

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**NATO AND EU/EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVES:
COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE NATO and EU/European Defense Initiatives Competitive or Complementary?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Hubert Muckel				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 26	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel (GS) Hubert Muckel

TITLE: NATO and EU/European Defense Initiatives: Competitive or complementary?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 5543 PAGES: 22

KEY TERMS: European Union, Western European Union, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States of America, National Agendas

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

"... it is important that NATO not be replaced by the European Union (EU), leaving the United States (US) without a voice in European security affairs."¹ Does this quote portray the current US view on Europe as a possible global competitor or does it express the US experience and lessons learned in the 20th century? Clearly, this quote can not be directly linked to the Bush Administration and therefore does not reflect the official US stand on that very issue. The quote, however, indicates an uneasiness from elements of the US political establishment with the ongoing security-policy related dynamics in the EU. This paper analyzes the current status of NATO and the European Union (EU) defense initiatives, examines national objectives and interests of European key-players and the US, and evaluates the aspects of competitiveness or complement of NATO and EU defense initiatives.

NATO AND EU/EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVES: COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?

Since the end of World War II several attempts have been made to establish a European defense and/or security system. On 4 March 1947, France and the United Kingdom signed the so called Dunkerque treaty, a military alliance directed against an attack of a recovered Germany.² Recognizing the evolving threat of the Soviet Union, this treaty was transformed in 1948 into the Brussels pact (also called West Union), an alliance between France, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux States.³ Although, as stated in its preamble, once again directed primarily against a German attack,⁴ this pact was clearly intended to focus the few western European resources against potential Soviet aggression. Another European treaty, the European Defense Community Treaty (Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense) was signed on 27 May 1952 by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux States. This treaty, initiated by France in fear of a rearmed Germany, aimed towards the establishment of a German army within the boundaries of European structures. However, due to France's refusal to ratify it, this treaty never came into power. The year 1954 opened another episode in Europe's security and defense politics. The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948, as amended by the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty signed at Paris on 23 October 1954, finally integrated Germany and Italy into the European security community and established the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU aimed at collective defense,⁵ however with the clear desire not to duplicate NATO structures.⁶ This episode of European security and defense policy ended when, as a consequence of EU's meeting in Cologne in June 1999, WEU's crisis management responsibilities were transferred to the EU. This move aimed at strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the EU and thus avoiding double-structures with different responsibilities in Europe.

In considering this history of European attempts to organize its own security and defense, and analyzing the results of these attempts one might be curious in which aspects the new European defense initiatives could compete with the trusted and reliable NATO, and how these initiatives could endanger the transatlantic link with the US, or if these initiatives could be a substantial complement in NATO. Is Germany's former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder correct when he says that NATO has ceased to be "the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate the most important strategic issues of the day,"⁷ and if he is, why? Or is US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld correct when he observes "... our Atlantic Alliance

relationship has navigated through some choppy seas over the years. But we have always been able to resolve the toughest issues. That is because there is so much that unites us: common values, shared histories, and an abiding faith in democracy.”⁸

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The grand old dame in transatlantic relations, NATO, was founded on 4 April 1949 as an alliance against the Soviet Union and the threat posed against the west European and North American nations. The main threat to NATO-members posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has vanished since 1991 (Soviet Union: 8 December 1991; Warsaw Pact: 31 March 1991). NATO, initially a twelve nation alliance, has evolved to an organization with twenty-six member states.⁹ The main reasons for this surprising development have been the security perspective for the new former Warsaw Pact members against possible threats posed by a politically unstable Russia, and the attractiveness of the transatlantic success story. As a result of these fundamental changes in international constellations and politics, member nations are striving to adjust NATO's role and missions to the new security environment since the mid 1990s. NATO's most recent strategic concept has been approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23 and 24 April 1999. This document states the purpose of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means and to maintain the function of the transatlantic link.¹⁰ The document defines the tasks of the Alliance to be ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, to serve as a transatlantic forum, to deter and defend against any threat against any NATO member, to contribute to crises management and to promote wide-ranging partnership.¹¹ Though this strategic concept briefly addresses means to accomplish its tasks other than military, the concept by and large still remains a military one.

Triggered by the Balkan wars in the 1990s and the imminent terrorist threat which culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, NATO finds itself today on operations on the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and on a training mission in Iraq. Most astonishingly, on September 12, 2001, NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, something no one thought might happen, at least not in the Post Cold War era.

Also, mainly triggered by the poor European performance during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, NATO and the US finally started to support the idea of a European Security and Defense Initiative. The reason for that new US approach was the hope that this project would cause a positive change in the European member states attitude towards sharing more responsibility in NATO instead of relying on the US.¹² The very idea of a European Foreign and Security Policy

reached back to the so called Maastricht Treaty¹³ signed in 1992. The US initially opposed this idea fearing the potential harm to NATO.

As a result of the historic changes in the geopolitical situation and the disappearance of perceived threats, most of the old European members of NATO have cut their military expenditures drastically despite the Maastricht Treaty. Today cooperation with the US military, which continues to represent the backbone of NATO, is seriously endangered mainly due to outdated equipment and/or technical incompatibility. The saved money, often referred to as the peace dividend, commonly is used to compensate for other budgetary shortfalls of these respective countries. The new NATO members, on the other hand, are mostly striving to restructure and to refit at least elements of their respective former Warsaw Pact style military. However, limited budgetary resources make the point of main effort for their governments the costly challenge of providing a growing economy and social progress for their people.

