Continuous Network Interdiction

Abstract

This report deals with network interdiction campaigns that are expected to be carried out indefinitely in time. Two sides are always involved, one desiring the unimpeded movement of some commodity, while the other desires the opposite. We consider two distinct situations. The first is motivated by warfare involving Improvised Explosive Devices (TEDs) directed against the movement of materiel in convoys on roads. It will be assumed that this kind of warfare is low level in the sense of destroying only a negligible fraction of the shipped materiel, so the objective becomes the maximization or minimization of the rate at which the convoys take lethal hits. The second situation is an economic one where the interdictor attempts to capture a significant fraction of the shipped materiel, so much so that a profit cannot be made by shipping it. This leads to a Nash equilibrium where the shipper's quantity shipped is in equilibrium with the interdictor's budget for interdiction.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 2006
Accession Number
ADA449515

Entities

People

  • Alan R. Washburn

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Counter IED

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Commerce
  • Commodities
  • Detection
  • Engineering
  • Explosive Devices
  • Explosives
  • Flow Network
  • Game Theory
  • Improvised Explosive Devices
  • Interdiction
  • Linear Programming
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Systems Engineering
  • United States
  • United States Military Academy
  • Zero-Sum Games

Readers

  • Military Science
  • Operations Research
  • Systems Analysis and Design