

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CULTURE – WE NEED SOME OF THAT!
CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

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The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report articulates a "Shift in Emphasis from the 20th Century to the 21st Century in order to meet the new strategic environment." Multiple references within the document refer to the movement away from traditional industrial age American operational principles such as weapons systems, mass and firepower to Information Age constructs of humans, information and effects.

Culture has gained quite a bit of currency in recent defense community debates concerning current and future capabilities of the American military, so much so that it has become something of a DOD "buzzword." As is often the case with "buzzwords," the term lacks a commonly accepted, agreed upon definition. What then, exactly, is culture? Does it really matter to the success of current and future American military operations, specifically land operations? If so, how do we effectively instill an appreciation of cultural knowledge within the force?

This Strategic Research Project will define culture and examine its role within the current and emerging contemporary operating environments, determine the importance of culture to the accomplishment of military objectives and provide recommendations for inculcating the appropriate level of cultural competence within the Nation's primary land force, the Army.

CULTURE – WE NEED SOME OF THAT! CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The end of the Cold War transformed the global environment. The eradication of an entire host of historic barriers unleashed the forces of globalization and ushered in the beginning of “The Information Age.” From Francis Fukuyama’s question about “the end of history”¹ to Samuel P. Huntington’s dire “clash of civilizations”², predications concerning the future of humans and their societies have been many and varied. More than a decade and a half later, the magnitude, scale and scope of changes in the post-industrial age have become more and more apparent. The hype and euphoria surrounding globalization and its pillars of free markets, liberalism, goodwill and the western way crashed with the Islamist terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Nearly four and a half years into the “Long War”³ and with the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq providing, to varying degrees, hindsight’s clarity, the calls for significant and, in many instances, profound change within the American military are loud and strident.

In response, in part, to these calls and in line with the Defense Department’s continuing efforts to transform itself, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) articulates a “Shift in Emphasis from the 20th Century to the 21st Century in order to meet the new strategic environment.”⁴ Multiple references within the document point to the movement away from traditional industrial-age American operational principles such as weapons systems, mass and firepower to the information-age constructs of humans, information, and effects. The 2006 QDR often utilizes key words, such as “transformation” and “change.”⁵ When these are read in conjunction with frequent uses of words such as “partner/partnership,” “allies,” “coalitions,” “language” and “culture/cultural,”⁷ a discerning reader comes away with the distinct impression of a new and significant emphasis within the Defense Department on leveraging multi-lateral relationships and understanding indigenous societies in the pursuit of national objectives.

As the lead elements of his Fifth Corps were approaching Baghdad, Lieutenant General (LTG) William Wallace was quoted as saying “The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we’d war-gamed against.”⁸ At the time, this statement was controversial; today, it appears prophetic. Three years later, American soldiers continue to wage a counterinsurgency campaign against a determined enemy, one which appears to leverage a deep understanding of the indigenous societal and religious culture, while seemingly taking advantage of the United States Army’s largely cursory knowledge of the same. This situation has opened a large debate within the American defense community. Was Fifth Corps’ failure to anticipate the nature of the enemy the result of mirror imaging at the political-strategic and operational levels?⁹ Has the insurgency profited from American tactical ineffectiveness in gaining and maintaining the

indigenous population's support or at the very least passivity? Is culture the culprit? Is it a significant contributing factor in one or both instances?

Culture has gained quite a bit of currency in recent defense community debates concerning the present and future capabilities of the American military, so much so that it has become something of a DOD "buzzword." As is often the case with "buzzwords," there is no commonly accepted, agreed upon definition.¹⁰ What then, exactly, is culture? Does it really matter to the success of current and future American military operations, specifically land operations? If so, how can we effectively instill an appreciation of cultural knowledge within the force?

Defining Culture

Culture is not easily defined, not least because it can have different meanings in different contexts.¹¹ During the 1960s, researchers found more than three hundred definitions of culture.¹² From organic cultivation of soil and crops or a biological 'culture' in a laboratory, through individual achievement (as in a 'cultured gentleman') to intellectual and artistic works or practices that define human society as socially constructed rather than natural, culture can have multitudinous definitions.¹³ Even cultural theorists have difficulty agreeing on one definition and generally believe the word to have a plurality of meanings, each of which is usually associated with a particular field or area of study within the broad domain of cultural theory. "Culture is an indispensable but multi-accented term with a complex and still open history, which in itself expresses the complexity of human history."¹⁴ Regardless of the difficulty of determining a generally agreed upon definition of culture, it is important to note that it is vital to a range of academic disciplines, such as Philosophy, Linguistics and Education, as well as Anthropology, Sociology, Literary, Media and obviously, Cultural and Regional Studies.¹⁵

