USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SECURITY COOPERATION: INTEGRATING STRATEGIES TO SECURE NATIONAL GOALS

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ABSTRACT

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Events following 11 September 2001 have confirmed the importance of interagency cooperation in the execution of many national strategies. Cooperation across all levels of government is critical if we hope to win the war against terrorism, sustain regional stability, expand trade and development, maintain friendly ties to global powers, or deal with such transnational challenges as weapons of mass destruction and international crime. As the President's National Security Strategy makes clear, U.S. foreign policy is not confined to short-term unilateral or bilateral defense efforts. Regional security requires a long-term, cooperative, multilateral civil-military effort to assure allies and friends, to dissuade potential adversaries, to deter aggression, and to defeat our enemies. Theater Security Cooperation, a major DoD program, incorporates specifically designed activities within specific geographic, economic, political, and military situations to achieve national strategy objectives. This paper assesses our capability and capacity to implement global and Theater Security Cooperation strategies to support national security goals. It concludes with recommendations for future planning and coordination of interagency programs to help achieve these goals.

SECURITY COOPERATION: INTEGRATING STRATEGIES TO SECURE NATIONAL GOALS

The value of Theater Security Cooperation has long been recognized—especially at the strategic level—as a means for Combatant Commanders to share their environments with the assistance of allies and friends. Joint Publication 3-0 defines security cooperation as:

> All the Department of Defense (DoD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. Joint actions such as nation assistance to include foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA); antiterrorism; DoD support to counterdrug operations; and arms control are applied to meet military engagement and security cooperation objectives. Security Cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and a pillar of WMD nonproliferation.[1]

Although regional Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are charged with integrating the activities of the U.S. military in their areas of responsibility, they have no standing process for integrating the activities of all U.S. government players in a given region. Moreover, key national security departments define the regions differently, thereby hindering interagency cooperation.

Because of recent, dramatic changes in the global environment, civil and military agencies have been tasked to implement national security strategies to counter a complex, multifaceted, and mobile adversary. Skeptics have cited our inability to coordinate funding, policy decisions, authority, and assigned geographic boundaries in order to promote interagency connectivity and synergy. Our National Security Strategy (NSS) depends on interagency cooperation to translate Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs into focused military activities, while delegating complementary roles to other U.S. government agencies. Regional activities—activities such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), security assistance, combined exercises, combined training, military-to-military contacts, and humanitarian assistance—are focused primarily on unilateral military efforts, as opposed to broader cooperative efforts between the Department of Defense and civilian agencies, that would more effectively achieve our national objectives.

Today, an over reliance on the military and insufficient reliance on other elements of power have weakened the current strategy of security cooperation. The requirement for more coordination and synchronization of civil-military activities that reach across regional boundaries to counter tactics used by terrorists and other criminals is needed. Current threats require a comprehensive strategy that looks beyond traditional alliances, bilateral relationships, and regionalized strategies.

<u>Scope and Methodology</u>

Our government does not have a process for translating higher strategic guidance into effectively coordinated departmental and agency programs to help develop key relationships with our international partners and friends. Even the military's process of executing strategic guidance through the tools and programs of TSC is not perfect; but it may provide a template for a more comprehensive and disciplined interagency process. This paper will show that U.S. bureaucracies are too disjointed to construct and implement a comprehensive process for interagency coordination within regional combatant commanders' areas of responsibility. Traditional stove-piped systems and capabilities are preventing senior leaders from achieving national security objectives. Our ability to implement national security policy is seriously hindered by several critical obstacles to interagency cooperation and affects the quality of TSC. The paper begins by describing the strategic environment, it then defines security cooperation and reviews relevant national guidance. It then analyzes four major obstacles to interagency cooperation: (1) lack of common conceptual understanding, or doctrine, (2) lack of clearly defined authorities, (3) outdated funding system with many constraints, (4) lack of a comprehensive organizational structure to integrate planning. These obstacles are hindering our efforts to achieve TSC goals. So we must change the way we execute and coordinate our efforts in order to achieve our strategic objectives. Following the analysis, several recommendations are offered for enhancing our ability to achieve interagency cooperation to enable more effective TSC.

