Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level

CORDS – a model for the Advanced Civilian Team

A Monograph

by

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This monograph addresses the Advanced Civilian Team concept developed by S/CRS. Its purpose is to propose an organizational approach for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization whereby the advanced Civilian team headquarters in combat situations can contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. This monograph suggests that the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support-like approach. This approach is applicable to both the current and future operational environment. This researcher argues that this approach will enable the ACT headquarters to accomplidsh the S/CRS purpose of transforming societies from conflict and civil strife to sustainable peace, democracy, and a market economy.

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Abstract

IMPROVING INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: CORDS – A MODEL FOR THE ADVANCED CIVILIAN TEAM by MAJ Ross M. Coffey, USA, 50 pages.

This monograph addresses the Advanced Civilian Team concept developed by S/CRS. Its purpose is to propose an organizational approach for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization whereby the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations can contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. The fundamental problem addressed in this research effort is that the ACT headquarters in combat situations will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full operational capability in 2009 without an organizational approach that addresses the principal impediments to interagency integration, lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry.

This monograph suggests that the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support-like approach. In addition to addressing the two impediments above, this approach is applicable to the operational environment today and the environment envisioned in the National Intelligence Commission's Global Trends 2010 and specifically to future stability operations envisioned in the Department of Defense's Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept. This researcher argues that this approach will enable the ACT headquarters to accomplish the S/CRS purpose of transforming societies from conflict and civil strife to sustainable peace, democracy, and a market economy.

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The Department of State recently established the Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) "to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S.

Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help

stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a

sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."[1] S/CRS aims to create

conditions where civil societies can move towards a sustainable peace and limit the factors of

instability that cause threats to the homeland. S/CRS acknowledges that the gaps in civilian

planning and operational capabilities jeopardize the success of stability and reconstruction and

complicate the withdrawal of military forces. S/CRS intends to work with its military colleagues

to plan the transition from military to civilian operations from the outset of the operation.

To help achieve stabilization and reconstruction, S/CRS will establish Advanced Civilian

Teams (ACTs) that deploy with military forces and initiate stabilization and reconstruction tasks

at the outset of conflict. These teams collocate with divisions and brigade combat teams and

potentially provide a foundation for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[2] Advanced

Civilian Teams "embed" with the divisions and brigade combat teams and provide immediate

civilian leadership in stabilization and reconstruction tasks.[3] The concept of Advanced Civilian

Teams "address the need for unity of effort in the field among diplomatic, military, and economic

activities."[4]

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[1] U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization* [documents on-line]; available from http://www.state.gov/s/crs; internet; accessed 29 August 2005.
[2] John C. Buss, "The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense," Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper 09 (July 2005) [paper on-line]; available from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/09-05-S-CRS-DOD.pdf; Internet; accessed 29 August 2005.
[3] Carlos Pascual, "Remarks to the 2005 Association of the United States Army Convention," 04 October; available from http://www.crs.state.gov; Internet; accessed 25 October 2005.
[4] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Executive Summary," *Stabilization and Reconstruction Concepts Paper -Draft*, March 21, 2005.

Twenty civilians from the interagency comprise each Advanced Civilian Team. S/CRS is forming five teams, four that collocate with deployed divisions or brigade combat teams and one that collocates with the in-theater, operational-level headquarters. The purpose of the ACT headquarters is to "support the peripheral ACTs and coordinate efforts with the appropriate USG in-country authority."[5] S/CRS is developing concepts for ACT and ACT headquarters employment in combat and non-combat situations.

This research effort indicates that the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations should partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a CORDS-like approach to help societies achieve stabilization and reconstruction.[6] This approach resolves the fundamental problem addressed in this research effort: the collocated ACT headquarters in combat will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full operational capability in 2009 without an organizational model that addresses the impediments to interagency integration.[7] [8] This historically transferable approach is consistent with S/CRS concepts and is advantageous when compared to other current approaches.

This monograph will prove its thesis statement, the first sentence of the preceding paragraph. It first reviews S/CRS concepts and then addresses impediments to interagency integration at the operational level. Following a discussion of the CORDS program, the researcher proves the thesis by demonstrating how a CORDS-like approach will address the

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[5] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Information Paper – Advanced Civilian Teams in Combat Situations," *Stabilization and Reconstruction Concepts Paper - Draft*, March 21, 2005, 1-2.

[6] The CORDS (or Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) program partnered U.S. Government civilian entities with the U.S. Military Assistance Command – Vietnam from 1967 through 1971 and achieved greater integration of civilian and military efforts, ultimately contributing to defeat of the Viet Cong Insurgency.

[7] Carlos Pascual, Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, Washington, D.C., 28 September 2005. Specifically, Ambassador Pascual, then the Coordinator, stated that in his assessment, S/CRS can reach full capacity in five years, contingent on Senate support.

[8] This monograph *does not* address models for interagency integration in Iraq. Although this model may be appropriate to resolve present impediments in Iraq, this monograph is devoted to an organizational model when S/CRS achieves full capacity in 2009 or later.

fundamental problem and also provides additional justification for the adoption of this approach by S/CRS. This monograph concludes with an identification of topics for further research.

THE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION (S/CRS) – ITS CONCEPTS

S/CRS will address the issue of coordination of U.S. government civilian response necessary in post-conflict reconstruction.[9] With the formation of S/CRS, the U.S. government intends that this organization will contribute to institutionalized, less ad hoc, approaches to stabilization and reconstruction. The U.S. Department of State says: "If we are going to ensure that countries are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy and a market economy, [the nation needs] new, institutionalized foreign policy tools - tools that can influence the choices countries and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their security, indeed, in some cases about the very social fabric of a nation."[10] S/CRS will be an interagency organization. Although the coordinator reports directly to the Secretary of State, the staff is drawn from many different agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the military's Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and others.[11]

At the time of this research, S/CRS is in its concept development stage with a staff of less than one hundred personnel and a budget measured in the tens of millions (USD). It expects to achieve full capacity in 2009 or 2010.[12] It has developed three basic concept sets: core objectives to produce conditions of lasting governance and stability, a reconstruction and stabilization framework, and categories of tools to manage the conflict response.

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[9] U.S. Department of State.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," Foreign Affairs 84 (July / August 2005) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84411/stephen-d-krasner-carlos-pascual/addressing-state-failure.html; internet; accessed 30 August 2005.

[12] Pascual, Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference.

The five stated core objectives of S/CRS enable it to produce conditions of lasting governance and stability. The first objective, monitor and plan, develops policy options to lead U.S. planning in regions and states of great risk and importance with the intent of averting crisis. The second objective, mobilize and deploy, coordinates the deployment and employment of resources and programs to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace. The third objective, prepare skills and resources, establishes and manages the interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate response and then sustain the assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively. The fourth objective, learn from experience, incorporates best practices into functional change to ensure improved performance. The fifth objective, coordinate with international partners, works with international organizations to increase interoperability with personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.[13]

The S/CRS views stabilization and reconstruction occurring in four generally sequential (and possibly concurrent) stages.[14] Stabilization, the first stage, requires immediate actions such as enforcing law and order, feeding people, restoring basic services, initiating a political reform process, generating local employment, and reintegrating returning refugees and internally displaced persons. The stabilization phase must create the conditions that help economic, political, and social development in later stages. Addressing the root causes of the conflict is the second stage; checking corruption, economic systems, political exclusion, and private exploitation of public resources allows progress and growth in the post-conflict setting. Creating the laws and institutions of the market democracy, the third stage, involves fostering the supply side of the governance. The creation of markets, equitable tax systems, and financial institutions; political structures and fair electoral processes; and laws, courts, and penal systems all occur during this third phase. Lastly, creating the "demand" of the polity for accountable democratic

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[13] U.S. Department of State.

[14] Pascual, Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference.

institutions, the final stage, ensures the sustainability of the state or region post-conflict.[15]
Entities like media, nongovernmental organizations, and civil societies all contribute to the
accountability of leaders by the people.[16]

The fundamental challenge for S/CRS addresses for the government is the capability and
capacity to manage all four post conflict stages. There is no single government office that is
capable of managing it by itself. To do so, S/CRS is developing six basic categories of tools to
manage the conflict response. First, S/CRS is developing the framework and capability to plan
for stabilization and reconstruction. Second, S/CRS is ensuring that the government is ready to
move rapidly to help countries in the aftermath of conflicts. Third, it is assessing and filling gaps
across government agencies with the goal of organizing resources so they can mobilize quickly
and efficiently after a conflict to fulfill needed functions and skills. Fourth, S/CRS is establishing
management techniques to foster interagency cooperation. Fifth, it is developing interagency
civilian teams to deploy to regional combatant commands to develop strategies for stabilization
and reconstruction. Sixth, S/CRS is serving as the focal point for relevant contacts with the UN,
the European Union, regional organizations, and bilateral partners.[17]

To apply these three basic concept sets in a post-conflict scenario, S/CRS is developing
three organizations to work the Department of Defense in stabilization and reconstruction
operations. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) in Washington
develops policy for civilian-led planning efforts with military participation. Humanitarian,
Stabilization, and Reconstruction Teams (HRSTs) deployed to regional combatant commands
participate in post-conflict planning where U.S. military force is applied. The third organization
is the Advanced Civilian Team described in the introduction. There are four roles for Advanced

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[15] Krasner.
[16] Pascual, Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference.
[17] Krasner.

Civilian Teams: the ACT headquarters in combat situations, the ACT headquarters in non-combat situations, the ACT in combat situations, and the ACT in non-combat situations.

