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Improving DoD's Alliance and Coalition Management

Summary of Recommendations

21 June 2005

**73rd Military Operations Research Society Symposium
West Point, NY**

A. Martin Lidy





The Challenge


- **The Cold War static environment is over**
 - International security-related structures haven't transformed to accommodate this shift
 - Yet expectations of their performance in the new environment remain high
- **New dynamic and ambiguous environment**
 - Expeditionary “pick up teams” to address complex crises in distant lands
 - Institutional responses are *ad hoc*
 - Lessons are identified but not learned because the underlying processes have not been changed
- ***How can DoD get improved performance from these structures?***

Adapt structures and processes with focus on

- ***Improving planning with interagency, multinational, and multilateral partners***
- ***Employing common and transparent processes and procedures***
- ***Encouraging interaction among potential partners to gain familiarity and understanding***



The QDR and Other Prisms



The USG National Security Strategy is implemented through alliances and coalitions of interagency, multinational, and multilateral military and civilian partners



Agenda: *DoD Challenges and Opportunities*

- **Managing Relationships with Security-Related International and Regional Institutions**
- **Managing *Ad Hoc* Coalitions**

- ***Alliance*** – An alliance is a result of ***formal agreements*** (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interest of the members. (Source: JP 1-02)
- ***Coalition*** – An ***ad hoc arrangement*** between two or more nations for common action. (Source: JP 1-02)



Alliances Are Important – They Lay Foundations for Future Military Coalitions

- **Alliances build trust among committed members and reach consensus and agreement on**
 - Joint and combined doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (e.g., NATO AAPs, ABCA and MIC handbooks)
 - Standardization of equipment and processes (e.g., NATO STANAGs, ABCA QSTAGs)
 - Joint and combined force structures
 - Rationalization of limited resources for alliance-wide support organizations (e.g., NC3A, NAMSA)
- **Educate and train multinational partners**
 - Educate through alliance schools (e.g., NATO, OAS)
 - Train together through alliance supported exercises (e.g., CAXs, CPXs, FTXs)
- **Opportunity to plan and prepare for future contingencies**
 - Identify capabilities of members and potential partners
 - Common view of threats for potential range of contingency requirements
 - Sponsor focused coalition building exercises and rehearsals

NSS-1: Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends



Current Security-Based International Institution Relationships

- **The UN is the world's most inclusive alliance with 191 members**
 - UN has no military or police forces of its own, and relies on member nations
 - Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
 - » Responsible for assembling and supporting military and civilian police during PKOs and other Security Council directed missions
 - » Staffed to manage 2 to 3 missions but **currently managing 18 PKOs and 11 observer missions, and 1 PKO being planned**
 - » Establishes standards for PKO forces and CIVPOL but does not train or evaluate
 - 9 DoD personnel assigned to US Mission at UN in NY and 2 are assigned to DPKO
- **USG efforts to influence other regional institutions vary widely**
 - A **US mission** to the IGO and **an integrated command structure** and **staffs** (e.g., NATO)
 - An **integrated command structure** and **staff** (e.g., NORAD)
 - **US missions** assigned to the intergovernmental organization (IGO) (e.g., OSCE, OECD)
 - An **“additional duty”** assigned to a country team where the IGO is headquartered (e.g., Ethiopia for the AU, Nigeria for ECOWAS)
 - Participation in **“periodic meetings”** orchestrated by one or more departments with allied counterparts (e.g., ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF))
 - FMS focus in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) or **“benign neglect”** for SADC
- **Most US influence is exercised through bilateral relationships, but 6 regional institutions – NATO, NORAD, OAS, ARF, AU, AND GCC –**
 - Encompass about 92% of the 23,736,000 active military forces worldwide*
 - US is a member in 4 but provides support to the other 2
 - NATO and EAPC have had major positive influence on Eastern Europe military forces



