The British Southern Campaign in the Revolutionary War: Implications for Contemporary Counter Insurgency

Abstract

The British effort in the Southern Campaign (1780-1782) of the Revolutionary War failed because of flawed national strategy and a failure to focus sufficient elements of national power against a background of competing global threats. In the American colonies, military power in isolation was ineffectively substituted for diplomatic, political, and economic effort. The operations in the Carolinas took place because no other strategic options were available given the basic and faulty strategic assumptions. Although there isn't a direct comparison between the 18th century British Army and today's U.S. Army, there are a number of parallels. The U.S.-led coalition counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq has marked similarities to the failed Southern Campaign. Training to fight a symmetrical opponent in a conventional conflict is not the best preparation for fighting an overseas counterinsurgency campaign in an alien environment.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 10, 2006
Accession Number
ADA448941

Entities

People

  • Julian P. Clover

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Engineered Resilient Systems
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Doctrine
  • Education
  • Governments
  • Insurgency
  • Joint Military Activities
  • Law
  • New England
  • New York
  • North Carolina
  • Resilience
  • Security
  • South Carolina
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • West Indies

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Strategic Security Studies