The ACT headquarters in combat situations synchronizes the activities of the four ACTs collocated with subordinate commands. It is an operational and strategic entity, translating the guidance and policy of the national-level leadership and the appropriate regional combatant command into action. It "coordinates and de-conflicts decentralized ACT activities."[18] It is comprised of political specialists, persons empowered to commit USG resources on the spot, and specialists who can assess and make practical arrangements for transitional security. It contains sufficient management and logistics capabilities to enable it to function.[19]

The ACT headquarters in combat situations performs several functions. It advises and acts on behalf of the ambassador if one is present in-country and manages governance issues. It communicates the policy and strategy of the CRSG to the peripheral ACTs and communicates situation reports of the peripheral ACTs to the HRST and the CRSG. It establishes priorities and de-conflicts ACT activities between agencies, and it coordinates, monitors, and tracks the activities of the peripheral ACTs. It plans and allocates resources with the host-nation and the international community. It coordinates and synchronizes efforts with military civil affairs units and potentially receives attachment of these units. It advises the military commander on civilian missions, capabilities, and limitations, and it advises the HRST of the military options to support civilian operations. Finally, it "sets conditions for transition from military to civilian control as rapidly as possible. When conditions for handover to civilian control are met, the ACT headquarters is absorbed into normal U.S. embassy/USAID mission structures." [20] Advanced

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[18] S/CRS Information Paper, 2-3.
[19] Ibid., 5-6.
[20] Ibid., 3.

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Civilian Teams "address the need for unity of effort in the field among diplomatic, military, and economic activities."[21]

Research suggests that unity of effort in operational-level interagency operations is only possible if unified command exists as well. This failure to achieve unity of effort is the first impediment to interagency integration. Additionally, the asymmetry in resources between military entities and civilian entities, the second impediment, also prevents effective interagency integration at the operational level. If the ACT headquarters in combat situations collocated with the in-theater military headquarters is to help achieve stabilization and reconstruction, it must address these two impediments. These two impediments contribute to the fundamental problem and are discussed in greater detail in the next section.

IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The fundamental problem addressed in this research effort is that the collocated ACT headquarters in combat will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full capacity in 2009 without an organizational model that addresses the impediments to interagency integration. To understand the context of this problem, this monograph describes the nation's post-September 11, 2001 national security paradigm, assesses comparative advantage of both military and civilian entities, and identifies the current and future impediments to interagency integration. This section will address each of these topics in turn.

A New National Security Paradigm

The attacks on September 11, 2001 resulted in a new threat paradigm for the Nation. The Nation's principal and imminent security threats come from the weakest nations on earth. Foreign states that cannot police their internal boundaries or harbor terrorist and extremist groups

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[21] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Executive Summary," *Stabilization and Reconstruction Concepts Paper -Draft*.

now pose a greater security danger to the Nation than ever before. Failed states matter in the joint operational environment.

Nation-building is an important component of the Global War on Terror as a result of the doctrine of intervention on behalf of failed or failing states. The United States must address the challenges in other nation-states that create the conditions for proliferation of terror attacks against the American homeland. To address the problems of failed states, the Nation can no longer be reliant simply upon military overmatch. Tools of nation-building are just as important as military strength in the Global War of Terror. If the United States cannot win hearts and minds and secure lasting peace out of its military engagements, any dominance the nation possesses will be squandered and rendered meaningless.[22] An important component in nation-building is a post-conflict reconstruction framework of four closely associated pillars: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.[23]

Comparative Advantage

The military has a role in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction framework at the operational level. Bathsheba Crocker says: "Both outside and inside the defense community, there is a broad consensus that the military is absolutely necessary to postwar missions."[24] In an environment where security is the prerequisite for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, the military possesses the personnel with the requisite training and confidence to stabilize the society and enable subsequent reconstruction by other agencies.[25] However, military forces are

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[22] Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 9.
[23] Ibid., 10-11.
[24] Bathsheba Crocker, John Ewers, and Craig Cohen, *Rethinking and Rebuilding the Relationship between War and Policy,* ed. Anthony D. McIvor. *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 367.
[25] This assertion is based on comments from a U.S. Army brigade commander with experience in Baghdad following the immediately following the conclusion of major combat operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In a non-attributed interview in 02 March 2005, this commander observed, "Training soldiers in combat skills gives them the confidence to carry out their stabilization operations mission. They

not sufficient. Crocker continues: "A functioning economy, a rule-based legal and political system, and some level of social well-being are all vital to ensuring the gains made by heightened security endure."[26]

Military organizations are not the paramount entities to accomplish these three tasks that ultimately foster democracy. W. McMahon Ball noted: "'In structure and in atmosphere, [undemocratic military organizations do] not seem to be well suited to foster democratic procedures. A military set-up, by its very nature, seeks to eliminate the individualism, the independence, the freedom of discussion and the atmosphere of equality which make the fabric of democracy.'"[27] By contrast, entities comprised of civilians have a far greater ability to affect stabilization and reconstruction. Robert Orr says: "Nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, international organizations, multilateral development banks, and civilian agencies of donor governments all have a crucial role to play in addressing post-conflict needs."[28] Civilians possess, therefore, comparative advantage in establishing democratic institutions. Civilian capacity generated by S/CRS, in partnership with military forces, is far more advantageous to enable societies to move towards democracy and its institutions such as a market economy than the military alone.

Interagency Integration and its Impediments

Realization the comparative advantages of each entity requires an integrated interagency effort. For example, the Department of Defense may be the supported effort along a security pillar. However, it may support the Department of State along a governance and participation

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know they're deadly, so they can therefore function effectively on the street." Because other agencies are not trained to this degree of proficiency, this observation implies that only military forces can provide security in such environments.

[26] Crocker, 367.

[27] D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Volume III, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 50.

[28] Orr, 15.

line of operation or the Department of Justice along a justice and reconciliation pillar.[29]

Similarly, the other agencies must be able to simultaneously perform roles as the supported

agency along the governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and

reconciliation pillar.

Interagency operations are here to stay, today and in the future operational environment.

Scott Moore says: "Jointness -- the purple paradigm -- although a work in progress is outdated

and insufficient. Contemporary civil-military operations require a smarter, more complementary

approach to global turmoil. This suggests the need to look at the increasingly vital, albeit

extremely difficult, realm of interagency -- or gold --operations."[30] Post-conflict stabilization and

reconstruction in the 21st century will be an interagency effort. Both civilian and military entities

will be invaluable in creating the conditions for nation-building and winning the Global War on

Terror.

Interagency coordination is the linchpin between the disparate government agencies.

Joint Publication 3-08 states: "interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military

instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of

the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies."[31] It is this coordination

between the agencies that enables the government to achieve success in nation building and post-

conflict reconstruction. However, interagency synergy at the operational level is not achievable

because of two principal impediments: lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry.

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[29] From Figure 2 – Case 2, Stability Operations. U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations Joint Operations Concept,* September 2004. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/so_joc_v1.doc. Internet, accessed 03 October 2005.

[30] Scott W. Moore, "Today It's Gold, Not Purple," *JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998-99): 100.

[31] U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.,* 09 October 1996, *v* [publication on-line]; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_08v1.pdf; internet; accessed 31 August 2005.

The lack of unity of effort is the first impediment to operational-level interagency integration.[32] Simply put, no one is in control of the efforts. Matthew F. Bogdanos writes: "According to *Joint Vision 2020,* 'the primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of participating organizations.'"[33] Joint doctrine suggests that the cause of our inability to achieve unity of effort is the wide-ranging backgrounds and values of the agencies involved. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,* states: "If the interagency process is to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. . . . *The essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas. . . . Each agency has core values that it will not compromise* (emphasis in original)."[34]

Because of the agencies' different backgrounds, values, and agendas, unifying command appears to be the only approach to efforts at the operational level. Crocker says: "As with any mission . . . , the key question for post-conflict operations is who is in charge. True unity of command between civilians and the military has so far proved elusive in American operations."[35]
[36] More so than the wide-ranging backgrounds of interagency entities, lack of unity of command at the operational level is the most significant factor in failing to achieve unity of effort. While

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[32] Portions of this monograph contain edited material submitted to Military Review in March 2006.

[33] Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation – the First Step," *Joint Force Quarterly,* 11 [article on-line]; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0437.pdf; internet, accessed 30 October 2005.

[34] *Joint Publication 3-08.*

[35] Crocker, 368.

[36] Unity of command and unity of effort have different meanings and implications. "Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure." In practical terms, unity of command is advantageous to unity of effort during execution because it enables synchronous direction of effort and action. From *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,* 14 November 2000 version, B-2 [publication on-line]; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf; internet, accessed 08 November 2005.

unity of effort is a useful phrase, it fails to address the problem of lack of decisive authority. No

accountability for integration of interagency efforts exists outside of Washington, D.C., and thus,

no unity of command exists during execution.

Today, interagency coordination is centralized only at the strategic level. No unity of

command of interagency operations exists at the operational level. This causes a lack of

cooperation by agencies across the U.S. Government and, ultimately, the absence of unity of

effort. In remarks to the 2004 Eisenhower National Security Conference, General Peter J. Pace,

now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the overarching problem with interagency

integration is found at the operational level: "The problem comes after [the President of the

United States] makes the decision. The various parts of the government take their various pieces

and go back to work on them. No one below the president has control over the totality of the

process. And if there are disagreements among the various players, it has to go back to the

president for resolution." [37] Strategic-level entities must resolve operational-level problems

because current interagency organizations have no mechanisms to resolve issues at the

operational level.[38]

Achieving unity of effort in practice requires more than identifying common purposes

and establishing working groups; instead, "unity of effort . . . refers to collapsing political and

military authority in the same hands [and requires] a complete overhaul of the entire division of

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[37] Jim Garamone, "Agencies Must Coordinate to Win Terror War, Pace Says," [article on-line]; available from http://www.armedforces.net/Detailed/2295.html; internet; accessed 29 August 2005.