Altogether, NATO's European members, with some few exceptions, today are far away from contributing an adequate share to NATO's resources.¹⁴ Although repeatedly addressed by several members of the European political elite¹⁵ and having been main topic of several NATO meetings,¹⁶ the strengthening of the European pillar within NATO still remains by and large a politics by slogan rather than facts. Regardless of these problems, further strain is posed on the alliance's coherence by the deep rift between European nations themselves and the rift between some European nations and the US on the issue of the Iraq war. Although regularly denied in public, NATO currently faces major challenges as a result of these politics. These challenges are not exclusively military in character, but impact NATO as the major political transatlantic organization.

Adding to this situation, NATO structures, in principle, have been unchanged from the early days until now. This poses another strain on NATO as an organization and as the major transatlantic political forum. The sheer fact that NATO is still dominated by the US and that the traditional pecking order of US chairmanship and European respect is still intact causes displeasure among some of old Europe's political leaders. Therefore, adjusting NATO's role and missions probably will not be sufficient to restore NATO's claim to be the exclusive forum for transatlantic exchanges and decision-making.

Western European Union (WEU)

As mentioned before, WEU is a product of Europe's early attempts for its own security and defense policy. From its early beginnings in 1954 until 1984, WEU never played an important role for Europe's security issues in public. Also, WEU lacked sufficient resources in terms of

money and troops due to the fact that the majority of Europe's leaders looked to NATO for security and, therefore, did not want to duplicate NATO's structure. If there was a European nation which was interested in WEU, it was France. After withdrawing from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966,¹⁷ WEU was the military forum of choice where France attempted to pull strings with regard to military and security related issues within Europe.

By the late phase of the Cold War some European Nations, especially France and Germany, started to think about strengthening the European pillar in NATO by changing WEU's significance.¹⁸ The reasons behind these thoughts were aimed at different directions. While for Germany the strengthening of the European Pillar within NATO aimed at a more balanced burden-sharing between the US and its European allies, and also towards a stronger influence of Europe on NATO's decision-making, it clearly did not aim at diminishing NATO's importance for Europe's security or at hurting the transatlantic link with the Americans.¹⁹ For France, in contrary, the aim of this game was different, but not different from the overall French aspirations of gaining more influence in Europe while simultaneously reducing the US influence on European Security issues.²⁰

The Western European Union was "reactivated" in 1984 after 30 years in a dormant status. In 1992, WEU's role and status changed drastically due to the role it was given in the Treaty on European Union, the so called Amsterdam Treaty.²¹ However, even after the Cologne summit of the European Council where the military role of WEU was transferred into the European Union, WEU as an organization has not ceased yet. The assembly of WEU acts as the Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, focusing on the European Security and Defense Policy and the further development of the European Union's civil and military crisis-management capabilities. Further, it also continues to scrutinize intergovernmental cooperation in the field of armaments and armaments research and development, which are funded and carried out by the 19 nations of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). The work of this Group is soon going to be taken over by the European Defense Agency and the 17 nations of the Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO).

European Union (EU)

On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. The treaty had been signed by the members of the European Community (EC)²² and introduced the three-pillar structure: the Community pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar,²³ and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. Originally, the EC dealt mainly with economic and trade

matters. Today economic related matters of the EC still dominate public opinion on EU in many countries outside of Europe. The sheer fact that the EU is an intergovernmental and supranational political union of 450 million people in 25 countries producing a quarter of the world's GDP should, at least, be convincing enough that there is more than economic relevance related to EU.²⁴

The people in EU countries have transferred to it considerable sovereignty - more than that of any other non-sovereign regional organization. Although the establishment of a Constitution for Europe failed due to the French (May 29, 2005) and Dutch (June 1, 2005) rejection, this setback will not be infinite. Major reasons for the results of these two referenda have been the dissatisfaction with the outcome of the new EURO currency;²⁵ the fear about an obscure European Commission (an immense powerful organization of mainly unknown former politicians and bureaucrats having influence on almost everything relevant to the common European's daily life); an uneasiness about the pace of EU's opening to new members and the related economical burdens; and the unwillingness to transfer more elements of national sovereignty to a mainly faceless organization at least for the time being. Therefore, and in conjunction with the deep rift over the Iraq war, EU's future seems to be less predictable than it had been in former times when it had fewer member states and when France and Germany were the driving factors for its development. The irresolution about the future course translates directly into Europe's efforts to come to grips with its security related issues. Within the framework of its CSFP pillar and the subordinated area of ESDP, EU's strategic concept²⁶ was issued in late 2003. Because of this, it is more current in addressing security issues than the 1999 NATO strategic concept. Yet, the approach to security in this strategy is more comprehensive but also different from that of NATO. While NATO's strategy²⁷ especially stresses the military aspects of security, the EU strategy approaches the issue of security more comprehensively. It points out that the military is only one element of a broad spectrum relevant to overall security.²⁸ This difference in formulating strategy is caused mainly by the different nature of NATO and the EU. While NATO is purely a political-military alliance of member states, EU is becoming a state-like entity not only with loosely connected different member nations sharing one common vision and common values, but with member nations who have transferred sovereignty to this supranational organization. Therefore, the EU strategic concept is more similar to a grand strategy of a nation, such as the National Security Strategy of the US than to a military strategy of an alliance.

That, in fact, is the problem. For the time being, Europe exists only on paper and in the head and heart of some European statesmen and not in the awareness of most European

politicians and people. European security, unlike other common political issues, is not sorted out as it should be.