Ultimately, culture is about humans and is inherent to the human experience. In fact, its very immanence makes it difficult to define in a univocal sense.¹⁶ The debate surrounding what constitutes culture and what it means to human interaction is not new. Plato (428-347 BCE) wrote about a large range of matters which fall within the realm of cultural considerations; questions concerning human identity and relations, as well as questions about politics, ethics and other distinctly human endeavors.¹⁷ Through the last three hundred years, the most widespread use of the word culture has generally referred to the world of the arts, but the arts in this sense are really only a reflection or manifestation of human endeavor writ large. In this regard, culture has often been mobilized to serve a liberal or radical conservative ideology.¹⁸

Only recently (1981), has the meaning of culture been extended to refer to the idea that it embodies "a whole way of life."¹⁹ Randolph Williams' definition of culture as "whole way of life'

of a social group or whole society unites multiple aspects of previous thought through the idea of culture as a signifying system, 'through which necessarily...a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.' What is significant about Williams' work is that, for the first time culture has come to mean constituting rather than expressing a certain way of life.²⁰ Although the idea that culture as 'a whole way of life' has come to be universally accepted, there is still some disagreement concerning a common definition of culture.

The focus can be narrowed even further. There appears to be some consensus that culture can be divided into two categories. The first category is 'objective' culture or the outwardly visible manifestations of a particular group of humans, which have become routinized into particular forms.²¹ In other words, objective culture is institutions and manifestations of identity that interacting groups of humans create or construct. This includes such things as art, literature, dance and music, but also social, economic, political, and linguistic systems.²² Less apparent, but more important for the subject/intent of this paper is 'subjective' culture, which includes the psychological features that define a group of people, their everyday thinking and behavior, i.e. elements such as beliefs, behaviors and values."²³ The remainder of this essay, unless otherwise noted, will refer to 'subjective' culture when using the term culture.

Psychologically speaking, culture is the learned portion of human behavior, most of which is acquired through habituation, or unconscious conditioning, oftentimes of an extremely subtle nature.²⁴ This is so much so, that most people do not realize how their thoughts and perceptions shape their understanding of the environment that they live in. Incidents or acts are formed largely as a result of the influence of long term unconscious conditioning received from their primary aggregate grouping. By combining these multiple aspects, culture can then be defined as "learned ideals, beliefs, values and assumptions characteristic of an identifiable community or population which cumulatively result in socially transmitted behavior patterns."²⁵ An important aspect to note is that culture, as defined here, exists in two dimensions; an invisible dimension (ideals, beliefs, values and assumptions) and a visible dimension (behavior).²⁶ Given this definition, what role does culture play in the military and how important is it?

Culture's Role

We can gather from the dearth of references to culture in current literature that the idea of culture as a concept or feature of war-fighting has gained momentum in recent times. President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy publicly introduced the principles of 'preemption' and 'prevention' into American security policy and states that for the United States Military to conduct its mission of defending the nation effectively it must: assure our allies and

friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.²⁷ The same emphasis appears in the most recent National Security Strategy, issued in March 2006.²⁸ The 2005 National Defense Strategy assesses the current strategic environment and identifies that potential adversaries recognize the United States' unparalleled strength in conventional war fighting and accordingly, most are striving to adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods categorized as traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges.²⁹

Furthermore, the 2005 National Defense Strategy directed a review of current Defense Department capabilities to address these challenges, the results of which are published in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.³⁰ In an effort to address these challenges, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), directed the development of "roadmaps" for areas of particular interest. The report specifically addressed "areas of particular interest"--institutional reform and governance; irregular warfare; building partnership capacity; strategic communication and intelligence.³¹ Furthermore, the QDR, in the interest of "better capturing the realities of a long war," articulates increasing the emphasis on irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.³² The increased emphasis is further articulated as greater investments and focus on developing and maintaining appropriate language, cultural and information technology skills.³³

In his *Capstone Concept For Joint Operations*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes how joint forces are expected to operate from 10 to 20 years into the future with the intention of providing a foundation to lead future force development and employment.³⁴ While recognizing that the nation must maintain its primacy in conventional military operations, the Concept draws special attention to the national security implications of operations that do not necessarily include either adversaries or combat.³⁵ It further articulates the need for new capabilities and processes to reduce the necessity to apply armed force and for integrated interagency and multinational involvement, regardless of the type of operations conducted.³⁶

Addressing the complexity of the future environment, this Joint Concept offers a solution defined as set of five elements³⁷ which the joint force is expected to use while solving military problems. Espousing the need for an explanatory framework to properly appreciate the complex nature and multi-dimensional dynamics of this environment, the Concept proposes to adopt a "Systems View of the Environment," one that approaches the operational environment as series of "complex, adaptive "systems" that are the product of the dynamic interactions between connected elements and processes."³⁸ In addition, the concept establishes three

fundamental joint actions;³⁹ which are primary to the organizing and integrating of time, space and purpose. One of these three; “establish, expand, and secure reach,” is further dissected into physical, virtual and human reach.⁴⁰ Obtaining reach in the human domain is about establishing mutual trust over time that may reduce the threat from adversaries to future operations. One of the key methods to setting the conditions for success in obtaining human reach is to understand the cultural environment.