[38] The dynamic described by General Pace is not significantly different than the interagency integration challenges of 1967. From a 1967 interview of Robert W. Komer by Joe P. Frantz: "[Frantz] Was there a line of demarcation between the military and the various civilian agencies that were there? [Komer] No. It was very fuzzy, and that was one of the basic problems in the field. You are on to what I regard as an extremely important problem area. The "other war" – it was all one war, as Abrams used to say, but it was being run by all sorts of different agencies. There was no unified management of the whole war--. [Frantz] You had a dozen or more quarterbacks, huh? [Komer] Exactly. And that made it very difficult. The only guy fully in charge was the President, and that is not the optimum way to do things. From Robert W. Komer, interview by Joe B. Frantz, 18 August 1970; interview AC 94-2, transcript, Oral History Collection, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, 26-7.

labor."[39] Unity of effort requires accountability, which is only achieved through unity of command. Michéle Flournoy says: "Perhaps the most significant determinant of success in interagency planning is the degree to which participants are held accountable for meeting U.S. objectives and for the roles they play in the process."[40] Therefore, unity of command at the operational level is the mechanism whereby we can achieve unity of effort.

The second impediment is resource asymmetry. Because of its comparative disadvantage in non-security related pillars, the military should play a supporting role along three of the four post-conflict pillars. However, this second impediment of resource asymmetry prevents it from doing so. "The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to receive the lion's share of national security funding."[41] The Department of State (DoS), the agency responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and comprised of personnel with the knowledge of foreign countries and foreign affairs, is a small organization with a corps of foreign service officers equivalent to the number of soldiers in a U.S. Army brigade.[42] Therefore, the agency that is capable of achieving the advantage described in the previous paragraph does not have access to the resources of the DoD, the organization with more money to conduct diplomacy.

Operations in Iraq illustrate the impediments of poor unity of effort and resource asymmetry. Even though the DoD had been developing courses of action and conducting campaign planning one year before the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the other agencies did not have similar time to plan follow-on civilian-led operations.[43] National

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[39] Anna Simons, *Seeing the Enemy (or Not),* ed. Anthony D. McIvor. *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 339.
[40] Michéle Flournoy, *Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,* ed. Robert C. Orr. *Winning the Peace* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 108.
[41] Crocker, 373.
[42] Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy,* July 2004 [article on-line]; available from http://www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/; internet; accessed 17 August 2005.
[43] Edward W. Loxterkamp, Michael F. Welch, and Richard M. Gomez, "The Interagency Process: The Need for New Legislation," Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, 27 September 2003, 15.

Security Presidential Directive 24 established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) and its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority, in January 2004, three months before commencement of military operations and five months before the self-identified conclusion of major combat operations. Consequently, ORHA never received the resources or time required to coordinate the stabilization and reconstruction effort following major combat operations. Even after military forces occupied Baghdad, civilian entities coordinated by ORHA would not enter the city for another two weeks – and restore basic services to the populace – because the Department of Defense claimed that security was not sufficient.[44] This episode in Iraq is not unique. Steven Metz writes: "The history of counterinsurgency shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of national power effectively."[45] The Nation's Iraq experience highlights the principal impediments in the interagency process at the operational level – its lack of unity of effort – caused by lack of unity of command – and asymmetry in resources.

Future Interagency Integration

S/CRS expects it will achieve full capacity in five years, contingent on Senate support. The global strategic situation will continue to require the nation to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and stabilize and reconstruct societies when S/CRS achieves full capacity. In the National Intelligence Commission's (NIC) Global Trends 2010 report, the commission noted that most conflicts will continue to center on failing states – those that fail to meet the most basic requirements of its citizenry. Internal conflict will be the rule, not the exception. Because the United States will continue to possess military dominance, conflict will take on an increasing

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[44] Loxterkamp, 15.
[45] Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response" (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, November

asymmetric nature. The spillover effect of refugee flows, starvation, disease, ethnic and civil conflict will require the United States to intervene to "transport supplies and equipment, to distribute needed material, to protect those displaces, and *to re-establish order* (emphasis added)."[46] The nation will be required to intervene in situations requiring stabilization and reconstruction.

The future concept to address how military forces will act in the environment suggested by the NIC is the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (SO JOC). It is a description of how it will conduct stability operations in 2015 – 2025.[47] There are four cases outlined in the concept where the future military force conducts stability operations: in response to protection requests from friendly nation-states (Case 1); incident to major combat operations (Case 2); intervention to prevent collapse of the nation or region (Case 3); and operations to defeat of transnational, non-state organizations (Case 4). Of the four cases, the current version of the SO JOC currently covers Case 2 – major combat operations. The remaining three are still under development.[48]

In Case 2, the "US and its allied conduct major combat operations to defeat a hostile nation-state that acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior."[49] Present in the Case 2 environment are many causes of instability: disintegration of government authority; tribal or clan leaders, warlords, religious groups, and organized crime; links to global terrorist networks, ruthless chaos with no local police or justice institutions to impose law and order; widespread starvation and disease; massive numbers of

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2004), 10 [monograph on-line]; available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/; internet, accessed 06 Nov 2005.

[46] Central Intelligence Agency, *Global Trends 2010*, November 1997 [report on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_globaltrends2010.html; internet, accessed 31 October 2005.

[47] U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept,* September 2004, *i* [publication on-line]; available from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/so_joc_v1.doc; internet; accessed 21 October 2005.

refugees and displaced persons; no, or shaky, foundations for civil society and democratization; and powerful illegal economic incentives for continued conflict.

The military force will support civilian attempts to prevent conflict before it erupts in the first, Preventive, phase. In close partnership with US civilian officials, the military force prepares to conduct stability operations. Both military and civilian entities attempt to set conditions for combat should the threshold for conflict be crossed and makes essential preparations for effective stability operations should deployment be necessary.[50]


Figure 1, Synopsis of the Case 2 Central Idea[51]

During conventional combat operations, the second phase, the military force is the supported U.S. government agency and focuses on achieving military victory. It performs stability operations in support of the major combat operation and emphasizes on "imposing security in the wake on conflict so that errant armed groups are brought under control and basic humanitarian relief activities can begin." These stability operations in this phase set conditions for subsequent restorative activities.[52] Post-combat, the military force reassumes a supporting role so that supported activities of civilian agencies can create "new normal" conditions that reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of the root causes of the conflict.

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[48] As of February 2006.
[49] Ibid., 1.
[50] Ibid., 6.
[51] Ibid., 8.
[52] Ibid., 6.

The SO JOC describes two obstacles to stability, spoilers and friction points.[53] Spoilers include those entities that aim to "willfully obstruct US and multinational strategic or operational objectives" and are comprised of three subordinate groups: total, limited, and greedy. "Total spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to the US and multinational position" and include members of the deposed regime and political, cultural, religious, and social opposition. Total spoilers cannot or do not want to be assimilated into the restoration phase society. "Limited spoilers are… mid- or low-level members of the deposed regime or defeated military" with limited objectives who seek settlement through the establishment of governance on their terms. While limited spoilers may work within a process of political transformation, the demands of this category of spoilers may be counterproductive to the long-term stability of the region. Greedy spoilers are those with selfish economic interests who take advantage of the political instability to further those interests. Greedy spoilers include black marketers, extortionists, and informal leaders of marginalized groups attempting to gain material advantage. While the interagency community can deal with each of the spoilers in their own right, the challenge occurs as the interagency attempts to deal with the systemic effects.

The other obstacle to stability comes in the form of "stability operations friction points." Interagency entities will encounter friction from a variety of entities with different purposes or mandates, each of which is "extremely necessary and important to the achievement of long-term transition to security and reconstruction." International and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, other foreign government agencies, and private volunteer organizations contribute to the friction; likewise, the population of the affected nation-state also contribute to friction as it adjusts to the "new normal" conditions and asserts a more prominent leadership role.

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[53] Ibid., 11-16.

Capabilities of both military and civilian entities are required for these situations. Advanced Civilian Teams mobilized by S/CRS and military forces will both be necessary to help stabilize and reconstruct the society. This situation will require integrated interagency action; the SO JOC is predicated on an assumption that, "the military and interagency community will achieve synergy in planning and execution."[54] This synergy is only achievable if the principal impediments of lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry are addressed. This suggests the requirement for an organizational model to unify the efforts of the in-theater military and the ACT headquarters and to provide the ACTs with the resources they need to execute their mission.

The Fundamental Problem

As stated in the introductory comments to this section, the fundamental problem addressed in this research effort is that the collocated ACT headquarters in combat will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full capacity in five years without an organizational model that addresses the impediments to interagency integration. S/CRS acknowledges there are gaps in planning and attempts to address this by creation of organizations that can conduct combined civil-military planning for stabilization and reconstruction. However, the mechanism to facilitate this coordination and address current and future interagency integration impediments is not addressed in S/CRS concepts. Any civilian capacity mobilized by S/CRS cannot contribute to stabilization and reconstruction because the lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry will impede any other attempts to integrate the efforts.

Failure to address these impediments will prevent effective interagency action and stabilization and reconstruction. The solution to the problem, then, must propose an organizational model to achieve effective interagency integration by "putting someone in charge." Crocker argues: "It is… time for the military and civilian sides of the U.S. government to take the

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[54] Ibid., v.

next step forward – achieving the level of jointness, unity of command and purpose, and pooling of resources that will determine success." An organizational model that can address these impediments and resolve the fundamental problem addressed by this research effort is the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program.