Capabilities and Interests of International Structures and US Goals

<i>International Structure</i>	<i>US Member</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>	<i>COCOMs' AOR</i>	<i>Integrated Military Staff</i>	<i>Primary Interest of Institution</i>	<i>Possible DoD Goals</i>
NATO/EAPC	Yes	25/42	EUCOM CENTCOM	Yes	Defense and political and military cooperation through shared democratic principles	Consolidate, selected expansion, and retain leadership role
NORAD	Yes	2	NORTHCOM	Yes	Air defense of Canada and US	Transform scope to meet GWOT and HLD
Organization of American States	Yes	36	SOUTHCOM	No	Governance, human rights, peace and security, and free trade	Increase regional influence, sustain democratic gains, and assist with global stability
United Nations	Yes	191	All RCCs	No	International security, and economic, social and human rights cooperation	Improve effectiveness and efficiency
European Union	No	25	EUCOM	Yes	Economic, governance, and security integration	Sustain compatible and complementary security capabilities
African Union	No	53	EUCOM CENTCOM PACOM	No	Unity and solidarity of members and promote regional peace and security	Develop capacity to contribute to regional stability and assist with stability elsewhere
Gulf Cooperative Council	No	6	CENTCOM	No	Regional economic, social, political, and military cooperation	Develop more robust collective security capabilities
ASEAN Regional Forum	Yes	24	PACOM	No	Confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution	Develop increased institutional capacity to address regional security issues

Institutions range from NATO – the “gold standard” – to ARF’s loose grouping



Does DoD Have a Plan to Manage Its Participation in Alliances? (1)

NSS-2: Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power

- **Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs)**
 - Address programs with individual nations on a bilateral basis
 - Do not take into account programs that enhance partner capabilities and interoperability through international or regional institutions
- **Some key questions to resolve:**
 - How should the DoD manage its relationships within UN and NATO, and with the evolving European Security and Defense Policy and structures of the EU?
 - Should NORAD be extended to include Mexico in today's 360 degree threat environment from land, sea, and air?
 - Should DoD's relations with the OAS be managed at the regional or sub-regional level?
 - Can the ARF build on PACOM's Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) exercise program and enhance preparation for future coalitions?
 - How should DoD and other donors manage support to the AU, especially the *Global Peace Operations Initiative* (GPOI)?
 - How should the DoD manage its relations with the GCC to fight the GWOT?



Does DoD Have a Plan to Manage Its Participation in Alliances? (2)

- **With the expanding role of RCCs in the DoD processes (IPLs, TSCP, etc.)**
 - What is the appropriate “division of labor” between OSD and RCCs in alliance participation and management?

NSS-3: Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction

- **Given the NSS goals of reducing the threat of WMD and defeating the GWOT**
 - How should DoD manage its relationships with Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) that have responsibilities for WMD (e.g., IAEA, OPCW, Interpol, and the evolving BWC)?



How DoD Could Improve Its Management of Alliances

- **Recommendation A1: QDR Roles and Missions Panel [USD(P)]**
 - *Determine which international institutions provide the US military with the greatest reach and leverage to influence and enhance allied military force capabilities to form ad hoc coalitions and conduct multinational operations identified in the NSS*
 - *Identify management of US interests in security-based international institutions as a DoD mission in the SCG*
- **Recommendation A2: QDR Business Practices Panel [USD(P)]**
 - *Establish and empower an office to manage DoD relations with designated international institutions and coordinate DoD and interagency activities and military support with the NSC, S/CRS, and DoS functional and regional bureaus to*
 - » *Defeat global terrorism, defuse regional conflicts, and reduce the WMD threat to us, our allies, and friends*
 - » *Prevent failed states, and prepare for post-conflict situations and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations*
 - *Expand the SCG and TSCPs to encompass designated regional groups*
 - » *OSD – Manage government-to-government organizational relationships and role in institutions*
 - » *RCCs – Develop military cooperation and capabilities through training and experimentation*
 - *Establish programs to share NATO doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures with selected international institutions, adapting them for use by regional members, and employing them during exercises and future coalition operations*