The cultural environment exists in the land domain because humans are land creatures. Although the Human Race now has varying capabilities to exploit Air, Sea and Space domains, humans live and interact primarily on land. As land dwellers, military actions on land, or in other words, land power⁴¹ has primacy of influence on human behavior. As the nation's primary land force, the Army's ability to control land, resources, and people through a sustained presence makes permanent the advantages gained by joint forces⁴². Although *FM-1* draws a clear distinction between current doctrine and future concepts such as those articulated in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, much of the Army's current doctrine already nests with many emerging Joint concepts.

The foundation of the Army's doctrine is its operational concept. While the operational concept will evolve as a result of changes in the nation's requirements, the operational environment, or in response to emerging capabilities, it is fundamentally a statement of the Army's current over-arching operational construct. In any situation, Army forces will seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through speed, shock, and surprise with depth, simultaneity and endurance.⁴³ Army forces provide strategic land power across the Range of Military Operations⁴⁴ by their ability to conduct Full Spectrum Operations, defined as simultaneous and continuous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations in joint overseas campaigns while concurrently supporting homeland security. A key point in the Army's operational concept is the central tenant that “overcoming the enemy's will is the objective of combat operations; physical destruction of enemy forces, when necessary, is only a means to this end.”⁴⁵ This point is in close alignment with the Defense Department's ‘shift in emphasis’ “from a focus on kinetics – to a focus on effects.”⁴⁶ This is especially important as elusive enemies increasingly seek to counter American strengths in technology and firepower by hiding themselves and their operational infrastructures in multi-dimensional geography and within societies.⁴⁷

The three dimensional construct – physical, intellectual, and moral - of the American profession of arms⁴⁸ places a significant emphasis on humans, their abilities and interaction with one another. Knowledge of both internal military culture and that of the external environment is

deemed essential to the success of the American military profession. The internal emphasis is there because the military is values-based and those values must be understood and embodied in all that a military professional does. The external emphasis exists because cultural awareness is central to a military professional's ability to adapt to varying environments with different cultural and political values while understanding what those differences may mean within the operational environment. Additionally, the uniquely human ability to formulate ideas is central to victory, in that war is ultimately fought for ideas, as ideas motivate combatants and complete victory is only possible if adversaries understand and believe that they are defeated.⁴⁹

American Land power can accomplish many things, most in conjunction with other components of the joint force, but land power is unique in its ability to decisively impose the Nation's will on adversaries. It follows then that, Land power, more than any other component, depends on human interaction and innovation while fundamentally seeking to change or control human will.⁵⁰

'Human Will' is a pluralist term, the exact meaning of which is the subject of historical debates by and among philosophers and theologians. Most attempts at defining 'human will' or 'the will' include the mind's power to choose.⁵¹ Carl von Clausewitz stated that "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."⁵² Will plays a significant role in current joint operations design in such things as identifying the adversary's Center of Gravity, which Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."⁵³ The concept of Center of Gravity is a vital principle in planning any military operation. *Joint Publication 5.0: Joint Operational Planning* states that Centers of Gravity "comprise the characteristics, capabilities, and/or sources of power from which a system derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight."⁵⁴

As previously noted, emerging joint operational design concepts center around a 'Systems View of the Environment.' Fundamental to this concept is an "Effects Based Approach to Planning."⁵⁵ The intent of this approach is to connect "strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks by identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational environment."⁵⁶ The draft joint publication further explains "effects" by stating that "Effects describe battle space behavior—often the desired behavior of the adversary."⁵⁷

A significant consequence of the advent of the Information Age is the categorization of information as an element of national power. This elevation in status has coincided with a corresponding increase in emphasis in the way in which nation's acquire, manage, process, control and distribute information, which joint doctrine labels Information Operations.⁵⁸

Just as Joint Operations integrate service capabilities, Information Operations serve to integrate information and information systems.⁵⁹ The coordinating draft of *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations* describes the “information environment” as “where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment of decision making.”⁶⁰ Distinct from, but capable of existing within each of the four geographical domains (land, sea, air and space), the information environment is considered to consist of the physical, information and cognitive dimensions, all of which are inter-related.⁶¹ The physical dimension consists of infrastructure, hardware, weapons platforms and the like, the informational dimension is the information itself and the methods used to process, manipulate and move it and the cognitive domain is where decisions are made.⁶²