<u>Security Environment</u>

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 dramatically revealed how different the world is today than it was during the post Cold War era. In a single day, the nation confronted an adversary that used religious fundamentalism as justification for enormous bloodshed.[2] The 2006 QDR directly addressed this new threat: "Our Nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere."[3] Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld elaborated:

> We are trying to figure out how you conduct a war against something other than
> a nation-state and how you conduct a war in countries that you are not at war
> with," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told civilian leaders who visited the
> Pentagon in February of 2006. "We have to be able to conduct that major warfare
> if we have to against a regular conventional army, but we also must be able to

defeat these non-state terrorist actors. And so we have to adjust." The Secretary went on to say. [4]

The March 2005, National Defense Strategy, describes today's adversaries as individuals or organizations willing to use sophisticated irregular methods to achieve their political goals through global terrorism. [5] Current strategy thus recognizes enemies that know they can't defeat us with conventional methods, so they will resort to terrorist attack through the use of WMDs, or other weapons, to achieve their goals. [6]

Today's security environment is very dynamic: Alliances, coalitions, and partners are constantly changing. The nature of the threat is also shifting away from the traditional state actors to an environment of non-state actors. Many of the groups that challenge national security operate in smaller groups through decentralized execution to communicate, coordinate, and conduct their operations using the internet. [7] Current threats are posed by transnational criminals, fundamentalists, ethno nationalists and transnational terrorist groups, acting sub nationally or transnationally. [8]

Globalization also makes it easier for terrorist groups and insurgencies to use criminal enterprises to finance their activities. Links have been identified between organized criminals, terrorist groups, and insurgents, so criminal and political violence are becoming indistinguishable. Criminal activities have increased financing for terrorist organizations, making it difficult to thwart criminal and terrorist organizations through traditional external and internal means. These groups finance their activities through kidnappings, extortion, narcotics trafficking, and other criminal activities, [9] beyond political and diplomatic controls.

The information revolution has also contributed to the threat of terrorism. Technology makes it easier for non-state actors to strengthen their operations into large, multinational networks–so the quest for and dissemination of knowledge has enabled them to build a network of friends and partners around the world. Terrorists now have their own "information operations" and "perception management," which enable them to get their message to the general populace through the media. Future strategies must ensure that psychological operations—as well as military operations—are considered in the planning process. [10]

The National Military Strategy reports that non-state actors are challenging global stability and security, and they are less susceptible to traditional means of deterrence. [11] So our security cooperation efforts should be expanded in an effort to devise new ways to deter them. Our responses to these emerging threats should include effective counter measures. We must develop more skill-sets and capabilities and integrate our domestic security resources as we seek greater cooperation with host governments and with non-governmental organizations. [12]

In the post 9/11 world, we must devise new and innovative measures to counter threats from weak states and non-state actors who rely on terrorism and insurgency to accomplish their goals. Examples of current responses to irregular challenges include stability operations, winning hearts and minds of potential adversaries, and giving the combatant commanders nation-building resources rather than bullets to win the peace.[13] The complexity of the security environment demands an integrated interagency to facilitate TSC to achieve our national objectives.

Background: Theater Security Cooperation

Security cooperation has been a part of the U.S. Armed Forces for many years. In fact, historians reveal that the U.S. military has always engaged in security cooperation with other countries and their military forces. However, the term used to designate such activities is now "Security Cooperation," a term that has evolved conceptually through various programs over the years. During the 1990s, the terms "engagement" and "shaping" were used without sufficient specificity; they were often used interchangeably, resulting in confusion that led to problems in both planning and execution. DOD thus adopted "Security Cooperation" in 2001. It included a broad range of military-to-military activities, but it also clarified roles and responsibilities.

The term Security Cooperation thus describes a broad range of activities used by the Department of Defense in peacetime operations. These activities refer to all DOD interactions that are carried out with foreign defense establishments, such as combined exercises, combined training, combined education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations.

Security Cooperation is sometimes confused with Security Assistance. The latter term falls under the umbrella of Security Cooperation, but it focuses more on programs such as Foreign Military Finance (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and other programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. However, the Department of State is responsible for providing policy direction for Security Assistance programs.[14]

Security Cooperation also designates DoD's planning process for executing the Secretary of Defense's strategic guidance set forth in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.[15] Security Cooperation Planning thus incorporates various activities supporting Security Cooperation goals by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating peacetime military engagement activities on a regional basis, thereby gaining efficiency through the coordination of engagement activities.