THE CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT APPROACH

The CORDS program partnered civilian entities with the U.S. Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (USMACV). The program established the position of Deputy to Commander USMACV (COMUSMACV) for CORDS and filled the position with a senior civilian. Similar partnerships existed at subordinate commands across the country. This arrangement, which contributed to stemming the Viet Cong insurgency and to helping pacify the countryside, addressed the impediments to integrated interagency action present in both the 1960s and the 2000s, lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry.


Figure 2, The CORDS approach of the Vietnam Era: a snapshot

CORDS Achievements

In its 4-year existence, CORDS contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong by influencing the decline of popular support for the insurgency, by helping pacify rural provinces of Vietnam,

and by strengthening South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. The Viet Cong suffered

after Allied counterattacks post-Tet and could not reassert itself. CORDS-enabled nation-

building and pacification prevented effective recruiting efforts. In the Kien Hoa province in the

Mekong Delta—the birthplace of the National Liberation Front—Viet Cong strength fell from

more than 12,000 insurgents in 1967 to 9,000 in 1968 to less than 2,000 in 1971. The monthly

rate of insurgent and criminal incidents in the province fell to 2 or 3 per 100,000 inhabitants by

1971, a crime rate that would be welcomed in any U.S. community today.[55] [56]

Other observers concurred. According to Thomas Thayer, Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Systems Analysis–Southeast Asia, "there was widespread evidence and agreement that the

government of Vietnam exercised a predominant influence over the vast majority of South

Vietnamese people."[57] Raymond Davis, a U.S. Army noncommissioned officer assigned to the

CORDS program made a similar, firsthand assessment: "CORDS, a thorn in the side of the Viet

Cong, has been frequently denounced by the VC. Some officials in Saigon believe the program's

progress since 1967 might have been a factor in North Vietnam's decision to launch major

military operations in 1968 to halt joint pacification efforts in rural areas."[58]

The CORDS Approach

The CORDS approach was the result of years of unsuccessful attempts to achieve unity

of effort. The initial stages of the U.S. Government's pre-CORDS response are case studies in the

lack of unity of command causing disunity of effort. In the early 1960s, no one agency in the

government possessed the capability to address the entire, multi-pillared mission. However, in its

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[55] David R. Palmer, 286-7.

[56] By way of comparison, the yearly crime rate in Leavenworth, Kansas was over four thousand per hundred thousand of the population in 2002 (specifically, 4161), slightly ahead of the national average of 4118 per hundred thousand per year. Compare with the figure mentioned in the narrative – two or three per month in the province that launched the National Liberation Movement with Leavenworth, Kansas, with figures of three hundred per month. Crime statistics are available from http://leavenworth.areaconnect.com/crime1.htm. Internet, accessed 25 September 2005.

[57] Hunt, 63.

early stages of involvement in Vietnam, the United States did not provide its existing institutions the incentives to adapt to the situation.[59]

At the outset of the Vietnam War, the government attempted to resolve the situation in Vietnam through its normal institutions and processes. The typical response was characterized by decentralized decision-making and delegation of authority to each individual agency with little accountability for results. According to Douglas Blaufarb, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick E. Nolting conceded to participating agencies the "full authority over their operations within agreed programs and policies—in effect, management by committee."[60] To complicate matters, the USMACV nominally controlled civilian agencies, but, in reality, civilian agencies reported either directly to their superiors in Washington, D.C., or to the ambassador.[61]

Despite efforts to coordinate the response to the Vietnam situation in 1961-1962, little centralized direction of the effort existed. Part of the problem was tied to the statutory obligations of each agency to remain responsible to its headquarters in Washington and to heed the expressed will of Congress.[62] This approach, later termed the Country Team, was typical of early attempts to achieve a balance between Washington-based direction and Vietnam-located execution.

The Country Team concept was a loose, poorly defined description of the relationship between the ambassador and the heads of the civilian agencies in-country. Although the ambassador remained technically in charge of all agencies in the country, in reality no one was in charge because each agency went its own way. President John F. Kennedy supported the concept throughout his administration, but the loose collection of agencies did not achieve the integration

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[58] Davis, 33-4.
[59] John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: learning to eat soup with a knife* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2002), 164.
[60] Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 117.
[61] Beckett, 194.
[62] Blaufarb, 117.

Kennedy desired. Furthermore, the Viet Cong insurgency continued to increase in size, influence, and effectiveness.[63] Furthermore, the Viet Cong insurgency continued to increase in size, influence, and effectiveness.

The Country Team concept modified its structure when Maxwell Taylor became the Ambassador to Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson empowered Taylor with "sweeping delegation of authority" to coordinate military and civilian activities.[64] However, he left military matters to the hands of General William Westmoreland, the COMUSMACV. Taylor renamed the structure the Mission Council and attempted to prepare a common agenda and a detailed follow-up of action.[65] However, each agency continued to retain separate responsibility for its operations, and, similar to previous integrative attempts, the Mission Council did not achieve effective interagency action. The Pentagon Papers describe the tensions and situation between the disparate civilian actors.[66] The unidentified author of the chapter titled "Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967" wrote: "Each agency had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communications channels with Washington, and its own personnel and administrative structure."[67]

As the U.S. involvement grew, individual agencies began fielding their own structures for operations in the provinces in 1964-1965. These agencies acted under wholly separate chains of command. Unified effort did not exist, as the Americans in the provinces did not work together and received conflicting and overlapping guidance from Saigon and Washington.[68]

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[63] Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in Vietnam* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 169.
[64] Blaufarb, 233.
[65] Ibid.
[66] The Pentagon Papers is the term used for a study by the U.S. Department of Defense, titled United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, that details the history of political and military involvement in Vietnam. The study was leaked to the New York Times, and all available information was eventually published under the title The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971).
[67] Blaufarb, 233.
[68] Ibid.

To better coordinate the civilian entities' nation-building activities, Robert W. Komer, the recently appointed Special Assistant to the President (for supervision of nonmilitary programs relating to Vietnam) argued for the creation of the Office of Civil Operations in Saigon in 1966.[69] The office would consist of functional divisions that he would organize along regional lines, including placing directors at regional and provincial levels. When William Porter assumed duties as the Deputy Ambassador to the Saigon Mission, he became the second-ranking civilian in the U.S. hierarchy. His responsibility was to coordinate the civil side of the pacification effort, and he devoted himself to the task.[70] Under his control were three major agencies: the CIA, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Three field operating agencies (the Chieu Hoi Defector Program, Manpower, and Economic Warfare) reported directly to him (see also Figure 3, Structure of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) within the U.S. Mission, December 1966 to April 1967).

Figure 3, Structure of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) within the U.S. Mission,
December 1966 to April 1967[71]

The military took parallel steps to centralize its pacification efforts by establishing a section in its headquarters named Revolutionary Development Support. It focused the attention of its subordinate echelons towards pacification. The military also emphasized the roles of military

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[69] Nagl, 165.
[70] Blaufarb, 234.

advisory units that had been disseminated beyond regular Vietnamese Army formations and into the territorial security sectors.[72]

These 1966 attempts did not result in pacification, the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency, or the withdrawal of its popular support. Splitting responsibilities between military and civilian entities to pursue pacification left the interagency entities with, in reality, no responsibility.[73] Assessing these efforts, Komer believed that Vietnam needed centralized authority in place. He hoped that unified, integrated civilian-military capabilities, each individually indecisive, could achieve decisive collective effects. In "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild," Komer states: "We realistically concluded that no one of these plans—relatively inefficient and wasteful in the chaotic, corrupted Vietnamese wartime context—could be decisive. But together they could hope to have a major cumulative effect."[74]

The energy Komer brought to his role as the president's special assistant precipitated the formation of CORDS. Consensus developed among the president, the secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs: because the overall mission could not achieve integrative effects, unification of the pacification efforts (both civil and military) was necessary.[75]

The integration of the two programs under a *single* director ultimately resulted in success.[76] Komer now had status equivalent to a four-star general and ranked third in the USMACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.[77] Although Komer possessed ambassadorial rank, he was not a diplomat; he was a member of Westmoreland's military staff and enjoyed direct access to Westmoreland, an access enjoyed by

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[71] Thomas W. Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support* (Washington: Center for Military History, 1982), 57.

[72] Colby, 206.

[73] Blaufarb, 237.

[74] Robert W. Komer, "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild," *Army,* May 1970, 19.

[75] Blaufarb, 238.

[76] Nagl, 165.

[77] Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 656.

only one other person, Abrams. In itself, Komer's position reflected the unique nature of CORDS as a civilian-military approach to integration.

Although there was consensus among the national-level senior leadership and little political opposition in Washington, presidential backing was nevertheless necessary in creation of CORDS. To fight the political war in Vietnam as well as the military war, Johnson needed to draw together the limited human resources with political expertise on Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 and put those people in charge of the effort. To be successful, a major pacification effort had to be centralized and, more importantly, "free of institutional constraints (existing doctrine, techniques, organizational practice) of the old-line agencies and programs."[78] In addition to identification of the right political actors, the military resources to achieve the President's desired effects needed to be firmly under the control of the effort. Willard Thompson noted: "The President, but only the President, could have done anything as drastic as that."[79]

Partnering Soldiers and Civilians

The CORDS approach directly addressed the impediment of lack of unity of effort by partnering civilian and military entities. CORDS did so by placing one person in command of the combined entities and supporting him with appropriate civilian and military personnel under a consolidated staff directorate in USMACV.[80] The ensuing organization "represented the formation of an ad hoc civil-military hybrid," not a military takeover of the pacification mission but, instead, an organization that was civilian as well as military."[81]

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[78] Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1973), ARPA Order No.: 189-1, 114-115.

