

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SHAPING CHINA'S RISE THROUGH STRATEGIC FRICTION

by

Colonel Douglas A. Castle
United States Army Reserve

Colonel G. Alexander Crowther
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Shaping China's Rise through Strategic Friction				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Douglas Castle				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Douglas A. Castle
TITLE: Shaping China's Rise through Strategic Friction
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 5,999 PAGES: 33
KEY TERMS: Asia-Pacific, Deterrence, Democratic Reforms, National Security
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

China's grand strategy calls for accumulating sufficient national power to maintain internal order, defend its sovereignty, and eventually replace the United States as the dominant global power. This SRP examines the origins and nature of China's global objectives and their negative implications for the U.S. Specifically, it will address these questions: How will China behave over the next several decades, and what should the U.S. do about it? China's history and cultural underpinnings indicate that it will continue on its course towards global superpower status. Unless China's political structure changes to allow a more representative form of government, its rise to this status will threaten American security. Washington's current China policy places its confidence in the unsubstantiated hope that increasing wealth will lead to democratic reform in China. Actually, China's increasing prosperity is countering democratic reform, and current policy will not quickly lead to a democratic China. This SRP identifies China's economy as its strategic center of gravity and recommends maintaining a utilitarian relationship with Beijing while purposefully slowing the rate of China's economic growth. This will prevent China's premature rise to superpower status and eventually enable democratic reform to change China's culture, producing a more responsible superpower.

SHAPING CHINA'S RISE THROUGH STRATEGIC FRICTION

China's grand strategy calls for accumulating sufficient national power to maintain internal order, defend its sovereignty, and eventually replace the United States as the dominant global power.¹ Unless China's political structure changes, its ascension will threaten American security.² This SRP examines the origins and nature of China's global objectives and their negative implications for the U.S. Specifically, it will address these questions: How will China behave over the next several decades, and what should the U.S. do about it? Rather than a detailed blueprint for action, it offers a prophetic road sign proclaiming, "This is the way – walk ye in it!"³ That way is to maintain a utilitarian relationship with Beijing while purposefully slowing the rate of China's growth, thereby enabling its society time to change and responsibly accommodate its rapidly expanding power.

China's Rise – Hic Sunt Dracones⁴

China maintains the world's fastest growing economy, averaging a nine-percent yearly increase in Gross National Product (GNP).⁵ Building military capabilities at a war-time pace,⁶ its increasing expansion will one day alter the Pacific power balance, enable force-projection capabilities,⁷ and produce coercive global muscle.⁸ Its burgeoning economy bolsters other instruments of strength, and China employs its wealth to fund worldwide diplomatic leverage and soft power.⁹

Beijing is preoccupied with maintaining security from suspected enemies,¹⁰ imposes stringent measures to preserve internal control,¹¹ and believes it can only achieve lasting national security if no greater world power can prevent it from carrying out domestic, regional, and global policies. Achieving superpower status is Beijing's ultimate defense from external threats and from losing domestic legitimacy.¹² Its intermediate goals are to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, reclaim other disputed territory,¹³ and dominate the region.¹⁴ China minimizes conflict with other nations in order to cultivate its economy, gain international influence, build its military, and maintain internal order. Having identified America¹⁵ as its greatest strategic impediment,¹⁶ it will begin to marginalize American influence when China's power renders it difficult to challenge.¹⁷ China's budding power, asymmetric capabilities,¹⁸ and historical readiness to employ force¹⁹ when it perceives challenges,²⁰ posture it to be America's greatest emerging competitor,²¹ despite contrary assertions by the Department of Defense.²² Unless the U.S. recognizes China's ambition and systematically deals with it, open conflict between the U.S. and China could flare where interests clash.

China's Rise – Contributing Influences

It is difficult to precisely interpret the intentions of a diverse population and leadership in a heterogeneous geopolitical entity like China, and China's recent regimes have not openly articulated an intentional grand strategy. However, their behavior implies an overarching sense of purpose and direction, which reflects contributions from Chinese culture,²³ philosophy, and history. China's view of time, history of empire, inclination toward authoritarian government, and cultural concepts of war and military use, all furnish pieces to the strategic puzzle. These factors bear further examination because they indicate how deeply China's strategy is embedded in its psyche and how likely this sense of purpose will motivate future leaders. A 2005 Defense Department report predicts that China is not yet set on an immutable course.²⁴ On the contrary, China's past indicates it will accumulate power, if unhindered, until no other nation can interfere with its will.

One component shaping China's intentions involves its Eastern approach to time.²⁵ Easterners view time as cyclical, whereas Westerners view it as linear, and the Eastern temporal perspective is a qualitative focus on events rather than a quantitative focus on length. Objectives, in Eastern strategies, are more important than the time it takes to achieve them.²⁶ The People's Republic of China's persistent campaign to replace Taiwan on the UN Security Council illustrated that the importance of the result far superseded the length of time taken to achieve it. With infinite patience, Chinese leaders plan in terms of generations, thus securing an advantage over Western leaders who plan in terms of the next election.

Chinese history²⁷ helps explain its drive for power and its acquiescence to totalitarian rule. For millennia China considered itself the center of civilization,²⁸ endowed with an inherent prerogative to receive both monetary tribute and respect.²⁹ The modern Chinese state is in many ways a revival and continuation of this empire.³⁰ Restoration of preeminence constitutes a powerful subconscious buttress to the Chinese will and looms as its ultimate goal. For the Chinese, the label "hegemon" is pejorative only when applied to other nations,³¹ and the hegemonic label would rest most comfortably over the doorframe of China's house. China believes that, with its superior culture,³² its rightful place is to again occupy the center of global civilization. Coupled with this early identity of empire is a "Strong China Complex."³³ China's European domination and brutal Japanese occupation have motivated its people to accumulate military and economic strength.

A tradition of absolutism, focusing authority and power in one person, has in various iterations formed the base of Chinese governance from its foundation. From hegemonic feudal states to Legalist-influenced dynasties, China experienced rule by those who elevated their

position and power.³⁴ China's history conditioned its culture to seek the greatness of empire and to accept autocratic government, both of which are operational in today's China.

China's philosophical view of war also shapes its grand strategy. Sun Tzu's indirect philosophy, arising from China's Confucian/Taoist core,³⁵ resonates with the modern Chinese approach to warfare. China's idea of military power differs importantly from Western views. Military force was not simply an extension of politics but was one of many implements political leaders employed to execute policy.³⁶ China uses every instrument of national power to achieve its goals and regards this comprehensive endeavor as war. It wields the military tool if it believes it appropriate to do so, yet would rather achieve goals without its use.³⁷ China will use all available means to structure the global environment, and to challenge the American economy and national will over time, so that the U.S. "has obviously lost before...it has even begun to recognize the futility of fighting."³⁸

Sun Tzu's concept that "war demands deception"³⁹ demonstrated itself in China's 2003 "peaceful rise"⁴⁰ campaign, quickly replaced with phrases like "peaceful coexistence,"⁴¹ to counter suspicion that China was an increasing challenge to world peace. This campaign presented China's economic and military buildup as peaceful. Yet Beijing acquired every weapons system it could, launched unrivaled global espionage operations, and exerted economic and military pressure on nations to abandon relations with the U.S. and align with China. In light of China's actual behavior, U.S. leaders would be wise to observe Shakespeare's admonition, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks"⁴² when listening to Beijing's benign announcements of its intentions.

China's culture and history reveal how it is disposed to use force and how it regards casualties. Andrew Scobell argues convincingly that the most accurate understanding of China's disposition to use force is evident in a mindset he terms a "Cult of Defense,"⁴³ a dangerous penchant to use offensive force, with defensive intentions, if threat is perceived.⁴⁴ An authoritarian regime does not have to answer for military casualties as a democratic leadership would. China killed tens of millions of its own people in the twentieth century, more than any nation in recorded history, and demonstrated that state priorities far outweigh human casualties.⁴⁵ China's willingness to use force and accept casualties, along with a frame of reference that searches constantly for external and internal hazards,⁴⁶ complicates deterrence. It is within the realm of possibility that China could initiate a losing military confrontation, risking great loss of life, to win an identified political objective.⁴⁷

China – Friend or Foe?

