

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**A TOTAL FORCE COMPONENT: A TRANSFORMED ARMY RESERVE FOR THE
21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army Reserve as a component of the Total Force provides combat support and combat service support capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The current operating and security environment, and the many lessons learned from the recent years reveal that the Army Reserve must transform to remain a responsive and effective component. The Army Reserve is transforming with the Army – changing more than it has changed in the last 50 years. The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI) serves as the transformational bridge that will ensure a ready and relevant Total Force component for the 21st century security environment. The research addresses the origins of the Total Force concept and its enduring effects on the Army Reserve structure, the FRRI with its associated imperatives, the effects of restructuring command and control, and the establishment of rotational capabilities based force to support the needs of the Army.

A TOTAL FORCE COMPONENT: A TRANSFORMED ARMY RESERVE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The events of September 11, 2001 serve as a reminder to all, the United States and the world, that the only superpower of the 21st century is vulnerable to attacks. The attacks came from a different type of enemy, one that does not use conventional means, as the President reported shortly after the attacks. Security is a national interest that includes protecting the sovereignty of the United States (U.S.), providing safety for the citizens, and protecting the nation's infrastructure.¹ National security is emphasized at the highest level of government and clearly articulated in public documents, such as the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, among others.

Since the attacks of 9/11, President Bush and his administration have heightened U.S. security measures in an effort to assure the American public that America will remain a safe place. A contributor to a safe homeland is the American military. The Military is providing domestic security while it supports actions at home and conducts operations abroad. Additionally, the President established the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001 to ensure greater accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity of purpose among the agencies responsible for them.² In July 2002, just eight months later, a National Strategy for Homeland Security was released by the President underscoring how vital the nation's security is to the United States. He asserted that homeland security is a shared responsibility of the entire U.S. society and that the government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future attacks.³

The Army, along with the other military services, is transforming to maintain in the future a decisive and responsive landpower capability which enables the military as a total force to deter and defeat existing and emerging adversaries and threats. Indeed, protecting the American homeland from attacks is the foremost responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces.⁴ Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, stated that "DOD uses the Total Force Concept – the right forces for the right jobs...The Total Force – Active, Reserve and National Guard...at home and abroad that promote the security and interest of our nation."⁵ The U.S. Military and Defense Agencies have been directed to transform to be more effective in maintaining security by countering emerging strategic and operational challenges.⁶ Transformation is DOD's way of preparing the Armed Forces to meet future global challenges.⁷

The Army responded to this directive with the development of its plan – the Army Transformation Plan (ATP) – followed later by an overarching architecture – the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The ACP serves as a road map for leaders to transform the force.

Army transformation advocates a Total Force approach – integration of Active, National Guard and Reserve components into an adaptive, agile, ready force.⁸ Although each component of the Total Force will contribute to the success of a transformed Army in the 21st century, this strategy research project (SRP) will focus on the Army Reserve (AR) transformation initiatives. The SRP will focus on this question: What actions is the Army Reserve leadership taking to ensure a ready and relevant force for the 21st century security environment? It will describe the origins of the Total Force concept and analyze its enduring effects on the Army Reserve structure. It will then describe recent transformational actions and initiatives taken by the Army Reserve to restructure its component of the Total Force to meet needs of the Army in the 21st century.

The Army Reserve provides the Total Force with combat support and combat service support capabilities. Since its creation in 1908, the Army Reserve has undergone continuous change or transformation in an effort to stay relevant and to support emerging Army needs. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, the Army Reserve is transforming with the Army – changing more than it has changed in the last 50 years.⁹ The current Army Reserve force structure was designed for large-scale, linear, and conventional operations. Since the attacks of 9/11, in response to security requirements and current operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT), Army Reserve forces have been mobilized mostly in less than full units – derivatives of units – to meet the requirements of combatant commanders.¹⁰ This derivative method of mobilization has reduced Army Reserve organizational readiness and its capability to respond to future requirements, such as humanitarian support to allies and friends, homeland security beyond our borders in support of global war on terrorism, small-scale contingencies, and responses to domestic incidents such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The challenges of the current operating and security environment, and the many lessons learned from the recent years reveal that the Army Reserve must transform to remain a responsive and effective component of the Total Force.