[79] Willard S. Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977) 189.

[80] Blaufarb, 240.

[81] Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 217; Thompson 214.

Figure 4, Structure of U.S. Mission, Showing Position of CORDS, May 1967.[82]

The partnership in the USMACV headquarters of a civilian CORDS deputy and the

military commander was also replicated throughout subordinate echelons of the command; each

of the four corps commanders partnered with a CORDS chief performing similar functions.

Provincial and district military advisers were transferred to CORDS, and the appointment of

personnel to CORDS positions was based on merit and experience without regard to status,

military or civilian.[83]

To achieve unity of effort throughout Vietnam, CORDS also created unified civilian-

military advisory teams down to district level. Eventually CORDS created teams in all 250

districts and 44 provinces in South Vietnam.[84] Komer said: "Each U.S. corps senior adviser had

a civilian deputy for CORDS and the province senior advisers were roughly half-and-half civilian

and military."[85] At peak strength, military personnel comprised nearly 85 percent of personnel

assigned to the CORDS program (6,500 military to 1,100 civilian).[86]

CORDS was the one program specifically tailored to the environment in Vietnam. No

conventional organizations in the U.S. Government had the raison d'etre for or the political,

military, and social capabilities to address counterinsurgency. The CORDS program filled the

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[82] Thomas W. Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1982), 58.
[83] Blaufarb, 240.
[84] Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,* 115.
[85] Robert W. Komer, "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild," *Army,* May 1970, 19.
[86] Krepinevich, 218.

gap; it was a deliberate attempt to break the mold of governmental form and function. In Komer's eyes it was the right thing to do at the time. He later wrote: "If institutional constraints . . . are such an impediment to adaptive response, then it would seem better to adapt the organizational structure to fit the need."[87]

CORDS took a flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem and organized civilian capabilities along functional lines. Bureaucratic procedures on behalf of the civilian – or military – agencies did not constrain CORDS because there were simply no procedures or precedent to work with. It literally "wrote the field manual as it went along."[88] As CORDS was a new type of organization, Komer's innovative style required him to act like a commander. Komer's unique position, itself a presidential innovation, created the only person (to date) of ambassadorial rank who served in the direct military chain of command subordinate to a general officer.

William Colby noted: "[Komer] made it very plain that in his vocabulary 'supervision' meant more than the familiar bureaucratic rain dance of 'coordination'."[89] Challenging any "foot-dragging" by any department or agency, Komer, often referred to by his nickname "Blowtorch," took his Presidential-granted authority seriously. He did not pass up the opportunity to "apply the appropriate tongue-lashing to the Presidential appointee of the offending entity at its head.[90]

Unsatisfied with the military performance in support of pacification and civilian support of military operations to date, Komer in essence commanded both soldiers and civilians as the Deputy for CORDS. Komer recalled, "I had many more military under me, about six to one, than I did civilians. And I acted like a commander… I did deploy and move people. And I wrote

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[87] Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 168.

[88] Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,* 115.

[89] Colby, 206.

[90] Despite his brash and confrontational nature, Komer's efforts were surprisingly well-received by some, at least as evidenced by William Colby's assessment of Komer. Colby stated, "As chief of the CIA's operations in the Far East, I came directly under Komer's gun – and loved it. Finally I found

their efficiency reports."[91] This efficiency report system, typical in organizations with unity of command, established firm accountability and served to instill discipline throughout the civil-military structure. CORDS advisors, both military and civilian, issued orders and instructions as if they were in typical military-only organizations.[92]

The de facto subordination of pacification efforts to military control was unprecedented. However, Komer quickly recognized the value of its placement within USMACV: "Since most available resources were in Vietnamese and U.S. military hands by 1967, since pacification first required the restoration of security in the countryside, and since what little GVN [Government of Vietnam] administration that existed outside Saigon had been military-dominated, it was also logical for the new pacification program to be put under military auspices."[93] Placement of the pacification programs under military command and control became necessary because the military controlled the practical resources.

Not surprisingly, the military was generally pleased with the arrangement. Westmoreland graciously accepted the "unprecedented grafting of a civilian/military hybrid onto his command" and supported Komer in his dealings with the USMACV staff, even into strategic plans and policy matters where military advisers opposed civilian-led initiatives.[94] Westmoreland was both careful and politically savvy enough not to stand in the way of Komer's efforts. He did not want to be an obstacle to CORDS and thus be forced to face the prospect of its failure because of a lack of sufficient resources or support. His attitude was quickly replicated throughout the military and greatly enhanced CORDS' early effectiveness and the integration it aimed to achieve.

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someone who understood the need for a pacification strategy and who had the clout to push the Washington agencies into producing it on the ground in Vietnam." From Colby, 206.
[91] Komer, Frantz interview, 38.
[92] Sheehan, 657.
[93] Thompson, 214-5.
[94] Blaufarb, 240.

Initial Reservations

Civilians, on the other hand, were initially less confident in the arrangement. Ever fearful of military authority, "civilian agencies had serious reservations about altering this arrangement."[95] Civilian reservations were well-founded; thus far, the military had demonstrated little regard for nationbuilding activities. Military operations to date had convinced civilians that they would be relegated to cleaning up the battlefield after poorly conceived search-and-destroy operations.

To address this initial uncertainty, Komer developed a clever compromise to the civilian-military cooperation problem and the reservations of civilian agencies. Understanding that a single manager was required, Komer established deputies for CORDS throughout the command with civilians as leads to reassure the civilian agencies.[96] This allied pacification and COIN operations under a single strategy and enabled the consolidation of authority for all aspects of pacification.

Unlike operations of the early 1960s, civilian programs could not be subordinated to military operations to seek out and destroy the enemy. Similarly, the military penchant for unity of command could not be breached because programs and problems could be addressed in Vietnam instead of in Washington. The CORDS organization retained civilian attributes and control from within the military structure without being subsumed by it.[97] The structural "takeover" of the pacification effort by the U.S. military had little effect on civilian agencies' individual identities or any real control over civilian programs. Aggressive civilian leadership, bureaucratic skill, and presidential interest ensured that the disparate U.S. civilian foreign policy agencies could achieve a remarkable degree of harmony.[98]

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[95] Colby, 207.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Blaufarb, 239.
[98] Krepinevich, 217.

This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have. According to Komer: *"Paradoxically, this [partnership] resulted in even greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than had ever existed before;* it also powerfully [reinforced] pacification's claim on U.S. and GVN military resources, which constituted the bulk of the inputs during 1967-1971 (emphasis in original)."[99] He went on to say: "'If you are ever going to get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from the military. They have all the trucks, they have all the planes, they have all the people, they have all the money—and what they did not have locked up, they had a lien on.'"[100]

Providing resources, manpower, and organization to civilian entities enabled them to make progress by improving cooperation between civilian-military entities and combining the function of civilian policymaking with the military's overwhelming people, money, and resources. CORDS gave civilians direct access to resources like transportation, military engineers for horizontal construction (roads, for example) and vertical construction (such as buildings), and Department of Defense (DOD)-allocated funds.[101] Much of DOD's monetary contribution went to support Regional and Popular Forces, but the U.S. Department of State and the CIA no longer needed to support U.S. civilians assigned to GVN military development out of their relatively small budgets.[102] As evidence of the new cooperation the civilian-military

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[99] Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,* 114.

[100] Nagl, 165.

[101] The formation of CORDS was innovative for the military as well. U.S. Army commanders, who in 1965 would have organized for combat with military forces to the exclusion of all else, began to cross-assign forces to the State Department, USAID, CIA, and the U.S. Information Service (USIS) commencing June 1967 with the establishment of CORDS (from James K. McCollum, "CORDS: Matrix for Peace in Vietnam", Army, July 1982, 49). Similarly, military commanders received cross-assignment of civilian agency personnel for conduct of their operations, a sharp contrast to the military-only search-and-destroy operations like those of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division in 1966 and 1967 (from Krepinevich, 222-3).