Examining Beijing's actions and intentions, Americans frequently debate this question: Is China friend or foe? China's intent becomes an issue if Beijing is consciously vested in hegemony rather than merely subconsciously motivated by its history and quest for regime legitimacy. It is perhaps easier to redirect an unconscious inclination than to foil a deliberate plan. However, actions are easier to interpret than intentions, so it is more practical to focus on Beijing's behavior. China, the world's ultimate pragmatic nation, grinds through international relations with an implacable resolve that preserves its own interests first, foremost, and always. It opportunistically seeks relations with other nations to serve those interests. China does not easily categorize as friend or foe, because it behaves as one or the other depending upon which posture best supports its interests.

China is advancing toward domination, but not in the sense of militarily conquest⁴⁸ and rule. China set its internal environment for growth and security through economic reform. It set its regional environment for growth and security by normalizing relationships with its immediate neighbors and beginning to settle territorial disputes.⁴⁹ China now seeks to set its global environment favorably for growth and security. China's appetite for resources⁵⁰ cannot be domestically satiated, and it must secure those resources abroad.⁵¹ China wants to shape a "China-friendly" world in which it has access to abundant resources and in which no other state can interfere with its progress.

China's global activities⁵² illustrate that it is energetically pursuing its advantage and America's disadvantage.⁵³ In every continent China uses economic largesse⁵⁴ and financial pressure to build alliances assuring a flow of resources to China, while limiting them to the U.S. and other competitors. China aggressively seeks relationships with non-democratic nations hostile to America and supports their inclinations to withstanding U.S. pressure to reform.⁵⁵ China is especially active in Latin America and the Caribbean, establishing advantageous relations geographically close to the U.S., such as a commercial presence near the Panama Canal⁵⁶ and complicit liaisons with anti-American leaders in Venezuela and Cuba.⁵⁷ China is pursuing the same policies in Africa to promote its political goals and feed its resource appetite. In Europe, Eurasia, and North America, China acquires advanced technology and weaponry through coercive economic agreements and a blizzard of industrial espionage. China's economic practices are at times brazenly lawless, especially at the local and provincial governmental levels⁵⁸ and remain largely unchallenged even under provisions of the World Trade Organization, in which China's membership was supported in an unsuccessful attempt to

modify that nation's political behavior.⁵⁹ Whether China is friend or foe, it acts to advance China and thereby hinder America.

The 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) begins with the warning.⁶⁰ "America is a nation at war." Unfortunately this NDS focuses on the less dangerous war. A greater long-term menace is the passive-aggressive contest⁶¹ initiated and conducted quietly by Beijing. Washington recognizes that China frequently does not abide by the rules of international commerce. However, the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Commission's mildly worded statement, that "trends in the U.S.-China relationship have negative implications for the long-term economic and security interests of the United States,"⁶² does not lend adequate urgency to the situation.

China initiated a war Americans find difficult to recognize. To Beijing, war is a competition for survival, security, and eventual supremacy that may or may not have a kinetic dimension. Eastern leaders value achieving goals without the use of force,⁶³ while the contrasting Western way of war primarily exercises the military instrument in a defined battle space.⁶⁴ Asymmetric warfare perfectly complements Chinese philosophy and exposes the difference between Western and Eastern approaches to war. American war-fighting resembles traditional American activities such as chess, boxing, and football, in which direct force-on-force, power-based tactics reign⁶⁵ and opponents clash symmetrically on the battlefield while disdaining unorthodox means.⁶⁶ The Chinese way of war relies more on strategy and indirectness, similar to the Chinese game of Go and Chinese martial arts, which reflect the indirect way Chinese think and act.⁶⁷ China would rather achieve victory in its war through the accumulated weight of many small indirect victories⁶⁸ than through a one-time, costly, large-scale confrontation.

Beijing is currently waging its preferred style of war against the United States – a product of China's cultural mindset, history, and drive for security. Victory in this war does not require invading or destroying the U.S. but replacing America as the world's lone superpower, giving China greater freedom to pursue its internal and external policies.⁶⁹ Victory cannot come for China unless American power is degraded and unable to deter Chinese actions. The stakes of this war include the balance of power in the Pacific, American security and economic well-being, and possible world dominion by a nation with an historic disregard for democracy and human life. Is China friend or foe? China's concealed or subconscious intentions may never surface, yet its behavior appears unambiguous and clearly damaging to the U.S.

Like a colossal ship at sea, China has gained considerable momentum and cannot maneuver quickly. Washington must act now to begin redirecting China, yet suitable courses of action are limited. Preventive war, though perhaps conceivable, is not acceptable. Remaining

options include either maintaining today's alternating engagement and containment approaches or constructing a consistent long-term strategy to guide China toward change.

Current Policy Has Not Worked

America's current China policy is an ambivalent, fluctuating course of action with little hope of initiating a positive change in China's governance. Washington recently shifted from the Clinton Administration's tolerant and disastrous⁷⁰ "strategic partnership"⁷¹ to the Bush Administration's initial containment mindset, followed by a wary engagement. U.S. administrations have for thirty years based China policy on hopeful myths,⁷² including the misapprehension that globalization and prosperity would mobilize Chinese citizens to secure representative procedures, yet Tiananmen deflated the hope that a wealthy China would quickly evolve into a democratic China. History demonstrates instead that a populace provided with security, basic services, and a wealth-creating environment, maintains little incentive for immediate change.⁷³ Another factor reducing incentive for change is the substitution of a regime-fostered sense of national pride for the inherent human needs of purpose and meaning. Beijing formerly used communist ideology to maintain internal control⁷⁴ but has replaced it with national pride⁷⁵ based on increasing global influence, prestige, and power,⁷⁶ and China will use the 2008 Olympics as a rallying event to showcase its enhanced place in the world.

Beijing uses economic patronage as another means to maintain power. The Chinese state, deeply intertwined in its economy, accounted for 38% of China's 2003 GDP. Leveraging that involvement, Beijing appoints 81% of chief executives and 56% of senior corporate executives in state-owned businesses.⁷⁷ In today's China, political power equates to prosperity. China's expansive economy and patronage system have significantly reduced pressure on political party members to yield power to China's people. In addition, professionals in repressive cultures often play a key role in democratic revolution, but in China these elites are economically co-opted through government payments.⁷⁸ Contrasting with current American policy that wealth will nurture democracy, China's prosperity actually contributes to the opposite effect.

China watchers hoped that Hu Jintao's emergence would signal the beginning of a democratization process,⁷⁹ but Hu's consolidation of power quickly killed that hope. He continued investing heavily in China's paramilitary police force,⁸⁰ fully manned by those downsized from China's army, which can rapidly deploy to counter internal unrest. Beijing further restricted speech and information access within China, deploying over 30,000 Internet police capable of removing "harmful" Internet content within 24 hours of a declared event.⁸¹

A democratic China should be a primary goal of U.S. diplomatic strategy. However, given China's culture,⁸² present leadership, and blossoming prosperity, there is diminishing hope for that over the next decade. The prevailing U.S. ad-hoc vacillation between containment and engagement strategies will not produce desired internal changes and is not a suitable option.

Proposed Course of Action – Strategic Friction

China's rapidly growing power, in the hands of a neo-Leninist,⁸³ top-down government, is a dangerous commodity. The most effective means of providing China the necessary time to change is to slow the rate of China's accumulation of power. Rapidly increasing national power without a commensurate sense of global responsibility has proven historically dangerous. Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union attained great power in the twentieth century faster than their societies could transform to a bottom-up representative system. As in today's China, authority flowed downward rather than upward, and governing regimes upset the global balance of power with ill-advised exercises of their new-found might. Precipitous changes since 1945 stripped China of much of its older, stabilizing social order,⁸⁴ and China is accumulating power too quickly to develop the necessary representative systems and mediating institutions to support the wise use of that power. There is little political feedback to temper Beijing's judgment regarding how a responsible superpower must behave in its global relations. If China eventually does allow its people some degree of democratic involvement, the emerging form will remain uniquely Eastern and will pay homage to a historical acceptance of strong central authority, yet a "Chinese-flavored" democracy will still be a great asset to the world.

