The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations
Abstract
An historical review of counterinsurgency warfare reveals one noteworthy constant -- none has been effectively carried out without a methodology for gathering and disseminating timely and accurate intelligence data, or in today's parlance, "actionable intelligence." Effective counterinsurgency warfare, by its nature, attains greater success through human intelligence vice intelligence gained through national technical means (e.g., signals, imagery, and measurement and signature intelligence; SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT, respectively). While the latter disciplines can be used with great strategic effectiveness, the preponderance of data is gained through a counterinsurgency intelligence collection campaign designed to gather, collate, and exploit data to expose insurgency cells for attack. This study will examine the historical record in several noteworthy counterinsurgencies, focusing on coalition or government (including law enforcement) intelligence operations. The purpose of the paper is to mine important strategic lessons and to extrapolate them for current and future counterinsurgency campaigns. The insurgencies discussed are as follows: French Indochina, 1945-1954; Algeria, 1954-1962; and Malaya, 1948-1960.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 15, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA448457
Entities
People
- David J. Clark
Organizations
- United States Army War College