Information Operations are concerned primarily with affecting decisions⁶³ and decisions are made in the cognitive dimension, where humans think, perceive, visualize and decide.⁶⁴ Thinking, perceiving and visualizing are all conditioned, to some extent or another, by culture, therefore to attempt to understand an adversary’s decision making processes or to ascertain his intentions, emphasis must be placed on understanding his culture. In this manner, culture provides a significant foundation for a bridge between the physical and informational dimensions into the most important dimension of Information Operations, the cognitive dimension.⁶⁵

In addition to the role that culture plays in the external strategic, operational and tactical environments – avoiding mirror-imaging in decision making and discerning adversary intent, constructing joint operational constructs, understanding adversary and target audiences perceptions and influencing human will, culture plays a significant role within the internal Department of Defense environment as well.

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*’s key message is change. Secretary Rumsfeld’s foreword states that the *QDR* “reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum... the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.”⁶⁶ The scope and scale of this proposed change is articulated as transformation⁶⁷ and subdivided into two fundamental imperatives; “reorienting the Department’s capabilities and forces... and implementing enterprise-wide changes to organizational structures, processes and procedures....”⁶⁸ Pertaining to enterprise transformation, the *QDR* states that “the Department has moved steadily toward a more integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture... ”⁶⁹ and that “the Department’s culture, authorities and organizations must be aligned in a manner that facilitates, rather than hinders, effective decision-making... ”⁷⁰ Lastly, senior Defense Department officials recognize that while many

different ways to transform the force have been identified, fundamentally “transformation is first and foremost about changing culture.”⁷¹

Just as culture exists in many forms and multiple dimensions, it also exists at many levels. Members of the military may expect to confront cultural differences at several distinct levels. The majority of the previous discussion emphasized the highest level of cultural difference, one of an international nature, generally expressed within some kind of an adversarial environment. These kinds of situations usually involve the nation’s interest in imposing on an adversary’s or target audience’s will, changing their intentions, or influencing their behavior. Another type of high level cultural interface frequently encountered is one that exists in a coalition, partner or allied environment. At the lowest level of cultural friction, practically every service member will have some conflict, at least initially, between the culture of their upbringing and the culture of their particular service. Even inside services, cultural differences exist. Usually tied to units and mission sets, these cultural differences may vary from subtle to quite profound, and service members must adjust to these differences as they volunteer to or are directed to transfer from one unit to another.

Another type of low-level cultural friction is that which can emerge in the triad between a service member’s personal culture, that of his service, and that of the local culture in the area where he is stationed. At the next level, the Defense Department’s tremendous strides in improving joint war fighting capabilities over the last decade or so has significantly increased the contact between the different service cultures. Likewise, the recent emphasis on Interagency operations will substantially increase the contact between Service members and the civilian employees of various government and non-government agencies, each of which possesses its own unique internal culture.

Recommendations

The American people must understand that the global environment has changed fundamentally, especially in the context of the post-cold war world and the advent of “globalization.” Still more or less accustomed to the “black and white,” relatively rigid structure of a bipolar world, the nation must come to understand the extent to which American responsibilities have changed in a de-centralized, less-structured, multi-lateral, inter-connected environment. Political leaders need to ensure transparency within the public debate while establishing for the American people what those responsibilities and roles truly should be. A fundamental issue that must be addressed is whether America as a society, like it or not, can grasp the fact that the world’s expectations and perceptions concerning the United States have evolved. The disintegration of the Soviet Union eliminated the balance between expectations

and reality and as a result, American policy and practice is now measured against the theoretical, always a much higher standard.

The United States has conducted six major nation-building operations since 1993, each generally considered by military personnel to be an anomaly and usually accompanied by a palatable undercurrent throughout the ranks of “we don’t do nation-building.” Despite loud and often indignant protestations to the contrary, experience shows that the American military does “do nation-building” and must be prepared to do more in the future. The challenges of the new strategic environment, i.e. terrorism, failed states and proliferation, indicate that this trend will only continue.⁷² When these challenges are combined with the “Long War” construct and considered in conjunction with the newly declared National security policies of “pre-emption” and “prevention,” many prudent observers would consider the possibility of an increase in these types of operations.⁷³ Acknowledging the validity of this type of trend and assembling the capability to adequately address these challenges requires significant changes in structure and culture across the Department of Defense. Maintaining an appropriate balance of capability to simultaneously counter emerging and yet to emerge peer or near peer competitors in conventional, symmetrical warfare exponentially complicates the change equation.