Currently, national interests and agendas of major European players in concert with the fear of many small European nations for domination by the big ones and the related almost total loss of influence on important decisions overshadow the development of the EU. Additional obstacles for sound development are caused by the decision making process between 25 sovereign member states and the rotational presidency model of EU. While guaranteeing equal participation in leading EU for all member nations, at least in the public opinion, this six month rotation model in reality causes many problems in the continuity of EU's further development while it simultaneously promotes the realization of national interests and biases. Last and certainly not least, due to the sheer fact that every presidency must be a success in public, many presidencies end up in a sort of declaratory politics instead of real and meaningful political outcomes.

In regard to Europe's security, this dilemma translates to the willingness to share more responsibility for global security²⁹ and to take action in line with the so called Berlin Plus Agreement,³⁰ but to rely on mission critical assets which can only be provided by NATO and its US backbone. The relationship between EU and NATO, and especially the further on value of NATO for EU, is only addressed quite vaguely and in favor of misinterpretation in EU's strategic concept.³¹ That, however, is directly caused by the fact that the wording of EU's Strategic concept represents the smallest common denominator of national interests.

Key-Players in NATO and EU Politics

The importance of national interests and aspirations on NATO and EU related issues can be most clearly discussed by using the key players in NATO – EU –US relations, namely the US, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Using these three European nations does not set aside the importance and contributions of all other NATO and/or EU nations. The political, economical, and military realities in Europe clearly indicate that their interests and behavior will be key to the developing political game on the future of NATO and the EU.

France

When US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld blamed France and Germany for representing Old Europe and for having lost political standing due to the shift of Europe's political center of gravity to the east,³² he obviously overreacted. Surely he knew that his statement was inconsistent with reality. France is a major European player in the context of political, economical and military power and influence. It is a nuclear power and a permanent

member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. These facts alone are sufficient to suggest that Rumsfeld's statement was off target. On the other hand, the frustration inherent to Rumsfeld's statement also points to the fact which influences NATO, Europe, and the transatlantic relationship since the end of World War II: France represents one extreme position in the complex NATO, EU, and transatlantic texture. Since President de Gaulle's decision to leave NATO's integrated military structure, France continued to establish itself as an anti-pole to the US in Europe. Consciously focused on gaining influence in the European political arena while simultaneously striving to contain Germany's power, France continuously used the different European institutions like WEU, EC, and EU as a means to reach its national objectives.

In its up-to-date manifesto,³³ the Groupe UMP,³⁴ French President Chirac's parliamentary backbone in the French national assembly, states their aim is to be inter alia "To assert France's international influence, the MPs of the Union for a Popular Movement (UPM) will actively support the initiatives taken by the President of the Republic so that the voice of France is heard everywhere, in Europe and worldwide." In regard to Europe, Groupe UMP goes on to state "Convinced that in many areas, France's future is within Europe, they expect the European Union to get closer to its citizens and make its workings more democratic. In this respect, the reform of the European institutions is essential. It must clarify the breakdown of powers between the Union and the Member States, contribute to the set-up of a real common foreign policy, reinforce synergies in the area of defense, and better harmonize the economic policies implemented to assert the international role of the euro after its successful introduction." This and the previous statement, although not made by the French government but by its parliamentary supporters and, therefore, still a clear hint of actual French policy, indicate several aspects in regard to current French aspirations and interests. First, France will continue to try to gain international influence using the international bodies of EU and UN as means of choice. Second, France does not intend to trade in its permanent membership in the UN Security Council in favor of a European seat. Third, France sees its future within Europe in many, but not all, areas. Therefore, EU will be supported by France only as long as it is in the French interest. Especially in the areas of common foreign, defense and economic policies France expects more democracy and a clear outline of power distribution between EU and its member states. Keeping in mind that one major discussion in EU tackles the aspects of the voting system, each member state one vote or each member state's vote depends on a system related to the quantity of its population, the wording "more democratic" loses its innocence and reveals the true aspirations of France's political elite. France is not willing to allow small

countries like Denmark or Lithuania to have the same political influence on European decisions as France has. At the same time, French policy has to ensure that France is not second to Germany, Europe's population-wise biggest and economically most powerful nation. Altogether, the decades long unbroken French aspirations in regard to its political status, often referred to as "La Grande Nation", will not allow for a quick and easy solution of significant European issues. The European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) thus will not have a big promoter in France, as long as it is not assured that France will dominate its future.

Germany

After the unpredicted parliamentary elections in September 2005 and their stalemate result, which may end in a Grand Coalition between the two big political parties CDU/CSU and SPD³⁵ and led by a CDU/CSU chancellor, Germany's future position in regard to EU and NATO currently seems to be somehow indifferent. Looking at Germany's historical approach to both issues up to 1998, the statement is true that both organizations have been Germany's point of main effort. Although, seemingly contradictory, this statement clearly points out Germany's historical dilemma. After World War II Germany changed its strategic culture fundamentally. Germans found themselves traumatized by the fact that their former core beliefs about Germany's role in world politics were wrong because they had led to a devastating war that killed millions. As a consequence, the old German Strategic Culture was strongly rejected and a radical new Strategic Culture was formed. This culture rejected nationalism and promoted the integration into the Western value community, the preference of multilateral action and a deep skepticism about the use of force.³⁶ Within this framework of political constraints, Germany always has proven itself as being the balancing factor between the United Kingdom and the US, which together represent the transatlantic faction in NATO and international politics, and France which represents the strictly European faction. Although the task to ensure this delicate balance and block a transatlantic and European internal rift often proved to be near impossible, Germany succeeded until 1998. With the change from the Kohl³⁷ to the Schröder³⁸ Government, Germany stepped away from this traditional balancing task and started to promote more strongly European oriented security policy. However, although publicly strong statements on Germany's aspirations and contributions to NATO's and EU's military capabilities and operations have been made and the German Armed Forces became involved in more and more operations during his chancellorship, Schröder's government could not change the German Strategic Culture towards intensified use of military power. To the contrary, during his chancellorship the aspect of the "zivile Krisenprävention" (civil crises-prevention) by a focused