[102] Scoville, 80-81.

interagency community achieved, the terms "other war" and "nonmilitary actions" fell out of the lexicon.[103]

CORDS contributions

The CORDS approach addressed many of the post-conflict reconstruction framework pillars. The CORDS program's principal contribution was how it complemented allied security operations.[104] Davis noted: "The key to CORDS [was clearly] protection [of the populace]."[105] By denying villages and hamlets to the Viet Cong, civil-military operations enabled the U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military forces to concentrate on North Vietnamese main forces. Also, CORDS fostered the creation of an organized People's Self-Defense Force composed of local inhabitants who could defend their villages and hamlets. Furthermore, CORDS created a grassroots political support mechanism for the government and, as a matter of routine, helped with community development.[106]

Regional Force units, equivalent to federalized U.S. Army National Guard forces, deployed throughout the country to deny sanctuary to North Vietnamese Army units or known VC sympathizers. Once Regional Force units forced the withdrawal of VC units, Regional and Popular Forces, advised by the CORDS program, maintained continual security while other CORDS advisory teams fostered development of villages and hamlets, thereby denying the insurgents a recruiting base.[107]

CORDS also affected political and economic progress, attempting to touch "the lives of the Vietnamese on every social level."[108] CORDS enhanced local protection and area security

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[103] Ibid., 80.
[104] Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "Speaker Notes," *Command Briefing,* March 1972, Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Part 1, microfilm, reel 2, frames 578-9.
[105] Raymond Davis, "CORDS: Key to Vietnamization," *Soldiers*, July 1971, 34.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.

and fostered significant gains in nation-building. Other major CORDS achievements included the revival of a functioning rural administration; an economic revival to parallel USAID land reform programs; and health and human services functions, including medicine, education, and refugee care.[109] [110] CORDS also facilitated the rebuilding of roads and waterways, which military forces had ignored during the early years of the war.[111]

The results of this multi-pillared approach appeared almost immediately. By 1969 CORDS had accelerated the pacification of the country, and by 1970, CORDS contributed to the departure of an estimated 300,000 foreign troops and the prevention of South Vietnamese capitulation even as the North increased its pressure at every attempt.[112]

Programs to destroy the VC infrastructure achieved great success. David R. Palmer said: "An enhanced security situation, along with increased peasant ownership of property and steadily increasing economic conditions, certainly constituted major dampeners to communist appeal, while plainly diminishing chances of success likewise abetted defections in insurgent ranks."[113] The VC insurgency that had battled the USMACV during Tet in 1968 was virtually eliminated by 1971.[114]

CORDS' Success

The North Vietnamese's decision to rely on conventional means to conquer South Vietnam suggests that CORDS and the pacification program were successful. With the help of U.S. forces and air and logistics support, South Vietnamese forces were able to repulse the 1972 North Vietnamese ground offensives. Former CORDS adviser to Abrams and later director of the

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[109] Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Schultz, Jr., ed, *Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 57.

[110] Only the covert operations conducted by the CIA and the land reform programs of the USAID remained outside of the CORDS structure.

[111] Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,* 116.

[112] David R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet* (New York: Ballantine Books: 1978), 285.

[113] Ibid., 287.

[114] Ibid.

CIA William Colby said: "The attack of 1972 and the final attack of 1975 were pure North Vietnamese military attacks. There were no guerrillas in those operations because in the interim our program actually won the guerrilla war by winning the guerrilla to the government. They were all on the government side."[115]

Curiously, Colby's viewpoint was shared by the Viet Cong insurgency. A VC official, who out of frustration and dejection surrendered to the CORDS-strengthened Regional and Popular Forces in 1971, reported that recruiting became nearly impossible in his region after the pacification program reached full operating capacity in 1969.[116] In his private notebook, a VC colonel wrote: "'If we are winning while the enemy is being defeated, why have we encountered increasing difficulties? Last year we could attack United States forces. This year we find it difficult to attack even puppet forces. . . . We failed to win the support of the people and keep them from moving back to enemy controlled areas. . . At present, the [South Vietnamese and U.S. forces are] weakened while we are exhausted.'"[117] By the early 1970s, adopting a unified pacification strategy had enabled the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency.[118]

The interrelationship of U.S. civilian and military functions and South Vietnamese counterpart functions permitted a more efficient application of resources, enabling firm and timely action.[119] The interrelationship was far more cost-effective than other parts of the war

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[115] Paul Seidenmann, "Pacification: A Winning Combination that Came too Late?" *Armed Forces JOURNAL International* 114 (January 1977): 25.

[116] David R. Palmer, 286-7.

[117] Ibid., 288.

[118] Note that for all of its success, CORDS could not contribute to the defeat of the main North Vietnamese invasion force. Writes McCollum in 1982, "CORDS defeated the insurgency in Vietnam, but it could not defeat the main-force invasion. Since nations in the Western Hemisphere are not likely to be threatened by outside invasion, the defeat of the insurgency should therefore be the primary concern. In subsequent attempts at pacification in any nation threatened by insurgency, it seems essential that a matrix organization [such as CORDS] be set up to ensure the local efforts are properly directed and coordinated." (McCollum, 53). The author will address this key point in the section devoted to its appropriateness to the situation in Iraq today.

[119] Headquarters, MACV, frame 579.

effort. It entailed "only a modest fraction of the enormous costs of the Vietnam war" and was

tailored directly to the needs of the environment.[120]

Observers suggested that CORDS was indeed a successful program. Neil Sheehan wrote:

"By the time Komer left [in the late 1960s], CORDS did seem to be pacifying the South

Vietnamese countryside."[121] Bruce Palmer noted: "Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker [insisted] that

this essential and integral part of the war [the counterinsurgency campaign] had been won by

1971."[122] Evidence suggested that CORDS worked better than even its advocates expected. The

pacification program and its desired effects on the counterinsurgency had apparently succeeded.

There are two causes for this success. First, CORDS ensured unity of effort among both

military and civilian entities because it unified command. Second, it addressed the impediment of

resource asymmetry by ensuring civilian agencies were provided with the resources, people, and

money to perform their tasks.

The program ensured unity of effort by unifying command of the pacification efforts

across the country and across the interagency. The government had searched for organizational

structures for the better part of a decade that skirted around the issue of control. Early on in the

Vietnam War, the ethos of interagency integration was unity of effort. Each agency – in theory –

should have worked towards a common goal but without centralization of control. However,

each agency supported the others only when advantageous for itself, requiring the eventual

unification of command to achieve unity of effort. This centralization is not merely co-incident

with the defeat of the Viet Cong Insurgency; it was that very centralization that contributed to

effective interagency integration.

Second, the program combined the comparative advantage of the civilian entities with the

overwhelming resources of the military. Civilians now had access to resources that were

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[120] Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,* 118.
[121] Sheehan, 731.

previously restricted to the military, and the civilian agencies could conduct complementary activities with the military. It was this combination that contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong Insurgency and the removal of its popular support.

Criticism of the CORDS program is generally founded on its limited duration and scope. Komer attributes its failure to have greater effect on the overall Vietnam situation to too little, too late.[77] For example, the CORDS program could not affect the capabilities of regular forces the North Vietnamese defeated in 1975. According to Komer: "Even after 1967, pacification remained a small tail to the very large conventional military dog. It was never tried on a large enough scale until too late. . . ."[123]

The scope of the CORDS program did not allow it to address the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government. Focused on defeating the VC insurgency, CORDS did not possess the personnel, organization, or structure to enhance the legitimacy and thus the popularity of the South Vietnamese government. A former CORDS analyst stated: "CORDS was a great program and a good model—with one caveat. Under the Hamlet Evaluation System, we collected lots of data indicating the security of the regions and provinces but nowhere did we find any evidence or indication of popular support of the [national-level] government.[124] This coincides with Komer's assessment of the program: "Perhaps the most important single reason why the U.S. achieved so little for so long was that it could not sufficiently revamp, or adequately substitute for, a South Vietnamese leadership, administration, and armed forces inadequate to the task."[125]

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[122] Bruce Palmer, *The 25 Year War: America's military role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 116.
[123] Ibid., 164.
[124] Ambassador David Passage, interview by author 18 January 2006.
[125] Komer, *Bureaucracy at War,* 160

THE ACT HEADQUARTERS AND THE CORDS-LIKE APPROACH

The fundamental problem addressed in this research effort is that the collocated ACT headquarters in combat will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full operational capability in 2009 without a model that addresses the impediments to operational-level interagency integration. To do so, the ACT headquarters in combat situations should partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a CORDS-like approach to help societies achieve stabilization and reconstruction. S/CRS should adopt this concept for three reasons. First, a CORDS-like approach will address the operational environment described in the SO JOC and will address the principal impediments to operational-level interagency integration. Second, a CORDS-like approach is consistent with the other concepts developed by S/CRS. Third, other current conceptual approaches like the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Interagency Task Force do not address the impediments to interagency integration. These three reasons are addressed in turn.

Addressing the Impediments

The formation of CORDS enabled unity of effort among the civilian and military entities in Vietnam and provides a model to achieve unity of effort in future operations. Commenting on command and control in Vietnam, Major General George S. Eckhardt stated: "[A prerequisite for command and control] will be unity of command, to ensure both tight control of the over-all U.S. effort by American political authorities and effectiveness of military and advisory activities." He recognized the value of this approach in counterinsurgent warfare; "an organization like the CORDS should be established as soon as possible," explicitly stating that civil affairs, counterinsurgency, and pacification could not be adequately coordinated without it.[126]

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[126] George S. Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), 86.

The CORDS model from Vietnam is historically transferable to future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Although future strategic situations may differ from the strategic situation in Vietnam, the principal protagonist – the United States – is present in both situations. Furthermore, ineffective interagency integration is not caused by spoilers but rather by our own lack of unity of effort and by resource asymmetry. The success of the program was not contingent on its civilian resources per se. Rather, its success was due to its foundational characteristics (unification of effort through unification of command, combination of inherent advantages of both civilian and military entities, equitable access to resources). Lastly, total spoilers in the stabilization and reconstruction operation envisioned in the SO JOC will consist of groups who are considered "liberation insurgents," the likely nature of insurgents in the 21st century, like the Vietnamese insurgency from 1965 to the early 1970s.[127] The CORDS program is therefore historically transferable to the future operational environment.

This approach is applicable to the environment described in the strategic situation described in the NIC Global Trends 2010 Report and the SO JOC. Military and civilian entities will continue to both make important contributions to the conditions described in Case 2. The second phase, conventional combat operations, can be the most challenging phase from an interagency perspective. It is during this phase that the threats to follow-on instability take shape, and it is during this phase that actions to negate the threats are most critical. The effects of total spoilers on the third phase are negated if the joint and interagency force controls the disintegration of the regime into controllable opposition groups. Limited spoilers and greedy spoilers may also have limited influence in the third phase if the joint and interagency actions in the second phase contribute to political and economic transformation. This second phase will

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[127] Liberation insurgencies "pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture… Examples include… Vietnam after 1965…" From Metz, 2-3.

also be the most visible phase to the international news media; therefore, the disruptive yet necessary presence of the friction producers will also take shape during this second phase.