China needs more time for various influences to initiate democratic changes and resolve its evolving self-identity with that of a responsible world power.⁸⁵ Two such influences are globalization and spirituality. Globalization is a strong shaping force; given time and access, it could foster democratic changes and incline China's behavior toward internationally "playing nice in the sandbox." Regarding spirituality, China's culture has been historically conditioned by semi-religious philosophies, but its people never largely embraced a relationship with a personal spiritual deity. They consequently endure a personal spiritual vacuum.⁸⁶ Emerging to fill this void is China's expanding underground church, predicted to produce 400 million deeply committed adherents within decades.⁸⁷ This belief-based (rather than culturally-based) movement could influence China toward a more responsible international role by transforming individual value-systems and thus impacting cultural values. Time is needed for these influences to effect necessary representational changes. America should carefully consider every instrument of power to incrementally impede China's growth, in order to buy the

necessary time for China to change enough to conscientiously utilize its power in a global context.

Comprehensive China Strategy

America does not have a comprehensive China strategy.⁸⁸ However, Washington cannot devise an effective China plan unless it first accepts the reality and nature of Beijing's danger. War does not have to be kinetic to be war, and a non-kinetic war can just as surely produce winners and losers. An unrecognized war is an undefended war and, therefore, a lost war. Given China's drive to achieve superpower status, view of the U.S. as its greatest obstacle, and willingness to militarily defend apprehended interests, it is imperative for the U.S. to construct and implement an effective, all-inclusive strategy toward China. The U.S.-China Commission's 2005 Report advises that the United States must aggressively address China with a variety of tools and approaches.⁸⁹ To meet China's multi-dimensional challenge, the U.S. must respond multi-dimensionally with all instruments of power to retard China's rise.

Diplomatic Response

To devise a diplomatic response, America should first ask: What does China want? China wants sovereignty over its people and territory, increased access to energy and food resources, and the respect due to a nation which sees itself as the center of civilization.⁹⁰ Diplomacy with China must acknowledge China's goals. America should find ways to help China obtain what it wants,⁹¹ while slowing its growth and nurturing it as a responsible international actor. China's initiatives to secure resources demand a vigorous, proactive response from a focused U.S. State Department.⁹² Secretaries of State Powell⁹³ and Rice have engineered a significant increase of the State Department's strength, efficiency, and effectiveness. Powell's personnel initiatives are providing more operators to support the U.S. diplomatic effort, and Rice's budgetary increases to provide targeted spending, combined with her strategic relocation of personnel,⁹⁴ will greatly enhance U.S. competition for global influence, especially in developing regions. With this rejuvenated State Department, Washington must accelerate its pursuit of further economic, trade, and defense alliances, not only in China's back yard but in all resource-rich areas. It must do this realistically, as China does, rather than idealistically. The U.S. must respond actively to China's "checkbook subversion";⁹⁵ Rice's changes in USAID could advance that tactic.⁹⁶ The fastest-growing and largest economies of the world surround the Pacific Rim. Their relationships with America are increasing their economic and military strength. These relationships can counterbalance China's increasing

power and moderate its upsurge. India, a nation strategically positioned economically and militarily to possibly offset China, is well worth significant relational, military, and economic investment. The State Department's new emphasis on "Transformational Diplomacy"⁹⁷ will impede China's global influence by projecting America as an involved partner wherever China competes with the U.S.

A combined State and Defense effort is essential to multiply American influence in developing regions. While capitalizing on and accommodating regionally distinctive relationships, Washington should reorganize, realign, and relocate the five combatant commands more closely with the six geographic State Department bureaus to interlock both entities within similar territorial boundaries, which will further strengthen the working relationships between ambassadors and combatant commanders. A regional assistant secretary of state, working shoulder-to-shoulder with a combatant commander within the same geographic boundaries and partnering to address the same concerns, would synchronize and focus military and diplomatic efforts.

Realistic Approach to Taiwan⁹⁸

A chronic diplomatic issue commanding such focused attention is America's China-Taiwan policy, which elevates the process of reunification above the substance of reunification.⁹⁹ Washington accepts the concept of one China, but with a predictable affinity for kinetic war, only opposes Taiwan's reunification by military force.¹⁰⁰ This confusing position does not resolve the issue. China has demonstrated great perseverance to achieve its national goals. Reunification will eventually happen if Beijing, Washington, and Taipei maintain their current attitudes and policies. China is rapidly developing the military means and methods to take Taiwan quickly before the U.S. can react.¹⁰¹ If Taiwan relies solely on the U.S., it will one day fall.

Consider a different course of action, understandably controversial, that blends regional stability with the diplomatic strategy of partnership over paternalism.¹⁰² Such an approach lends itself more to a win-win result than the current construct. It borrows from the Chinese way of war by yielding ground to gain a greater advantage. It concedes Taiwan, if it fails to take greater responsibility for its own defense, to ultimately gain a stronger regional hedge around China.

The Taiwan Relations Act¹⁰³ was designed to help Taiwan arm and defend itself, but Taiwan now essentially depends on America for defense. Liberty costs both blood and treasure, and free people must be willing to pay the asking price for that liberty. Yet Taiwan,

relying on American blood and treasure, decreased its defense spending as a percentage of GDP from 4.8% to 2.4% since 1995,¹⁰⁴ and recently rejected military upgrades and improvements from the U.S.¹⁰⁵ Washington should communicate unequivocally that the U.S. will help Taiwan defend itself if Taipei commits greater resources to its own defense.

If Taipei does not respond to this message, the U.S. should then recognize that Taiwan has made a sovereign decision and allow it to realize the consequences of that decision. Then America should proclaim that it is honoring Taiwan's desire to control its own destiny. China would soon get what it wants, and regional tensions would decrease as Washington stopped "interfering in China's domestic affairs."¹⁰⁶ The U.S. has feared that if China takes Taiwan militarily, regional nations would lose faith in America's commitment and gravitate toward China. Structuring regional and worldwide perceptions so that the issue is framed in such a way that America is supporting the sovereign decisions of a friend rather than abandoning a friend, will ameliorate that fear. Washington can shape those perceptions with a strategic information campaign. A Chinese military takeover of Taiwan, augmented by the message that nations must participate actively in their own defense, would motivate some regional nations to increase military spending. Taiwan's location on sea lanes vital to Japan would also impel Japan to build its military power. This scenario would add to regional balance while decreasing China's status in world opinion.

If, on the other hand, Taiwan decides to increase its defensive capabilities, its new "teeth" will serve to detain China, especially if the U.S. would add offensive weapons to the package.¹⁰⁷ This scenario will send the message to China's neighbors that America will help them if they assume greater responsibility for their own sovereignty, thereby disposing them to boost defense spending. A stronger fence would be constructed around China, curtailing its enlargement.

This realistic approach to the Taiwan dilemma is more likely than the current approach to produce a win-win outcome because U.S. security would be enhanced no matter what decision Taiwan makes. In the first scenario, China loses standing in the world and lends the U.S. legitimacy to take a stronger position against China's economic behavior, while strengthening the regional balance of power. In the second scenario, China's ambition is forestalled for decades, while greater regional military spending also strengthens the balance of power.

Economic Response

China's economy is Beijing's strategic center of gravity – its source of real national power and internal legitimacy. Because wealth equates to power and power is essential to achieve its

international political goals¹⁰⁸ and because prosperity mitigates internal dissent, Beijing is focusing intently on its economy.¹⁰⁹ China is building new economic partnerships throughout the world but still relies heavily on American revenues.¹¹⁰ When it no longer needs American buying power to fund its objectives and when its military deterrent capabilities are sufficient, it will be in a position to more aggressively degrade U.S. capabilities and threaten American interests. China's power will increase unless its economy is slowed. Involuntary influences, such as lack of water resources and pollution, HIV infection and epidemics, corruption, unemployment and social unrest arising from disparities between urban and rural income, could slow its economy. Aside from the unpredictable possibility of these naturally occurring impacts, deliberately moderating the rate China's growth is the most direct means of delaying its power build-up and decreasing its threat to America.