cooperation of different multinational organizations such as NATO, EU, OSCE (always legitimized by the UN) prevailed. The “EU – joker” play with the related intensified European-based approach to security as well as the ostensive cooperation with France and the never before attempted rapprochement towards Russia are directly related to the severe transatlantic struggle about the Iraq war and the personal dislike between the Europeans Schröder and Chirac (the French President), and Bush (the US President).

A look into the future by using the different German political parties' manifestos³⁹ for the parliamentary election in September 2005, reveals that security policy as well as NATO and the EU only have second or third order priority in German politics for the near future. All manifestos are dominated by the social, economical, and labor-market related problems Germany has been struggling with for many years. The CDU/CSU manifesto, however, addresses the German – NATO relationship in an extended passage and explains that European Unification and transatlantic partnership will be the cornerstones of German foreign policy, and that NATO will remain guarantor for Germany's security. It continues to state that the strengthening of the EU will mean to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.⁴⁰ Should this CDU/CSU position prevail in the new German government that would mean a clear refocusing on old German foreign and security policy in the tradition of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. NATO's role for German security would be reestablished and the overstressed German – French co-operation of the Schröder government would be ended. Germany would regain its balancing role between the transatlantic and European factions. Last and not least, Germany's political stand towards Russia would be reassessed. However, the change in German politics would not mean an end to the European security policy.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) is the third European key-player in NATO as well as EU related matters. As France, the UK is a nuclear power, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The UK, however, represents in many aspects the opposite to the French positions in NATO as well as in EU. Being traditionally a transatlantic stronghold in NATO and having a special relationship with the US – as currently documented in the course of the Iraq war - the UK has a special position in EU. Although being strongly committed to EU, the UK still has not joined the new European currency. The parliamentary process to ratify the European Constitution was postponed in June 2005, although the UK currently holds the EU Presidency (July – December 2005).⁴¹ Last and not least, the majority of the Britons entertain traditionally a quite euro-skeptical attitude. As Germany, the UK has to live with a dilemma in regard to NATO

and the EU. NATO, without any doubt, is the cornerstone for UK's security.⁴² The European Union on the other hand is also indispensable for the UK's future. Therefore, the UK has to co-operate with and within EU as a precondition for exercising political influence on European decisions. As outlined in the white paper *Prospects for the EU in 2005*,⁴³ the UK, indeed, is actively involved in European policy and decision making. On the other hand, the UK never forgets its national interests,⁴⁴ and hence, the Common European Foreign and Security Policy are supported by the UK in a way which serves the UK's interest not to hurt NATO and/or the transatlantic link with the US. In regard to the actual European Presidency held by the UK, that interest translates directly into the white paper *Prospects for the EU in 2005*. There is no indication in this document that the UK intends to further develop the European Security and Defense Policy actively for the time being. In contrary, the document indicates that the UK Presidency only will continue already ongoing activities like EUFOR (EU Force in Bosnia), the military requirement catalog, and the EU Battle Groups related issues.

A conclusion of the UK's program for its current EU Presidency, consequently, is that there will be no major outcome of this presidency which could change NATO's and EU's relationship in favor of EU.

United States of America (US)

The US is the last remaining Superpower on Earth. The US possesses a unique military capability including nuclear weaponry, enjoys the most powerful economy for the time being, and it has worldwide interests. For many nations the US are the world policeman and the guarantor of their security either in a binational relationship or as part of a multinational framework or alliance. For other nations, the US represents a hegemon with global selfish interests. In regard to Western Europe, the US significance is multifaceted. First, the US has twice sorted out European triggered World Wars. Second, the US saved the majority of the Western European countries from the NAZI-regime. Third, the US, in its capacity as the backbone of NATO, guaranteed Western Europe's survival during the Cold War. Fourth, the US sponsored the German reunification, and last and not least, the US took action in the Balkan Wars during the 1990s when Europe was not willing and prepared to tidy up its own backyard. As a consequence, US interest in Europe and the related EU development is quite high. Due to the historical experience of the 20th century the US interest in Europe can be described as skepticism about European maturity and the related possible consequence for the US to have to sort out European affairs once again.

On the other hand, US global interests can not be secured in the highly unstable and unpredictable environment of today's world without support of allies. Even for a superpower, the global challenges at hand and in the future are too big and too complex to be addressed and successfully resolved unilaterally. Unified in its core beliefs and values and based on a common European stamped cultural heritage, the US and Europe are natural allies. Thus, the US interest in a stable, reliant, and mature Europe should be self-evident.

