Forgoing SALT: Potential Costs and Effects on Strategic Capabilities
Abstract
In 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the SALT II treaty to control the number of strategic nuclear weapons that each country could have. The treaty placed limits both on the number of launchers carrying multiple warhead missiles and on the total number of launchers. The last of the treaty's provisions expired in December 1985. Since the treaty was not approved by the U.S. Senate, its terms never became binding U.S. policy. Instead, until recently, the Administration pledged not to "undercut" the provisions of the treaty so long as the Soviets followed the same policy. In June 1986, however, President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the provisions of SALT II, arguing that the Soviet Union had violated its provisions. The Administration is negotiating with the Soviet Union on other strategic nuclear arms control proposals, including one recently made by the Soviets. Some Members of the Congress have expressed concern about the U.S. decision to renounce the "no-undercut" policy. Indeed, a recent nonbinding resolution of the House called on the Administration to continue not to undercut SALT II. Concerns are based in part on the possibility that the absence of SALT II restraints could fuel an escalation in the arms race. Would the absence of arms control limits speed up the arms race? It need not, of course. Both sides could continue along their current paths even without any arms control limits. Indeed, the Administration argues that the current rough balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with weakness in the Soviet economy, would preclude any major expansion by the USSR. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has already developed, or is deploying, numerous new strategic weapons systems.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA447675
Entities
Organizations
- Congressional Budget Office