Congress can participate in this process by acting decisively with respect to both China and U.S. corporations. However, it will take courageous, selfless congressional leadership due to American addiction to cheap Chinese goods, congressional addiction to corporate money, and corporate America's unswerving choice of immediate wealth over timeless principle.¹¹¹ Congress can use legislation and tax incentives to lure U.S. business to other sources, and increasing the value of China's Yuan would also help push U.S. companies toward other markets.¹¹² Small tax increases on companies doing a certain percentage of business with China, with tax incentives to companies opening new markets in other developing countries, will begin to reduce American dependence upon China. Congress can also add tariffs to Chinese goods to level the trading field, which will either decrease the trade imbalance or add to America's export opportunities. Gradually creating friction between U.S. business and the Chinese economy, while also holding China accountable in world organizations for violations of its commitments, will help abate China's rise and certainly affect its international conduct. China presently engages in illicit economic behavior almost unchallenged.¹¹³ Warnings of consequences for such behavior must be credible to be effective, yet the U.S. has filed only one WTO complaint against China despite numerous infractions.¹¹⁴

China's economic vulnerabilities provide an opportunity for promoting representative government. Historically, financial crises have generated democratic reforms,¹¹⁵ and despite China's surging economy, its economic disparities leave it perilously close to such a crisis. China's economy is vulnerable in areas such as energy availability and acquisition, limited banking capabilities, cash outflow, and shrinkage of foreign direct investment.¹¹⁶ Economists can more clearly pinpoint Chinese susceptibilities and plan a legally-vetted campaign that slows China's economy while safeguarding regional and global economic interdependence. The

strategic goal is to skillfully regulate China's ascension to power without destroying its economy or seriously impacting the global economy. Strategic success will be measured in the number of decades taken from China's unimpeded economic rise.

Information Response

America must engage in all-out information warfare to decelerate China's ascent, and every creative legal means should be considered to exploit weaknesses. This offensive information campaign should utilize the Internet, information technology, intelligence, and information operations using world opinion to shape China's society.

The Internet represents one of the greatest threats to Beijing's internal control, and it works hard to control this gateway to world information. China is energetically exploiting Internet capabilities for intelligence, growing adept at using information technology to penetrate the networks of other governments.¹¹⁷ The Internet also reciprocally represents opportunities for America. Offensive and defensive "hacking" capabilities, network warfare, and global network operations should continue to be a high U.S. priority in an artfully conceived information campaign to frustrate China's ambitions.

America's knowledge of China has key intelligence gaps, such as China's actual amount of defense spending and the disposition of its weapons systems.¹¹⁸ American interaction in the Chinese economy, though fueling China's rise, also presents an opening for "boots-on-the-ground" intelligence gathering to perhaps fill these gaps.¹¹⁹ More dangerous to America than these gaps is the information and technology flow moving from advanced nations to China through espionage,¹²⁰ corporate greed, and Chinese economic coercion.¹²¹ China's successful intelligence war¹²² impels its national military and industrial power forward at comparatively little cost. Safeguarding technology and forcing China to develop it rather than stealing or coercing its acquisition¹²³ can significantly impede China's economy. Washington has behaved scandalously in its unwillingness to stop this flow of technology. Along with other governments, Washington has unwittingly contributed to a dangerous proliferation of weapons to those hostile to America¹²⁴ and must begin to take seriously its obligation to enforce protection of vital technology.

China, sensitive to world opinion¹²⁵ and loss of face,¹²⁶ is especially vulnerable to negative publicity. The U.S. should launch a massive public diplomacy campaign to get China's resistance to democratization, human rights issues, and economic practices in the forefront of every global media outlet.¹²⁷ This campaign will necessitate a response from China and spark internal debate.

Military Response

Continued strengthening of the U.S. military can also decelerate China's expanding potency. Washington must not allow China to outpace America's conventional or nuclear capabilities and must maintain its clear technological advantages. If the U.S. can stay significantly ahead of China in weapons technology – such as advanced missile defense, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and space utilization systems – then China would be forced to spend inordinate amounts of money to develop a costly defense infrastructure, thereby further delaying its power build-up. However, this plan depends upon safeguarding technology from espionage, corporate transmission, and allied governmental transfers to prevent a free ride for China.

China's military growth is disconcerting, given that it faces no real regional challenge.¹²⁸ Its development of intercontinental nuclear missiles as well as land- and sea-launched weapons poses a significant threat to the continental U.S. as well as forward-based land and maritime U.S. forces. Although China has publicly endorsed a "no first-strike" strategic nuclear policy,¹²⁹ its "cult of defense" predilection increases the likelihood of a first-strike scenario.¹³⁰ America is especially vulnerable to the effects of a high-altitude EMP-producing detonation. Such an attack would cripple America's economy and infrastructure, yet the U.S. has no publicly-stated policy of response.¹³¹ An effective, operational U.S. anti-missile defense shield and credible EMP deterrence are thus essential to American security.

Maintaining a U.S. regional presence is critical, and Pacific Command has positioned both a quantity and variety of land, air, and sea forces throughout the Pacific to counter China's growing conventional power.¹³² This deployment should both continue and increase throughout the region. Guam's Andersen Air Force Base is a model for power-projection basing,¹³³ but it presents the Chinese with a convenient "one-stop shopping" target, not unlike the clustered battleships and aircraft in 1941's Oahu. Pacific Command must continue securing diverse basing throughout the region.

China, the first civilization to launch rockets, has prodigious ambitions for space,¹³⁴ so America must not give Beijing the opportunity to secretly militarize space. Washington should resist Beijing's pressure to sign further space-limitation treaties, since China would likely violate such accords while holding America to their terms.¹³⁵ Although the U.S. participates in treaties addressing the militarization of space, many capabilities are not currently limited by law or treaty,¹³⁶ so America can still exploit space legally. Space-control and force-application programs must increase, and the U.S. must revive its ground-based anti-satellite programs. If

threatened by EMP weapons, nuclear ballistic missiles, or attacks against space instrumentation, the U.S. must be prepared to act immediately to control space.

Asymmetric Threat

America has proven itself vulnerable to low-tech asymmetric attacks, and China is even more dangerous with its high-tech asymmetric abilities. Two senior PLA officers in 1999 detailed an application of unrestricted warfare¹³⁷ between disparate military powers in which the lesser could defeat the greater. Unrestricted warfare employs all imaginable methods to degrade enemy capabilities, including drug-smuggling, computer infrastructure attacks, assassinations, environmental destruction, and subversion of financial systems – the list continues as far as imagination allows. There are no moral constraints in unrestricted war; ultimate victory is the only guiding principle, so all capabilities are desirable as long as they are effective. High-tech applications of this type of warfare could significantly attenuate the U.S. economy, degrade its military, and deflect U.S. attention and resources to other areas of the globe, while China's military power becomes too formidable to challenge.¹³⁸

How should the U.S. respond? The legendary Marine motto to "Improvise, Adapt and Overcome" applies. Two American strategists, using fire against fire, recently arose to the occasion with a construct they labeled "combination warfare."¹³⁹ They contend that in combination warfare, not unlike unrestricted warfare, many unlikely events, such as crashing a stock-market or launching a crippling computer virus, can become weapons against combatants and entire populations.¹⁴⁰ The U.S. is a nation of laws and morality, so certain uses of combination warfare could be legally or ethically questionable, appearing contrary to Western concepts of engagement on the field of honor. America is, however, currently engaged in a non-kinetic war with an ascending world power that does not share the same values. The U.S. must creatively use all legal forms of war to contest this vigorously active competitor. Combination warfare activates every imaginable national instrument of power and may be Washington's best hope to delay China's rise and thus enable it to develop more responsible use of its increasing power. America must here choose realism over idealism.

Conclusion:

Without substantial change in China's culture, its eventual manifestation as a great world power requires a corresponding decline of American power. Beijing, perhaps influenced by the Confucian wisdom, "Just as there are not two suns in the sky, so there cannot be two emperors on earth,"¹⁴¹ will not yet share dominion.¹⁴² China is capable of using force with little regard for

the cost to its own people and views asymmetric conflict as a legitimate means to degrade U.S. strength and influence. This positions Beijing as a formidable world competitor rather than a world partner. Although increasing U.S. military and diplomatic capabilities to levels necessary to retain U.S. dominance will cost a higher percentage of GDP than current spending, the alternative will some day cost the nation much more. Washington must grasp the concept that the U.S. is in danger of losing its place within short decades and convince the American people that an untamed dragon prowls their neighborhood.

America's most suitable response to China's ascent is to pragmatically engage Beijing in areas of common interest while applying subtle friction to its economy. An economic slowdown will be more effective than the current unchallenged economic boom in facilitating democratic reforms by stirring greater discontent and hindering China's patronage system. Adding decades to China's rise will give its culture necessary time to react to global influences and offer any grassroots democratic initiatives opportunities to propagate. This is a dicey proposition. Without the wisest of hands at the controls, the strategy risks damaging U.S. and world economies, provoking open conflict, or encouraging a new and more perilous cold war. However, unless the U.S. is willing to step aside as the only superpower and consign that responsibility to an authoritarian, repressive regime, it must carefully absorb the risk and use a full spectrum of means to stall China's economy while maintaining an even greater military advantage. Is it right or ethical to manipulate the economy of 1.3 billion people for a greater world good? If this approach prevents a disastrous war, maintains U.S. dominance, and eventually leads to a responsible China willing to share the burden of maintaining international order, the answer is clearly, "Yes."