A third aspect of US – EU relations is dominated by the growing power of the EU, which may eventually present a challenge to the global hegemon, the US. This multi-faceted, complex relationship between the US and the EU, however, causes severe problems in today's political arena. Looking at the 2004 Republican Party Platform,⁴⁵ the European Union is mentioned in contrary to the European friendly 2000 Republican Party Platform⁴⁶ only once. "We hail the President's success in achieving unprecedented cooperation with Europe – at NATO, through the European Union, and with individual nations – in combating terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, building peace and democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, and advancing the cause of freedom, democracy, and opportunity throughout the broader Middle East and North Africa."⁴⁷ Although it is crystal clear that a party platform is not the substitute for actual political action of the Bush Administration, it clearly points towards possible trajectories of actual US government work.

From a European perspective, thus, there could not be clearer evidence that the current US Administration does not see the necessity of close US - European cooperation. In mentioning discrete European nations as they contribute to the US security related interests in the world, especially the US Global War on Terrorism and the Iraq war, an impression arises that one aim of this administration might be to divide the European nations and thus destabilize the EU in order to retain political influence on selected European countries.⁴⁸ Reasons for that behavior could be the frustration about insufficient European political and military support in the ramping up phase of the ongoing Iraq war and in its execution and the related post-war operations or, as some European media and politicians state, imperial hubris. Whatever the true reasons for that approach to Europe may be, the US has to make a deliberate and conscious choice how to proceed in future in US – EU relations. Part of this choice will also be the decision on the future status of NATO. While from a US perspective NATO might be the anchor of transatlantic relations, the EU apparently is only considered as second best. If this is the right approach to foster US-EU-NATO cooperation in the future is more than doubtful as a July 2004 Hearing on *TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A POST-SUMMIT ASSESSMENT* before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on international Relations House of

Representatives⁴⁹ reveals. All witnesses in this Hearing point out in their respective comments after having given an official statement, that from their perspective the relationship between the EU and the US seems not to be dominated by a real partnership and that the US administration has to change its behavior towards the Europeans. Ambassador Burghardt, Head of Delegation, European Commission, in his comment points it out this way "But we have to get back to the spirit of partnership and interdependence, and this means that both sides have to be able to and willing to be a partner. The Europeans are certainly willing. They are not maybe able across the board of all of the policies, and we have to do our homework on that. The US side was certainly able, but there were great doubts whether part of the Administration was even willing to think in these terms and not, rather, in terms of coalitions of the willing and all of the divisive and polarizing things which happened from there."⁵⁰

NATO and EU a Quadruple Problem

Summing up the aforementioned positions of the four key players in NATO – EU –US relations the following positions can be stated: France will continue to play the European card in order to carry out its national interests, and, therefore, will try to use the EU as a means to outbalance NATO and by doing that to diminish US influence in and on Europe. Germany with its newly elected government presumably will return to its old policy of relying on NATO as its guarantor for security while simultaneously striving for a strengthened EU. The ESDP, however, will be used as a European tool in NATO and not as a competitor, or even worst, replacement of NATO. The United Kingdom will continue to rely on NATO as the cornerstone for UK's security while playing the European Card as a means to ensure influence in and on Europe. The US will have to rethink its approach to Europe. If the US will treat Europe and the EU as an equal partner there will be no need to worry about a possible loss of importance of NATO.

Therefore, the question "NATO and EU defense initiatives: competitive or complementary" can be answered with the statement that from a European perspective they are complementary. However, both, NATO and EU, need new momentum. If the key players in NATO do not develop a new vision on what NATO should be in the 21st Century or they continue to portray the solving of day to day problems as the only urgent questions in regard to NATO's future, the risk exists that NATO will become part of history. Although, the three European key players in NATO and EU think of themselves to be capable to address the challenges ahead of NATO and EU successfully, there is only one nation who can instigate the necessary political processes in

transatlantic relations and who is able to develop the outline of a new vision for these relations: the United States of America.

Both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, must stop *the dialogue of the deaf*⁵¹ as Simon Serfaty, Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, calls the ongoing struggle between Europe and the US.

Endnotes

¹ The Project for the New American Century, or PNAC, is a Washington, D.C., USA based think tank. Present and former members include several prominent members of the Republican Party and Bush Administration, including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Dick Cheney, and Zalmay Khalilzad. For more information, see PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: September 2000), 6; available from <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>; Internet; accessed 03 October 2005.

² The Dunkerque Treaty Preamble states: "Le Président de la République Française et Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au-delà des mers, Empereur des Indes, ... Résolus à se prêter mutuellement assistance pour faire échec à toute reprise d'une politique allemande d'agression, et estimant d'ailleurs hautement souhaitable la conclusion, entre toutes les Puissances ayant compétence pour agir à l'égard de l'Allemagne d'un traité ayant pour objet d'empêcher que celle-ci ne redevienne un danger pour la paix ..."

[Translation by the author: "The President of the French Republic and his Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British overseas territories, Emperor of India ... Determined to mutually lend themselves assistance in order to render failure to a resumption of a German policy of aggression, and considering it highly desirable for all the Powers being competent to act with regard to Germany to have a treaty with the aim of preventing that this one does become again a danger to peace..."] For more information see: "Traité d'Alliance entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne, signé le 4 mars 1947 à Dunkerque," available from <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

³ The Benelux States comprise of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

⁴ The Treaty of Brussels Preamble states: "To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression." For more information see: "Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. Brussels, 17 March 1948," available from <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

⁵ The WEU Treaty Article V states: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." For more information see: "Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty"

Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954," available from <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

⁶ WEU Treaty Article IV states: "In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." Ibid.