The 21st Century Security Environment – A Mandate for Change

Today's security environment presents unprecedented challenges. Enemy threats are no longer represented by large and clearly defined formations ready to cross the border of another country. This was the case during the Cold War era that abruptly ended in the early 1990s. To address the security environment of the twenty-first century, the National Security Strategy (NSS) provides overarching focus and direction for the application of all of the nation's instruments of power – Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic. Accordingly, the

National Military Strategy (NMS) further defines key aspects of the global security environment for effective application of the nation's military power. The Army Reserve is an important component of the military power. The current NMS categorizes the dangerous and persuasive threats posed by traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.¹¹

The NMS further highlights three key aspects of the security environment which present special problems in executing the nation's military strategy and the development of concepts and capabilities to assure victory in future engagements.¹² The first problem is the wider range of adversaries that are capable of threatening the United States, its allies, and its interests – non-state organizations and even individual terrorists. Second, is our military will have to operate in a more complex and distributed battlespace in which boundaries are virtually nonexistent. Current battlespace extends from critical regions overseas to the homeland and spans the global commons – of airspace, waters, space, and cyberspace. Finally, our military must be able to acquire and effectively use and diffuse emergent technology, while denying its' advantages to the enemy. The advancement and availability of technology and weapon systems, coupled with the ability of today's adversaries to acquire them, affect the character of future conflicts in which our military will engage.¹³ These emerging conditions are prompting immediate and profound transformation in the Army Reserve as the environment changes from:¹⁴

- Discrete War to Continuous War,
- War as Exception to War as a Norm
- Mobilization of RC as Exception to Mobilization of RC as a Norm
- Army Reserve Supplementary Force to Army Reserve Complementary Force
- Mass over Time to Be Ready Now
- Linear Battlefield to Asymmetrical Battlefield
- Secure Rear Area to No Secure Rear Area
- Theaters of War to Global Operations

The United States is the sole remaining superpower in the world. But it is not immune to threats. Its superb military force contributes to its premier global status. U.S. leaders, civilian and military, recognize the need to transform the military to maintain the leading edge and the dominant advantage in the 21st century security environment. The Army Reserve's added value mitigates operational and force management risk by providing unique skills and capabilities that contribute to the Total Force's ability to meet and sustain current and future challenges worldwide.

In his testimony of 2 February 2005 to the House Armed Services Committee, General Richard A. Cody highlighted the Reserve Component's contributions to countering the global

threats: "All three components...have proven that they are a combat capable and ready team. Reserve Component's contributions to our global commitments have been substantial. The Active and Reserve Components are inextricably linked today with changes in one necessarily impacting the other. Accordingly, our Reserve Components have shared a significant portion of the Army's worldwide full-spectrum mission."

Army Reserve leadership has taken significant actions to remain relevant and ready in the 21st century security environment. Army Reserve leaders realize that the cost of not transforming the force as projected would lead down a path towards inadequacy. The inherent risks of transforming while at war are worth taking since the alternative would be a force that does not comply with the mandates of Title 10 of the U.S. Code – a force that would be unable to contribute effectively to the Army's needs as a Total Force component in response to the threat of the 21st century global environment.

