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REVIEW OF *GATES II: THE CONFIRMATION!* (A MELODRAMA)

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***Gates: The Confirmation* (1991).** Produced by the Bush Administration; directed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI); written by the Bush Administration, the Intelligence Community, and Robert Gates. **Cast of Characters:** The silver-haired bureaucratic survivor and intelligence analyst (Robert M. Gates); The neutral and above-the-fray SSCI chairman (Sen. Dave Boren, D-OK); The attack dog Senator (Warren Rudman, R-NH); the crotchety liberal Senator (Metzenbaum-D-OH), the presidential wanna-be and liberal (Bradley (D-NJ); assorted Senators in supporting roles; former CIA analysts (Jennifer Glaudemans, Melvin A. Goodman, Hal Ford); disgraced CIA Operative (Allan Fiers), and the entire U.S. Senate. **Running time:** 6 months (May 1991-November 1991)

Since *Gates The Confirmation* (1987) was a failure and went straight to video, the Bush Administration, the innovative makers of *Gulf The War* with its stupendous special effects, took a chance and produced a sequel to its original Gates failure. However, *Gates II: The Confirmation*¹ (1991) was deemed a only a minor success and was withdrawn from circulation in 1993, when the Clinton Administration took over the studio. Although it did not play well at the box office and is now six years old, the Gates sequel has just been released in video. As a service to our readers who may have forgotten the details of its initial run, we are providing a quick review of the film's background and production woes (a kind of political *Waterworld* or *Heaven's Gate*) and an analysis of why its initial reception was not as smooth as the producers expected. *Gates II* touches on a number of interesting issues, including Congressional oversight of intelligence, presidential privilege, the Iran-Contra affair, and politicization of intelligence.

Senatorial confirmation hearings have always been carefully stage-managed and provide good theater. Major Congressional hearings, when broadcast, are regularly reviewed by television critics using the same language and analytical tools used for any drama or movie of the week.¹ The Gates confirmation of 1991 is a prime example. From Gates's point of view, the confirmation did not go smoothly, due to the fact that some former CIA players did not follow the

¹ In discussing hearings in general, Roger Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek have noted that "Hearings are among the most orchestrated parts of the lawmaking process. Hearings are shaped mainly by the chairman and staff." See their *Congress and Its Members*, 4th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1994), 227. For comments on television and

prearranged script and threw the production off course. Recounting his experience in 1991, Gates himself said that it began to resemble a “soap opera.”²

One of the artistic, theatrical problems of *Gates II. The Confirmation*¹ is that the viewer cannot really appreciate it without first comprehending some of the background—somewhat like coming to the latest *Alien* film and not knowing about the long history and interplay of the character played by Sigourney Weaver and the alien creature.

Congressional Oversight

Since the establishment of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there has been a running skirmish over who ultimately controls intelligence, particularly covert intelligence—Congress or the President. For a long time Congress deferred on this issue to the President. Congressional oversight was originally vested in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and their subcommittees. Congressional “awareness” of CIA was limited mostly to the ranking chairman and the ranking minority leaders of those committees.³

This started to change in the 1970s. First, Congress itself reorganized and started to break down the power of the chairman, Congress became increasingly unwilling to defer to the executive branch after Watergate, finally, growing and seemingly unending revelations of unsavory CIA domestic and foreign covert activities alarmed Congress. By 1974, to assure accountability and clear lines of authority for covert actions, Congress insisted that covert action

hearings. see Frank J. Smust, Jr., *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994*, 2d ed (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1994), 260-61.

² Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 548.

³ U.S. Congress, Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, *Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience*, 103d Cong., 2d sess., October 1994, S. Prt. 103-88, 3-4.

had to approved by the President and reported (in a “finding”) to the appropriate committees of Congress