Current USG Institutional Management Challenges

NSS-4: Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century

- **DoD transformation has started through experimentation at JFCOM (e.g., JIACGs and MNEs) and JS activities with the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC)**
 - Focus has been mostly on DoD-Centric and multinational military coalition issues
 - Needs increased participation from
 - » USG departments and agencies to transform USG interagency processes – “Project Horizon” is a new DoS-led interagency scenario-based planning effort that could help
 - » Civilian multilateral and multinational partners

NSS-5: Work with others to defuse regional conflicts

***An Emerging Alliance Management Challenge:
The GPOI is a USG funded multinational effort focused on Africa,
but with a worldwide reach***

- **Announced at the G-8 Summit, Jun 04 and reaffirmed by the POTUS at the UN General Assembly meeting in Sep 04**
 - Enhance peacekeeping capabilities of African and other regional forces
 - Train 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010 and additional stability police units



Current Management of the G-8 Global Peace Operations Initiative

- **GPOI Program**

- Establishes G-8 expert-level **meetings** for exchanging information on efforts to enhance peace support capabilities
- Conducts periodic **exercises** and provides **training** to maintain skills
- Enhances the institutional capacity of African regional and sub-regional organizations to **plan for and conduct** peace operations
- Develops **transportation and logistics support** arrangements to facilitate deployment and sustainment in the field
- Increases **training of stability police units** by supporting existing centers and promoting the Italian initiative for a international center of excellence

- **Current USG management of AU support at the strategic theater level**

- Is an “additional duty” for Ambassador and country team in Ethiopia; same arrangement for sub-regional organization, ECOWAS; none with SADC
- Oversight of security cooperation programs in 53 AU nations with 2.1 million active military forces distributed within
 - » Two DoS bureaus (NEA and AF)
 - » Two USAID bureaus (ANE and AFR)
 - » Three US COCOMs (EUCOM–42 countries; CENTCOM–8 ; PACOM-3)
- CJTF-HOA operates in support of the GWOT in 6 AU nations



How Can DoD Improve Its Management of Alliances? (2)

- **Recommendation A3: QDR Roles and Mission and Business Practices Panels and Integration Group** [USD(P), CJCS, and JFCOM]
 - *Expand DoD transformation and experimentation activities to increase participation by USG departments and agencies and civilian components from multinational and multilateral partners*
 - *Direct EUCOM – in coordination with NSC; S/CRS, S/PM, and regional bureaus; JS, other RCCs and JFCOM; and allied donors – to develop a concept of operations for a Multinational, Multilateral, and Interagency Group (M2IG) to effect unified donor support to the AU*
 - *Implement and evaluate the M2IG at the AU*
 - *Develop options to improve management of USG and allied support to the selected institutions by fielding M2IGs to oversee and guide USG and allied interests and programs in those international and regional institutions*



Coalition Challenges

- ***Who Are the Potential Coalition Partners?***
- ***How Willing and Capable Are Potential Coalition Partners?***
- ***Is There an Agreed and Transparent Process?***
- ***Arrangements Among Partners and Integration of Resources***
- ***Preparing Partners for Future Operations***



Challenge 1: Who Are the Potential Coalition Partners?

- **Two types of coalitions of interest to DoD**
 - **Military Coalitions** – Real force capabilities needed for combat operations, but “flags” are often provided (e.g., KFOR, SFOR, OEF, OIF, ISAF)
 - **Civil-Military Coalitions** – Formed from USG interagency, multinational, and multilateral resources for complex contingencies (e.g., UNAMA, MINUSTAH, UNMIK, CPA)
 - **What are the capabilities of potential partners**
 - Many Capabilities-Based UN, IGO, and IO resource systems available
 - No single agency has developed an authoritative consolidated database to
 - » Assess potential coalition capabilities
 - » Identify shortfalls across conflict and post-conflict S&R operations
 - » Develop multinational and multilateral programs to improve future coalition capabilities
 - **Recommendation C1: QDR Business Practices Panel, Roles and Missions and Capabilities Mix Panels [USD(P) and DPA&E]**
 - *Expand existing Conventional Forces and JS/State Coalition Capabilities Databases to develop and maintain an authoritative “Consolidated Future Coalition Database,” including capabilities of both military and civilian partners*
 - *Assess the worldwide civilian and military capabilities for future coalitions, determine shortfalls, and propose programs to improve future coalition capabilities*
-