Total Force Policy and the Future Force

The origins of the Total Force reside in President Nixon's 1968 election year promise to end the draft. In the wake of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive and declining popular support for the war, Nixon promised to end conscription, reasoning that ending the draft would remove an easy target for antiwar protestors and congressional opposition.¹⁵ Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird recommended that President Nixon appoint a commission to determine the most practical means for eliminating the draft while ensuring the United States would still meet its defense commitments.¹⁶ The newly appointed commission began its work in March 1969 and delivered its report in February 1970. Findings of the commission concluded that an "all-volunteer force" could serve as a practical alternative to conscription. When General Creighton Abrams became Army Chief of Staff on October 1972 Secretary Laird had plans in motion to reduce the active Army force strength to a total force of 13 divisions.¹⁷ However, General Abrams contended that more conventional force was required to assure sufficient capabilities to meet the Soviet threat. General Abrams, with the support of the new Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, moved to increase the Army to 16 divisions, composed of both active and reserve forces.¹⁸ General Abrams then reduced each active division by one brigade and assigned it to the reserve component along with considerable support forces to round out the force structure of the divisions.¹⁹ The Reserve Component brigades were very attractive to the Department of Defense because of their cost effectiveness. Reliance on the Reserve was less costly than keeping the assigned units on active duty.²⁰

Secretary Laird's Total Force Policy, coupled with the actions of General Abrams, initially enhanced the Army Reserve for a while, and Army Reserve units were receiving unaccustomed attention. Active Component (AC) personnel were assigned to Reserve units to monitor and train these round-out organizations. This new association of AC and Reserve units created a training and planning relationship that focused on wartime missions and left no doubt as to the wartime organization of the unit in a total peacetime force.²¹ Today's Army Reserve remains well aware of the value that it brings to the Total Force during peacetime and more importantly during war or conflict. Reliance on the Reserve has continued to grow since the Total Force policy was introduced thirty years ago. While the Army Reserve makes up only 20 percent of the Army's organized units, it provides nearly half of the Army's combat support and a quarter of the Army's mobilization base expansion capability.²²

Total Force Policy endures into the 21st Century. A workshop on Rebalancing the Force was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership in 2003, with senior representatives (including combatant commanders) from the Active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, as well as individuals from the Department of Defense and other Government Agencies. In accordance with their charter they examined the Total Force Policy and other roles and issues of the Reserve Component (National Guard and Army Reserve). They concluded that the Total Force Policy should be maintained.²³ Currently, the Army cannot go to war without the Reserve Components. However, workshop leaders recommended a rebalance of capabilities within the force to ensure early deployment capabilities while reducing the current strain on the Reserve Components through more efficient application of manpower and technological solutions.²⁴

The Army Reserve's capabilities and contributions are fundamental and necessary for the operational success of the Army team on the battlefield. The Army Reserve is transforming with the Army to develop a future force – a strategically responsive, precision maneuver force, dominant across the range of military operations.²⁵ The future force will leave behind the stove-piped, staff-centric command and control for a joint integrated, network battle command and control to enable decision superiority and synchronization. The future force will be a more modular, capabilities-based force to better meet combatant commanders' requirements.²⁶ It will provide commanders with a much broader array of options in future contingencies and with advanced technologies that are fully integrated with the emerging joint, interagency, and multinational framework.²⁷ The Army Reserve continues to support operational deployments and rotations, implementing its transformation initiatives while at war. Ultimately the Army Reserve is a contributor and part of the Army's vision of establishing a new way to fighting, that

depends on a networking force, that links people, platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together.²⁸

A Bridge to Transformation: The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRR)


The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative is the Army Reserve's transformational bridge to the future force. It is the single most important initiative that the Reserve developed to achieve a transformed force. The Army Reserve leadership's objective is to have a ready and relevant force when called upon to protect and defend the nation's interests as a component of the Total Force. This initiative cites six inter-connected and mutually supporting imperatives as the means to succeed. The FRR forges the path to the future force by providing ready soldiers and units and shortened deployment timelines.²⁹

The first imperative addresses the demands placed on the current unit mobilization process. Re-engineering of the Mobilization Process provides for the identification and removal of impediments that delay Department of the Army authorized mobilizations; it is designed to shorten the time it takes for Soldiers to arrive in theater at their place of duty.³⁰ The Army Reserve leadership identified more efficient systems by leveraging automation to reduce the timeline of requirements to conduct Soldier Readiness Processing (SRPs). Leaders recommended coordinated mobilization readiness exercises that enable units and Soldiers to complete administrative details prior to arriving at mobilization stations as well as post-mobilization training.