Two separate, special congressional committees examined these intelligence problems the Senate’s Church Committee in 1976 and the House’s Pike Committee in 1976 Their reports led to the formation of special intelligence committees--the SSCI and the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) The function of the new committees was to receive intelligence and information on activities from intelligence agencies and provide centralized and specialized Congressional oversight The first ground rules between intelligence agencies of the executive branch and Congress were worked out on an ad hoc basis—but often not put into concrete legislation This would cause problems during the next fourteen years, leading up to *Gates II* Congress, insisted on being given more intelligence, for example on Soviet treaty violations, and demanded the right to examine intelligence operations Both Republican and Democratic administrations did not share Congress’s view of intelligence oversight and vigorously sought to limit the dissemination of such information only to the executive branch ⁴ Intelligence agencies advanced various arguments to explain their position As a practical matter, the CIA believed that Congress has an “unquenchable appetite for intelligence” which could overburden CIA resources The CIA did not see Congress as a serious consumer of intelligence ⁵ Moreover, the CIA believed that none of its customers has the right to all the intelligence that is produced and that the “President has the right, if not the responsibility, to control it ” At the same time, Congressional oversight committees asserted their theoretical right to review all intelligence To avoid major battles over a possible, tricky constitutional issue, they did not asked for everything ⁶

⁴ L Britt Snider, *Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers Congress as a User of Intelligence* (Washington Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997), 9-15

⁵ *Ibid* , 34

⁶ *Ibid* , 17

These tensions between Congress and the executive branch worsened during the Reagan Administration. During this period, the director of the CIA, William J. Casey, was particularly hard-nosed about the executive branch's rights vis-à-vis those of Congress. The Administration notified Congress about covert findings after the fact, if at all, and flouted the Boland Amendment, forbidding aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, in the Iran-Contra affair. The SSCI regarded Iran-Contra as "the most serious breach of the oversight arrangements since the committees were created."⁷ Congress continued to insist covert action findings be reported within 48 hours (and thus prevent a repeat of the Iran-Contra debacle), while the Administration, which did not want its hands tied, often refused.

Gates: The Confirmation (1987)

In the midst of this debate over who has the final word on intelligence and the limits of presidential power, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Casey was forced to resign due to failing health.⁸ The President nominated Robert M. Gates, then his Assistant National Security Advisor, for the DCI position. Gates had an extremely unpleasant confirmation hearing in 1987. Usually such confirmation hearings are set theatrical pieces designed to make issues public and extract promises from the individual being confirmed. The SSCI was designed to be nonpartisan and traditionally used the confirmation process

not only to ascertain the views of the nominee with regard to intelligence, but also to obtain commitments from nominees toward the oversight process itself. Confirmation hearings not only serve to acquaint the Senate committee with the leaders of the Intelligence Community with whom it must closely work, but also to inform the nominee with respect to the views and concerns of the committee itself.⁹

⁷ This is the SSCI's own view in Select Committee on Intelligence, *Legislative Oversight*, 22.

⁸ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 410-14, provides a moving description of Casey's resignation. However, Gates notes, without further elaboration, that Casey had been in the hospital for 5 weeks before Gates met with him.

⁹ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Legislative Oversight*, 19.

Through the early 1990s, before partisanship started to take over, a nomination was essentially cooked in advance and a general script written or unconsciously acknowledged before hearings occurred, despite the “high decibel levels” that sometimes took place in public. The staff prepared the script and the members played out their roles, leaving overall direction to the Chairman and staff¹⁰. However, Gates had the misfortune of having both his confirmation hearings subject to unusual changes in the script at the last minute, which threw the whole melodrama off its normal axis. In 1987, he fell victim to Iran-Contra.

Because this was an early stage of the investigation, there were still many unanswered questions about CIA’s (and my) role, I ran into a buzz saw from several Republicans and most of the Democrats on the committee. Congress was outraged over Iran-Contra, and I was the first piece of business to greet the new Democratic majority in the Senate on their return to work in February 1987. And I was a great target¹¹.

After two days of fruitless hearings, Gates feared he would not be confirmed and withdrew his nomination. William Webster, a political Mr. Clean, was nominated instead and spent four years as DCI. While Webster made no major changes at CIA, he at least was careful to avoid major problems. Thus, *Gates: The Confirmation* failed because it was ahead of its time (the sequel was actually more successful) and because the script fell apart. The Senators, some new to their role as a majority and alarmed at Iran-Contra, did not play their usual roles.

Prelude to Gates II: The Confirmation!