Accordingly, geographic Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans are forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and integration into the global engagement plans.[16]

The current approach to regional Security Cooperation originated in 1997, when the newly published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cited a large number of security cooperation activities that were not tied to formal deliberate plans. As a result of the QDR findings, the Joint Staff was directed to develop more specific guidance. Using the Joint Strategic Planning System, the Joint Staff integrated Security Cooperation activities into Combatant Commanders' (CCDR) areas of responsibility. In turn, CCDRs developed the Theater Engagement Planning system.[17] Since 1997, more specific security cooperation goals have been promulgated by the Bush Administration.

<u>Security Cooperation Goals</u>

The Secretary of Defense has specified the following Security Cooperation goals:
- Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interest;
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation;
- Work with international partners to improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to harmonize views on security challenges;
- Provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.[18]

First and most importantly, we need to cultivate allies and partners that *share common strategic interests*—for example, the war on terrorism, missile defense, and increasing our militaries' interoperability. These commonalities can be gained through combined exercises, shared training and education, military-to-military contacts, and international acquisition projects.[19]

The U.S. government also needs to *develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense* against countries that don't share our national values and goals. Successful relationships can be measured by our ability to reform allies' military and governmental institutions consistent with our national policies. More importantly, our intentions and actions should instill trust and understanding between ourselves and our allies.[20]

Security Cooperation activities are consistent with our national interest and goals. Supporting emerging democracies through effective military-to-military contacts, through

improving defense capabilities of our allies and friends, and through training and operating together when necessary—all such activities support our objectives.[21]

Admiral Fallon addressed building relationships before the Senate Armed Services Committee in his Pacific Command Posture:

> Our friends and allies have provided incomparable support to OEF, the war on terrorism, and OIF. Their support is a positive sign that means cooperation on our shared security interest will continue. He also said that our close and ongoing strategic dialogue with our allies has never been greater. He stressed the importance of our alliances.

General James L. Jones similarly observed "TSC programs are the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and stability with allies and regional partners and are an important component to our overarching strategy."[22]

However, the March 2004 bombings in Madrid demonstrate how terrorists and criminals continue to exploit weaknesses of our highly compartmentalized national intelligence system. The revolution in *intelligence and information sharing* has made it very important that we stay ahead of the adversary's ability to collect and disseminate data. However, developing technologies in the internet, cable services, and wire technology, unfortunately coincide with reductions in our funding for research and procurement. So we are increasingly challenged in our effort to adapt to the changing environment.[23]

Sharing intelligence and information with coalition partners will require fundamental changes in the way we operate as we attempt to counter and defeat a network of criminals and terrorists. Successful partnerships with international allies will help build a global network of intelligence, law enforcement, military, finance, diplomatic, and other instruments to confront these global organizations.[24] Our regional partners are sometimes better positioned to access information and intelligence than we are. So, our intelligence and law enforcement communities must continue to expand and enhance their relations with foreign counterparts to take advantage of their source reporting.[25]

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that procedures and systems that facilitate interagency, intergovernmental, and private information-sharing needs should be expanded to allow overseas agencies to have access and input. Horizontal and vertical information flow through database alignment is essential; this flow should be facilitated by a disclosure policy to establish consistent reporting criteria throughout our agencies and with our allies.[26] Better information-sharing will assist in combating terrorism by improving deterrence and averting conflicts. Cooperation with international intelligence partners enable the U.S. to take advantage of foreign expertise and provides access to previously denied areas.[27]

Human collectors of information are critical components of a networked system; they provide invaluable information about the intention of adversaries and produce intelligence that can be used to develop plans and orders. Information-sharing is not easy, but it is necessary if we expect to achieve multi-level security capabilities that allow multinational partners and other government agencies access to relevant information, while reducing security compromises. Multi-level security access will enhance command and control and provide needed transparency in multinational operations.[28]

The United States needs peacetime and contingency *access and en route infrastructure* in regions of the world to support U.S. efforts to project power against emerging threats and to create conditions that reduce extremist ideologies.

> Ensuring our strategic access to key regions, lines of communication and the global commons underwrites the security, prosperity and well being of the American people and guarantees a maximum freedom of action. By assuring the universal, open, and peaceful use of critical lines of communication and the global commons, we help support the security of the global economy and key regions.[29]

Our military forces work cooperatively with other countries and their militaries to eliminate threats and to patrol regions that are vulnerable to unrest and violence.[30] Security cooperation enables our deployed military units to work closely with international partners and other U.S. government agencies to take the battle to the enemy.