The Defense Department, and as a subset, the Army is a traditional organization and as such, is institutionally averse to change. Schein’s cultural organization theory states that a group’s culture exists on three levels: on the surface are artifacts, underneath artifacts are values and behavioral norms and at the deepest level lays a core of beliefs and assumptions.⁷⁴ We do not have to look deeper than the most superficial culture layer, at artifacts, for an excellent expression of this aversion to change. The case of the Beret offers an excellent example. The Army Chief of Staff’s decision to establish the Black Beret as the Army’s garrison headgear met with manifold and manifest criticism. Five years later, and despite even more substantial change, to include a new field uniform, this decision still elicits negative comments. Meant to be a symbol of a new, improved Army, the black beret met with significant resistance upon implementation and even now, is not regarded by many career soldiers as permanent.

The Army has traditionally been an inward looking organization which believes its values and behavioral norms to be correct and spends a good portion of its energy protecting its core beliefs and assumptions. Although the Army has been relatively successful at instituting significant changes in its culture, i.e., de-segregation and women in the military, both of these successes were instituted as a result of outside influences.

Writing between the two great wars, Basil .H. Liddell-Hart noted: “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out.”⁷⁵ This is an insightful

observation that identifies the duality of the challenge in developing a culturally aware army and a culturally adept officer corps. If the Defense Department and by extension, the Army truly intends to inculcate “a culture of innovation” and establish the capacity to “look and operate deeply within societies,”⁷⁶ it must break the traditional paradigm of service exclusiveness significantly exacerbated by a “culture of control” and an inflexible, “one size fits almost all” Personnel Management System and embrace, at the entry to senior leader level, a pervasive, meaningful, critical thinking skills and cultural education training methodology, while simultaneously reforming career development paths. If the latter is implemented, over time, the former will be accomplished.

Historically, the United States has primarily pursued bi-lateral external relationships, with the resultant traditional military educational processes producing narrow and specifically focused talent, providing our Nation with niche capabilities which have habitually been “too little, too late.” Inefficient and exclusive, this paradigm has not satisfied anything beyond our most basic requirements.

Education and training is, as it has always been, the key to successful change. The number and diversity of the world’s cultures prohibits a “cookie-cutter” single culture training regime and has demonstrated that our current, specifically focused, career-field approach is inadequate in today’s contemporary operating environment. In order to address the necessary cultural imperatives, the Army, as the Nation’s primary “human terrain” maneuver force, must institute a multi-echelon, inclusive and comprehensive cultural knowledge training program.

Any truly pervasive program must begin with basic soldier education. During a soldier’s initial entry training, we must introduce, within the framework of mission accomplishment and without degrading tactical proficiency, the idea of cultural wherewithal. Instilling cultural wherewithal does not mean developing each soldier into a foreign area expert. Rather, its purpose is to establish a baseline for cultural literacy. Culturally literate soldiers understand their own cultural background and are aware how their own views and actions may affect the views of people from other cultural contexts.⁷⁷ Culturally aware soldiers also understand that their actions or behavior may be misread or perceived in a manner inconsistent with their intentions by a member of another culture. This is not about cultural relativism, multi-culturalism or cultural pluralism,⁷⁸ nor is it a vehicle for increasing soldier propensity for “going native”; it is about leveraging culture in the pursuit of mission accomplishment and furthering the nation’s interests. This concept must be further developed, expanded, and professionally instilled into the non-commissioned officer’s professional education and junior officer’s initial training.

Cultural training for officers should begin, if not already started, upon acceptance into a commissioning program. Every Reserve Officer Training Corps and United States Military Academy cadet should be required to take at least two years of a foreign language prior to being commissioned. Cadets should receive the same cultural awareness training as soldiers do during initial entry training. Furthermore, cadets should be encouraged or even required to adopt a region of the world, preferably one that complements their language training. In doing so, cadets should spend some, if not all of their elective class hours on learning as much about that country, countries, or region as possible.

Junior officer education and training continues with cultural literacy training and then expands into cultural competency. Cultural competency in the civilian world is about understanding the management of groups and communities across cultural boundaries and is demonstrated through organizational leadership capable of crossing cultural divides while establishing cooperative frameworks within organizations and between communities and groups from different cultures.⁷⁹ From a military standpoint, Cultural competency must have a foundation in cultural anthropology, but it is primarily concerned with understanding and managing group dynamics inherent in specific regions of the world where the nation's interests are most pronounced. Regional studies specifically designed to increase regional awareness should be emphasized.