Endnotes

¹ Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy* (Santa Monica: Rand Publications, 2000), x.

² C. Richard D'Amato, *Hearing on China's Growing Global Influence: Objectives and Strategies*, (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 July 2005), available from http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/damato_richard_open.htm; Internet; accessed 30 November, 2005.

³ "Your ears will hear a word behind you, "This is the way, walk in it," whenever you turn to the right or to the left." Isaiah 30:21 NASB.

⁴ "How and when did the notion that old maps commonly bore the phrase "here be dragons" become established in popular belief? Da Costa writes, "In this region [i.e. China, called East

India on the globe] near the equatorial line, is seen 'Hc Svnt Dracones.'" Erin C. Blake, *Ubi Sunt "Hic Sunt Dracones?"* April 1999, available from <http://www.maphist.nl/extra/herbedragons.html>; Internet; accessed 05 October 2005.

⁵ Robert S. Ross, "Assessing the China Threat," *The National Interest*, Fall 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/rvp/pubaf/05/RossNationalInterest.html; Internet, accessed 13 December 2005.

⁶ "China is fast becoming a modern military power, with robust naval and air forces, precision weapons, and space-based capability, and is increasingly projecting its forces in the Pacific regions in particular." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Statement of C. Richard D'Amato at the Release of 2005 Annual Report to Congress*, 9 November 2005, available from http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2005/damato_statement.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 November, 2005.

⁷ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 19 July 2005), 13.

⁸ "First, the PLA is expanding its capabilities for strategic coercion and strategic denial. Chinese General Zhu Chenghu's recent comments indicate that China uses its nuclear weapons not just for deterrence but also for political coercion." *Hearing on Chinese Military Power, Statement of Richard D. Fisher*, 11.

⁹ "(China) has growing increments of 'soft' power that demonstrate a particular gift for adaptation. While stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones. All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the-way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence—by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements." Robert D. Kaplan, "How We Would Fight China," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2005 [journal on-line]; Available from <http://www.lanueva.cuba.com/nuevacuba/notic-05-05-1003.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 November, 2005.

¹⁰ Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force (Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March)*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: The Press Syndicate of the Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34.

¹¹ As a typical example, following is from an online news article: "China's government has initiated the first police force designed to monitor the Internet. Authorities in Shenzhen said the police force began Jan. 1 and will monitor 'everything that is said in online forums,' the Hong Kong Ming Pao reported. The Shenzhen police said in announcing the new force that the 'Internet is not beyond the law' and that Chinese should strictly regulate their online behavior. China is cultivating high-technology specialists from around the world to develop expertise to control content on the Internet, which China's communist leaders view as a threat to their control over the country." "Internet Is Not Beyond the Law, China's New Online Police Warn," *World Tribune Online*, 11 January 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2453747.1111111111.html>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2005.

¹² "Growth is the basis of the social contract with the people that keeps the regime in power through thick and thin. The global ambitions, in the words of Kong, are to restore China 'to its

proper place on the international stage.” Martine Bulard, China: *Middle Kingdom, World Centre*, Le Monde Diplomatique, available from <http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/02china>; Internet; accessed January 5, 2005.

¹³ “This self-arrogated role will not be accepted by most neighbors and has already raised concerns with a number of states, to include Korea, Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines -- the majority of which currently have territorial disputes with China.” Fisher, 13. See also: *South China Sea Reference Book*, (PACOM HQ, Camp Smith, HI: United States Pacific Command Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate Research and Analysis Division, April 1996).

¹⁴ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monro, *The Coming Conflict With China*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997), 64.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Steven W. Mosher, *Hegemon* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), 12.

¹⁷ Swaine and Tellis, 97-98.

¹⁸ Amrish Sehgal, “China and the Doctrine of Asymmetric Warfare,” *Bharat Rakshak Monitor*, Volume 6(1), Jul-Aug 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-1/IDR.html>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2005.

¹⁹ Alastair Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 266.

²⁰ Scobell, 198.

²¹ “China’s reforms since 1978 have given rise to unprecedented economic growth; if this course of development is sustained, China will be able to turn its great potential power, derived from its huge population, large territory, and significant natural resources, into actual power. The result could be, in the *very long term*, the rise of China as a rival to the United States as the world’s predominant power.” Abram N. Shulsky, *Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior*, (Santa Monica: Rand Monograph Publishing, 2000), vii; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1161/>; Internet; accessed 20 November, 2005.

²² “We will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military capability.” Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, March 2005), 5.

²³ Swaine and Tellis, 8.

²⁴ 2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 8.

²⁵ For a thorough discussion of the Chinese view of time, see Manuel B. Dy, Jr., “*The Chinese View of Time: A passage to Eternity*,” available from http://216.25.45.103/book/Series03/III-11/chapter_xx.htm; Internet; accessed 14 November, 2005. See also: Bob Riel, “*The Cultural Context – China*,” available from http://www.eatonconsultinggroup.com/whats_new/cultural_context.html; Internet; accessed 14 November, 2005.

²⁶ Lieutenant Commander Thomas D. Nolan Jr., *Cultural Differences, East and West: Silent Lessons from U.S. Involvement in East Asia*, Student Research Paper, (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff School, 1996), available from <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/nolan.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 November, 2005.

²⁷ "...the past casts a long shadow over modern China." Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 430.

²⁸ Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 11.

²⁹ Kathleen English, "The Challenge of China: Opening the Cultural Curtain," *UAB Magazine* 22-2 Fall/Winter 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <http://main.uab.edu/show.asp?durki=55884>; Internet; accessed November 30, 2005. See also "China is called the *Zhongguo* in Mandarin Chinese (also romanized as *Jhongguo* or *Chung-kuo*), which is usually translated as "Middle Kingdom", but could also be translated as, "Central State" or "Central Country". It literally means "middle (or center) land," referring to the supposed position of China at the center of that society's "known world", surrounded by lesser tributary states." "China" available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China>; Internet; accessed on November 16, 2005.

³⁰ "The Chinese Communist state displayed all the characteristics of the Empire." Mancall, 227.

³¹ Mosher, 8. See also Douglas M. McCready, "Learning from Sun Tzu," *Military Review - The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army* (May-June 2003): 85

³² "The Chinese, a billion strong, see no diminishment of their moral authority – exercised with such power for thousands of years – and their sense of cultural superiority ... Foreigners in the eyes of the Chinese are inferior, corrupt, decadent, disloyal and volatile, frequently hegemonistic, barbaric and, in essence, 'devils.'" Richard D. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide*, (London, UK: Nicholas Brealey Publishing., 2004), 379. See also: Zhang, 284.

³³ Zhang, 285.

³⁴ The Shang dynasty, 1766-1027 B.C. "...was ruled by an autocrat who, when addressing his subjects, pointedly styled himself as 'I the single one man.'" Following the Shang was the Zhou dynasty, which continued the autocratic traditions of the first dynasty. The centralized dynasties disintegrated into smaller feudal states, each ruled by an autocrat. Duke Huan formed a league of feudal states and ruled them as hegemon. This first hegemonic arrangement produced a Legalist "...school of statecraft dedicated to exalting the ruler and maximizing his power....the ruler must have absolute power to assure his rule." After Huan's rule expired, other feudal states were swallowed by regional hegemons, until eventually seven states remained, having conquered the rest. These seven states began to accumulate and centrally concentrate power under the legalist councilors, the essence of their doctrine being the supremacy of the ruler. The people found a measure of security in this arrangement after five centuries of chaotic warfare. Emerging from this feudal arrangement of hegemonic states was the Qin dynasty. Qin Shihuang launched in 231 B.C. a series of campaigns which were to bring much of what is today's China under his control. Qin, Legalist, concentrated his power absolutely and continued a policy of geographic expansion, and treated ordinary people as a disposable resource of the state. The Confucian-influenced culture which arose after Qin's

death continued a belief in the authority and power of a single sovereign. The Han dynasty, arising in 202 B.C., continued the autocratic and absolutist tradition for 360 years before giving way to three states, and reemerging as the Sui-Tang dynasty in A.D. 589. Later dynasties, the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing, followed earlier traditions and placed ultimate authority in the hands of the emperor into the A.D. 1800's. Mosher, 15-36.