Our regional presence helps assure our friends of our commitment and improves our ability to prosecute the War on Terror. Security Cooperation activities help ensure strategic access to key regions and lines of communications critical to U.S. security and sustainment of operations across the battlespace.[31] Strong regional alliances and coalitions improve our expeditionary capabilities by providing physical access to regions critical to the conduct of war. These relationships also provide invaluable support through non-military means.

Strategic Guidance: Policy and Planning Documents

President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy specifies U.S. interests and objectives. In general terms, it also forms the basis for our foreign policy. The 2002 NSS cites many examples of our reliance on the capabilities of friends and allies in order to meet our national objectives. The United States needs to invest sufficient time and resources to build these international relationships.[32] Our decisions should be based on our principles as we seek to develop partners through favorable actions.[33] Coalition partners and cooperative security arrangements are keys to countering emerging transnational threats."[34]

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism further enhances the guidance when it advocates reliance on relationships "by adapting old alliances and creating new partnerships we will facilitate regional solutions." Further, "In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new international relationships and redefining existing ones in terms suited to the transnational challenges of the 21st century."[35] The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights the terrorists' reliance on criminal activities.[36] National strategy documents also cite terrorists' efforts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, emphasize the importance of preventing WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists, a task that requires a widely coordinated effort.[37]

The 2005 National Defense Strategy supports our national interest and objectives. It builds on the efforts of the 2001 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review. Since the QDR was released, events have confirmed the importance of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and defeating adversaries.[38] The QDR significantly focuses on improving capability and interoperability among our allies. The QDR also addresses the importance of preparing our forward-deployed forces for a variety of contingency operations around the world through expansion of our bases beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia and by securing temporary access at new bases for training and exercises. Additionally, it calls for strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships through peacetime activities and preparation for coalition operations, as noted.[39]

> A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves as an important means for linking DOD's strategic direction with those of U.S. allies and friends.[40]

Creating "balances" of power requires ensuring our partners are assessed and supported in the context of the capabilities concept of defense planning. The QDR shifted the basis of defense planning from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically on who the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that planning must look beyond regional conflicts in distant theaters and identify the capabilities needed to deter and defeat adversaries who rely on networks of surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.[41] It is the capabilities needed to fight in the 21st century, focused on particular countries, that is the basis for the Defense Department's Security Cooperation Guidance.

The Department of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance and CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01, Security Cooperation Planning, provide guidelines and describe procedures for developing Security Cooperation strategies and plans.[42] In April 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued the Security Cooperation Guidance document that describes security cooperation in terms of the goals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and prescribes its execution.[43] The OSD now issues this guidance annually to direct the planning and activities of the Combatant Commander's, Special Combatant Commanders, military Services, and other DOD agencies. This guidance assures that security cooperation activities support the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy objectives. It specifies regulations and country prioritizations, objectives, and measures of effectiveness for security cooperation planning. Subordinate plans are then developed to execute Security Cooperation activities to comply with the Secretary's guidance.[44]

Military organizations that conduct engagement activities within a CCDR's area of responsibility provide data to the supported CCDR for the development of and inclusion in the Theater Security Cooperation Planning. When approved, these plans are then used by those organizations to develop programs and budgets.[45]

Theater Implementation of TSC

> As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination within the U.S. government and with our allies. EUCOM's plan to promote cooperative security relationships, enhance the capacity of foreign partners, and expand cohesion within the interagency teams consistent with the four core pillars (Building Partnerships to Defeat Terrorist Extremism, Defending the Homeland In-Depth, Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads, Preventing the Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Hostile State or Non-State Actors) of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.[46]

Tallent's statement to a house sub-committee describes a regional strategy to promote cooperative security within the U.S. European Command's AOR. A review of other statements from regional Combatant Commanders to the Senate Armed Services Committee reveals a similar commitment to implement strategies consistent with the Defense Secretary's guidance on security cooperation. Some of the commitments include extending U.S. influence, developing access, sharing intelligence, and promoting defense capabilities among our potential allies.