⁷ It must be stated that this sentence leads to serious misunderstandings if used out of context. Chancellor Schroeder clearly stated also upfront in his speech "Ladies and gentlemen, one thing is certain: We will only master the challenges of the 21st century if transatlantic relations, the close ties between Europe, Canada and the United States are - and remain - intact." He continues in his speech to propose "To this end, the governments of the European Union and the US should establish a high-ranking panel of independent figures from both sides of the Atlantic to help us find a solution." The complete speech can be read at: Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, "Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy," 12 February 2005; available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&prache=en&id=143&; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

⁸ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States of America, "Security in the Middle East: New Challenges for NATO and EU." *Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy*, 12 February 2005; available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&prache=en&id=144&; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

⁹ With the exception of the two North American nations, the US and Canada, and Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Romania, and Turkey all other NATO nations are also members of the European Union.

¹⁰ The NATO Strategic Concept, dated 1999, states in *Part I – The purpose and the Tasks of the Alliance*: "6 NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region. 7 The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests." For more information see: NATO, "The Alliance's new Strategic Concept (Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999)"; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> ; Internet; accessed 10 September 2005.

¹¹ Ibid. The full text of the relevant passage reads: "To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance."

¹² Martin Walker, "The European Union and the European Security and Defense Initiative," 17; available from <http://www.ics.si.edu/ees/special/2000/walker.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

¹³ Treaty on European Union, *Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy* (Maastricht: 7 February 1992); available from <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>; Internet; accessed 06 October 2005.

¹⁴ According to NATO's Information for the Press *NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data relating to Defence*, Brussels 09 June 2005, page 7, the average of defense expenditures of NATO's members as % of gross domestic product has been 1.88 % in the year 2004. The list's top position is held by the US with 3.9%. Luxembourg, however, spends the least amount with 0.8%. Of the European NATO nations, nine are spending considerably less than 1.88% for their respective military. Only four European NATO members are spending considerably more than the average for their defense.

¹⁵ Carsten Voigt states: „Verbesserte Handlungsfähigkeiten würde nämlich dazu führen, daß Europa in den Augen der USA an Handlungsrelevanz gewinnt. Denn Europa muß sich eingestehen, daß seine Kritik an Amerika und Amerikas Probleme mit Europa immer auch in Europas Schwäche begründet lagen und weiterhin liegen. Wer als schwach erscheint, wird in den USA nicht als handlungsrelevant angesehen. Partnerschaftsfähigkeit würde auch die immer wieder aufkeimende Relevanzdiskussion über die NATO zum Erliegen bringen.“ [Translation by the author: "From a US point of view, improved capabilities and willingness to act would enhance Europe's relevance. Europe must admit to itself that its criticism of the US and vice versa the US's problems with Europe always were and still are caused by Europe's weakness. Who appears to be weak will not be regarded as relevant by the US. If the Europeans would be willing and able to act as real partners of the US, the continuing discussion about NATO's relevance also would end."] For more information see: Carsten Voigt, Koordinator für die Deutsch-Amerikanische Zusammenarbeit im Auswärtigen Amt, "Die deutsch-französischen

Beziehungen und die neue Geopolitik," (Berlin: 5 July 2002); available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussepolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=3375&type_id=3&bereich_id=17; Internet; accessed 05 October 2005.

¹⁶ The Readers Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington states: Page 52 "...the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose." For more information see: NATO, On-Line Library, "THE READER'S GUIDE TO THE NATO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON 23 - 25 APRIL 1999"; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde/rdrgrde-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 05 October 2005.

¹⁷ Charles de Gaulle writes in his letter to Lyndon B. Johnson: "This is why France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, at present diminished by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the use which is made of her airspace; to cease her participation in the integrated commands; and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO." For more information see: Charles De Gaulle, "Letter to Lyndon B. Johnson" (Paris: 7 March 1966); available from <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

¹⁸ On 20 June 1984, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, states in his speech to the WEU Assembly: „Es hat in den zurückliegenden Jahren nicht an Bemühungen gefehlt, der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Zusammenarbeit Europas die dritte Dimension einer gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik anzufügen. Die Staats- und Regierungschefs der zehn Mitgliedstaaten der EG haben in der Feierlichen Deklaration zur Europäischen Union vom 19. Juni 1983 bestimmt, daß „die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der Sicherheit“ im Rahmen der Europäischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit behandelt werden können. Die Fragen der Verteidigungspolitik bleiben in diesem Zusammenhang ausgeschlossen. Europa muß jedoch beginnen, auch in diesen Fragen mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, damit es zu einem starken und selbstbewußten Partner im Bündnis wird. Europa und Amerika bilden die beiden Pfeiler der Atlantischen Brücke; sie ergänzen und brauchen einander. Deshalb kommt es entscheidend darauf an, daß beide Pfeiler stark und tragfähig sind. Auf beiden Seiten des Atlantik gab es immer wieder Klagen über ein Ungleichgewicht im Bündnis. Es entstand das Bild eines Europas, das Kostgänger amerikanischer Stärke ist. Dazu wiederhole ich hier, was ich am 12. Juni auch im Ministerrat gesagt habe: Nicht die USA sind im Bündnis zu stark, sondern die Europäer sind zu schwach. Es gilt, den europäischen Pfeiler der NATO zu stärken.“ [Translation by the author: "During the course of the recent years, there have been several efforts to add a common security policy as a third dimension to the economical and political co-operation in Europe. The heads of states and the heads of governments of the ten member nations of the European Community have determined in their 19 June 1983 solemn declaration of the European Union that „the political and economical aspects of security“ can be dealt with within the framework of European political co-operation. The aspects of a defense policy, however, remain unaddressed. In order to become a strong and self-confident partner in the

