The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994
Abstract
In shaping policy towards Somalia, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Staff had to advise how US military forces could execute an evolving range of missions "other than war": humanitarian relief and suppression of banditry, followed by peace enforcement with international forces under United Nations (UN) command, all accompanied by a nation-building effort. The experience of the Vietnam War, where US military involvement deepened while political goals remained misty, shaped their thinking. From the beginning, these officers sought a definition of the political goals or "end-state in Somalia. Yet, despite their efforts, US objectives underwent repeated change. Press images of a massive famine provoked US intervention in Somalia. Severe drought destroyed local crops and famine resulted when marauding gangs seized food and blocked the distribution of relief supplies. Minimizing risks for US forces by confining them to ensuring the flow of aid also meant minimizing their role in political reconciliation and reconstruction. On the other hand, widening US military missions could further the attainment of political objectives but risked American casualties. Such losses eventually did turn public opinion against continued US involvement there.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA449836
Entities
People
- Walter S. Poole
Organizations
- Joint Chiefs of Staff