Challenge 2: How Willing and Capable Are Potential Coalition Partners?

<i>Political Ambition</i>	<i>Required Force</i>	<i>Example of Assets</i>	<i>Members</i>
Low Profile and Low Risk <i>Tier 5</i>	No expeditionary and limited stability operations	Light Infantry, surface transport	ES*, LG*, LU, SI*
Low Profile, Medium Risks <i>Tier 4</i>	Niche capabilities for expeditionary warfare	Add SOF, mountain troops, medical, NBC protection	BU*, CZ*, GR*, HU*, LH*, PO*, RO*, SL*
Medium Profile, Medium Risk <i>Tier 3</i>	Defensive expeditionary and combat support operations	Add air defense, BMD, RPVs, UAVs, mine hunters	PL*, TU*
Medium Profile, High Risk <i>Tier 2</i>	Offensive expeditionary operations	Add fighters, frigates, subs, initial entry and follow on forces, framework for PKO	BE, CA, DA**, GE*, NO*
High Profile, High Risks <i>Tier 1</i>	Broad expeditionary capability	Add framework for combat operations at division level	UK, FR**, NL, SP**, IT**
Global Responsibilities <i>Tier 0</i>	Full spectrum expeditionary capabilities	Add satellites, strategic bombers and framework for corps level operations	US

Legend: * = **Constrained** by conscripts
 ** = **Transitioning** to professional armed force or mix of conscripts and professional, some with other planned restructuring

Although a national political decision at the time a coalition is formed will determine whether or not a prospective member will join, these factors are useful for planning



How Can DoD Assess Potential Coalition Partners Capabilities and Willingness?

- **Recommendation C2: QDR Roles and Missions and Capabilities Mix Panels and Integration Group [DPA&E and CJCS]**
 - *Extend the Tier and Risk assessment process to military and civilian resources of designated international and regional institutions and potential coalition multinational partners*
 - *Include the assessments in the “Consolidated Future Coalition Database”*
 - *Identify national and multilateral partner conditional limitations (**red cards**) to deployment and employment of resources and add them to the “Consolidated Future Coalition Database.”*




Challenge 3: Is There an Agreed and Transparent Process?

- **Findings from Workshops**
 - Oct 03 Multinational Workshop hosted by JFCOM/FSI – allies expressed concerns with lack of a standard USG processes for planning and managing coalition operations
 - Aug 04 USG Interagency Workshop on Iraq hosted by NDU, JFCOM, S/CRS
 - » Military and civilian planning must be integrated from the beginning and continue until the intervention goals are achieved
 - » Operations must be carried out simultaneously by interagency, multinational, and multilateral partners
- **DSB concluded that to be successful, political (not just military) objectives must be achieved**
 - Requires preparation years in advance
 - S&R operations extend years after open hostilities and can be as resource intensive as major combat
- **JFCOM is conducting multinational experimentation with some USG agencies and allies to improve coalition planning and management**
 - Constrained by existing DoD processes that
 - » Do not recognize the experimental National Political Military Plan as its guiding authority
 - » Require all interagency contributions (USG and partners) to be included in the RCC's OPLAN Annex V



Experimental Process



0–Peacetime Engagement

1–Interagency Assessment and Preparation

2–Rehearsal, Pre-positioning of Enablers, Strategic Deployment, and Civilian and/or Military Resource Build-up in the Region