Transformation of the Army Reserve Command and Control (AR C2), the second imperative, focuses on Soldiers, units, and leadership development, along with shortened mobilization timelines.³¹ Among the FRR objectives is the establishment of clear lines of operational command and control. This clarification is fundamental to the achievement of a fully transformed force and to meet the challenges of the operational and security environment. It will facilitate actions required to improve the readiness of Soldiers and units, and to reduce deployment timelines. Army Reserve Command and Control (AR C2) is a critical asset, so this imperative has received extensive analysis from the leadership because of its importance in sustaining the transformational bridge.³²

As part of FRR implementation the ten Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) were to be reduced to seven command and control headquarters.³³ Just one year after concept approval and in synchronization with the mandates of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), the Army Reserve C2 restructure plan was reevaluated and reorganized in accordance with the BRAC guidance. The revised plan establishes four Regional Readiness

Sustainment Commands, more functional commands, and the establishment of a Training, Transient, Holding and Student account. These new command and control headquarters will regionally support the needs of the transformed modular operational force, thereby enabling the operational commands to focus on training and readiness and thus provide ready Soldiers and units to meet Army needs in confronting the challenges of the emerging operational and security environments.³⁴ The proposed structure, depicted in Figure 2, is a draft version of Regional Readiness Sustainment Command (RRSC) design.



Source: United States Army Reserve Command Fall Conference 2005 AR C2 Update

FIGURE 1. REGIONAL READINESS SUSTAINMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN (DRAFT)

Some clear advantages of AR C2 transformation include the creation of an integrated structure with enhanced capabilities, a reduced number of reporting headquarters to allow for better management of regional units, and a surplus of approved personnel authorizations to create warfighting units with inherit personnel space-saving. The unquestionable disadvantage early in the process is the amount of force turbulence that will be result from the reduction of multiple headquarters. An additional disadvantage is the need to establish new command relationships during high OPTEMPO as support for current operations for Iraq and elsewhere continue. The associated risks to these actions will be most evident in areas of recruiting and retention. Soldiers may feel uneasy with the paradigm shift and implementation of improved business practices and decide to seek other opportunities. But these risks are worth taking:

The benefits will be most evident in the Army Reserve's improved response to future wars and engagements.

While the stand-up of four regional headquarters is oriented toward base operations and personnel administration, the establishment of new functional commands is focused on the Army Reserve's core competencies – Medical, Military Police, Quartermaster, Transportation – and provides better training opportunities and increased unit readiness. The establishment of an effective Army Reserve Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students (TTHS) account – an allocation of 20,500 spaces, 10 percent of the total Army Reserve operational force – will allow regional commands to transfer out of their units Soldiers not qualified in their occupational skills or otherwise non-deployable.³⁵ These transfers will enable the units to have a higher readiness level of deployable Soldiers assigned that can deploy more rapidly to support the Army's needs. The Army Reserve's plan and transformational drive towards improved command and control architectures and personnel management strategies while at war underscores the commitment to build and maintain a force that contributes timely operational support capabilities when needed.

Another enabling imperative is the restructure of units into a flexible and adaptable force. During Total Army Analysis (TAA)³⁶ 2005, Congress authorized the Army Reserve to overstructure the force above the authorized end strength of 205,000. This authorization created a hollow force because units had excessive authorized vacancies.³⁷ During TAA 2011, executed in 2003, the Director of Army Reserve Force Programs presented a strategy to the Army Reserve leadership that called for force reduction of 14,200 spaces. These force structure reductions were in accord with the Army Reserve transformation plan and the Chief of Staff of the Army's focus areas of Modularity and Active and Reserve Components Rebalancing.³⁸ Reduction of Army Reserve over-structure serves to eliminate hollow units and to fully resource organizations to meet objective force requirements for both personnel and equipment.