After 1987 some Congressional observers questioned the value of the CIA in the post Cold-War world. They were appalled at numerous spy scandals. They also believed that the CIA had not supported U.S. military commanders well in the Gulf War. Senator Moynihan (D-NY), a former vice chairman of the SSCI, argued that the CIA had not predicted the problems that the Soviet Union was then experiencing and spent its time tracking a Soviet threat that no

¹⁰ Interview with Marvin Ott, former staff member, SSCI, December 5, 1997.

¹¹ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 417-18.

longer existed. Therefore, he suggested abolishing the CIA entirely. Even former CIA officials argued for a redefinition of the CIA mission.¹²

The Bush Administration promised a renewed commitment to oversight, but there were still problems.¹³ One solution was to legislatively force on the CIA an independent Inspector General who would report directly to the congressional intelligence committees when problems could not be successfully resolved in-house. The CIA objected to this separate channel to Congress, but was overruled and Congress passed the legislation in 1990.¹⁴ In a more comprehensive second solution, four years after the Iran-Contra scandal broke, Congress pushed for greater accountability from the Intelligence Community in the FY91 Intelligence Authorization Act (authorizing legislation was Congress's usual channel for developing new rules for the intelligence community). Bush pocket vetoed the bill in the fall of 1990 and the Administration and Congress spent the rest of the year negotiating intensely over this legislation, which was not passed until August 1991, only a month before the second Gates hearings. For the first time, the executive branch by law was required to report covert activities to Congress in a timely fashion. The time period was left specifically vague as the result of compromise with the Bush Administration. This legislation replaced a patchwork of statutes, executive orders and informal understandings and was the first revision of intelligence oversight legislation since 1980.¹⁵ This legislation was worked out between the President and Congress, because the President's dominance and influence in intelligence matters cannot be ignored. A key participant in

¹² Christopher Madison, "In From the Cold," *National Journal* 23, no. 38 (September 21, 1991): 2272.

¹³ Even the Bush Administration had problems with Congress regarding intelligence oversight, despite its being more amenable than the Reagan Administration. SSCI Chairman Boren and National Security Advisor Scowcroft engaged in an acrimonious exchange over a botched coup attempt against Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. Scowcroft accused Congress of "micromanagement" and imposing too many restrictions on intelligence and Boren called Scowcroft a "liar." See Smist, *Congress Oversees*, 276.

¹⁴ Smist, *Congress Oversees*, 276-77; Select Committee on Intelligence, *Legislative Oversight*, 13.

¹⁵ *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 102nd Congress, First Session, 1991 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), 480-82.

developing the legislation noted, “You cannot legislate in this area [intelligence] without the president. There are not enough votes to override a veto. You come to that dynamic in the system—the president’s prerogatives as commander in-chief”¹⁶. This was to prove crucial in the second Gates nomination to be DCI.

Gates II: The Confirmation!

Like all good productions, the Administration’s announcement of Gates’s nomination as CIA Director in May 1991 started the usual process of scripting the hearings. All the key actors expected Iran-Contra to be a central issue. Indeed, the court’s dismissal of the conviction of Oliver North made the front pages of newspapers the day the hearings started in September and, thus, could not be ignored. Alan Fiers, a CIA operative, had also just pleaded guilty to lying to Congress about Iran-Contra. Fiers himself testified at the hearing but, as expected, the staff reviewed his testimony in advance. Essentially it was scripted and offered no surprises and no smoking gun linking Gates to Iran-Contra.¹⁷

Gates, too, learned how to play his role more convincingly in the four years since his initial disastrous confirmation hearings. He distanced himself from Casey’s techniques and confessed his own sins of omission. The initial reviews gave Gates high marks. *The New York Times* called it the “*mea culpa* of a lifetime,” and that “the seemingly impromptu admission of mistakes and misjudgments had been plotted well in advance, but the committee loved it,” while the *Washington Post* referred to his “cautious script.” Gates’s good performance convinced the Senators he was genuinely out of the loop on Iran-Contra. Seen as both human and humble, he also endeared himself by showing extraordinary deference to the committee. Senator Metzenbaum grudgingly noted that Gates reminded him of Nixon, one of the great political actors