Personality inventories designed to identify potentially culturally adept personnel should be administered to every officer during the Officer Basic Course. Those with identifiable aptitude should be offered the future opportunity for individually focused and more intensive training. If an officer possesses interest and demonstrates proficiency, that officer's career should be carefully managed to provide him with additional opportunities to increase his military knowledge and his regional awareness and language skills. An additional, extremely critical element is the identification of language aptitude and development of language capability. Generally, the motivation necessary to move beyond the superficial, rudimentary knowledge of a specific foreign culture, especially a culture that is radically different, is driven by language capability.⁸⁰

Leaders at all levels must do a much better job of establishing the importance of linguistic ability to soldiers. Every officer in the United States Army must be required to take the Defense Language Aptitude Test. Resources, especially time, must be dedicated to the attainment of language capability. Demonstrated linguist aptitude should be noted and managed separately from the majority. If an officer has an aptitude, is provided the necessary time and training, and

receives true support and encouragement from his Chain of Command, he will embrace a language, which will provide the motivation and opportunity necessary to attain cultural fluency.

Intermediate as well as senior officer educational programs must continue to stress improving cultural and language skills. Cross-cultural negotiation skills are a definite force multiplier and gain in importance as an officer rises in grade.

Individual cultural education, for both soldier and officer, must be re-enforced with collective, specifically focused cultural education and training during a unit's train-up for deployment. This training should be designed and supervised by the most culturally adept soldiers available, preferably a cell of experienced Foreign Area Officers.

The concept as outlined, while broad, provides a foundation to establish an initial rudimentary baseline of cultural awareness and then expand the ranks of those who are culturally competent within our Army. Additionally, it identifies those soldiers and officers with the prerequisite aptitudes and interests for specialized training. Having struggled with developing culturally adept soldiers for years, I am fully aware of the challenges associated with attempting to produce them, especially the cost in resources, particularly in our two most valuable ones, personnel and time.

At some point, we, as military professionals, have to decide what is essential to meet our multiple mission requirements. Clearly maintaining a "warrior ethos" and unsurpassed kinetic capability is fundamental. I submit that in today's combined, multi-national environment, culturally literate soldiers and culturally competent officers are also fundamental. Achieving the right balance will most likely require a holistic review of practically every system within the Army's "system of systems" and result in significant changes in personnel management, compensation, retirement, education, training and perhaps, most significantly of all, attitudes. Adding a few hours of "cultural training" to the already overburdened annual training menu will not suffice. Inculcating the appropriate level of cultural knowledge throughout the force will necessitate sizeable changes within our own, rather exclusive culture, which may, therefore, require significant external pressure to achieve.

Endnotes

¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* No.16 (Summer 1989). Fukuyama asks if the end of the Cold War is not just the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution with the universal acceptance of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

² Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 73, No. 3, Summer 1993; available from <http://www.aolamut.com/subj/economics/misc/clash.html>; Internet; accessed 09 March 2006.

³ Julian Barnes. "A Long, Hard Fight: A Cold War Approach to Beating Radical Islamists," *U.S. News & World Report*, 28 February 2005, Vol 138 Issue 7, 34-36. General Abizaid refers to the "Global War on Terror" as the "war on extremism" or the "long war", in which he compares the duration and the scope of the current struggle with the fight against fascism and the fight against communism. The Defense Department has now adopted this term and utilizes it in the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*.

⁴ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 06 February 2006), vii. The 2006 QDR asserts that it, above all, reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor QDR in 2001.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vi.

⁶ *Ibid.* Electronic word searches of the *2006 QDR* produced 50 hits on the term "change" and 31 hits on the term "transformation."

⁷ *Ibid.*, Further *2006 QDR* word searches produced an astounding 140 hits on the terms "partner/partnership," 51 hits on "allies," 28 hits on "language," 26 hits on the terms "culture/cultural" and 25 hits on "coalition."

⁸ Atkinson, Rick. "General: A Longer War Likely". Access <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/>. Accessed 23 October 2005.

⁹ Mirror imaging refers to applying your own decision-making methodology and framework onto the enemy.

¹⁰ Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 38 (3rd Quarter, 2005) 43. Word Searches of current applicable Joint and Army Publications yielded dozens of "hits" on the words 'culture' and 'culture', but only one definition of 'culture', which pertains to physical objectives and map references and is inconsistent with the term as it is being used in the current debate. This definition was found in two publications: *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) Publication AAP-6* dated 2006, p. 2-C-15 and *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* dated 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 31 August 2005). Both publications' definitions were exactly the same: **culture – a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.**

¹¹ Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick, eds., *Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 101.

¹² Craig Storti, *Figuring Foreigners Out: A Practical Guide*. (Yarmouth, Maine, Intercultural Press, Inc., 1999) 5.

¹³ Peter Brooker, *A Glossary of Cultural Theory*. (London: Arnold Publishing, 2003) 58.

- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. 60.
- ¹⁶ Edgar and Sedgwick, eds., *Cultural Theory*, 1.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. 3.
- ¹⁸ Brooker, *A Glossary of Cultural Theory*. 59.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. 60.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Milton Bennett, *Basic Concepts of Intercultural Communication: Selected Reading*, ed. Milton Bennett (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1998), p. 3.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Melville Herskovits, *Cultural Dynamics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964) 11.
- ²⁵ This particular definition is proposed as a combination of the explanations of culture in the following five books: Richard Brislin, *Understanding Culture's Influence On Behaviors*, (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1993) 1-27, Gordon Curphy, Robert Ginnett, and Richard Hughes, *Leadership: Enhancing The Lessons of Experience*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002) 157, Herskovits, *Cultural Dynamics*, 3-10, Carl Coon, *Culture Wars And The Global Village* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2000) 53-61, Storti, Craig. *Figuring Foreigners Out*, 5.
- ²⁶ Storti, *Figuring Foreigners Out*. 5.
- ²⁷ President George W. Bush, *2002 National Security Strategy*, (The White House, 17 September 2002) 29.
- ²⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., March 2006.
- ²⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, The Pentagon, March 2005, 2.
- ³⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*.
- ³¹ Ibid. 3.
- ³² Ibid. 4.
- ³³ Ibid. 5.

³⁴ Richard Myers, *CAPSTONE CONCEPT for JOINT OPERATIONS*, Version 2.0, The Pentagon, August 2005, vii.

³⁵ Ibid. 8.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid. 11. The CCJO solution offers five interrelated elements that describe how the joint force is expected to resolve the military problem: **A Central Idea, A Systems View of the Environment** where all situations (adversary and crisis response) are viewed as involving complex adaptive systems, **The Fundamental Joint Actions** that are key to designing joint force operation, **The Supporting Ideas** which describe how the future joint force is expected to operate, and **The Key Characteristics** the joint force must possess to operate as envisioned.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid. 12. Fundamental actions taken by the joint force are: Establish, expand, and secure reach, Acquire, refine, and share knowledge, and Identify, create, and exploit effects.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 13. Reach describes the capacity for the Joint Force Commander, in multiple dimensions and across multiple domains, to constantly assess the ability of the joint force to conduct military tasks and to support other non military tasks directed by nation leadership. Reach sufficient for success demands the persistent attention of the JFC in day-to-day operations. Reach is best established by integrated and complementary military, diplomatic, economic, information, and societal actions.


Definitions of Physical, Virtual and Human Reach are as follows: **Physical reach** is established through military operations or diplomacy either by creating an environment of cooperation and mutual understanding or by forcibly gaining access in the face of adversary strategies and anti-access capabilities. Expanding and securing physical reach is accomplished through kinetic and non-kinetic means to facilitate operational flexibility and to enhance security along all lines of communications (LOCs). Securing physical reach includes protecting LOCs to discourage or prevent adversaries from disrupting operations. **Virtual reach** is established through the use of cyberspace (includes all domains through which information flows) to acquire, transmit and monitor information in order to gain knowledge. Expanding virtual reach is accomplished by having adaptive virtual capabilities. Securing virtual reach requires preventing adversaries or other entities from disrupting operations in the virtual domain. **Human reach** is established by thoroughly understanding the adversary or other groups through various means--examples include diplomacy, human intelligence, and cultural studies. Expanding human reach is accomplished by continuously engaging and studying the group of interest in order to know when it is adapting and conditions are changing. Securing human reach is gained through mutual trust garnered over time that may discourage or prevent potential adversaries from disrupting operations.

⁴¹ Peter Schoomaker, *Field Manual 1: The Army*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Pentagon, June 2005, 1-1. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid. 3-4. The Army's operational concept depends on flexible combinations of Army capabilities (combined arms) and joint capabilities (joint interdependence) integrated across the full spectrum of operations through mission command.

⁴⁴ Myers, *CAPSTONE CONCEPT*, 10. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in which the future joint force will be expected to succeed is depicted in Figure 3.



This figure reflects both adversary-focused and humanitarian non-adversary operations in which the future joint force is expected to engage. The United States will remain continuously engaged across the globe in a continuum ranging from peace and stability (maintained by shaping and deterrent activities), through conflict to reconstruction, with a goal of maintaining or returning to a state of peace and stability in which US national security interests are assured. The joint force commander's (JFC) ability to integrate various operations in the right proportion is key to achieving desired strategic outcomes. The uncertain environment combined with the scope of different operations will demand capabilities that are adaptable and can be applied in multiple types of operations simultaneously. Resource constraints alone will prevent an indefinite number of simultaneous effective responses across the ROMO.

⁴⁵ Schoomaker, *Field Manual 1*, 3-8.

⁴⁶ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, vi.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 2-3. Multi-dimensional geography includes natural, man-made and subterranean, while society includes associated social and political domains.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 1-12.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 1-14.