³⁵ Ibid., 382-384.

³⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 40, 77.

³⁷ Ibid., x, 77.

³⁸ McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, 86.

³⁹ Sun Tzu, 27, 41, 66.

⁴⁰ "China, aware of rising U.S. interest in its strategy, is churning out the propaganda – "promoting a "peaceful rise" policy to counter American suspicions about its long-term strategy, sending the message that China is not trying to displace the U.S. as the world's top power." "China Claims It Wants to Peacefully Rise to Power in the World," *NewsMax.com*, 14 September 2005 [newspaper on-line] available from <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/9/13/154447.shtml>; Internet; accessed 26 November, 2005.

⁴¹ Robert Suettinger, "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'", *China Leadership Monitor*, Issue 12, Fall 2204 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20044/>; Internet; accessed 10 January, 2006.

⁴² William Shakespeare, *Hamlet* (III, ii, 239).

⁴³ Scobell, 30.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 32-33.

⁴⁵ R.J. Rummel, *China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900*, (New Brunswick and New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 12. See also Jack Wheeler, "The Chinese Christian Crusade," *NewsMax.com* [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/12/8/132707.shtml>; Internet; accessed October 12, 2005. "...China has periodically endured spasms of murderous cultural insanity."

⁴⁶ Rummel, 32-33.

⁴⁷ McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, 7.

⁴⁸ "The task of Chinese policy – in keeping with Sun-tzu's ancient strategic wisdom – is to use American power to peacefully defeat American hegemony." The author is quoting Zbigniew Brzezinski. Mosher, 9.

⁴⁹ Lai, 23.

⁵⁰ "China's Endless Hunger for Resources," *Asia Business Consulting*, 17 February 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://asiabusinessconsulting.blogspot.com/2005/02/chinas-endless-hunger-for-resources.html>; Internet; accessed 30 January, 2006.

⁵¹ Nicholas G. Johnston, *Warning: Feeding the Hegemon May Be Hazardous to Your Health (Assessing China's Fitness to Be a Superpower)*, (Maxwell AFB: Air College Press, 2000), 5. Linked from *The Air University Publications Page*, available from <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA393957&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>; Internet; accessed 05 October 2005, 11.

⁵² Bernstein and Munro, 20.

⁵³ Michael Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy, *Shaping U.S.-China Relations - A Long Term Strategy*, (New York: 1997), 15-16. See also: U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission 2005 Annual Report to Congress available from http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/05_annual_report.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 November, 2005.

⁵⁴ Bill Gertz, *The China Threat: How the People's Republic of China Targets America*, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2000), 94.

⁵⁵ Tkacik, 25.

⁵⁶ Gertz, 94.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 96-97.

⁵⁸ China's deliberate piracy is widespread and well-documented. Fishman lists many examples in his book, including a fake prison in Sichuan Province manufacturing forty types of phony brand-name cigarettes – China produces perhaps 100 billion counterfeit cigarettes each year. \$1 million in fake name-brand designer clothes were seized in North Carolina. Nintendo lost \$720 million in sales as a result of Chinese-cloned Game Boy cartridges. A Beijing court ruled against Toyota in its suit against Geely, the Chinese auto manufacturer. Geely used Toyota's logo and name on one of its models. The court ruled that China did not recognize Toyota's logo. Fishman quotes testimony before a U.S. Senate hearing in 2004 that "No problem of this size and scope could exist without the direct and indirect involvement of the state." Ted C. Fishman, *China, INC.: How the Rise of the next Superpower Challenges America and the World*, (New York: Scribner, 2005), 233-237.

⁵⁹ "The Commission was established in response to the debate that led the Congress to approve Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for China and China's admission to the WTO. During that debate the Administration argued strongly that including China in the world trading system would lead to development of a market economy and to political reform and a more open Chinese society. Unfortunately, during the past year it has become clear that the Chinese leadership will not countenance progress on any important features of political reform, human rights, government openness and transparency, media freedom, building democratic institutions, or implementation of the rule of law. Indeed, the opposite is more often the case..." U.S. Congress, House, *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 109th Cong. 2d sess., November 2005, iv. available from <http://www.uscc.gov>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2005.

⁶⁰ Rumsfeld, 1.

⁶¹ "Someone who is passive-aggressive will typically not confront others directly about problems, but instead will attempt to undermine their confidence or their success through comments and actions which, if challenged, can be explained away innocently so as not to place blame on the passive-aggressive person." Applied to a global scale, this definition matches much of China's behavior toward the U.S. Linked from *Answers.com Home Page*, available from <http://www.answers.com/library/Wikipedia.jsessionid=t1ho0ph2gmw8-cid-1861980799-sbid-lc05b>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2005.

⁶² *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 1.

⁶³ Griffith, 77.

⁶⁴ "The United States can no longer limit its definitions of modern warfare to force of arms and military power. Instead, it faces a new strategic challenge: Combination Warfare." James Callard and Peter Faber, "An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, (Winter/Spring 2002): 67.

⁶⁵ David Lai compares the American way of fighting to the Chinese approach to war, specifically explaining the Chinese game of GO as a clear example of Chinese strategic thinking. David Lai, *Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept*, SHI (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004).

⁶⁶ "As one observer puts it, "the Greeks developed what has been called the Western way of war? a collision of soldiers on an open plain in a magnificent display of courage, skill, physical prowess, honor, and fair play, and a concomitant repugnance for decoy, ambush, sneak attacks, and the involvement of noncombatants." With respect to stratagem, Alexander the Great said, when he was advised to launch a surprise night attack against the Persians: *'The policy which you are suggesting is one of bandits and thieves, the only purpose of which is deception. I cannot allow my glory always to be diminished by Darius' absence, or by narrow terrain, or by tricks of night. I am resolved to attack openly and by daylight. I choose to regret my good fortune rather than be ashamed of my victory.'*" Ibid., 5.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 33.

⁶⁸ "It was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory." This quotation from North Vietnamese General Giap illustrates the same principle to which Mao adhered. Deborah Elek, "Unconventional Warfare and the Principles of War," *Small Wars Journal*, 1994, [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/elek.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 January, 2006.

⁶⁹ Bernstein and Munro, 4.

⁷⁰ Scobell, 18. See also Gertz. "China Threat," chronicles in detail the damage done to the U.S. during the Clinton administration's relationship with China.

⁷¹ Mosher, 131.

⁷² Mosher, a social scientist who conducted a full-length study in a Chinese village from 1979-1980, wrote that he had initially been caught up in the idea that China would embrace democracy in the years leading up to Tiananmin, but after a great deal of study of China's history and culture, as well as the societal changes following Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, he abandoned that concept. He articulates the following ideas in the sixth chapter of his book, labeling them "myths." 1. Democracy is the wave of the future in China. 2. The rise of market forces and international trade will transform China into a free-market democracy. 3. The pull of American culture will make China into the mirror image of the United States. 4. The communications revolution and the internet will change China. 5. Our own fears blind us to the fact that China has already changed. *Ibid.*, 117-135.

⁷³ Successful counterinsurgency strategies teach us that people deprived of basic rights or needs are motivated to fight against ruling authorities to change their situation. Providing these needs and giving people an opportunity to economically develop usually removes the motivation for local populations to join insurgencies and robs them of an important recruitment tool. For a recent review of counterinsurgency lessons learned in Baghdad, see Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, "The requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, (July-August 2005):1-14.

⁷⁴ Douglas M. McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, November 2003), 11.

⁷⁵ Mosher, 120.

⁷⁶ "Now, to me, that is a remarkable change for a Chinese Communist ideologue. What it means is that the Chinese Communist Party is no longer basing its legitimacy on the ideology, but it's basing its legitimacy on national strength. Insofar as China can project that national strength, not just economically, not just culturally, but militarily and politically and diplomatically, the Communist Party maintains the right to rule. And I think this is why China's new Communist Party is focusing so much of its attentions on military modernization. It sees its position in Asia, its growing position in Asia as the predominant power, the pre-eminent power, as essential to regime survival." U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing on Chinese Military Power, Statement of John Tkacik Jr.*, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 27 July 2005, 15.