General Abizaid, Commander U.S. Central Command, is responsible for three principal activities; building indigenous military capabilities is one activity designed to help local

governments defeat terrorists and extremists on their own. In 2004, security cooperation directly contributed to Pakistan's and Saudi Arabia's ability to counter internal extremist threats with indigenous forces. Additionally, a boost in regional capabilities helped deter Syrian and Iranian involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. We gained regional access and improved our capacity to share valuable information and intelligence within the region[47] through security cooperation.

Many successful accomplishments of TSC are evident in many theaters and countries around the globe. For instance, Admiral Fallon, U.S. Navy Commander U.S. Pacific Command, notes that our key allies and friends continue to provide critical assistance in support of OEF, the War on Terrorism, and OIF. He then reports that "We have new security partners , Mongolia, for example, that has made significant contributions in Afghanistan and in the reconstruction of Iraq. Their support of other nations is a positive sign that meaningful regional cooperation on our shared security interest will continue."[48] Building professional military capabilities of our coalition partners demonstrates the value of TSC in meeting U.S. national objectives.

Latin America and the Caribbean are generally free of any potential cross-border attacks, but they are located within one of the most violent regions on the planet, with a 27.5 homicide rate per 100, 000 people. General Bantz, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Southern Command, recognizes this problem and focuses his security cooperation efforts on preventing terrorist groups from preparing, staging, or conducting terrorist operations against the United States or our vital interests in the region. Today there are over 30 democratic countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR, a positive upward trend over the last 25 years that can be attributed to the improved security in the region.[49]

Foreign Military Sales contribute to implementing TSC. When we provide essential equipment and training to our friends and partners, we build better relationships, bolster regional defense capabilities, improve interoperability between our forces, and ensure access to critical regions of the globe. General Jones, USMC Commander U.S. European Command, points to Poland, Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria as examples of countries that benefited from foreign sales. They are now serving beside our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, while contributing to the Global War on Terrorism. The sale of F-16 aircraft, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to Poland, and the C-17 lease program to the United Kingdom are further examples of the benefits of security cooperation. Furthermore, both countries support the war on terrorism.[50]

<u>Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation Impact TSC</u>

President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), mandated interagency contingency planning and increased awareness of the need for interagency coordination, but fell short of its original intent and has been rarely invoked. The Bush Administration revisited the issue of interagency coordination in its first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1). Under NSPD 1, the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) have primary responsibility for interagency coordination of national security policy. The PCCs provide policy analysis for consideration of the Principles Committee (PC) and the Deputies Committee (DC) to ensure a timely response to the president's decisions. NSPD 1 establishes six regional PCCs chaired by an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary designated by the Secretary of State. The PD 1 also establishes 11 functional PCCs chaired by an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary. Each PCC is assigned an Executive Secretary from the NSC staff who assists the Chairman in agenda setting, task assignment, and responding to the PCs/DCs.[51]

Remarkably, PDD 56 and NSPD 1 were not followed up by a procedural directive. Although they specify formal organizational structure, they do not specify how the structure should be applied and managed. The guidance is apparent but obstacles continue to restrict our ability to conduct the most effective TSC.

This lack of integration among USG agencies has been addressed in various studies, reports, and books, such as "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," "Defense Science Board 2004 study: Transition to and from Hostilities," and in issue 37 of the Joint Force Quarterly, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step." Additionally, General Abizaid cited the challenges of interagency cooperation: "Too many organizational agendas and hard-wired boundaries inhibit the type of openness and sharing that is required to fight the extremist networks. We are simply not structured for success at higher levels of integration against an enemy that recognizes no organizational, geographical, legal, or informational boundaries."[52]

The USG is described as ineffective in integrating Security Cooperation functions because of four major obstacles that affect most interagency cooperation efforts at all levels of government.[53] First, we do not have a common conceptual understanding, or doctrine, that explains how to use security cooperation resources to achieve our strategic goals. Second, we don't have a clearly defined authority or the appointment of a lead agency to guide the distribution of security cooperation resources to achieve our common strategic goals. Third, our funding system is outdated and imposes too many funding constraints on security cooperation activities. Finally, the interagency system lacks an organizational structure to integrate planning and programming of security cooperation activities and resources.[54]