⁵⁰ William T. Johnsen, "Redefining Land Power For The 21st Century," Strategic Studies Institute Manuscript, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 7 May 1996. 9-10.

⁵¹ Various articles and a dictionary were consulted to attempt to define 'human will' or 'the will'. Jonathan Edwards in "Concerning the Nature of the Will," [on-line] <http://www.jonathanedwards.com/text/FoW/partI/DefinitionofTerms/1.1.htm> states that "the **will** (without any metaphysical refining) is that by which **the mind chooses anything**. The faculty of the will is that **power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing**. An act of the will **is the same as an act of choosing or choice**. Mr. Edwards quotes Locke from Human Understanding, Edit 7, vol.1) in making his case for this definition; Matt Grinder in "Value and the Freedom of the Will," [on-line], <http://vanparecon.resist.ca/Matt/Freewill.html> believes that "the will, that faculty of our minds that **seems to enable us to choose**, can be defined as that which **causes us to pursue what we perceive we value**"; *Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary* (1984 reprint 1996) defines will as , (from among multiple definitions), "The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides on a course of action: i.e. VOLITION and as "deliberate intention or wish." *Webster's* further defines volition as "1. An act of willing, choosing, or deciding, 2. A conscious choice: DECISION. 3. Power or capability of choosing: WILL."

⁵² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

⁵³ *Joint Publication 5.0: Joint Operational Planning*, Revision (3), 3rd Draft, 10 August 2005. IV-10.

⁵⁴ Ibid. In response to the growing significance of the Effect Based Approach (EBA) in joint operational design concepts, the joint definition of Center of Gravity is evolving. *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations*, revised 2nd draft, 09 May 2005. GL-8. lists the proposed definition as "A characteristic, capability, or source of power from which a system derives its freedom of action, physical and moral strength or will to act. Also called COGs"

⁵⁵ *Joint Publication 5.0*. III-2.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid. III-4.

⁵⁸ Norton A. Schwartz, Director of the Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations*, Final Coordination Draft 2005. GL-10. The definition of **Information Operations** contained in the final coordinating draft of JP 3-13 is "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversary human and automated decision

making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)


⁵⁹ William T. Johnson, *Information Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information Operations* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, January 2006), 1.

⁶⁰ Ibid. I-1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid. I-2.

Chapter I



⁶³ Ibid. I-6.

⁶⁴ Ibid. I-2.

⁶⁵ Ibid. **The Cognitive Dimension.** The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. **It is the most important of the three information dimensions**, as leaders typically make decisions based upon information available to them. This dimension is also affected by a commander's orders, training, and other personal motivations. Most battles and wars are won or lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, fear, confusion, level of training and experience, situational awareness, public opinion and public diplomacy influence this dimension.

⁶⁶ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. iii.

⁶⁷ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. vi. "If one were to attempt to characterize the nature of how the Department of Defense is transforming and how the senior

leaders of this Department view that transformation, it is useful to view it as a shift of emphasis to meet the new strategic environment.”

⁶⁸ Ibid. 1.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 63.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 65.

⁷¹ Art Cebrowski, Director of the Department of Defense’s Office of Force Transformation, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, 14 March 2003.

⁷² Samuel Berger and Brent Scowcroft, co-chairs, “In The Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities” Independent Task Force Report No. 55 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), xiii.

⁷³ George Bush, *National Security Strategy for the United States*, September 2002, p. 14.

⁷⁴ Hatch, Mary Jo. “Organization Theory”, (UK, Oxford University Press, 1997) 210.

⁷⁵ Akshay, Joshi, “A Holistic View of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),” *Strategic Analysis*, VOL XXII, No. 11, February 1999 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99joa01.html; Internet; accessed 23 October, quoting B.H. Liddell-Hart, no reference cited.

⁷⁶ Terry Pudas, Deputy Director, Defense Department Office of Force Transformation, Briefing “Transforming Defense” 21 October 2003. slide 7.

⁷⁷ Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education”, *Military Review*, March-April 2005, 63.

⁷⁸ Booker, *Cultural Theory*. 193. Pluralism is a widely employed term describing less a single theorized position than the ideological tenor of much academic work in a liberal or more radical vein. Pluralism implies the acceptance of difference and diversity across a very broad possible range in a number of disciplines and areas of cultural and political activity. It can be viewed as a recipe for a relativism that views everything as different but equal with the capacity to jettison the means to discriminate on questions of value, morality and truth.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Throughout my career, I have worked extensively with multiple foreign cultures; European, African, Central Asian, Middle Eastern and even Australian. My experience with soldiers attempting to grasp the intricacies of a significantly different culture has shown that those who know anything of the language invariably perform markedly better in an operational environment which requires close contact with the indigenous population.