The fourth imperative calls for improved human resources by means of a Life Cycle Management program managed at the regional commands. This program will better manage Soldier assignments for career progression and personnel readiness. Often Army Reserve Soldiers must travel long distances to find career progression and development, yet they remain bound to their locations because of civilian jobs and responsibilities. Unlike Active Component Soldiers, Army Reserve Soldiers do not conduct permanent change of station to seek advancement. As Citizen-Soldiers, they must maintain a balance between their civilian jobs and military obligations. The all-encompassing Life Cycle approach with central management will

provide deliberate career management and professional development for all Soldiers from recruitment to separation. It will reduce turbulence in Soldiers' career paths and make Reserve Component service a more attractive opportunity for members leaving the Active Component to join the Army Reserve. This imperative increases assignment opportunities for Soldiers and facilitates the continuum of service.

A fifth imperative seeks to improve individual Soldiers' capabilities to support combatant commanders. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) directed the establishment of an Individual Augmentee Program within the Selected Reserve to meet these needs. The Individual Augmentee (IA) program is intended to meet real-world combatant commanders' requirements as validated in the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS).³⁹ Additionally, this program will preclude the deployment of individual capabilities from Active or Reserve Component units that adversely affect their units' readiness, cohesion, and future effectiveness. Additionally, IA will help alleviate the effects of the current mobilization law, which impedes quick access to resources and capabilities of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Access to IRR resources and capabilities is only available when a national emergency has been declared – and then partial mobilization rules apply.⁴⁰ While providing qualified Soldiers to fill critical requirements, the IA program will also allow Soldiers to participate at several levels of commitment. This flexibility supports the U.S. Secretary of Defense's proposal for a continuum-of-service model that enables service members to move more easily among the services' components during their careers.⁴¹

Building an expeditionary rotational force is the final FRRI imperative. While transforming industrial-age mobilization processes, personnel, training, and development policies is necessary, restructuring the force so that the Army Reserve can conduct predictable and sustainable rotations based upon depth in capability is also necessary to support the Total Force.⁴² The Army Reserve leadership seeks a capability ratio that will predictably minimize and limit Army Reserve deployments to once every five years. This approach matches two units to provide similar capabilities to support a mission for 6 months each over a one year deployment requirement. Thus, in a five year period a 10:1 ratio is derived. By applying this mobilization methodology, predictable rotation schedules are established for the force. This rotational force enables the Army Reserve to continue to provide a long-term source of skill-rich capabilities to meet worldwide requirements, along with ready units for small scale-contingencies, major operational conflicts, and follow-on operations.⁴³ The rotational force has been designated the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force.

Since 1995, the Army Reserve has sustained a steady state of mobilization with an average of nearly 10,000 Soldiers mobilized each year. The years following 11 September 2001 have seen more than 110,000 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).⁴⁴ The demands imposed by operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom validates the Army Reserve's value and contributions. These demands further underscored the requirement for a rotational force capability to meet the ongoing needs of the Army. The Army Reserve developed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) and later partnered closely with the active Army in developing the Force Generation Model – Active Component model – to ensure the synchronization of unit capabilities to meet mission requirements.⁴⁵ The AREF is designed to provide individual predictability to the Soldiers, their families, and employers. This predictability enables Soldiers to know when their next deployment will be and for how long. Soldiers, along with their families, will be able to plan accordingly, as opposed to an unexpected extraction from the family circle for an uncertain period while fulfilling the Soldier's military obligations. Likewise Soldiers' employers can plan for their absence and shortage of labor well in advance and adequately prepare through temporary hiring or other management techniques. It will also provide the Army with predictable access to Army Reserve units and capabilities and give Army Reserve leadership a way to sustain a level of support over time for continuing operations.⁴⁶

Use the energy and urgency of Army Transformation and the operational demands of the Global War on Terror to change from a technically focused, force-in-reserve to a learning organization that provides trained, ready, "inactive-duty" Soldiers poised and available for active service, as if they knew the hour and day they would be called.