Military and civilian leaders acknowledge the importance of interagency cooperation above the tactical level—and still we *lack a common doctrine* to fix the problems. During the 1990s and early 21st Century, DoD successfully established procedures to translate higher level strategic guidance into specific programs to accomplish strategic objectives. These procedures promote discipline in the military commands, services, and other defense agencies to support strategic goals through the execution of security cooperation activities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense issues periodic Security Cooperation Guidance. For DoD, this serves as informal doctrine, that specifies the "what," "how" and "why" of Security Cooperation.[55]

Within the DoD, General Abizaid advises that doctrinal, educational, and training centers of the different services change fundamentally in training our forces to confront current challenges. He believes that educating our people in new and innovative ways will sustain our military and ideological edge over current and potential adversaries. [56]

Other government agencies, in contrast, do not have comparable doctrine that integrates their efforts with security cooperation efforts.[57] This lack of standard operating procedures at the operational and strategic levels result in slow response times and mostly ad hoc coordination, making it difficult for the military to plan, program, and integrate their assigned activities with other departments.[58]

By 11 September 2001, we had failed to coordinate inter departmental efforts to anticipate a catastrophic attack. The U.S. had at least five lists of the most wanted terrorist. President Bush had just issued the NSPD1, replacing 102 interagency working groups with a three-tiered National Security Council (NSC) system for interagency coordination. Unfortunately, the Joint doctrine—the authoritative guidance on interagency cooperation—failed to bring about the needed coordination to prevent the tragic events that took place on that day. [59] Our laws and policies also place higher budgetary priorities on combat operations than on civilian-military operations. So, fewer resources—equipping, procurement, training, and doctrine—are allocated for security cooperation efforts.[60]

Civilian agencies are not subject to sufficient *authority* and *accountability,* so they generally pick which programs to participate in or which countries to travel to. Consider the case of sanctions applied by U.S. customs officials to Bosnia, but not applied in similar situations against Iraq and Serbia. This lack of consistency makes it difficult for the military to determine which missions to pursue.[61]

Which Cabinet agency will have lead responsibilities over certain programs? How will their efforts be coordinated? And how will budget issues related to the various programs be resolved? National Security Presidential Directive 17 was signed on 17 September 2002; it

outlines a broad strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction. It fails, however, to clearly identify what the main roles and responsibilities are for each governmental agency. Likewise, National Response Plan 22 outlines roles and responsibilities in the event of a disaster or attack within the United States, but applies only to the response portion of the homeland security mission—thus creating confusion and uncertainty. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations Vol I, discusses how to facilitate coordination and cooperation among U.S. Government agencies, and intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.[62]

Interagency cooperation is also constrained by a *budgeting process* that has changed very little from the Cold War era. Individual agencies prepare their budgets, set priorities, and fund their programs using OMB fiscal guidance that promotes *funding* "stovepipes." This system fails to link agency priorities with national priorities prior to budget preparations. Currently, our ability to match national strategy objectives with budget priorities of each individual agency is inadequate. Without a comparative match, the federal government doesn't know if the President's top goals and objectives are taken into account when national security missions are funded.[63] Currently, coordination between the defense department and non-defense agencies is insufficient, especially when it comes to prioritizing the federal budget.[64]

At the White House level, the National Security Council and the National Economic Council staffs, have no institutionalized role in coordinating resources across national security agencies. Recently, NSC agents with regional and functional expertise have worked closely with the OMB to track or support the implementation of specific initiatives. The current process, however, still lacks a senior NSC policy official designated to review national security priorities and work with OMB on budget trade-off decisions across those priorities and across agencies.[65]

Executing policy guidance focuses largely on how agencies are *organized or aligned.* Today six regional Bureaus (African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs)[66] are responsible for formulating policy for the Department of State. Conversely, national security and defense policy is organized under the Secretary of Defense through six different regional bureaus (Africa, East Asia, Western Hemisphere, Near East and South Asia, Eurasia, and Europe).[67] Finally, the five geographic combatant commanders are organized into specific regions (Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command).[68] At the tactical level, there are over 40 agencies involved in Foreign Assistance, each with unique requirements, priorities, systems, and resource constraints.

