Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats
Abstract
DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability.5 Although DOD strategic guidance and policy have for the last decade repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of an adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons, DOD and joint acquisition policies currently do not require that survivability be specifically addressed, and the military services have developed their own varying and unique policies. In the absence of consistent policies from DOD and the services, the nine weapon system program offices we reviewed made inconsistent decisions in their consideration and testing of weapon system survivability, even for similar systems. For example, the program offices for the three land systems we reviewed each conducted very different tests, even though all three systems are intended for the same operating environment. Similarly, the program offices for the nine weapon systems we reviewed did not consistently document their chemical and biological survivability decisions because of the absence of a DOD or joint requirement for them to do so. Although the program offices could provide documentation regarding what chemical and biological survivability testing was conducted, they did not have a consistent method to track what was considered or not included. Furthermore, DOD is unable to exercise oversight of program office decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological survivability because DOD and service policies have not established a clear oversight process for monitoring these decisions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA446797
Entities
Organizations
- United States Government Accountability Office