⁷⁷ Minxin Pei, "The Dark Side of China's Rise," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2006):32-40.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁹ Philip P. Pan, "Hu Tightens Party's Grip On Power," *Washington Post*, 24 April 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12427-2005Apr23.html>; Internet; accessed 17 January, 2006.

⁸⁰ Pei, 39.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁸² Bernstein and Munro, 15.

⁸³ Pei, 40.

⁸⁴ F.W. Mote, *Imperial China*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 972.

⁸⁵ Zhang, 295.

⁸⁶ Jack Wheeler, "The Chinese Christian Crusade," *NewsMax.com*, 09 December 2003 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/12/8/132707.shtml>; Internet; accessed 16 December, 2005.

⁸⁷ David Aikman, *Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2003), 344; available from www.chinaaid.org; Internet; accessed 07 November 2005.

⁸⁸ "The United States has no coordinated, national strategy for dealing with China. We need one that specifies and prioritizes what we want to accomplish, what outcomes are and are not acceptable, and how to reach those goals." D'Amato, para. 6.

⁸⁹ *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 1.

⁹⁰ Swaine and Tellis. 4.

⁹¹ "... the Commission has sought to conceive of ways in which the United States can work with China to engineer win-win arrangements that will enable us to avoid animosity, miscalculation, and conflict. The Commission recognizes that it will be harmful to let situations evolve whereby only the United States OR China can realize a satisfactory outcome, because that could well be a recipe for conflict." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Statement of Vice Chairman Roger W. Robinson, Jr*, 9 November 2005, available from http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2005/robinson_statement.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 November, 2005.

⁹² "So, I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this way: to work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy: Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service," 18 January 2006, linked from *The U.S. Department of State Website*, available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2006.

⁹³ "In the past five years, it was my friend and predecessor Colin Powell who led the men and women of American diplomacy into the 21st century. He modernized the State Department's technology and transformed dozens of our facilities abroad. Most importantly, Secretary Powell invested in our people. He created over 2,000 new positions and hired thousands of new employees and trained them all to be diplomatic leaders of tomorrow." Ibid.

⁹⁴ "It is clear today that America must begin to reposition our diplomatic forces around the world, so over the next few years the United States will begin to shift several hundred of our diplomatic positions to new critical posts for the 21st century." Ibid.

⁹⁵ Gertz, 94.

⁹⁶ "Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is wisely transforming the State Department in several key ways. She is changing promotion standards to transform the values of State Department personnel, shifting assignments to place the right people in the most effective global areas, and elevating the U.S. Agency for International Development to a deputy secretary of state status. Her purpose is to change the way America uses its State Department from an information-gathering and reporting arm to an active agent of U.S. global policies." Glen Kessler and Bradley Graham, "Diplomats Will Be Shifted to Hot Spots," *Washington Post*, 19 January, 2006, [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e200601194212054.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2006.

⁹⁷ "President Bush laid out a vision that now leads America into the world. 'It is the policy of the United States,' the President said, 'to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.' To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself. I and others have called this mission 'transformational diplomacy.'" Rice.

⁹⁸ Justin Logan, "Taiwan's Turn," 03 October 2005, linked from *The Cato Institute Home Page*, available from <http://www.cato.org/>; Internet; accessed November 30, 2005.

⁹⁹ McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, 35.

¹⁰⁰ Shulsky, 3.

¹⁰¹ "As my testimony indicates, China is expanding its number of land- and submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles. It is also gathering a range of anti-satellite, C4ISR new attack submarines, new types of fighter-bombers and their requisite missiles and ground attack systems, and other systems designed to deny U.S. access for our air and naval forces in the event of Taiwan contingencies. Second, the PLA is expanding all required military capabilities needed to coerce Taiwan into a reunification dictated by Beijing or to eventually attack and conquer the island. My estimates are that, by 2010, there could be over 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at the island, aided by 200 to 300 all-weather Sukhoi or indigenous Xian fighter-bombers. Missile and air strikes, combined with nuclear and non-nuclear radio frequency weapon strikes, information warfare strikes and attempts, special forces attacks, effective airborne and amphibious assaults directed at the Taipei region, likely combined with political warfare and subversion efforts, are intended to force a collapse or surrender on Taiwan" within the U.S. decision-cycle time frame." *Hearing on Chinese Military Power, Statement of Richard D. Fisher*, 11.

¹⁰² "Let me be clear, transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not in paternalism. In doing things with people, not for them; we seek to use America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures." Rice.

¹⁰³ Sam Brownback, "The Taiwan Relations Act at 25" April 5, 2004, available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl828.cfm>; Internet; accessed on 20 November, 2005.

¹⁰⁴ "Taiwan's legislature must swiftly pass a defense budget adequate to the threat that the country faces. Taiwan's defense spending is only 2.4 percent of GDP, down from 4.8 percent in

1995. Other nations facing similar threats have much larger defense commitments." John J Tkacik, Jr., "Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power Deserves Careful Reading," linked from *The Heritage Foundation Home Page*, available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/wm804.cfm?>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2005.

¹⁰⁵ "Over the last five years, Taiwan's overall defense spending has dropped roughly 25 percent, to an anemic 2.4 percent of gross domestic product...in April 2001 President Bush promised to do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself." What the Taiwanese seem to have heard was "whatever it takes to defend Taiwan."" Logan, "Taiwan's Turn."

¹⁰⁶ McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, 18.

¹⁰⁷ "Consider 'Offensive' Systems for Taiwan: The administration must also make new weapons systems with at least a limited 'offensive' capability available to Taiwan as a deterrent to Chinese aggressiveness. For 25 years, U.S. policy has limited arms sales to Taiwan to systems "of a defensive nature." While "defensive" systems are certainly part of the mix, they are vastly more expensive than the systems they defend against. The administration must make available to Taiwan weapons capable of effective strikes against the bases from which attacks against Taiwan may be launched. In any conflict scenario, it will be in the U.S. interest that initial strikes against Chinese targets come from Taiwan, not U.S. platforms." Tkacik, *Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power Deserves Careful Reading*.

¹⁰⁸ "Power requires wealth, and wealth cannot protect itself without power." Richard Rosencrans, "PA Croesus and Caesar: The Essential Transatlantic Symbiosis," *The National Interest*, 72 (Summer 2003), 32.

¹⁰⁹ Zhang, 293.

¹¹⁰ "Without the United States to buy Chinese goods, China cannot sustain its growth." Fishman, 269.

¹¹¹ As one small but indicative example of corporate greed, Google announced in January, 2006, that it had agreed to give Beijing unlimited censorship rights to web content so that Google could participate in China's booming internet market. Google's company slogan is "Don't Be Evil," and is resisting efforts by the U.S. Government to acquire an anonymous list of one day's web searching to fight child pornography, on the grounds that the government request would violate privacy and free speech ethics. At the same time, with the prospect of millions of dollars from opening markets in China, Google did not even pause before agreeing to unlimited Chinese government censorship. This type of scenario plays out daily in corporate America's rush for the Chinese gold fields.

¹¹² "Today, due to its fragile financial sector, China probably couldn't float the yuan if it wanted to. And even if the yuan's value were to rise, the effect on the U.S. trade deficit would be minimal, according to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. Why? If the yuan's value were to rise, U.S. companies would continue to seek low-cost imports from other developing countries." John L. Manzella, "Does China Play Fair," *Kansas City Star*, 20 November 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily/news/opinion/13213106.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2006.

¹¹³ "This report documents '...China's inability or refusal to abide by many important WTO commitments.'" *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 47.

¹¹⁴ "Many of the major compliance problems persisted in 2004, even as China continued to address them with at least a nominal effort. China instituted a large number of reforms in 2002, but progress toward full compliance slowed in 2003 and 2004. Many of these persistent problems are of utmost importance to U.S. industries, but the United States has filed only one WTO dispute against China to date." *Ibid.*, 46.

¹¹⁵ Pei, 39.

¹¹⁶ The authors of a Rand study in 2003 evaluated China's economic vulnerabilities and predicted eight domains in which circumstances might go seriously wrong with China's economy to counter what they believe to be the prevailing notion that China's economic rise will continue unabated for decades to come. The domains are Unemployment, Poverty and Unrest, Economic Effects of Corruption, HIV and Epidemic Disease, Water Resources and Pollution, Energy Consumption and Prices, Fragility of the Financial System and State-Owned Enterprises, Possible Shrinkage of Foreign Direct Investment, and Taiwan and Other Potential Conflicts. Charles Wolf et al, *Fault Lines in China's Economic Terrain*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), xv-xxi.

