The Mobilization of Army Reserve Components: Addressing Future Capacity Gaps on Power Projection Platforms
Abstract
Not since World War II has the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) relied so heavily upon the use of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to prosecute a war. "Total Force Policy" eliminated the nation's ability to rapidly expand the size of its military force through the draft, and placed its Reserve Components (RC) in the role of a strategic reserve. Today, the RC role has expanded into one in which they are fully integrated into the NMS as an operational force. At the core of this strategy is the ability to respond to crises worldwide through the power projection of U.S. based active component (AC) and RC forces. Until recently, the large-scale mobilization of RC forces was rarely exercised or evaluated at a strategic level to determine the validity of these plans. When looked at critically, many mobilization plans were invalidated by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation of the last decade. This paper examines this perilous situation in more depth and offers strategic recommendations to better address capacity gaps and reduce the risks created by current BRAC actions, the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), and the conversion of AC and RC to the modular force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 10, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA448768
Entities
People
- Kenneth D. Newlin
Organizations
- United States Army War College