and strong citizen of the international community rather than a collection of fractious and disparate countries that had gone to war three times in 75 years. With the advent of EC 1992, it's time to let them proceed on their own, accepting responsibility for their own security. Like anxious parents, we can watch with interest, and offer a helping hand if needed and asked for, but we can't live their lives for them.

¹⁶⁴ Joe Sirincioni, Professional Staff, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, presentation to NWC class on "Arms Control and the Policymaking Process," 19 Nov 91.

The lesson for 1992 can be found in our actions in 1947 and 1952. In those years, significant changes in the intersection of interests and threats forced the United States to adopt equally dramatic responses. In 1992, we have a exciting change in the intersection of interests and threats. The end of the Cold War offers an opportunity for to evaluate our response: the level of U.S. military involvement in European security.

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