¹⁶ Quoted from a confidential interview in Smist, *Congressional Oversight*, 279

¹⁷ Ott interview

in America, and the Checkers speech you get out in front of a crowd and say you're sorry Metzenbaum noted that "Gates got brownie points for that " Clearly there was little passion among the SSCI members for again tarring Gates with Iran-Contra, since four years of Congressional investigation and court cases had failed to do that, and even Ollie North had his charges dropped ¹⁸

The issue of politicization of analytical intelligence provided by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, which Gates controlled, took everyone involved in this production by surprise and gave it its genuine interest The staff knew about politicization as low-grade issue and all thought it would be minor By politicization, they meant slanting intelligence analysis so that it would support the policy the Administration wanted to pursue The hearings themselves were postponed from July precisely so these questions could be dealt with and there would be no question about the fairness of the hearings, which the public was sure to scrutinize As they more thoroughly examined the question of intelligence politicization, the SSCI staff realized this was actually an important issue, they eventually reviewed "more than 20 instances of alleged politicization, particularly over an Iranian estimate "¹⁹ After talking with people familiar with the CIA, the staff heard of complaints raised by Melvin Goodman, a senior CIA analyst then teaching at the National War College The staff brought him in to talk informally for several hours, they had him come back several times and questioned him more intensely, as they slowly began to comprehend that their expected script needed major revisions Eventually, the staffers also interviewed Jennifer Glaudemans, a younger analyst who had left the agency and moved out of

¹⁸ Elaine Sciolino, "Gates's Winning Form," *New York Times*, 23 September 1991, A1 and B8 and Walter Pincus, "Gates's Solid Performance Follows a Cautious Script," *Washington Post*, 18 September 1991, A13 Emphasis added The entire hearing testimony is in U S Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence. *Nomination of Robert M Gates Hearing before the Selected Committee of Intelligence of the United States Senate* 102d Cong , 1st sess , vol I Sep 16,17, 19, 20, 1991, vol II Sep 24, Oct 1, 2, 1991, vol III October 3, 4, 18, 1991

¹⁹ Marvin Ott, "Shaking Up the CIA," *Foreign Policy* 93 (Winter 1993-94) 136

town She was especially interesting because she spoke of politicization at the lower levels and had a great memory for detail She and Goodman, along with several people to support Gates spoke on the issue to a closed committee session To add to the growing drama caused by the new characters straying from the original outline, the night before his closed testimony, Harold Ford, a respected older analyst who was expected to support Gates, changed his mind and recommended he not be approved All this proved so explosive and provocative that Senator Nunn insisted that this was much too sensitive to be discussed behind closed doors and should take place in open session The committee then made all the witnesses and most of the staff withdraw and met privately The witnesses returned, finished their testimony, and then spoke in a later public session, where their comments hit like a bombshell²⁰ Most of the public and many senators knew about problems with covert operations, but this was the first time that intelligence analysis had been examined like this in public Moreover, Harold Ford's last minute decision to go against Gates was a deep blow The White House liaison team following the nomination thought Gates was finished at this point Goodman, who was attacked at both the closed and open sessions by Senator Rudman, nevertheless thought the issue of politicization had been given a fair and necessary hearing²¹

As one staffer noted, the "Republicans started out with the premise that Bush could not afford to lose this battle, but they became very concerned about what they were hearing"²² The carefully crafted theatrical production was almost falling apart²³

²⁰ Interview with Melvin A. Goodman, December 2, 1997 See also, Elaine Sciolino, "Gates Suppressed Dissent, A Witness is Said to Testify," *New York Times*, 26 September 1991, A1

²¹ Goodman interview

²² Quoted in Smist, *Congress Oversees*, 288

²³ See, for example Elaine Sciolino, "Senate Panel's Democrats Voice Skepticism on Choice for CIA Gates's Support Ebbing After Critical Testimony," *New York Times*, 3 October 1997, A1 and Sciolino's "Testimony of 3 is Seen as Hurting Gates," *New York Times*, 27 September 1991, A15

In response, the producers were trying desperately behind the scenes to save their production. The White House told Republicans it wanted the nomination saved at all costs and that the president “would go to the mat” to get Gates confirmed. The White House proceeded to twist arms and turned what was supposed to be nonpartisan process into a very partisan one. Publicly, the President “denounced the allegations of slanted analysis as ‘an outrageous assertion against a very honest man.’” Obviously referring to Glaucomans, Bush said that “every junior analyst cannot have his or her estimate be the one that comes to the president.”²⁴

