Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom -- What Went Wrong?
Abstract
This monograph examines the integration of Information Operations (IO) during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a rule, most commanders considered IO ineffective because IO was unable to respond to the complex environments of Afghanistan and Iraq. This monograph examines how the Army prepared commanders to integrate IO into operations in those two theaters of operations. Both theaters offer good examples of how some commanders integrated IO effectively, and how other commanders failed to integrate IO effectively. There are essentially three issues commanders must confront to integrate IO: doctrine, intelligence support to IO, and resourcing the IO efforts. First, Army doctrine does not provide commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into their operations. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective. Third, the Army has not resourced itself to conduct IO in an effective manner. As a result of these three issues with the Army's concept of IO, commanders do not understand how to integrate IO. This monograph will provide a series of recommendations that, if implemented, will help prepare commanders for the task of integrating IO. Those recommendations include doctrinal changes and modifications, organizational changes, training requirements, material resourcing requirements, leadership and education requirements, and personnel resourcing requirements. If implemented, these recommendations will make long-term changes to how the Army prepares commanders to integrate IO into their operations. The appendices discuss the relationship of Public Affairs to IO, provide an overview of IO organizational and equipment capabilities of the units identified in the main body of the monograph, and provide a more detailed breakdown of the various units that served in OEF and OIF.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA449922
Entities
People
- Joseph L. Cox
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College