3–Initial Entry Operations of Intervention Resources

4– Stability and Reconstruction Operations: Military to Civilian lead

5–Post-Conflict Peace-Building, Transition and Indigenous Military Force Restructuring: Civilian to Affected Nation Authority lead

6–Durable Peace: Civil-Military mentors

7–Self-sustaining Peace: Normal relations

Focus on seams and transitions of lead


Generic National Political-Military * Plan Template – not recognized by DPS

Interagency and Multinational planning is required for all interventions

- Both civilian and military resources are employed from Phases 0 thru 7
- Transitions between phases change lead and support roles



Must Adapt Current Planning System to Incorporate Emerging Capabilities





Can DoD-supported Experimentation Help to Develop Essential Processes?

- **Recommendation C3-1: QDR Business Practice Panel [USD(P), CJCS, and JFCOM]**
 - *Develop an integrated USG **civilian** and **military** experimental process, supporting procedures, and organizations (taking into account other potential partners' processes and procedures) to plan and manage coalition operations during transitions from peacetime operations through crisis response, post-crisis stabilization and reconstruction, and return to affected nation control*
 - *Conduct experiments and modify the processes and procedures to achieve an agreed transparent **civil-military and interagency** standard that can be used to manage future coalition operations*

Need NSC support to bring USG interagency and other partners into DoD experimentation, and to use NPMP as strategic guidance to DPS



How Can DoD Improve Formation and Employment of Coalitions?

- **Recommendation C3-2: QDR Business Practice Panel [USD(P), DPA&E, and CJCS]**
 - *Collect best practices from managing recent coalitions (e.g., OEF, OIF, and CJTF-HOA) and compile a “USG Coalition Management Guide” containing agreed **USG interagency procedures** to be followed when assembling and employing future coalitions*
 - *Develop, through the Multinational Interoperability Council, a generic “Coalition Partner Guide” that can be tailored to a specific coalition to inform **potential partners** of that is expected from them and what the coalition will provide to facilitate management of future coalitions and partner expectations*
 - *Within existing exercises, conduct **interagency, multinational, and multilateral coalition building events** to evaluate and modify the coalition management guides*




How Can DoD Clarify Arrangements Among Coalition Partners?

- **Recommendation C4-1: QDR Roles and Mission and Business Practices Panels and the Integration Group** [USD(P), CJCS, and JFCOM]
 - *Develop clear definitions of responsibilities when civilian and military organizations operate together during peacetime and complex contingencies*
 - *Develop common TTPs for **joint police and military force operations** during security sector reform and stabilization operations*
 - *Develop a “USG Dictionary of Interagency Terms” (including abbreviations and acronyms) for all phases of intervention from security cooperation through post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and restoration to affected nation authority*
- **Recommendation C4-2: QDR Roles and Missions and Business Practices Panel and Integration Group** [ASD(NII) and USD(I)]
 - *Develop information sharing architectures for coalition operations during complex contingencies, and an agreed implementation plan*
 - *Develop distributed CPX-based training to build capabilities*



Preparing Civilian and Military Partners for Complex Contingencies





How Can DoD Prepare Partners for Future Coalition Operations?

- **Recommendation C5-1: QDR Business Practices Panel [USD(P)]**
 - *Assign to the office designated to manage DoD relations with selected alliances the responsibility for managing DoD coalition activities and coordinating them with interagency, multinational, and multilateral partners so that future coalitions can be deployed and employed effectively and efficiently*
- **Recommendation C5-2: QDR Business Practices Panel [CJCS]**
 - *Develop, within the existing series of COCOM exercises, events that realistically address activities from phases 1 through 7 employing agreed common doctrine, TTPs, and terminology*
 - *Assist S/CRS with developing and conducting an annual **civilian-led exercise** of the various transitions between phases 3 and 7 employing both civilian and military resources and agreed common doctrine, TTPs, and terminology*