(NATO) Alliance, Europe, however, must begin to speak with one voice in this regard. Europe and the US are the pillars of the Atlantic bridge; they supplement each other and they need each other. Therefore, it is mandatory that both pillars are strong and able to support load. On both sides of the Atlantic, there have been repeatedly complains in regard to a unbalance in the Alliance. An image of Europe being a boarder of US strength developed. In this regard, I repeat what I have said in the council on 12 June: In the Alliance, the US are not too strong, but the Europeans are too weak. Therefore, the European pillar in NATO must be strengthened ."] For more information see: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bundesminister des Auswärtigen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, "Speech given to the WEU Assembly," (Brussels: 20 June 1984); available from <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

¹⁹ Ibid. „Ich betone den Bündnisaspekt hier nicht ohne Grund: Es täuschen sich alle jene, die hinter einer Belebung der WEU den Aufbau einer Gegenposition zur NATO vermuten, oder die glauben, hier sei ein Ansatz, Europa und Amerika voneinander zu trennen. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall: Die Belebung der WEU dient der Festigung des Bündnisses. Unser Ziel, die Stärkung des europäischen Pfeilers der Allianz, bestimmt den Inhalt der künftigen Arbeit der WEU.“ [Translation by the author: "I stress the aspect of the Alliance intentionally: All those, who assume that the revitalization of WEU will mean the deliberate creation of an anti-pole to NATO in order to separate Europe and the US, are wrong. The contrary intent is true: The revitalization of WEU is intended to consolidate the Alliance. Our aim, the strengthening of the European pillar in the Alliance, will guide the future work of WEU."]

²⁰ Matthias Jopp states: "For the German government, the WEU was a transitory solution, a vehicle for transporting security and defense into the Union over time. France had a greater interest in the WEU as such because of its purely intergovernmental nature and its relative distance from communitarian mechanisms in the EC framework. Problems caused French ambitions to conceive of the WEU as an instrument of a rather autonomous European defense policy and to downgrade American influence on European security." For more information see: Matthias Jopp. "Germany And The Western European Union," *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. The Johns Hopkins University. AICGS Research Report No. 9 (Washington D.C.: April 199.)*; available from <http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/weu.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2005.

²¹ Treaty on European Union. *Declaration on Western European Union (WEU)*. "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role."

²² The EC was originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome under the name of European Economic Community. The founding nations Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany were joined in 1973 by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.

²³ Because the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), or also known as European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI), is an integral part of EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the use of the term EU in the following deliberations always incorporates the ESDP

²⁴ With the exception of Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden all EU nations are also NATO members. Depending on the success of the ongoing EU enlargement process, four additional nations could become EU members in the near future. Three of these four candidates (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) are also NATO members.

²⁵ Although official statistics often deny the fact that almost everything became more expensive in the daily life of the Europeans, the perceived fact is that it is more expensive nowadays than it has been prior to the EURO.

²⁶ European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy," (Brussels: 12 December 2003); available from <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>; Internet; accessed 06 September 2005.

²⁷ Although, NATO points out in its 1999 strategic concept "The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations." The addressed broad approach to security is only discussed in this one sentence. Otherwise all aspects of NATO's strategic concept relate to political and/or military means.

²⁸ European Union. *A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy*, 9: "In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective."

²⁹ Ibid. 1. "The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."

³⁰ Berlin Plus agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit. It is comprised of the following major parts:

- a. NATO - EU Security Agreement
- b. Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)
- c. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO
- d. Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities
- e. Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO
- f. EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities
- g. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements

All parts are tied together through the so called "Framework Agreement", which consists essentially of an exchange of Letters between SG/HR and SG NATO, dated 17 March 2003. Since that day, the "Berlin plus" package has been in effect and serves as the foundation for practical work between EU and NATO. In that, the view of EU-led CMO makes use of NATO

planning support or NATO capabilities and assets for the execution of any operations. For more information see: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), "Info"; available from http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005.

³¹ EU's Strategic concept addresses NATO only very shortly in the following passages:
- "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO."
- "The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict."
- "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship."
- "The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century."
European Union. *A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy*.

³² The following passage of a US SecDef Briefing is the source for the famous term *Old Europe*. "Rumsfeld: Are you helping me? (Laughter.) Do you think I need help? (Laughter.) What do I think about it? Well, there isn't anyone alive who wouldn't prefer unanimity. I mean, you just always would like everyone to stand up and say, Way to go! That's the right to do, United States.
Now, we rarely find unanimity in the world. I was ambassador to NATO, and I -- when we would go in and make a proposal, there wouldn't be unanimity. There wouldn't even be understanding. And we'd have to be persuasive. We'd have to show reasons. We'd have to -- have to give rationales. We'd have to show facts. And, by golly, I found that Europe on any major issue is given -- if there's leadership and if you're right, and if your facts are persuasive, Europe responds. And they always have.
Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently -- what is it? Twenty-six, something like that? -- you're right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem.
Q: But opinion polls --
Rumsfeld: But -- just a minute. Just a minute. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the United States." The whole briefing transcript can be found at: United States, Department of Defense, News Transcript, *Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center* (Washington D.C.: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 - 1:30 P.M. EST); available from http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html; Internet; accessed on 15 October 2005.