- LTG James R. Helmly
Chief, Army Reserve

The AREF model thus includes expeditionary packages of forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for rapid mobilization to active duty. Consistent with the Army Reserve restructuring initiative, the AREF model is designed with a rotational force composed of ten designated packages that will progress through a five-year cycle, thereby providing two packages per year over a five-year period consistent with the 10:1 ratio previously described. These packages are referred to as Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) and include the majority of Army Reserve units.⁴⁷

Each package includes combat support and combat service support units that will move through a progressive five year readiness cycle – from regenerate and restructuring to a period of high readiness for deployment.⁴⁸ Consider this normal cycle.⁴⁹ Two packages are cycled

through the process together each year of the cycle. Units redeploying from operations are assigned to a package in the cycle. In Year Five the package of units are in the refit, reconstitute, reset mode – primarily focused on individual training. In Year Four, units will conduct collective training at squad, platoon, and detachment levels. During Years Three and Two, units train together at company level and above and are validated and certified. Finally, in Year One the units train to sustain their capabilities at the highest possible level and are mobilized for nine months and ready to deploy for six months in support of mission requirements. During this year, the units receive priority for all resources to include equipment modernization compatible with the Active Component. The force management strategy – train-alert-deploy – of the AREF model will predictably provide ready Army Reserve units that are prepared to be called to active duty within five days of notification.

LTG James R. Helmly described the AREF model as a “revolutionary change for the Army Reserve.” Furthermore, he indicated that transitioning the force to this new way of organizing, training, equipping, and mobilizing will require strong leadership and overall commitment, but the benefits will strengthen the force in the long run.⁵⁰ Army Reserve leadership is engaged and committed to the transformation of its force to meet the Nations’ ongoing security requirements and the needs of the Army. (See Figure 2 – Army Reserve Expeditionary Force: Army Reserve Expeditionary Cycle Package.)



SOURCE: UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND AREF UPDATE BRIEF, DEC 2005

FIGURE 2: ARMY RESERVE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (AREF) BRIEFING

The Transformational Challenges

The Army Reserve's transformational goals and objectives are clear but the implementations of their initiatives present genuine challenges. The reduction in command and control headquarters and the establishment of four regionally focused sustainment commands will cause significant force turbulence in the field. The Northwestern region command, for example, will have the most Soldiers, just over 53,000, within its territorial boundaries of at least 14 states.⁵¹ This geographical span of control may require the split stationing of key organizations to adequately support the Soldiers and equipment needs across the region. Another challenge is the synchronization of force structure programmed actions to form the future force. These include the activations, inactivations, and reorganizations of units in the programmed years in compliance with Total Army Analysis, Base Realignment and Closure, and ongoing Army Reserve transformation actions. The programmed actions may be easily affected by unforecasted operational requirements against the global war on terrorism and funding, for example. Better business practices provide Army Reserve leadership with ways to mitigate the foreseeable challenges.⁵² Army Reserve leadership is positioning itself to achieve personnel authorization savings as the force restructures to achieve the required future force. These savings will be used to increase the operational force and thereby enhance capabilities and opportunities for Soldiers at all levels – tactical, operational and strategic. Also Army Reserve will improve administrative support – both in speed and quality – coupled with improved internal processes to increase overall Soldier satisfaction at all levels of unit support.