Different senators acted as point men against the three major witnesses against Gates on politicization. Senator Rudman, a former prosecutor, became the designated White House pit bull and tried to poke holes in Goodman’s testimony, believing in a good prosecutorial technique that if you can show a few minor inconsistencies, the whole testimony would be suspect. This technique worked, and allowed the committee to approve Gates’s confirmation by focusing on inconsistencies in the testimony of all three witnesses to argue that the charge of politicization was overdrawn. Because of his venerable status, Ford was handled somewhat gently. Glaucomans, whose testimony was quite detailed and spoke of a wider issue of intimidation among junior analysts, was handled quite gingerly by Senator Danforth. She was smart, attractive and attacking her would be like mugging Bambi.²⁵ This was especially important because the public was following the hearings on their front pages and at the top of the news. The Democrats acted in kind against Gates, with some like Boren and Nunn staying publicly above the fray.²⁶

²⁴ Pamela Fessler, “Gates Hearings Take Lid Off CIA’s Bitter Internal Feuds,” *Congressional Quarterly* 49, no. 40 (October 5, 1991) 2882.

²⁵ Ott interview. Ott believes Boren was privately committed to Gates’s candidacy from the beginning.

²⁶ Ott interview. Ott believes that Goodman damaged his arguments by overreaching a bit and leaving himself open to attacks by Rudman and others on some questions of detail. Other CIA witnesses insisted they saw no politicization.

All this almost made the Gates confirmation less a question about Gates than about the integrity of the analytical process which is at the heart of intelligence. It was clear that the committee was rattled. Its nonpartisan self-image had been breached and what was supposed to be a normal and uneventful set of hearings was no longer so—"the process is no longer under control in any way" a staffer told the press.²⁷ While members were willing to do their party's bidding, they apparently did worry about the effect, because the issue ultimately dealt with essential national security issues they neither intended nor really wanted to explore. One staffer admitted that some members worried they were "about to do something extremely painful in public—something that could do irreparable damage to the intelligence process."²⁸

Gates himself was shocked by the vehement attacks against him and worked hard to salvage his confirmation and reputation, which was based on his leadership of intelligence analysis at CIA. He noted that "It wasn't fun." In fact, it was physically grueling—he answered over 900 questions in open sessions alone. Claiming he "finally got mad," he closeted himself with piles of CIA documents and hand wrote a defense which he delivered before the committee.²⁹ In addition to his arguments against the charges of politicization, he went out of his way to give Congress what it wanted. He promised to cooperate with the committee regarding Congressional oversight and even promised to resign rather than jeopardize the relationship of trust with Congress. He promised he would immediately inform them of covert action findings. He knew Congress was concerned about having more military input into intelligence so he promised to name a military deputy. He spoke about vigorously working to restructure the CIA.³⁰ Indeed within 24 hours of

²⁷ Elaine Sciolino, "Gates Almost A Side Issue in Hearings," *New York Times*, 1 October 1991, A19

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 544-549. Ott believes that Ken Duberstein, a Republican Mr. Fix-It, actually worked closely with Gates to fashion his defense (Ott interview)

³⁰ U S Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence Report together with Additional Views*, 102d Cong., 1st sess., exec. rept. 102-19, 190-99

his confirmation he contacted the chairmen of the intelligence committees to talk about the future³¹

The White House continued to lobby extensively, for example, changing Senator Specter's vote and influencing Senator Cohen³²

Boren's support was also important. He personally lobbied 30 senators to get their support for Gates³³. Publicly, he stated that he supported Gates because of his long experience the CIA had too many problems and was too important for on-the-job training, Gates had the trust of the President, could work with Congress, and had a strong commitment to the oversight process. Boren specifically mentioned Gates's willingness to resign rather than cause problems with Congress. Boren felt that Gates had matured and grown over the past years. Moreover, he spent years working with Gates and trusted him³⁴. The Senate vote was rancorous and here Boren's influence was crucial with key individuals. Both Senator Mitchell, the majority leader, and Senator Nunn ending up voting for Gates primarily because Boren supported him.