Civilian agencies maintain very small staffs and generally do not conduct expeditionary operations. In Somalia, DoS and the US Agency for International Development could not provide enough people to effectively perform their missions. During operations, Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff were working with the military, but they did not have enough civilian personnel to engage in civil affairs duties, thus creating a new set of challenges for the regional commander.[69]

When Combatant Commanders are involved in the interagency process, the interaction tends to be vertical as opposed to lateral, primarily because of the way the interagency is organized and because the interagency doesn't have a counterpart to the regional commander. DoS has regional assistant secretaries, but they seldom deploy or manage activities on the ground. Ambassadors are responsible for ground-level operations, but only at the State-level— not for a particular region.[70]

The U.S. needs a comprehensive strategic network to counter the enemy's network. Because the USG does not have an operational framework at this time, the Regional Combatant Commanders are generally the principal U.S. authorities in the region, providing the necessary leadership on behalf of the nation, despite their supporting roles to civilian agencies. Complications frequently arise between the DoS country teams and DoD (with its regional commands). These problems reveal a need for an overarching policy and organization to guide all operations, to include a single national-level organization issuing guidance, managing competing agency policies, and directing interagency participation.[71] Until we have this capability and capacity to implement guidance, our regionalized programs will be uncoordinated and only haphazardly supportive of national objectives.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are highlighted to enhance interagency cooperation and thus to improve TSC programs.

1. A common doctrine is needed to clearly define what is and is not security cooperation.[72] Such a conceptual framework would improve interagency integration into the planning, programming, and execution of national security directives.[73] The President should sign a directive to maximize interagency coordination and strengthen efforts of the U.S. Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct security cooperation activities. The directive would ensure comprehensive interagency planning for foreign Security Cooperation and integrate capabilities of USG entities, with the DoD's military plans and operations—all under the supervision of the National Security Council.

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Additionally, the President's directive would formulate Security Cooperation into a doctrine for the interagency—such as NSPD 44; it would provide authority to establish a series of working groups, along with the appointment of a lead and supporting agency. As with any strategic plan, guidelines should be developed to integrate specific elements of the budgeting process.

2. The National Security Council should issue security cooperation guidance for the U.S. government to complement the strategic guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. This guidance should be issued on a bi-annual basis to align with the Secretary's guidance. It would set priorities for planning and programming foreign security cooperation programs for all Departments. The guidance will also direct the formation of working groups, as well as spell out the procedures for any budget submission proposals.

3. OMB should serve as the lead in tracking planned resource allocations against the President's mandated priorities. Funding and budgetary constraints drive many initiatives and proposals to improve interagency coordination. "Beyond Goldwaters-Nichols" goes to the heart of the problem and makes several relevant recommendations to improve our antiquated budgetary process. The most compelling recommendation addresses cross-agency funding issues and recommends that OMB serve as the lead in tracking planned resource allocations against the President's mandated priorities before agencies submit their budgets back to OMB. NSC and OMB would co-chair an interagency mission area and review proposals before agency budgets are finalized to ensure mandatory compliance. Reviews would be conducted in two phases: in the early summer, before agency submissions to OMB; and in the fall, as part of the process of finalizing the President's budget submission to Congress. Additional reviews would be held as necessary. [74]

4. Revise geographic responsibilities to align with a modified five DoS regional bureau structure. Strengthening the link between policies made in Washington and their execution in the field requires greater integration of U.S. government programs and activities on a regional basis. In "A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security," Pasquarette and Kievit propose retaining the five existing DoD regional commands, but revising their geographic responsibilities to align with a modified five DoS regional bureau structure. This proposal would best integrate U.S. military power with U.S. economic and diplomatic efforts across the globe. Also,

it would allow regional combatant commanders to focus more on the cultural characteristics of the region along with their Department of State operatives.[75]

5. The NSC should lead an interagency effort to create a common regional framework that could be used across the U.S. government. The resulting framework should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it adapts to changes in the international security environment.[76]

<u>Conclusion</u>

This paper described the role of TSC Cooperation as a tool for implementing national security goals and interests. It identifies our inability to truly integrate the planning and execution of interagency operations, and cites four critical obstacles to interagency cooperation at the strategic level. It addresses the importance of interagency cooperation in countering current global threats and analyzes our ability to meet national strategic goals and objectives through security cooperation.

The current security environment demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are most capable of contributing to security cooperation efforts. The solution to a complex regional problem seldom, if ever, resides within the sole capability of the Department of Defense, or any other single governmental agency, on one campaign or operations plan. Security cooperation activities must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of the many agencies involved, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The military element of power as a component of national security strategy should assure attainment of military objectives, which need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. But in many cases, a civilian organization may be required to lead international efforts to achieve stability, with the military acting as the supporting agency.

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