Because this second phase is potentially the most challenging phase, the manner in which military and civilian entities apply diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power at the operational level is important. At the ACT headquarters level, establishment of a CORDS-like partnership with the military in the combat phase of the stability and reconstruction operation envisioned by the SO JOC provides civilian entities with the resources to take action *during* conventional combat instead of *after* conflict. This partnership also ensures unification of stabilization and reconstruction efforts because there is no diffusion of responsibility, accountability, or direction. There fore, the ACT headquarters in combat situations should partner with the military headquarters using a CORDS-like approach to address the impediments of poor unity of effort and resource asymmetry.[128]

Consistency with Concepts

In addition to addressing the two principal impediments to interagency integration at the operational level, this approach is also consistent with S/CRS concepts. S/CRS has developed three basic sets of concepts, described in the second section of this monograph. S/CRS has core objectives to produce conditions of lasting governance and stability. It has developed a framework for stabilization and reconstruction. Lastly, it is identifying sets of tools to provide the government with the capability and capacity to manage all four post-conflict stages.

The five core objectives of S/CRS are monitor and plan, mobilize and deploy, prepare skills and resources, learn from experience, and coordinate with international partners. A

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[128] As noted in the first section of this monograph, this research effort did not focus on improving interagency integration in present-day Iraq. Instead, this research effort focused on organizational approaches to resolve impediments to interagency integration when S/CRS achieves full capacity in five years. Accordingly, this researcher chose to apply the CORDS model against the expected environment of 2009 and later, as described in the National Intelligence Commission's Global Trends 2010 Report and the SO JOC.

CORDS-like approach complements each of the objectives. Whereas the operational-level CORDS-like approach does not directly affect the strategic-level monitor and plan objective, this approach enables effective execution of the policy and translation into action. A CORDS-like approach integrates the mobilization and deployment of civilian capacity with existing military capabilities. The interagency skills and resources deployed, sustained, and integrated with a CORDS-like approach ensures the creation of effective traditional support mechanisms. Applying a program like CORDS to S/CRS concepts embodies learning from experience. The experience gained through interagency integration in the defeat of the Viet Cong Insurgency can be applied to future stabilization and reconstruction operations. A CORDS partnership within the headquarters can achieve proper coordination with international partners, as the military headquarters now possesses the talents and experience of civilian diplomats.

A CORDS-like approach also supports the four stabilization and reconstruction stages described by S/CRS. In the stabilization stage, civilian agencies coordinated and controlled by a CORDS deputy ensure that the meeting of immediate needs occurs in a synchronous manner with the military operation. As the joint and interagency force addresses the root causes of conflict in the second stage, civilian agencies operating in concert with military forces can effectively address the corruption and exploitation that caused the instability in the first place. Civilian agencies will operate with the benefit of military-enabled security, and the military will contribute to reduction of the root causes of conflict by facilitating operations by civilian actors. The joint and interagency force modeled along a CORDS approach can also effectively address the supply and demand sides of governance and politics, the third and fourth stages, respectively, as civilian and military efforts will be synchronized and integrated from the highest levels of leadership in the country and the necessary degrees of accountability and centralization will exist.

This approach also directly addresses three of the six basic categories of S/CRS tools. First, a CORDS-like approach provides a framework and capability to plan for stabilization and reconstruction. Second, this approach establishes the management techniques that foster bona

fide interagency cooperation. Third, this approach develops a tool to ensure the interagency

civilian teams deployed to a regional combatant command produce effects that contribute to

stabilization and reconstruction from the moment they arrive in the region.

Most importantly, a CORDS-like approach fulfills the conceptual framework of the ACT

headquarters. It appears that many of the personnel and staff structures that will serve on the

ACTs mirror the qualifications and education of CORDS personnel in Vietnam. The functions

performed by the ACT headquarters in future stabilization and reconstruction operations do not

differ from those performed by CORDS in Vietnam, and its composition is similar to that of

CORDS in 1967. The CORDS approach is wholly consistent with S/CRS concepts.

Advantages Over Other Approaches

In addition to addressing the impediments to interagency integration and its consistency

with other concepts, S/CRS should adopt a CORDS-like approach because other current

conceptual approaches do not address the fundamental problem. These approaches include the

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Interagency Task Force.

The concept of the JIACG is the current approach adopted by the Department of Defense

to achieve unity of effort. The JIACG is a working group of interagency personnel that seeks to

establish collaborative relationships between the civilian and military operational planners. Its

primary purpose is to facilitate information sharing across the interagency community; functions

include providing civilian agency perspectives to military planners, presentation of civilian

capabilities and limitations, and interface with crisis action planning activities.[129] Thomas

Lafluer says: "The JIACG is comprised of U.S. government civilian and military experts and

provides commanders with the capability to work with other agencies at the operational level."[130]

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[129] United States Joint Forces Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group" [fact sheet on-line]; available from http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm; internet, accessed 25 October 2005.
[130] Thomas M. Lafleur, *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 2005), 35.

There are conflicting visions of the direction of the JIACG. One idea envisions the JIACG as the facilitator of specific staff directorates such as intelligence or plans, although this vision relegates the JIACG to the traditional stovepipe technique of information management. Another envisions the JIACG as a small staff directorate of a dozen personnel, potentially quickly marginalized within the larger military staff structure. A third vision reduces the JIACG to a think-tank role.[131] In addition to its conceptual search for its role within the military hierarchy, analysts cite other challenges for JIACGs. The first is the national-level expectation of unity of effort at the operational level without unity of command. The second is similar to the resource asymmetry problem described above; there is no unified communications and information management architecture at the operational level. The last is insufficient staffing from all agencies, both military and civilian.[132]

This research suggests that unity of effort is not possible without unity of command at the operational level. Komer noted that the problems inherent in the stabilization and reconstruction environment demand departures from normal institutional responses. Komer stated: "*Perhaps the key lesson to be learned from our Vietnam experience is that atypical problems demand specially tailored solutions – not just playing out of existing institutional repertoires* (emphasis in original)."[133] CORDS is an advantageous approach compared to the JIACG. Whereas the JIACG is by its very nature a collaborative workgroup without authority, the CORDS approach offers a different perspective. The CORDS deputy to COMUSMACV possessed real authority to make decisions and commit resources. Conversely, the JIACGs of Iraq and Afghanistan did not possess such authority.[134] Therefore, the ACT headquarters should not adopt a JIACG-like approach because it will not address the impediments of unity of effort or resource asymmetry but instead adopt a CORDS-like approach.

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[131] Bogdanos, 14.
[132] Ibid., 15-17.
[133] Komer, *Bureaucracy at War,* 166.

Another approach is the Interagency Task Force as suggested by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 report. Clark Murdock, the author of the report, states that the purpose of this task force is to "enhance the unity of effort among all the U.S. government actors involved – civilian and military." [135] He continues: "[This will] ultimately improve the chances for success on the ground."[136] CSIS recommends that this task force be co-led by a senior civilian, the President's Senior Representative, and the military joint task force commander. Although both leaders ultimately report to the President of the United States, the Special Representative reports to the Secretary of State, and the joint task force commander reports to the regional combatant commander. There is a fully-integrated, functional staff, but both leaders have directive tasking authority over their own entities, with the military retaining control over all military forces in theater and the civilian leadership retaining control over all civilians in theater. If disagreements occur in theater, these are forwarded through the appropriate channels (Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, as appropriate) to the President of the United States.

The CSIS approach is reminiscent of the pre-CORDS approaches in Vietnam. Komer noted that: "Vietnam suggests that in such conflict we cannot afford to separate out its many aspects and attempt to cope with them in separate bureaucratic compartments."[137] Much like the *Pentagon Papers* author articulates earlier in this monograph, this approach does not address the problem of lack of unity of effort.

The approach suggested by CSIS mirrors the 1966 Mission Council or Office of Civilian Operations approaches that, while integrating each of the civilian agencies into one collective

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[134] Bogdanos, 16.

[135] Clark A. Murdock and Michéle Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 48 [report on-line]; available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf; internet, accessed 31 October 2005.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Komer, *Bureaucracy at War,* 169.

whole, failed to integrate the military and civilian entities together. It also relies on collaboration

and coordination – and keeps the military and civilian agencies separate and distinct. As Bruce

Hoffman of the RAND Corporation stated to the House of Representatives in September 2005:

"organizations will therefore have to do – or be compelled to do——what they have been

reluctant to do in the past: reaching across bureaucratic territorial divides and sharing resources in

order to defeat terrorists, insurgencies, and other emerging threats."[138] Therefore, S/CRS should

not adopt an Interagency Task Force-like approach.

The CSIS report does mention a CORDS-like approach in its chapter titled "Building

Operational Capacity outside of the Department of Defense." It notes that there are four options

to address the problem of limited civilian post-conflict reconstruction capacity: (1) creation of

such capabilities through establishment of a new U.S. government agency for stability operations,

(2) giving the military the *de facto* lead (similar to the Vietnam-era CORDS approach), (3)

creating a deployable civilian cadre outside of the Department of Defense, and (4) relying on

allies to a greater degree.[139] Although the report notes that many senior military personnel have

argued against the second (CORDS-like) option, in the long-term, it also notes that this approach

may be necessary in the short term. That conclusion is consistent with the conclusion of this

research; the ACT headquarters in combat situations should partner with the military using a

CORDS-like approach when it achieves full capacity in five years.[140]

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[138] Bruce Hoffman, "Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?" (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, September 2005) 16 [testimony on-line]; available from www.rand.org; internet, accessed 06 November 2005.