The SSCI vote for Gates was 11-4 and the Senate vote for him was 64-31. Though Gates won handily, there had never been that many negative votes for a DCI before³⁵. Ultimately, *Gates*

³¹ Pamela Fessler, "Gates Confirmed to Lead CIA Into Post-Soviet Era. Nominee, Committee Chairmen Promise to Move Quickly to Redefine Mission, Sharpen Intelligence," *Congressional Quarterly* 49, no. 45 (November 9, 1991) 3291.

³² Elaine Sciolino, "Senate Approves Gates by 64 to 31, to Head the C I A," *New York Times*, 6 November 1991, A23.

³³ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 550. Gates also enlisted Nunn's support and sent him a private letter outlining the new initiatives he would take at the CIA.

³⁴ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination Report together with Additional Views*, 200-208. Boren also wanted someone at the CIA who would make changes. Webster restored relations with Congress, but as an outsider he did not try to make great alterations in the way CIA was organized. However, Boren did give a remarkably unusual pledge in public—he said anti-Gates analysts would not have action taken against them for their testimony. Of course, many people at CIA wondered how Boren could enforce that pledge, according to Goodman. For his part, Gates noted that he earned his congressional oversight bona fides with Boren over the years and that he had "always played straight and honest" with Boren. See Gates, *From the Shadows*, 545. Ott notes that despite his flaws, Gates had a good history as an interlocutor with the SSCI and could brief on anything from budgets to grand strategy (Ott interview).

³⁵ Goodman interview.

*II. The Confirmation*¹ was saved from disaster because the President and his Republican foot soldiers and Boren worked hard ³⁶

As a result of his weakened political state, Gates promised publicly and privately to take Congress's views into account at the CIA. He became more a creature of Congress than any of his predecessors. *The New York Times* noted that "In an administration that has shown its disdain for what it considers Congressional meddling in national security issues, Mr. Gates will be the first director who is directly beholden to Congress. He has vowed to resign rather than jeopardize that relationship should differences emerge between the executive branch and CIA."³⁷

Post-Production Notes

After the high drama of successfully producing the Gates nomination, President Bush proceeded to lose the following presidential election. By that point, Gates was carrying too much baggage and President Clinton did not keep him as DCI, though he wanted to stay ³⁸. He served a little over a year in the job toward which he worked all his life. As a result of the issues raised during the nomination, the CIA was much more aware and on-guard against politicization of intelligence analysis. Congress did propose and pass the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992, which was "the first successful effort by Congress to enact organizational legislation for the U.S. Intelligence Community Since 1947."³⁹ George Tenet, who had a non-speaking role as the SSCI staff director, became a star when he was nominated and confirmed as CIA director in 1997. His

³⁶ Ott interview

³⁷ Sciolino, "Senate Approves Gates," A23. In his interview, Marvin Ott did not agree with this last point, thinking that it may have been held by some people but was too subtle for most of the SSCI. However, analyzing the issue early in the confirmation process, *Congressional Quarterly* noted, "Most members of the Senate Intelligence Committee seem far more interested in whether Robert M. Gates will be candid with them in the future than whether he had misled them in the past." They felt that Gates would allow trust to develop, without which oversight process doesn't work. See Pamela Fessler, "Keeping Congress Informed," *Congressional Quarterly* 49, no. 39 (September 28, 1991): 2803.

³⁸ Goodman believes that Senator Bradley convinced Clinton to let Gates go (Goodman interview). Ott believes the BCCI scandal had caused Gates to lose credibility with Boren and he had no high-level Democratic protector (Ott interview).

confirmation hearing was dull and is unlikely to make it to video, since it barely got a major release

Rating *Gates II: The Confirmation*

The drama was expected to go smoothly and it did not, but that weakness made it all the more interesting and human. The drama showed the intersection of policy and personality. Gates's accusers could not have been chosen better by a Hollywood studio of the 1940s—the elder statesman (Ford), the ingenue (Glaudemans), and the seasoned pro and Gates contemporary (Goodman). As political drama and theater, it gets four stars.

Note The prospect that if a Republican wins the presidential election in 2000, the new administration will produce *Gates III: The Musical* is definitely unsettling and hopefully just a rumor.

³⁹ Select Committee on Intelligence, *Legislative Oversight*, 26