³³ Groupe UMP de l'Assemblée nationale, "Our History," 2004; available from http://www.ump.assemblee-nationale.fr/lang/en/article.php3?id_article=4; Internet; accessed 20 September 2005.

³⁴ Ibid. "The U.M.P, a great unified, pluralistic, democratic and decentralised political movement bringing together the Right and Centre, was created on 23 April 2002 to support the candidature of Jacques CHIRAC in the second round of the French presidential elections and give him a governing majority to implement his national project.

The U.M.P. won the French parliamentary elections of 9 and 16 June 2002. With over 360 MPs from Gaullist, centrist and liberal movements who have chosen to come together within the UMP, the group and its political allies holds the majority at the National Assembly.

The group, chaired by Bernard ACCOYER, supports the reformist and determined action of the government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin."

³⁵ CDU/CSU stands for Christian Democratic Union – a party represented in Germany but Bavaria - and Christian Social Union – a party solely represented in Bavaria. Both parties represent a conservative political stand. SPD stands for Social Democratic Party, a politically left wing party, which sponsored Germany's government in concert with the Green Party – a ecologically oriented party – until the September 2005 elections.

³⁶ Björn Conrad and Mario Stumm, "German Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice: Transatlanticism and/or Europeanism ?" *Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik* Nr. 9, December 2004; available from <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/tazip/tazip9.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 August 2005.

³⁷ Helmut Kohl has been Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1982 until 1998.

³⁸ Gerhard Schröder has been Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1998 to 2005.

³⁹ Bundesvorstand der CDU und Parteivorstand der CSU. " HARNESSING GERMANY'S OPPORTUNITIES. Growth. Labour. Security. Government Programme 2005 – 2009," 11. Juli 2005; available from http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/05_07_11_Government_Programme_CDU_CSU_EN.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, "Wahlprogramm 2005 Solidarische Modernisierung und Ökologische Verantwortung," 9./10. July 2005; available from http://www.gruene-portal.de/unser_programm.7.0.html; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

SPD. "Vertrauen in Deutschland Das Wahlmanifest der SPD," available from <http://kampagne.spd.de/servlet/PB/menu/1053380/>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005

⁴⁰ Bundesvorstand der CDU und Parteivorstand der CSU. " HARNESSING GERMANY'S OPPORTUNITIES. Growth. Labour. Security. Government Programme 2005 - 2009," 42. " Germany's responsibility for European unity, for the transatlantic partnership and for the existence of Israel are key factors governing Germany's reason of state. German foreign policy must return to this basic consensus.

- European unity and transatlantic partnership are not contradictions in terms but are the two most important pillars of our foreign policy. We will revive transatlantic co-operation

with the USA. European identity and European self-confidence require a partnership based on trust instead of delimitation with the USA. They are perpetuated by powerful commitment in the search of solutions to international conflicts and in the fight against international terrorism. A good transatlantic bond of trust does not exclude differences of opinion, but is dependent on co-operative dialogue in the spirit of friendship instead of hurling polemic abuse.

- Germany has a special interest in the stable and lasting involvement of Russia in Euro-Atlantic organisations and in the success of the difficult task of modernising the political and economical structures of the country. We want to entertain good relationships with Russia – but not without consulting our neighbours. At the same time, we must not ignore the problematic development of internal affairs in Russia.
- NATO is and remains for us the most important security network for Germany. We will strengthen NATO by making a more reliable German contribution and intensifying political dialogue. In order to strengthen the European pillars of the Atlantic security partnership, we will strive to increase and improve the capabilities and options for action of the European Union.
- We regard as imperative a significant improvement in the international division of labour and the appropriate tools at the disposal of the United Nations .“

⁴¹ *Britain and the EU. Homepage EU Constitutional Treaty*, “Foreign Secretary's Statement to the House of Commons,” 06 June 2005; available from <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1115144244649>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005.

⁴² Labour Party, “Manifesto 2005 Britain forward not back,” 84; available from http://www.labour.org.uk/fileadmin/manifesto_13042005_a3/pdf/manifesto.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 September 2005.

⁴³ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty. “The UK Presidency of the EU 2005,” June 2005; available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Prospects%20in%20the%20EU%202005_CM%206611.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1. *Foreword By The Secretary Of State For Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs, The Right Honourable Jack Straw MP*: “The Prime Minister has made clear that whilst we have our own national position, we recognise our responsibilities as Presidency, and will do all we can to seek a satisfactory outcome by the year end.”

⁴⁵ Republican Party, “2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America,” 26 August 2004; available from <http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2005.

⁴⁶ Republican Party, “Republican Platform 2000 Renewing America's Purpose. Together,” available from <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.00/>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2005.

⁴⁷ Republican Party, “2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America (New York: 26 August 2004);” 34.

⁴⁸ US House of Representatives, "The EU Constitution And U.S.–EU Relations: The Recent Referenda In France And The Netherlands And The U.S.–Eu Summit." *Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Europe And Emerging Threats Of The Committee On International Relations House Of Representatives One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session* (Washington D.C.: JUNE 22, 2005), 7; available from http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/21975.pdf; Internet, accessed on 04 October 2005.

⁴⁹ US House of Representatives. "Transatlantic Relations: A Post-Summit Assessment." *Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Europe Of The Committee On International Relations House Of Representatives One Hundred Eighth Congress Second Session* (Washington D.C.:JULY 15, 2004); available from http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/94836.pdf; Internet, accessed on 04 October 2005.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 45.

⁵¹ Christina V. Balis and Simon Serfaty, *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004).