Conclusion

The events of 11 September 2001 dramatically changed the way the United States prosecutes wars and conflicts now and in the future. As an instrument of national power, our military provides an option for the government to exercise if the security of the United States is threatened when other means, such as diplomatic and economic powers, cannot alone mitigate the threat. The Armed Forces as a whole have the responsibility to protect the security of the United States. However, this strategy research project focused on the Army, specifically on the Army Reserve, as an essential component of the Total Force. The 21st century environment introduced new enemies that do not conduct the conventional wars of the past. This enemy is without a country; it can acquire affordable and effective technology to wreak harm and arouse fear. The Army Reserve must stand ready and be prepared to fight indefinitely as a component of the Total Force. The Total Force policy that was introduced over thirty years ago is still viable today; it meets the needs of the Army to protect the United States. The goals and objectives of

this policy will be maintained as all the components of the Total Force transform to meet the changing 21st century threats and respond to the dynamics of the current operating and security environment in which the United States forces are deployed. During the early 70's, the Total Force Policy of Secretary Laird, coupled with the strategy and initiatives of General Abrams, strengthen the reserve forces, both National Guard and Army Reserve. Following implementation of the policy, along with other initiative and actions, the Army Reserve evolved to its current role and structure. The Army Reserve now provides twenty percent of today's Army; it is a contributing component of the Total Force that makes the Army whole.

The Army Reserve has remained in a steady state of mobilization since 1995, providing an average of 10,000 Soldiers per year in support of operations around the world. The Army Reserve has worked closely with the Active Component in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq and elsewhere around the globe. The mobilizations following the September 11, 2001 attack to the United States validate the value that the Army Reserve brings as a component of the Total Force: Over 110,000 Reserve Component Soldiers have deployed annually in support of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Leaders at all levels agree that the success of current operations cannot be sustained without on-going contributions of the Reserve Component – Army Reserve and National Guard forces.

Army Reserve leaders have implemented elements of Army Transformation by introducing significant changes to its doctrine of force management and force structure. This strategy research project highlights these Army Reserve transformational changes and actions. It identified the ways Army Reserve initiatives are meeting the requirements of the current security environment and supporting needs of the Army at war. It provides details on the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRRI) with its six imperatives and elaborates on the imperatives of a rotational force – an Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) – and the restructuring of the Army Reserve command and control (C2) architecture, which establishes functional commands that will ensure the transformation of Army Reserve core support competencies as it streamlines training resourcing from base operations.⁵³ Clearly, the Army Reserve leadership is answering its call to meet Army needs with a ready and skills rich operational force. Its integral component of the Total Force and it is contributing to the support and defense of the nation.

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¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

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²¹ Ibid., 256.

²² Eric Minton, "Institute of Land Warfare: Profile of U.S. Army 2005," *Association of the United States Army* (Arlington, Va, 2005) 20.

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²⁶ Global Security Home Page, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/future-force.htm>. Internet; accessed 6 February 2006.

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²⁸ Paul L. Frances, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects for Success, (Washington D.C.: March 16, 2005) 3.

²⁹ Thomas G. Cole, "Resourcing a Changing Army Reserve – The Demands of War," briefing slides with note commentary, Fort McPherson, United States Army Reserve Command, 4 October 2004.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

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³³ Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3, Memorandum of Approved Concept Plan for Reorganization and Transformation of Army Reserve Command and Control Structure, Washington, D.C.: 1 April 2004.

³⁴ United States Army Reserve Command, Executive Summary, Army Reserve Force Programs, *Abbreviated Concept Plan for the Reorganization and Transformation of Army Reserve Command Structure (Draft)*, Fort McPherson, GA: January 2006.

³⁵ The United States Army Reserve Home Page, available from <http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/soldiers/tths>. accessed 17 November 2005.

³⁶ Total Army Analysis (TAA) is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure. It takes us from the Army of yesterday to the Army of the future.

³⁷ Cole, 5.

³⁸ Bastian Oskam, "Army Reserve Way Ahead," briefing, Washington, D. C., Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Sep 2003.

³⁹ Cole, 5.

⁴⁰ Partial Mobilization- Under title 10 USC Mobilization Statutes, 12302 Partial Mobilization, requires declaration of National emergency and reports to congress every 6 months. Allows for the use of Ready Reserve, up to a 1,000,000 soldiers for up to 24 months.

⁴¹ Helmly, <http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/>; Internet accessed 18 November 2005.

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⁴⁴ Oskam , 2.

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