¹¹⁷ "Security experts have revealed tantalizing details about a group of Chinese hackers who are suspected of launching intelligence gathering attacks against the US government. The hackers, who are believed to be based in the Chinese province of Guangdong, are thought to have stolen US military secrets, including aviation specifications and flight-planning software. The US government has coined the term 'Titan Rain' to describe the hackers. Alan Paller, director of the SANS Institute, said: "From the Redstone Arsenal, home to the Army Aviation and Missile Command, the attackers grabbed specs for the aviation mission-planning system for Army helicopters, as well as Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air Force." The team is thought to consist of 20 hackers. Paller claimed the Chinese government was the most likely recipient of the information they intercepted." Tom Espiner, "Chinese Hackers Breach US Military Defences," available from <http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39154524,00.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 January, 2005.

¹¹⁸ *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 4.

¹¹⁹ Gertz, 201.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹²¹ Fishman, 228.

¹²² One small example demonstrating China's intelligence efforts is presented in the USCC report: "There is ample evidence that the Chinese have engaged in numerous attempts to break into various classified and unclassified U.S. government and private networks. The scale, persistence, and sophistication of these attempts point to Chinese government sponsorship or acquiescence." *2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 125.

¹²³ "All four of China's main banks (all state owned) have more un-collectable debts than they have assets. The Shanghai Composite, China's largest stock market, has fallen from 1600 to 1200, or 25%, in the last 12 months. Foreign companies and investors may be pouring money into China, but Chinese companies and investors are pouring money out of China. Billions in government and private money is in capital flight and invested in "safe havens" around the world, rather than ploughed back into the Chinese economy to insure its continued growth." Jack Wheeler, "The Communist Party – It's Over," *The Epoch Times*, 08 May 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-5-8/28586.html>; Internet; accessed 05 December 2005.

¹²⁴ "If you look at the track record over the past 15 years, China has illegally transferred -- at least 25 times -- significant technology. I'll just rattle off a few. Telemetry equipment to Iran for the Jhadvav (ph) III. The Jhadvav (ph) III is now deployed. It would not have been deployed without Chinese cooperation. Biological weapon technology to Iran -- the Chinese supplied technology. 400 metric tons of chemicals to Iran for chemical weapon technology. Accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iran for missiles, furnishing diagnostic equipment to Pakistan for their nuclear program, bringing magnets to Pakistan for their nuclear program. These are all documented." *Hearing on Chinese Military Power, Statement of Congressman Weldon*.

¹²⁵ "Chinese officials now largely shrug off complaints from the United States, but they remain very sensitive to world opinion. This is why China has fought so hard in the UN Human Rights Commission to prevent passage, or even debate, of resolutions critical of its practices." Greg May, "China and the World," linked from *The Nixon Center Home Page*, available from http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/may_china&world.htm; Internet; accessed 12 January, 2005.

¹²⁶ McCready, *Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait*, 7.

¹²⁷ "There must be an unceasing, unrelenting demand for Chinese democracy. China's lack of democracy must be the front-page issue in newspapers around the world, not Taiwan's confrontational insistence on independence, or Japanese textbooks. The democratization of China is what can shatter the glass house [of] Chinese Communism, and rebuild in its place a nation where the Chinese people can live peacefully, prosperously, and free in the 21st century." Wheeler, *The Communist Party – It's Over*.

¹²⁸ *2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, 13.

¹²⁹ Scobell, 31.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹³¹ "...an EMP attack using a few nuclear weapons could theoretically damage the entire continental United States, far exceeding the impact of using those same warheads against specific U.S. cities or installations. Likewise, an EMP attack could degrade the U.S. armed forces throughout an entire region. Because America's response to an EMP attack by a rogue state is unclear and because EMP attacks are less risky for rogue states, such attacks are far more likely in this era of nuclear weapons proliferation than during the Cold War... The difficulty of developing a clear response to EMP is due primarily to the unique nature of the threat. It is unclear, for example, what would constitute a "proportional response" to an explosion that takes place in space without being seen or heard, yet instantaneously devastates society or a military

force while resulting in no initial loss of life or physical destruction. Furthermore, there is a dearth of academic or legal analysis by which to guide such policies because, until very recently, few took the threat seriously." Jack Spencer, "The Electromagnetic Pulse Commission Warns of an Old Threat with a New Face," *Heritage Foundation Online*, 03 August 2004 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1784.cfm>; Internet; accessed 08 January, 2006.

¹³² "Carrier Strike Groups remain critical to ensuring effective dissuasion, capable deterrence, and rapid contingency response in the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to examine options to determine the optimum basing posture for these very capable forces. With deployment of the F/A-22 Raptor, we will upgrade our capability to counter growing anti-access threats in the Pacific. Initially through the relocation of newer F-15C's to Kadena AB and with the upgrade of our HIANG F-15As to the F-15C standard of our active duty fleet, the recapitalization of our PACOM fighter aircraft will assure U.S. air dominance in the region for years to come. The conversion of four TRIDENT class submarines (SSGNs) to cruise missile/Special Operations Force (SOF) platforms has particular utility in the Pacific, where our most demanding potential warfights and the continuing threat of terrorism converge. High Speed Vessels (HSV) are becoming increasingly important to projecting capability across the region quickly. Our transformation plans incorporate the flexibility and capacity of HSVs to move troops, combat equipment, and vertical lift around the theater to conduct important training, demonstrate presence, and respond to contingencies. We will continue to develop this capability. Transformation remains key to protecting our national security interests in an evolving security environment. The new threat context demands we adapt to meet the challenges of the 21st century." U.S. Congress, Senate, *Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, Testimony of Admiral William J. Fallon*, 109th Congress 2d Sess., 08 March 2005, available from <http://www.defense link.mil/dodgc/olc/tstmny.html>; Internet; accessed on 15 November 2005.

¹³³ Kaplan, 58.

¹³⁴ "In 2004, China placed 10 satellites into orbit, the most of any year, and has a similar schedule through 2006. It hopes to have more than 100 satellites in orbit by 2010, and launch an additional 100 satellites by 2020. In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field radar, ocean surveillance, and improved film-based photo-reconnaissance satellites. China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications...*Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)*. China is working on, and plans to field, ASAT systems." *2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, 43.

¹³⁵ "ANDREWS: What leads you to the conclusion they're likely to violate an international obligation? FISHER: It is, in my opinion, in their nature. They will sign agreements if they can see that these agreements will limit an adversary. But they will not view themselves as bound by these same agreements if, by violating those agreements, they can achieve a military advantage over a potential adversary." *Hearing on Chinese Military Power*, 24.

¹³⁶ "The defensive use of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads – assuming compliance with self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter – are not illegal, although it certainly would be contrary to the principles stated in the Treaty's preamble. Ballistic missiles do not orbit and they were purposely excluded. Weapons other than nuclear or of mass destruction are also allowed and can be placed in orbit. Lasers, conventional explosives, and kinetic devices can be deployed in space as an ASAT system or as a launching pad for space-to-ground or space-to-

air attacks. Re-usable space planes similarly armed are also left out of the Treaty, leaving open future possibilities of dogfights in the cosmos. However, the Treaty includes one long-term arms control benefit. Anticipating the exploration of the moon just two years in the future, the Treaty banned the militarization of celestial bodies. With compliance, this provision will govern travel to and colonization of distant planets in the decades and centuries ahead. Withdrawal from the Treaty requires a one-year notification." Nicholas Berry, "Existing Legal Constraints on Space Weaponry," available from <http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue2/legal.html>; Internet; accessed on 18 November, 2005.

¹³⁷ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization*, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

¹³⁸ "China must pay close attention to those countries that are opposed to American interests, or are potential strategic enemies. It must be borne in mind that the enemies of enemies are one's own allies... Know this: the more the United States encounters trouble in other places in the world, the more difficult it is for it to concentrate its power on dealing with China and the greater the opportunities for China's existence and development.' – Chinese author He Xing." Gertz, 101.

¹³⁹ Callard and Faber, 61.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 65.

¹⁴¹ Mosher attributes this saying to both Confucius (Li ji "Book of Rites" Chapters 7, 30) and Mencius (Mengzi "Book of Mencius" Chapter 5a.4). Mosher, 15.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 15.