[139] Murdock, 57-58.

[140] This research did will not address the "long-term" argument described in the CSIS study; nevertheless, Goldwater-Nichols-like legislation for the interagency may or may not obviate a CORDS-like approach. However, the establishment of command and control structures through Goldwater-Nichols-like legislation may not achieve initial operating capability beyond the timeframe of the stabilization and reconstruction operation described in the SO JOC and obviously well-beyond S/CRS's achievement of full capacity in 2009.

This researcher argues even if Goldwater-Nichols-like legislation for interagency integration were to be passed and signed into law today, it would not achieve the integration envisioned in such legislation until 2020, well after S/CRS achieves full operating capacity. As a matter of comparison, the Department of Defense did not achieve true joint integration Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, 17 years after its

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR S/CRS

First and foremost, the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations should partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a CORDS-like approach to help societies achieve stabilization and reconstruction. This approach addresses the two principal impediments to interagency integration at the operational level, it is consistent with S/CRS concepts, and is advantageous to other current conceptual models.

> ## A CORDS-like approach for the ACT headquarters in combat situations
> ### A snapshot
>
> - Partnership of the ACT headquarters and the in-theater, operational-level military headquarters
> - A civilian CORDS-like deputy from the ACT headquarters collocates with the in-theater military commander
> - Unified effort achieved through unified command
> - Requisite resources – personnel, equipment, and funds – provided to civilians from the military and vice versa

Figure 5, A CORDS-like approach for the ACT headquarters in combat situations: a snapshot

There are also other topics for future research suggested by this research effort. Further research is required to determine the best institutional practices, the strategic communications strategy for implementation, to and to identify initiatives across the domains of doctrine, training, and leadership.

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passage. Operation DESERT STORM may have been the first major conflict executed after the inception of the 1986 legislation, the coordination of joint assets during that conflict can be better-described as "deconfliction." The two methods of "deconfliction" employed in that campaign were both temporal (e.g., a 45 day air campaign preceding the 100 hour land campaign) and spatial (e.g., fire support coordination lines to deconflict the air and land component commands). Conversely, the military did not operate in a truly coordinated joint fashion until Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, where the air and ground campaigns commenced nearly simultaneously and the employment of joint fire power in support of ground maneuver did not require such linear means of deconfliction.

Determining Best Practices

Robert Komer noted: "Where specifically tailored programs which are not in conventional organizational repertoires or which cut across conventional agency lines are required, *it may be best to set up autonomous ad hoc organizations to run them* (emphasis in original)."[141] Komer concluded that a critical aspect of CORDS' success in Vietnam was its lack of institutional history or bureaucratic procedures. Although there was political maneuvering within Washington, D.C., especially concerning legislative authorities and funding requirements, CORDS remained above some of the typical bureaucratic responses because it was a new organization – with none of the bureaucratic inefficiencies or poor practices associated with it.

The ad hoc nature of CORDS greatly contributed to its success. The "institutionalization" this potential approach by S/CRS must, therefore, not limit the effectiveness of the program. If adopted, S/CRS must ensure that the programming of this approach does not become mired in attempts for bureaucratic efficiencies that hamper its effectiveness.

Another topic for further research is the thorough analysis of time and capabilities. The overarching criticism of the CORDS program was two-fold; the program was instituted to late in the war, and the program was not implemented on wide-enough scale. If S/CRS adopts this approach from the outset, that adoption would prevent the repeat of the "too late" criticism. Analysis is required, however, to determine the proper capabilities and capacity in order to ensure the ACT headquarters in combat situations is sufficiently resourced with personnel and money (preventing the reiteration of the "too little" criticism).

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[141] Komer, *Bureaucracy at War,* 168.

Strategic Communications

A strategic communications strategy must also be developed if this approach is to be implemented with S/CRS achieves full capacity in five years. This strategy must exist both within the agencies internal to and external to the executive branch.

William Colby, the program's second director, noted: "The civilian agencies had serious reservations about [the CORDS organizational arrangement]."[142] S/CRS should expect the civilian agencies of the next decade to similar reservations. Rather than restrict the autonomy of civilian entities, however, a CORDS-like approach enables civilian entities far greater autonomy because of the realized unification of effort and the provision and availability of military resources. S/CRS must develop an internal strategic communications strategy for civilian and military agencies within the executive branch as it implements this approach within its ACT headquarters in combat.

S/CRS should nevertheless develop an external strategic communications strategy. Because this approach may require executive decision to unify the civilian and military agencies, potential Iraq-Vietnam comparisons may be drawn. Whereas these comparisons do not stand up to the historical analysis of the program, these comparisons may nevertheless adversely influence the implementation of such an approach. Therefore, S/CRS should also develop an external strategic communications strategy for implementation and provide accurate public information regarding the advantages (and disadvantages) of this organizational model and all others it considers.

Initiatives

In addition to determining best institutional practices and developing the strategic communications strategy for implementation, follow-on research is also required to identify

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[142] Colby, 207.

initiatives across the doctrine, training, manning, and leadership domains. If this program is to be adopted, S/CRS and the military must develop the appropriate doctrine to ensure consistency across military and civilian institutions. Additionally, a CORDS-like approach at the Advanced Civilian Team level might increase the effectiveness of already successful Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It also requires the appropriate training to rehearse procedures and to realize the advantages of the program during deployments and contingency operations.

This research effort suggests that the energy and commitment of senior leaders greatly enhanced the early implementation of the CORDS program. Therefore, this approach also requires further research to identify the specific impacts of key leaders involved with CORDS. The attributes of leaders like Komer, General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Bunker, and Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu certainly enabled the success of the program, and a greater understanding of their specific contributions is required in order to implement a CORDS-like approach.

Komer clearly made the greatest impact on the program and his energy he infused into the program enabled its success. Komer's appointment of Westmoreland's Deputy for CORDS was the natural extension of the authority bestowed upon him as Johnson's Special Assistant. There was no pause when he took charge of the programs in Vietnam in 1967.[143] Within two years, Komer had built a capable organization capable of working with local security forces and understanding the needs of the populace. He had created a small cadre of personnel schooled in pacification studies that were trained in the language and knowledge of the region and aware of what was required for the country.[144] CORDS reached an eventual authorized personnel strength of seventy-six hundred in 1970 and operated with a budget of $891 million."[145] [146]

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[143] Blaufarb, 240.
[144] Thompson, 189.
[145] Blaufarb, 269.
[146] $891 million in 1970 is equivalent to $4.5 billion in 2006. From oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/cv2004.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 September 2005.

Three other figures enhanced the effectiveness of the program and helped Komer to unify the efforts of military and civilian entities. First, the appointment of Bunker to the Saigon Mission as Ambassador in May 1967 created the environment whereby the effective integration Komer envisioned. Ambassador Bunker gave full support to the arrangement. Colby said: "As one of his first actions, Bunker presided over the announcement of Komer's new authority and position and quietly made it clear to the American civilian agencies that they would comply fully with the new structural arrangement."[147]

General Abrams, the in-theater military commander, was also influential in CORDS success and growth because he provided unprecedented priority to the pacification efforts. He was sensitive to the subtleties of the civil-military environment and was willing to take a supporting position to Ambassador Bunker if it meant that the cause of nation-building could be supported. Of particular importance, Abrams was able to relate to and respect the views of allies from different backgrounds, both in the U.S. government and in the South Vietnamese government

The fourth key figure was the host nation national leader, Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, elected in 1967. President (and former General) Thieu welcomed the attention Komer brought to the pacification efforts, specifically the strengthening of the Vietnamese defense forces. Long considered orphans of the Vietnamese military establishment, the Vietnamese defense forces eventually played an important role in pacification and nation-building and the overall counterinsurgency effort. CORDS applied its attention to the local and provincial forces known as the Popular Forces and Regional Forces, respectively. Colby noted: "For the first time there was an American [Komer] with responsibility and interest in these essential units, so long neglected in the American military's enthusiasm for building up the regular Army, Navy, and Air

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[147] Colby, 209.

Force."[148] Komer's recommendation to assign CORDS the responsibility for support, advice, and training of the paramilitary auxiliary forces directly supported the security environment in Vietnam and thus enlarged President Thieu's support for the program.[149]

The program's first director, the ambassador, the in-theater military commander, and the host-nation national level all contributed to the success the program enabled in subsequent years. If S/CRS is to adopt this organizational approach and partner the ACT headquarters in combat situations with the military headquarters, further research is required to determine the contributions enabled by specific leaders. This further research will assist in the selection of key leaders and in leader development in general.

CONCLUSION

The Department of State recently established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."[150] The Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations will collocate with the in-theater, operational-level military headquarters in an attempt to address the requirement for interagency integration of military and civilian entities. The fundamental problem addressed by this research effort is that the collocated ACT headquarters in combat will not achieve stabilization and reconstruction when it achieves full operational capability in 2009 without a model that addresses the two principal impediments to interagency integration, lack of unity of effort and resource asymmetry.

To address this problem, this research effort concludes that the Advanced Civilian Team headquarters in combat situations should partner with the in-theater military headquarters using a

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[148] Ibid.
[149] Blaufarb, 244.

CORDS-like approach to help societies achieve stabilization and reconstruction. This historically transferable approach is consistent with S/CRS concepts and is advantageous to other organizational models. In so doing, the ACT headquarters and the military can address the lack of unity of effort and asymmetry in resources and enable societies to reach the sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy. This approach – and this research effort – is offered for consideration to stabilize and reconstruct societies and enhance the Nation's security.

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[150] U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization* [documents on-line].

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